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ABSTRACT
This iiork is an examination of the changing nature of state intervention in
the area of industrial training between 1964 and the present. It seeks to
identify those factors that have been significant in influencing the form that
industrial training policy took and the reasons for subsequent changes that
have occurred. It further identifies those factors that have remained constant,
A central proposition of the work is that changes to policy cannot be fully
understood simply by reference to an examination of the interests and
processess involved at the formal <re)formulation stage of the policy process.
Rather, that an analysis of the process of change needs to incorporate past
experience of implementing policy programmes as well as an examination of the
relationship of the role of values and ideas in informing policy choices. This
is accomplished by charting the progress of the intervention at various levels
throughout the period, employing a conceptual framework developed for the
purpose. Included in the analysis is a detailed case study of the impact of
industrial training policy in two industries: chemicals and pottery. The study
concludes with an examination of the prospects for the current New Training
Initiative
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PART Q1 E:
INTRDDUCT IQN
CHAPER ONE
IN T.RQD UC T ION: AN 0 VER VIEW QJF POL ICY
CHANGE AND IND UISTR IAI., TRA IN ING
One of the last pieces of legislation that the 1959-64 Conservative
Administration placed on the statute book was the 1964 Industrial Training
Act. This marked the beginning of a series of major interventions by the state
in the area of industrial training. The Act allowed for the establishment of
Training Boards for different sectors of industry which were charged with the
task of increasing the quantity and quality of training and spreading the
costs more equitably between individual firms. Since that time the significance
of industrial training policy, both in terms of the resources devoted to it and
its political salience, has considerably increased and a number- of important
changes have been made in the form of intervention. The principal r-aison d'être
of state intervention was to increase the supply of skills necessary to
achieve a higher level of economic growth. Yet some 22 years on it is still
maintained that despite successive governments' search for a solution Britain's
industrial training system has 'failed' to produce the mix of skills required
to ensure the kind of economic prosperity and growth shared by Britain's major
competitors.1) Questions arise therefore as to the reasons why this might be
so. It might, for instance, be maintained that industrial training policy has
fallen victim to the same difficulties that have been claimed to have beset
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governments generally in their attempts to intervene in a variety of spheres
and which have resulted in governments' failure to attain their policy
objectives. Such an explanation of the apparently limited, capacity of
governments or state authorities to effectively pursue solutions to problems,
was advanced and gained considerable currency during the 1970s and centred
around the notion of 'overload' and related issues of 'governability'.Q)
State intervention, in particular in the economic sphere and in production, is
essentially concerned with influencing the behaviour of private actors such
that behaviour proceeds along the lines deemed desirable by the state. In other
words the achievement of governments' aims is to a large extent contingent
upon the decisions and actions of relatively autonomous actors. The more that
governments sought to intervene in production, it was argued, the greater their
dependency upon such actors whose interests may not be congruent with those
of the state, which in turn increased the likelihood of non-compliance. Should
a government be foolish enough to proceed with its policy proposals in the
face of opposition from producers, however, then the power of such groups
would in all probability render the policy ineffective when it came to be
implemented.{3) Increased dependency meant, therefore, that in seeking to
formulate policies governments were unable to prescribe solutions to problems
as they perceived them. Policies did not thus represent coherent strategies
formulated through a 'rational approach' to problem solving but were instead
the product of a process whereby government was forced to seek accommodations
with producer groups about the form that policy should take.
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Thus governments, and the impact of public policies thereby, 	 have been
characterised as increasingly less effective as a result of their increased
dependence upon outside interests, The process involved is similar to
Lindblom's notion of partisan mutual adjustnient{4) where it is argued that the
dominant mode of policy making in liberal democracies is one in which
agreeinent is sought through bargaining and negotiation between competing
interests (partisans). Such a process typically produces policies that differ
only marginally or incrementally from existing policies or the status quo.
However, many suggest that in the British context, having to accommodate and
bargain with interests whose power is enhanced as a result, means that
government is effectively "at the mercy of powerful groups". The product in
terms of policy making is as often as not viewed as inducing a state of
inertia or paralysis{5) so that changes to policies are often held to be
difficult, if not impossible to secure.{6) Any change that might be secured
being based on agreement through compromise will tend to be the 'lowest
common denominator'. The process may additionally produce symbolic or pseudo
policy responses (those which are not intended to be fully implemented and
those which are not based on knowledge which is available regarding the
necessary preconditions for successful implementation), {7) or placebo policy
responses (which have the apper-ance but not the intention of solving a
problem).<B) The overall thrust of of these views is that the process -
bargaining between groups - produces policies that are not capable of tackling
a particular problem, therefore the problem is likely to remain, unless it
disappears for other reasons.
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Although a number of writers have provided a range of perspectives on this
notion of 'inertia', a common strand is the link that they make between one
aspect of the policy making process - group bargaining - and the
ineffectiveness of policies in relation to a given problem. It is, however,
questionable as to whether this hypothesised relationship can be said to exist
on a one to one basis, or indeed whether it exists at all. Other factors during
the formulation process or outside formulation itself may be at least as, or
even more, important in inducing policy 'failure'. The assumption seems to be
that such a process is only capable of leading to small changes in policy
which are in effect the 'lowest common denominator', unsuited therefore to
responding to the scale of the problem. But there would seem to be no a priori
reason to assume that a process which involves consultation and group
bargaining should produce such an outcome. It may be noted that a similar
criticism has been made of those writers who have adopted an incrementalist
mode of analysis, particularly in the area of budgeting.{9} Further, such a view
tends to present a rather static picture of policy making in that there is a
propensity to focus upon one particular episode in the policy making process
which thereby largely ignores developments over time. It is perfectly feasible,
for instance, that even where changes may be small in scale, that over a
number of years collectively they might add up to a significant change in
policy and its impact. That this might indeed be regarded by some or all
participants in policy formulation as strategically the best means of
proceeding(lO) seems to be rather lost sight of. This does of course raise the
problematic issue of how one measures and categorises change in any case,{1l)
Apart perhaps from budgeting, there are likely to be a range of variables such
that measurement is a much less straightforward matter. Furthermore, the
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assumption that policies based on the lowest common denominator will be the
outcome of this process may be questioned on other grounds. It does, for
example, imply that the power of participants is roughly equal with little
tendency towards domination, with all the actors being inclined to cancel each
other out, There would seem to be no necessary basis for such a position, for
it appears to ignore differences in the strategic position of participants,
their capacity to mobilise power resources, as well as the dynamics of
coalition buiding and logrolling for instance. Linked to this is the point that
policy making is seen to be about 'winning', or at least not losing. Whilst the
play of power is obviously an important element, attention is diverted away
from the possibility that bargaining may take place within the context of
participants actually being desirous of finding some solution to a particular
problem:{12) if this were the case then there seems to be no reason why the
lowest common denominator should lead to such ineffective policies. Even so,
there is the additional suggestion that the lowest common denominator is
somehow equivalent to the least satisfactory response. But at what point and
upon what scale is the lowest common denominator to be found? It may well be
that in one case it represents 99 per cent agreement and a 99 per cent
response to a problem, whereas in another it may be only 2 per cent. In other
words we are not dealing with absolute but relative categories that can only
be assessed by empirical Investigation and analysis.
The area of industrial training is certainly one where there has been a high
degree of involvement by producer groups - and to a lesser extent other
outside interests - in the decision making process. Yet It is an area where
changes to policy have occurred at a number of periods that prima fade at
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least, cannot simply be regarded as representing the 'lowest common
denominator'. In adthtion it would appear that the extent and nature of
producer group involvement has not been altogether consistent during the
period studied. There are periods (for example around 1964 and post-1979) when
it seems possible that the processes of consultation and participation were
not the major determining factors in shaping the general direction or thrust
of policy. Not only does this suggest changes in the balance of power over
time, but the possibility that government is not necessarily - or not
consistently - as much 'at the mercy' of powerful groups as the above
perspectives imply. What would seem to be the case is that at different points
governments have been content to leave decision making largely to producer
group and other interests, but at others have been concerned to play a more
leading role in the formulation of policy. Whilst this may still have involved
governments in having to compromise to some degree, reflecting the different
interests and dispersion of power, it may be an indication that in particular
circumstances government's authority counts for rather more than the above
perspectives would suggest. And finally, even a cursory glance at developments
in the area of industrial training indicates that at the level of policy
formulation there has, in general, been a lack of overt conflict and a fair
measure of agreement between participants about the overall direction and
objectives of policy.
What the discussion thus far reveals is that both theoretically and perhaps
empirically, the relationship between the policy formulation process and the
outcome in terms of what we might call 'problem persistence' is not a
straightforward one: it would certainly appear to be more complex than some of
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the above representations indicate, The possibility exists for instance that in
some cases the policy may be a quite adequate response in relation to the
scale of the problem to be tackled. The fact that the problem (s) persists may
be due to other factors. One possibility therefore is that we need to examine
not just how the policy is formulated but also how it is being implemented.
The role of the implementation process in influencing policy success or failure
has been studied by various writers in recent years (see chapter 2). Early
attention in the literature centred upon identifying the factors responsible
for 'unsuccessful' implementation leading to a failure to realise policy
objectives. Therefore it may not be that responsibility for failing to resolve
problems lies with the formulation process, it may instead reside with the
implementation process, This does not, of course, mean that group power does
not count, merely that it may be located elsewhere. Some later studies,
however, regard approaches that seek to identify conditions necessary for
'successful' implementation as presenting an oversimplified view of what
actually happens. They argue instead that policies may in fact undergo change
during their implementation. If such is the case - and we shall be considering
these issues in some detail in chapter 2 - then it is maintained that policy
formulation is not something that solely takes place at discrete periods in
time, but may also extend into the formal process of implementation. Thus it
is important if we are to more fully understand the form of intervention and
any subsequent changes, to examine not simply the formulation of policy, but
how policy is being Interpreted as it Is put into practice.
This would seem especially pertinent in the area of industrial training as,
ostensibly at least, there is a considerable degree of what we might call
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page	 8
Chapter- One	 Intrc,duction: Folicy Change and Industrial Training
'forward loading'.What this means is that some crucial decisions are left in
terms of problem solving to various organisations involved in the
implementation of policy. That is, policy making may have been more concerned
with enabling certain things to happen during implementation than with the
provision of detailed prescriptions. Therefore policy might be regarded as
setting the framework within which a range of other organisations with a
significant degree of discretion in terms of choices, attempt to resolve the
problems as well as the outstanding conflicts. An important reason why this
might be so is that industrial training depends upon influencing the decisions
of producers whose circumstances are, however, subject to wide diversity. Such
complexity means that policy has therefore, as occurs in many other areas of
economic and industrial policy,{13} to be sufficiently flexible in the forms of
its response to discrete incidences of the problem. In consequence,
implementation involves important choices about effective means to tackle the
problem in its own right, and the scope of implementation in terms of the area
of choice it affords can have a major bearing upon the impact of intervention.
Therefore any assessment of industrial training policy in relation to Its
impact needs to recognise this point and afford the implementation of policy
detailed attention. Furthermore a considerable delegation of responsibility of
itself opens up the possibility of changes to policy during implementation. In
other words where discretionary powers are afforded to a range of
Implementing agencies there is a possibility that decisions may move beyond
the bounds of such powers, particularly where there is lack of clarity about
where these boundaries lie. It is not suggested that such stepping outside the
bounds of discretionary powers should necessarily be regarded as a simple act
of non-compliance, it may be the case that these actions may be, or come to
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be, sanctioned or approved by poiicy makers as they are viewed as constituting
improvements to their original proposals, Thus implementation can in this
respect be seen as a process that 're-shapes' policy. This again emphasises the
importance of the implementation process as a determining influence over the
final form of intervention.
While recognising that implementation is a significant part of the process of
forging intervention, policy does of course set an overall framework for this,
The kind of representations of the policy making process that we discussed
earlier would, however, it appears ignore or leave implicit an important
element of the framework within which policy itself is formulated. While they
refer to the context of group power resources, they do not encompass the
context of predominant ideas which guide the thinking of the pafticipants.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this with which we shall be concerned
presently, being the decision to intervene in industrial training, on a
comprehensive basis, marked by the 1964 Industrial Training Act which quite
clearly cannot be attributed simply to a shift in the balance of power between
groups. The power of groups over industrial training is significantly
determined by the existence and thereafter the form of interverition.{14)
Industrial training, like other areas of economic intervention, quite obviously
raises issues about the role of the state in the economy. Over the post-war
period there have been movements in the widely accepted ideas concerning this
role. It is hard to discount the possibility that such shifts in ideas have not
influenced those making choices about economic intervention. These shifts seek
to remind us moreover of the basic point that policy making takes place within
a frame of reference set by fundamental ideas and beliefs that have widespread
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currency within society. In this connection any decision to intervene in the
area of industrial training raises issues concerning the relationship between
the state and private capital where ideas concerning the need to maintain the
autonomy of capital are widely held. Such ideas may thereby place serious
constraints on the policy options up f or consideration, This has indeed been
noted in the closely related area of industrial policy where private autonomy
is in general highly valued and policies may be seen to conform to this,C15)
As well as ideas that stem from wider ideological and value positions, there
are what might be regarded as lower level ideas concerning how to tackle
particular problems. For example, there has been a great deal of discussion in
recent years of the efficacy of the German training system and the advantages
that would accrue if such a system were emulated in Britain.{16) In view of the
the changes that have occurred in Britain's training system that we are going
on to study it is difficult to maintain that such ideas are uninfluential.
Further, and linking back to our previous point, the implementation process
itself may be an important source of information about the feasibility,
practicality and efficacy of policy options which may In turn therefore
influence the process of future policy change. Thus policy formulation is not
simply the resultant of the interaction of competing groups - although It may
well have to take account of such interests - but is also the result of
assessments of what is desirable and possible derived from current ideas.
Finally, there is the point that a great deal of eniphasis has been placed upon
the notion of policy failure and its reiationship to the policy making process.
Given that even governments have acknowledged the relative lack of success in
tackling the training 'problem' in Britain{i7) we cannot simply dismiss such a
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possibility. But behind this relatively straightforward sounding notion of
policy failure lie a number of complex issues which are by no means
unambiguously linked to the formulation process either theoretically or
empirically as we shall see in our study of training policy. Clearly, to talk
of success or failure is to imply that the impact of any given policy can be
measured. But even this is by no means a straightforward matter for not all
'evidence' is objective and quantifiable but is also subjective and as such
disputable. It is therefore crucial that the criteria by which success or
failure is being measured are clearly stated. There are, however, difficulties
with this which centre on . the question of what is being measured, At the
most basic level this may be seen to be simply assessing the impact of policy
against the objectives that it was designed to secure, But, on the one hand
objectives may, for a variety of reasons, not be clearly specified,{18) or on
the other, the impact may not be capable of quantification. In any case,
policies often contain a number of, sometimes conflicting, objectives, the
weighting given to each of which may not be equal and may vary over time.
Policies, perhaps to state the obvious, are formulated in response to a
perceived problem. Apart from any issue of the relativity of commitrn ent to
resolving that problem, there is the question as to how far the problem itself
remains the same or even continues to be regarded as a problem. A policy may
originafl3/ have been an edequate response to a perceived problem, but should
the nature of that problem change in an adverse direction, then the response
may no longer be adequate and the likelihood of 'failure' is enhanced. In other
words, the policy process itself may nut be at fault, policy failure may have
more to do with the speed and way in which societal problems develop that
were not or could not have been anticipated. Similarly, the original policy
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response may have been adequate in terms of the definition of the problem, but
if the definition of that problem was for some .reason 'misconceived' then
subsequent performance is less likely to provide appropriate remedial action.
This may not, of course, apply if, as has been suggested, action at the
implementation level takes account of this. If, however, such action is in
actuality changing the policy, this raises the question of the criteria by
which the impact of policy is to be assessed: is the extent of its 'success' to
be measured against the original policy, or against the policy as 'evolved'
during implementation? Finafly, we need to consider the possibility that
policies may not in fact be formulated with the intention of providing a
resolution to a given problem within a specified period of time. Rather, the
approach may be ameliorative{19) in that, for example, it prevents the problem
from getting worse or creates the conditions that are regarded as necessary to
more effectively tackling the problem, the responsibility for which lies
elsewhere than with government or the state apparatus. In other words the
purpose of policy may be to enable others to perform certain functions and in
this sense the policy
	 may be successful. That other actors may not
behave as desired, and the problem therefore remains, does not Ipso facto
imply policy failure. Thus we can see that even where we may speak of failure
in the sense of problems continuing to persist, the link between such 'failure'
and the policy formulation process is by no means clear.
The foregoing discussion has also, however, raised the possibility - both in
general terms but more specifically when applied to a particular policy area
such as industrial training - that such representations may offer an
inadequate explanation of policy change by too narrowly focussing upon the
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bargaining/formulation process, and thereby fail to take sufficient account of
other key factors, This is particularly true in that the group bargaining
approach is primarily a general representation and may not therefore reflect
the variations across, and indeed within, policy areas over time. In other
words, the issues surrounding the formulation of a particular policy and its
relationship to the outcome - in the sense of being linked to some view of
success or failure - may be considerably more complex than is captured by
such generalisations. Whether such generalisatian are valid as an overall
representation of the policy process cannot be determined from a single case
study, but has to draw support from a variety of policy areas including an
appropriate selection of different types of policy.{20) Nonetheless a case
study, especially in a policy area as important as industrial training can at
least act to validate or otherwise such a general representation and may also
raise further issues for consideration.
ST1UCT1JTRE AND 1(ETHOD OF THE STUDY
The present study attempts to analyse the process of policy change in the area
of industrial training from 1964 to the present. In doing so, as our earlier
discussion has revealed, the process is a potentially complex one. Such
complexity arises from the range of other factors that we have identified as
possibly being relevant to policy change and which therefore any analysis
needs to address. The actual degree of complexity can only be determined in
the area of industrial training policy when we have examined whether, to what
extent and in what way these factors can be regarded as important. This means
that in addition to examining the formulation of policy in relation to the
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interplay of different interests, it is necessary to take account of two other
factors, Firstly, we need to move beyond the point of formulation to an
examination of the implementation process. If, as we have argued, there may be
no direct link between the formulation process and policy failure - or success
- then what happens during the implementation process is likely to assume
considerable significance. Furthermore, as we have already noted, there is the
possibility as suggested in certain of the policy analysis literature, that
policies may actually undergo change during their implementation. Both of these
factors may have important consequences for the impact of policy which will
have to be taken into account in any explanation of success or failure and its
relationship to policy change. Secondly, as far as the formulation process
itself is concerned, we need to set this within a wider context which examines
the role of ideas as establishing some kind of framework which may serve to
guide, shape, or constrain policy making. Such ideas derive from the normative
positions of participants on the one hand, and also on the other from views
about what might be termed the technical feasibility of different courses of
action. In this respect the implementation process may again be significant in
that it can be an important source of information not only about what is
desirable but what is possible in relation to policy change.
Therefore, we are looking at policy change not just as some formal point of
policy making but as something that needs to be examined over the longer run,
We are not of course arguing that we. need to examine in detail the whole range
of decisions and actions in the process taken in industrial training since
1964. Rather that we concentrate upon those periods when significant events
and changes occurred, and that we place them in a wider context that
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incorporates other aspects of the policy process in order to build up a
picture over tine that captures the dynamic nature of the process of change.
Consequently this involves analysing the relationship between what can be
identified as the different levels of the policy process, that is the levels of
ideas, of formal policy formulation and implementation. Thus, having outlined
the central concerns of the study, we move on to set out the structure and the
method adopted.
Having stated the case for incorporating different periods and levels of
analysis into our study of the process of policy change, Part Two is concerned
with developing an appropriate analytical framework. In seeking to analyse
the interaction between policy formulation and implementation we confront the
problem that the conventional approach to the policy process, the sequential
model which was first offered by Harold Lasswell{21} and adopted and develped
by others since, may not be particularly appropriate to our concerns. Indeed
there is currently in policy analysis a very important debate regarding the
matter of how to represent the formulation and implementation processes and
therefore their interactions, which raises serious analytical and normative
issues. Given the significance of these issues in directing analysis and
understanding of the policy process we need to be aware of the basis of this
debate and seek to assess the relative benefits of adopting either of the
alternative approaches put forward. Thus we begin chapter two by elaborating
upon this debate on the 'top-down' versus the 'bottom-up' approaches. While
recognising many of the benefits of the 'bottom-up' approach, it will be argued
that its failure to treat policy as a distinctive and coherent concept places a
serious limitation upon its utility as a means of analysing policy change. As a
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result it is necessary to develop an alternative framework that incorporates a
conceptualisation of policy while recognising the strength of some of the
arguments put forward in the 'bottom-up' approach. Furthermore, given our
concern with the role of ideas and ultimate values and norms from which they
are derived, it is necessary to incorporate this level of analysis into the
framework. In particular this involves finding a means of translating abstract
values into a more concrete form that can be directly related to policy
decisions. Thus we set out a framework through which it is possible to analyse
-the policy process at three different levels in a chronological manner which
can be used to chart and categorise changes in the policy process even when
they do not happen in a particular sequence. Within the confines of the
framework there is a discussion of how to address, if not actually to resolve,
the crucial issue of whether to view certain forms of 'non-conformance' to
original policy proposals as implementation failure or policy change. The rest
of the thesis, with the exception of the conclusion, involves applying this
framework to a chronological study of the key factors within industrial
training.
Part Three analyses the 1964 Industrial Training Act which marked the first
comprehensive form of state intervention in the area of industrial training.
This, by any standards, was a watershed in the policy area which led to the
establishment of a series of industrial training boards with responsibility for
overseeing training arrangements in specific sectors. Given the Act's
significance the first chapter in part three will provide a historical
background up to the early 1960s when serious proposals for legislation began
to emerge. In particular, this chapter details the role of the state in the
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economy generally and the prevailing ideas behind this, and the limited role
that the state performed in the area of industrial training. One key feature
that emerges is that the state's role in training provision was seen primarily
in terms of social, not economic, objectives though this began to shift towards
the end of the 1950s. This shift in itself can be placed in the context of
changing views concerning the state's remit in managing the economy. Following
on from this examination of changing ideas and attitudes about state and
economy, in chapter four we are concerned with providing an explanation of the
nature and form of the intervention adopted. Here we study the process of
policy formulation and the resulting legislative provisions to identify what
central ideas and interests were embodied in the policy and who exerted
influence over it, From there the final chapter in this part provides a study
of the implementation of the policy contained in the Act. This starts with an
examination of the establishment of industrial training boards in the mid-
l960s, which were afforded considerable freedom to make decisions concerning
their industries, and follows up with an examination of their work up until
1970 when there was a change of government.
In Fart Four the central issue of concern will be the Conservative's 1973
Employment and Training Act. Chapter six picks up on the views that had
developed about the operation of the 1964 Act, and in particular the role of
industrial training boards in meeting policy objectives, as an important source
of thinking that influenced the formal change to policy that occurred in 1973.
Thereafter the chapter considers other influences in the process of change,
notably the views of the Government and the Department of Employment, and
interests of producer groups, detailing the extensive consultation involved.
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The chapter concludes by outlining the contents of the 1973 Act that emerged
from this process. The Act marked a significant formal change in industrial
training policy including a curtailment of the autonomous powers of the
training boards. However, it is most noted for its establishment of a new
'hived-off' executive agency with responsibility for coordinating the work of
the industrial training boards and non-board sectors of industry, plus the
exercise of certain labour market functions previously carried out by the
Department of Employment. Given the subsequent importance of the role
performed by this body - the llanpower Services Commission (XSC) - in
industrial training, chapter seven discusses in depth the structure of the 14SC,
its relationship to the Department of Employment and ITBs, the position of the
Commission which was constituted of representatives from the CM, the TUC,
education and local government, and the evolving role of the MSC in industrial
training. The last chapter of part four then moves on to consider the impact
of the 1973 Act at the level of the firm. It provides a detailed case study of
the relationships between ITEs and individual firms in two industrial sectors
- chemical and ceramics - in order to assess the appropriateness of the
policy, and ITEs as policy instruments, in changing the attitudes and behaviour
of firms about the form and incidence of training.
Part Five considers the major changes in industrial training since 1979 when
there was again a change of government. Unlike the two other periods that we
have studied, however, that from 1979 is less clearly marked by a single point
of formal policy formulation encompassed in a single piece of major
legislation. Rather, there has been a series of initiatives, most of which
derive from the )lew Training Initiative of 1981, which collectively have
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wrought considerable changes in the training system. Chapter nine, therefore,
is a case study of the decision making processes that preceded these changes.
It concentrates upon a major review of the operation of the 1973 Act,
conducted by the MSC between 1979 and 1981, and the subsequent debate to
which this gave rise and which involved what must be one of the largest
consultation exercises ever mounted, Vhat is especially addressed here is the
strategic position of the outside interests and the capacity of government to
secure the kind of changes it wished to see introduced. Chapter 10 goes on to
examine these changes in more detail and the extent to which they reflected
the Government's attitudes towards training. From there we move on in chapter
11 to look at the the implementation of industrial training policy since 1981,
most notably following the establishment of the Youth Training Scheme. Apart
from a consideration of some other facets of the wider initiative we also
examine the way in which the replacement of a large segment of the industrial
training board system with voluntary arangements has been introduced and
operated. Obviously, given the recent setting up of these arrangements some of
the conclusions reached can only be regarded as interim in nature.
Part six presents the conclusions derived from our study of industrial
training. It seeks to identify overall patterns that give us a clearer
understanding of the process of policy change in this particular area. In short
what it attempts to clarify are those factors that influence change set within
specific contexts including that of the efficacy of the policy.
*	 *	 *
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The method of investigation employed for gaining empirical information upon
which the analysis was conducted has been to draw upon a wide range of
literature concerned with industrial training and training policy covering the
period under consideration. Included in this literature, apart from the usual
range of books and articles has been official documents, including government,
Parliament, MSC, ITB, and the National Economic Development Office (NEDO)
publications; internal XSC and ITB documents and reports; documents from
private bodies involved with training, such as the Confederation of British
Industry (CEI), other employer organisations, the Trade Union Congress, Non-
Statutory Training Organisations, the British Association for Industrial and
Commercial Education; training packs and manuals from training organisations;
internal documents from firms in the two industries studied; private
correspondence between key participants; and attendance at a number of
national and regional conferences attended by training personnel and 1(inisters
and public officials, Such material has not simply been used to detail the
course of particular events, but has also been drawn upon to help in
identifying the views, perceptions and ideas of those involved in influencing
decisions.
In addition the case studies of the two industrial sectors and the role of
ITBs and the review of the 1973 Employment and Training Act conducted by the
NSC are largely based upon information gathered from a series of extensive
interviews with many of the key participants. These interviews were mainly
conducted between 1979-1982, although there were a number of follow-up ones
carried out subsequently. The interviews conducted in the firms within the two
industries studied took place with senior management, line management, training
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personnel, trade union representatives and trainees, who collectively were able
to supply a reasonably comprehensive picture of the training system and the
impact of public policy in these two sectors. This was complemented and
extended by interviews with senior officials and field staff of the two ITBs
concerned. The interviews in respect of the review process were conducted with
personnel from a number of organisations involved, most notably the XSC, the
CBI and other employer organisations, private firms, Department of Employment,
the TUC, ITEs and private consultants used by some of these organisations.
Furthermore some of the information concerning the formulation of the 1973 Act
itself and the resultant establishment of the MSC was obtained from these
interviews, 1tore recently interviews have been conducted to provide material on
the Youth Training Scheme as well as the operation of ISTOs in the chemical
and ceramic sectors. During many of these interviews the author was afforded
access to, and often given copies of, a considerable amount of internal
documents and papers.
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In the previous chapter we outlined the central concerns in seeking to
understand the process of policy change in the area of industrial training, We
argued for the importance of examining factors other than those relating to
the formal policy formulation process. Also included should be the
implementation process and the wider context of ideas within which formulation
and implementation take place and that such analysis should take place over a
fairly lengthy period of time. Before we can proceed with the analysis of
training policy, however, there are a number of issues that need to be
addressed, Unless we are to provide a highly detailed description of events
and hope that we can disentangle it sufficiently to see some pattern emerging
at the end of the account, we have to be able to incorporate our information
into some representational model of the policy process. That is, we need to be
able to distinguish those decisions and actions involved in the formulation of
policy, which will also allow f or some clear conception of policy, from those
involved in its implementation. Similarly, we have to be able to demonstrate
the links between the level of ideas and policy formulation and implementation
whilst simultaneously demonstrating their interconnectedness,
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Such issues are not, however, clear cut for there is considerable disagreement
in the world of policy analysis as to how far it is possible - or indeed
desirable - to make such distinctions. The essence of such disagreement lies
in two differing perspectives of the policy formulation and implementation
processes. One such - usually referred to as the 'top-down approach' - tends to
represent the policy process as a series of steps or stages where
implementation follows formulation, whereas the other - the 'bottom-up
approach - stresses the complexity of the policy process and maintains that
policies may actually be changed during their implementation. We therefore need
to examine these two approaches in order to assess the extent to which they
can offer an adequate framework for representing policy change. In so doing,
however, we also have to discuss the nature of the disagreement between the
proponents of the two approaches, The reason for this is not to engage in some
purely abstract debate, but to weigh up the relative costs and benefits of
adopting either approach - or indeed some other approach. A discussion of both
approaches will bring to the fore important implications of representing the
policy process in one form or another. At the heart of this debate is the
crucial issue that whilst the bottom-up approach allows us to make the link
between implementation and policy change, it leaves us conceptually somewhat
short in that we have no clear concept of policy and, therefore, of policy
change. Thus they raise some fundamental issues of concern to our analysis
which have to do with how we can categorise and chart the progress of change.
What, therefore, we are concerned to do in this chapter is to construct a
framework for analysing policy change. In this we have firstly to examine what
current approaches have to offer and from there, as necessary, develop a
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framework appropriate to our needs that incorporates the three levels that we
have identified as being important in our analysis.
THE TOP-DOWN, BOTTOX-UP DEBATE
The publication of Pressman and \ildavsky's study Implementation,{i) which
examined the failure of one of President Johnson's Great Society initiatives to
realise its objective of creating jobs for ethnic minorities, gave great
impetus in political science and policy studies to the notion that to properly
understand the outcome, and consequently improve the results of, state action
it was essential to pay attention to the implementation as well as formulation
of public policies. The Oakland study of Pressman and Vildavsky and many of
those which followed its lead did not just point to the centrality of
'implementation' for academic and practical concerns. They additionally
extended the remit of implementation analysis beyond the traditional
organisational focus of public administration to encompass issues of policy
performance, the theories of causation inherent in policies and the
complexities of interorganisational processes. As Dunsire points out, Pressman
and Vildavsky did not 'discover' the implementation process, {2) but few would
contest that they played a major role in redefining its substance. Those
studies which picked up on these new concerns in the 1970s devoted
considerable attention to providing representations or models of the
implementation process that identified the key categories or types of
impediments to effective implementation. From these it was hoped to establish
the causes and the possible remedies for the 'implementation problem'. Not
surprisingly, given the complexities and variability of the implementation
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process, there emerged a number of contending representations, each seeking to
distil the essence of implementation. No one model came to be held to provide
a comprehensive or universal representation of the process and its attendant
impediments, but all helped to enhance understanding of the general and
seemingly pervasive difficulties faced by policy makers wishing to see their
policies properly executed. Interestingly, as Elinore noted in 1978 whilst
examining the existing literature, there was only "modest empirical support" to
be found for the assumptions underlying the various approaches.{3) The
implication was that these models were drawn deductively from pre-existing
organisational and political models rather than inductively from the empirical
evidence of policy implementation. Indeed, there is no doubt that in this
explosion of implementation studies a few 'common sense' deductions went a
long way when set against the previous conventional wisdom.
any of the models developed employed idealised representations of
implenientation{4) as a basis for indicating where, and to some extent to what
degree, there was a shortfall in conditions for effective implementation. There
was never any suggestion that the ideal could ever be achieved, but it did
provide a target at which to aim to at least narrow the gap. Vhile various
models were put forward of implementation - the differences usually predicated
upon different views about the essentials of organisational behaviour - there
was one fundamental element common to the vast majority of models, Implicit in
them was the underlying assumption that the implementation process entailed
the translation into action of a policy plan that had been previously
formulated by those officially charged with policy making. Formulation and
implementation were, therefore, presented as separate entities both in terms of
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the personnel responsible and, more importantly, chronology. Thus the
'implementation problem' was couched in terms of the failure of the policy
intentions or plans of governments, or other 'top public officials', to be
realised in their execution. Defining the problem in such a form was itself
premissed upon the view that those at the top could (ie it was feasible) and,
in most cases, should Kie it was desirable) be able to at least put their
policy plans into practice. Given this perspective, attention naturally turned
towards why policy makers failed to achieve adequate control over and
coordination of the execution of their policies. Such an overview of
implementation has been characterised, inter alia, as the 'top-down approach'
(from now on simply TDA). By the end of the 1970s, however, there was
beginning to emerge an alternative literature that was critical of the
feasibility and desirability of the prognoses being put forward by those
adopting a TDA, The growth of this 'bottom-up approach' (BUA) has provided a
series of questions about the validity, both descriptively and prescriptively,
of the TDA and at points comes very close to challenging the very usefuliness
of having a concept of implementation at all.
It is the purpose here to examine what these two approaches indicate about the
nature of the implementation problem and how it ought to be addressed. We will
also seek to pinpoint certain important limitations contained in each.
Thereafter, we shall move on to consider if there can be constructed a third
approach that attempts to overcome some of the limitations identif led in
adopting one or the other approach and from that we will seek to consider the
notion of 'policy development'. In discussing the two approaches we are
principally concerned to extrapolate their essential characteristics, not
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engage in a thorough literature review of which there are already a number.{5)
It is recognised, therftre, that there is a tendency to represent both
approaches in a rather basic manner without a great deal of reference to their
attendant qualifications largeiy because such qualifications - which tend
invariably to be in the direction of the other approach - are in the main not
so great as to fundamentally remove their underlying logic and the central
implications of their adoption. In fact most 'top-down' writers, including to a
significant extent Pressman and Wildavsky themselves, do acknowledge
limitations imposed by adopting their schema, while several 'bottom-up'
proponents have never been able to consistently escape the notions and
language of the TDA. To treat the two approche.sas being mutually exclusive is
to enter the realms of a rather sterile debate, Nonetheless, even allowing for
a flexible employment of their models by proponents in both camps, the two
approaches remain significantly distinctive, in how they represent and
prescribe about implementation
The Top-Down Approach
The IDA identifies policy as the output of a particular stage in the policy
process, namely formulation, In overall terms the policy process is conceived
as comprising a "number of stages through which an issue may pass."{6) Such
sequential models clearly have advantages in allowing the complexities of the
policy process to be disaggregated into more manageable parts. There remains,
however, an ambiguity surrounding the conceptual logic of such representations
and that of the policy process in practice. For example, the policy formulation
process is principally distinguished from the implementation process, and
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hence 'policy decisions' from 'implementation decisions' by reference to their
ordering - usually in some formal sense - in the policy process. While it is
accepted in practice that the logic of the sequence does not always hold and
may be iterative,{7} the sequential approach tends, though by no means
inevitably so, to focus upon policy as fixed once a particular point is reached
in the process. This is a strong tendency because, although the logic is not
taken to universally hold, there are no clear alternative criteria by which to
determine what are formulation activies and implementation ativities. The
problem here is that those engaged in implementation are not involved in
different types of activities - deciding options, gaining agreement,
determining measures of success, planning ahead, accepting instructions,
gather ing advice and so on - from those engaged in formulation. {8) It is what
these activities are aimed at that is the basis of difference, but this
requires some formal definition of policy and implementation. Thus,
distinguishing the two is thrown back on to the sequential criterion.
The first tendency of the TDA, therefore is to see implementation as something
that happens after formulation is complete; implementation is about
operationalisng a pre-determined policy plan. Such a perspective is succinctly
set out by Pressman and Vildavsky:{9)
Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly or not,
policies point to a chain of causation between initial
conditions arid future consequences. If X, then Y, Policies
become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial
conditions are created. X now exists. Programs make theories
operational by forging the first link in a causal chain
connecting actions to objectives. Given X, we act to obtain Y.
Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links
in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.
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They are, however, astute enough to recognise that as time passes it "wreaks
havoc with efforts to maintain such tidy distinctions" and changes in
circumstances, goals and initial conditions begin to occur, For all that,
policies start off as something prior to implementation.
From that point of departure are spawned a number of other tendencies within
the approach. First, by holding to a position that regards formulation and
implementation as two essentially separate activities, implementation can
legitimately be assessed and judged on its own terms without recourse to
consideration of what actually is being implemented. Second, effective
implementation is judged by how successfully it conforms to the original
policy plan or prograxnme.{lO) Ensuring more effective implementation in
consequence becomes establishing the necessary conditions so that the policy
plan will be adhered to in practice. Third, such an approach tends to align
itself with the interests and objectives of policy makers and regards
iinplementers as their agents. Normatively they take a top-down view that
authority flows downwards. While few writers make such judgements overtly,
there is an implicit view that any act of non-conformance by iniplenienters is
undesirable. This position is strongly supported by appeal to the fact that
'top policy makers' are elected while officials are not,{11) This indeed can be
extended to top officials who are more closely accountable to elected
politicians than those lower down. Such a line of argument rests strongly on
the assumption that constitutional theory is a reasonably accurate account of
how policies are made.{12}
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The above tendencies constitute the linchpins of the TDA. The implementation
problem, to repeat the point, is defined as essentially one of failure to
achieve conformity to policy decisions by those engaged in implementation.
Such failure is not simply seen as the result of recalcitrance, the pursuit of
self-interest and a desire to escape the constraints of authority by
impleinenters, though these can play a part.{l3) More fundamentally failure can
arise because of barriers that make coformance difficult or uncertain, such as
the adequacy of resources available for the task, the clarity and compatiblity
of objectives, the technical abilities/skills of implementers and the adequacy
of communications.{14) Logically and validly, but also somewhat confusingly,
included in such factors is the efficacy of the policy itself. To put it simply,
implementation can only be as good as the product it is working with, and if
the policy's underlying theory is not sound relative to the problem, then
implementation will 'mirror' this,{15} This sort of failing, however, is
evidently the responsibility of policy makers rather than implementing
agencies,	 indicating	 the	 interdependency	 between	 formulation	 and
implementation. But the question arises as to whether the theoretical validity
of policy is directly an issue for implementation analysis, part of the
implementation problem. Indeed, Bardach acknowledges this matter by posing a
consequential puzzle: "[Lit is not exactly clear what "good" implementation of a
basically misconceived policy would mean." Yet this is a fundamental matter
because no policy will ever be free of some defects. Bardach concludes that
successful implementation will in the event probably "exaggerate rather than
ameloirate basic conceptual problems."{16) Following such a line of thinking,
we find that successful implementation - the very aim of the TDA - actually
makes things worse.{17}
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In effect, many top-down proponents assess or evaluate implementation by
reference to the attainment of the policy's goals or objectives.{18) Such
writers appear, however, overainbitious in terms of what legitimately can be
placed as the direct outcome of the implementation process. The situation is
something akin to criticising an orchestra's performance largely because of the
score it is playing. There is a danger that implementation can come to be seen
as the depository for previously accumulated mistakes. On this point it is
worth recalling that Pressman and Wildavsky's study, held as a classic study
of implementation failure, devoted considerable space to suggesting that the
policy itself left a lot to be desired in its ability to create jobs for ethnic
minorities because it subsidised capital, not labour, This in itself adversely
affected implementation: {19)
"Theoretical problems exaccerbated bureaucratic problems.
Numerous activities had to be carried on - assessing the
viability of marginal enterprises, negotiating loan agreements,
devising and monitoring employment plans - that would have
been unnecessary if a more direct approach had been taken,"
Pressman and Vildavsky therefore ended their study in 1973 {20) discussing the
efficacy of the policy, not its implementation.
The top-down approach, therefore, starts from a position of the separateness
of policy and implementation but finds it hard to sustain the distinction and
moves to recognise the interdependence between the two. This is not to imply
criticism: all models have to reduce and simplify, and analysis employing them
would be ill-advised to stick rigidly to the boundaries they delimit when the
complexities of the policy process indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, the TDA
does, drawing upon its identification of certain problems with the
implementation process as it affects the realisation of policy makers
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objectives, produce particular prognoses for making implementation more
effective. Pressman and Wildavsky themselves viewed the implementation process
as a chain consisting of a number of 'decision points' where agreement is
required to proceed with a number of participants having to give 'clearance' at
each point. By simple calculation they demonstrated that even where there was
a high likelihood that each participant would grant clearance at a particular
decision point, when all the probabilities were multiplied together the overall
chances of success for implementing a policy were extremely low.{21) The
conclusion they reached was that implementation was likely to be more
successful the fewer the number of clearances required. There were two
assumptions in their schema which did lead to a potenial exaggeration of the
chances of failure: that a clearance could only be attempted once and that
success was an 'all or nothing' matter.{22) They did, however, identify the
points at which. difficulties arise.
Other writers have turned to the causes of and remedies for these difficulties
(azmanian and Sabatier, for example, supply an extensive list of factors
relevant to the achievement of statutory objectives. The general tenor of their
discussion is how to identify the sources of, and then minimise the
opportunities for, non-compliance. The remedies put forward include
establishing a clear heirarchy of command among implementing agencies,
provision of sanctions/inducements to prevent 'veto', allocating responsibility
to agencies who are committed to achieving the objectives and stipulating the
formal decision rules of such agencies. <23) Similarly Hogwood and Gunn outline
a model of the conditions necessary for ideal implementation. They do not
argue that all attempts to move towards the ideal are necessarily desirable -
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even if they were practical - but, for all that, the clear implication behind
the exercise is that many of the obstacles can be reduced in extent.{24)
Somewhat differently Van Meter and Van Horn build up a model of six clusters
of variables. This can be employed to "alert policy makers to variables that
can be manipulated to improve the delivery of public services,"{25} With a more
overtly political perspective Bardach presents an analysis of implementation
that emphasises the strategic and tactical nature of the (self-interested)
participants. There are a series of implementation games that characterise the
control aspect of the process:{26)
"Every policy worth its salt is vulnerable to at least a few of
these games. Such risks cannot be avoided, The object of
describing these games - and, where possible, certain
mitigating strategies - is to help designers calculate the
risks more accurately and to design policies robust enough to
survive them."{27)
Bardach does not, therefore, emphasise, as Pressman and Wildavsky do, means to
conflict resolution but strategies for winning including recourse to "fixing
the game".{28)
Common to all these recommendations are means of enhancing the control and
influence - or at least create the conditions where this can occur - exercised
by policy makers over the implementation process. By taking the appropriate
actions - in the main precautionary ones - policy makers will be in a better
position to guide the implementation process along the intended path. While the
case for enhancing the control of top policy makers is often made by reference
to ideal models of 'perfect implementation', it is acknowledged that some
discretion has to be afforded to lower levels and that there are practical and
ethical limits to total control. For all that, the direction of such
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prescriptions is clear enough: increasing centralisation of the implementation
process; the reinforcing of original policy decisions; and a predominantly
managerial role for policy makers in the implementation process.
Such solutions to the problems of the implementation process have been
fundamentally criticised on descriptive and normative grounds by proponents of
the bottom-up approach. They question whether top policy makers could and
should seek to enhance control over implementation. Behind these criticisms
are different evaluations concerning the basis of the distinction between
policy and implementation and adherence to distinctive norms in respect of
authority in liberal democracies.
Criticisms of the Top-Down Approach
The most sustained critique of the TDA has come from those writers who adopt
a bottom-up perspective. Indeed the BUA presently is much more a critique of,
and case for, an alternative to the TDA rather than a fully elaborated
approach in its own right. As two proponents of this approach stated recently:
"we are not attempting to construct an 'implementation theory'; rather we are
setting out the ingredients of our approach which we hope will provide a
platform for further theoretical development."{29) The criticisms of the top-
down approach centres around three 'pressures' that impinge upon the
implementation process that are held to seriously question the validity of the
conclusions about the implementation problem and what remedial action to take.
We shall look at each of these in turn.
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First, there can be identified pressures emanating from a limited commitment
from policy makers towards their policies. The top-down approach essentially
works off the premise that policy makers are fully committed to seeing their
policies put into effect so that the problem will be effectively tackled, Yet
policies can be formulated not for the purpose of effectively dealing with the
problem, but to give the impression the problem is being dealt with, In other
words policies can have a symbolic rather than substantive content. Some
writers do indeed imply that policies can be formulated simply to manage the
political agenda and get the issue off governments' back.{30} One does not have
to be a fully paid up member of the cynics club, however, to recognise that in
formulating a policy there will be variations in the degree to which policy
makers are willing to endure the costs, both financial and political, that will
be generated as a policy is implemented to change the behaviour of target
groups. Policy makers may not wish to, or be able to, commit the resources
and/or endure the conflict generated out of implementation. Policies to
regulate pollution are a good example in Britain where even rather minimalist
statutory regulations are often delayed in being put into force and are then
rather ineffectively applied due to inadequate policing provisions.'C31) Likewise
l'hchael Hill's study of the implementation of Housing Benefits questions how
serious central government was about seeing the new scheme put into practice
given the financial constraints they placed upon the administrative agencies,
local authorities, Examples of policy makers not wishing to too vigorously
pursue their policies lest it generates unwelcome conflict or adverseiy affects
certain interests are also prevalent. The 1975 Industry Act, itself a watered
down version of previous proposals, provided a variety of measures for
pursuing industrial regeneration, but many of them were never effectively
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resorted to because greater weight was placed on respecting the autonomy of
private capital and of maintaining good relations with industry.(32) Such an
outlook was shared by ministers, officials and directors of interventionist
agencies. Gilliatt indicates that oil sanctions against Rhodesia is another
example of politicians not being committed enough to follow through on their
own formally adopted policies.
Thus to quote Stephen Gilliatt, there is not enough consideration "given to
investigating degrees of political commitment and the choice rather than the
fact of policy design."{33) The top-down proponents would no doubt argue that
they have such issues covered. First they do see adequate and coordinated
resources as a necessary element in successful implementation. But they cast it
as simply an implementation issue, not as a policy issue when, of course,
resource questions are fundamentally a question for policy decision. This may
appear a case of semantic hair-splitting, but it in fact reflects the issue of
variability in commitment by policy makers to policies in this instance
measured by the resources they are willing to sink into the exercise.
Prescriptively, the approach implicitly accepts the need for the necessary
commitment, but descriptively it has no conceptual means of handling the
ambiguity of what constitutes policy in practice. The emphasis in this case is
very much placed upon formal positions, but as we recognise what is actually
being implemented - and forms the subject of an implementation study - can be
something different. Even prescriptively some of the recommendations of the
approach look too out of place with divergence between formal and actual
policy positions, For example, if policy makers are not that strongly
committed to a policy they would not necessarily be advised to assign
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implementation to a strongly committed agency {34) for fear that the agency
becomes instrumental in exposing their less than enthusiastic position. A
recent case of this would be the Conservative Government's abolition of the
Supplementary Benefits Commission which was not only resonsible for
administering the benefits scheme but also acted as an advocate for an
improvement in it provisions.{35) Second there is the case of policy makers'
ambivalence about policy because it may ruffle the wrong feathers, Again in a
descriptive analysis there is the danger of focussing on the wrong - that is
the formal - definition of policy. Prescriptively, top-down writers would
emphasis the use of authority to ensure compliance, but its use may - even if
successful - entail adverse costs to policy makers and challenge their norms.
In other words, the top-down approach prescribes the use of authority to
reinforce implementation wherever and whenever necessary without fully
recognising the normative and political implications that this may have for
policy makers. We will consider the matter of gaining agreement to and
generating consensus about policies to actually avoid such conflicts emerging
during implementation presently.
The second pressure to which policy implementation is prone that questions the
top-down approach can be termed intellectual. Top-down writers assume that
what emerges out of the formulation stage is an entity that is based on an
adequate and coherent intellectual understanding of the nature of the problem
and effective solutions to it. But as Najone and Wildavsky point out, such a
planning and control model fails:
"to recognise the important point that many - perhaps most -
constraints remain hidden in the (policy) planning stage, and
are only discovered in the implementation process, l'loreover,
feasibility conditions keep changing over time: old constraints
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disappear or are overcome (eg through learning), while new
ones emerge."
The result is an ad hoc, tr jal and error searching for a feasible solution,
"a far cry from the deliberate procedures suggested by the
planning model,"C36)
Similarly Ham and Hill suggest that fundamental decisions "determining the
major issues" may be deliberately left to the implementation process "because
it is regarded as necessary to let key decisions be made when all the facts
are available to iinplementers,"{37) There is in effect an inability to formulate
adequate policies until, so to speak, certain ideas have been put to the test.
Martin Rein has pointed to two clear examples from the United States - Health
1(aintenance Organisations legislation and the Primary and Secondary Education
Act - where implementing agencies changed the policy's operating procedures to
make the policies 'workable', essentially to placate outside interests whose
support was required.{38) Likewise, in the face of a changing and complex
environment, getting the necessary coherence of response may require
rethinking and revision. Coherence may, of course, also be absent because the
original policy embodies a political compromise. Pressman and Wildavsky's
study notes that the statutory guidelines of the Economic Development Act were
internally contradictory because of acceptance in Congress of pressures not to
create jobs which threatened to displace existing Jobs in the locality. The
Business Loan Division had little recourse but to ignore the legislation and
devise their own guidelines.{39)
The picture emerging from the above cases is somewhat at odds with the top-
down position. Implementers are seen not to be subverters of the policy, but
Ana.lysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 42
Chapter Two
	 A Framework for Policy Change
enhancers of it - improving it, making it work. Richard Elmore raises the
argument that those closest to a problem - those at the point of delivery -
are in fact in the best position to find solutions to problems.{40) This may
not be just a matter of proximity to the problem, but experience and expertise
in dealing with it. Levitt points out in her study of the implementation of
pollution control policies that "local agencies may feel their longer experience
of policy problems puts them in a better position to determine the best way
forward than the central agencies - which may be far more influenced by
questions of short-term political expediency".{41) Thus prescriptively the top-
down approach may not be such a panacea. By emphasising central control, tight
regulations and building support for and agreement about the policy such a
mode of operation can end up reinforcing an inadequate policy, To use Berman's
phrase 'pre-programmed implementation procedures' can prove too rigid for
effective problem solving, while an 'adaptive' approach may allow for changing
and uncertain contingencies to be catered for.{42) The top-down response -
implicit in the conditions for effective implementation and reflecting their
managerialist perspective {43) - would be to argue that policy makers should
ensure that adequate and coherent policies are formulated in the first place.
Here the debate becomes centred upon how far this can be achieved given the
inherently political nature of policy making and the complexity surrounding
policy problems. From the bottom-up perspective the TDA predicates
prescriptions concerning implementation upon an idealised view of policy
formulation, For them policies are frequently vague, formulated rapidly and
without a full understanding of the means to a particular end,{44) and reflect
compromise and dissensus.{45) Even if such factors could be reduced or
eliminated, to Majone and Wildavsky it does not seem feasible to argue that the
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well-defined policy can achieve what it is supposed to without
modification {46)
In descriptive terms also the top-down approach is held to misdirect
attention. The bottom-up perspective argues that as the original policy is
implemented it is actually modified. There indeed may be - de facto - a
significant change to policy. What is being implemented is not constant, This
raises the question as to how valid it is to study the implementation of a
policy that is never fully executed, and opens up a broader issue of what
constitutes an implementation study. While not suggesting that a top-down
approach would simply fail to perceive such events, it would perceive them in
a strict sense as implemeitation failure, another example of the limits of top-
control. Such conclusions cannot be lightly dismissed as merely providing a
different interpretation to that of the bottom-up. Cumulatively the conclusions
drawn from the top-down approach point to the limits upon government;
governments formulate policies only to see them taken off in another direction
as they are executed. This argument was one of the central strands in the
'overload thesis' as proposed by conservative and liberal writers: Government
was so ensnared upon the wire of dependency relationships that "its capacity
to deal with problems, even many of those it had before, has decreased.."{47)
The 'overload thesis' was like the Oakland study writ large. And the overall
conclusion was clear enough - the need for 'less government'. While the thesis
pinpointed the increasing tensions of governmental authority, its top-down
view could be argued to have over-emphasised failure. The implicit premise was
that those upon whom government was dependent were mis-using their power.
There was no serious consideration that such actors - even some of the time -
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might actually be changing things for the better, by finding more suitable
solutions to problems than were contained in government policy.
Of course behind such a debate are complex normative issues about what
constitutes success and failure. What we can say is that the top-down
perspective does establish rigorous standards of success such that failure -
at least in some form or other - becomes too likely an outcome. We will return
to these matters more fully in due course. For the moment, it is importan't to
recognise that in practice top-down writers often acknowledge that policies
are not a constant throughout implementation. Xazmanian and Sabatier, for
example, recognise the "legitimate concern with the evolution of policy over
time as value priorities change". But they maintain a sequential perspective by
suggesting three stages: formulation, implementation and reformulation. Such a
scheme however clearly holds to the view that formulation should rest
exclusively with formal policy makers,{48) Others have gone even further and
talk of the interdependence between policy making and iniplementation,{49} and
case studies have recognised the evolution of policy as it is implemented. In
these cases the overall logic of the model is watered down: the dilemma facing
the TDA is thus to stick with the logic of the model or to find something with
which to replace it. As already mentioned the key issue is what to assess
success against.
Political pressures are the third type of pressures to which implementation is
held to be subject, which thereby breaks the neatness of the formulation -
implementation distinction in bottom-up eyes. According to this line of
argument those involved in implementation, as well as those affected by policy,
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have interests and values that differ from those expressed in the policy
emerging from the top. Given that implenienters have power and often control
over key variables, such interests and values can be made to count. This
conflict means that the implementation process, like formulation itself, is
fundamentally a political process. It is likely, however, that in the
implementation process different actors able to niobilise different resources
will be involved, producing a different result to that achieved at the time of
formulation, {50} Thus negotiation and compromise continues into implementation
and with it the 'shape' of the policy may change. As Barrett and Hill state:
"The political processes by which policy is mediated, negotiated, and modified
during its formulation and legitimation do not stop when initial policy
decisions have been made, but continue to influence policy through the
behaviour of those responsible for implementation and those affected by policy
acting to protect or enhance their own interests."{51) The National Health
Services provide many examples of initiatives from the departmental level that
get redirected as they are translated into action.{52}
In general terms, descriptively there is not any complex differences between
the approaches. The top-down view is that such political pressures, where
effective, subvert the policy and bring about implementation failure while the
bottom-up writers see it as a process of negotiation between poiicy makers and
implementers to influence action, the success of which is judged not by
reference to conformance but by actual performance as assessed according to
particular perspectives. It is important to emphasise that both approaches do
not contend that policy is soley 'redirected' during implementation by overt
action from impleinenters. There is, in addition, recognition of the point that
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as well as threats of non-compliance and vetoes, the 'rules' by which agencies
operate are influenced by factors other than the policy - including possibly
other policies - and that such rules may well influence policy as be influenced
by it. }azmanian and Sabatier suggest in their top-down prognosis that policy
should be assigned to an implementing agency "that perceives the new mandate
to be compatible with its traditional orientation".{53) They also stress the
desirability of policy makers stipulating the formal decision rules of the
implementing agencies. {54) Bottom-up writers emphasise the position of street
level bureaucrats{55) and, indeed higher officials, as one of being too busy
coping with day-to--day matters to familiarise themselves with or fully take
account of broad policy.{56) Indeed, for Barrett and Hill implementation
behaviour is guided by political interactions designed to secure resources and
influence. These are sought not just from straight-forward motivations of
material gain, but also for wider normative reasons. On these grounds they do
not see that the purpose of negotiation should or can be the achievement of
consensus.{57) The difference between the two approaches can be summarised as
the managerial versus the political perspective.
When we turn to the prescriptive side of the division, the issues become more
involved. As mentioned earlier, the top-down view holds such nan-compliance to
the decisions as illegitimate, being a breach of the norms of liberal
democracy. To quote Hogwood and Gunn: "There are surely limits - if only legal
and constitutional limits - to how far post-legislative geurilla skirmishing
should be taken."{58) It is possible to identify five counts upon which bottom-
up writers might challenge such a view. First, if it is accepted that the
implementation process actually entails some policy <re)formulation then the
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case for keeping political conflicts out of implementation is less strong. In
other words, if it is legitimate to have consultation and negotiation at the
formulation stage proper, then it is not illegitimate to continue such
activities when policy matters are re-considered during implementation. Second,
it is hard to distinguish between policy and implementation decisions simply
on the grounds that the former is political while the latter is not. For
example, a decision whether or not to give financial assistance to a firm or
not may be regarded as the administration of industrial assistance policies,
but it is hard to see such an issue as lacking political content when
employment and other important issues are at stake. Many policies involve
aelegating substantial discretionary decisions to implementing agencies which
under a more ru]e-oriented policy would have such matters decided during
formulation. Indeed in areas like supplementary benefits it can be argued that
widespread discretion has been used in part as an attempt to shift
controversial issues out of the formal political arena.<59} The formalities of
formulation provide the only criterion of which issues are up for negotiation.
Third, the bottom-up approach recognises that authority may flow upwards as
well as downwards, Technical expertise, proximity to policy problems and being
the target or beneficiary of policy can be regarded as grounds f or having
authority concerning the policy issues.C60) Fourth, many policies are
implemented by actors "that are relatively autonomous and not subject to the
direct authority of those making policy". To achieve coordination "other
influence mechanisms have to be brought into play, hence the emphasis on
negotiation and bargaining, and the likelihood of policy modifications as part
of the process".{61) Likewise the work of Hjern and his colleagues has sought
to provide an approach that "overcomes the shortcomings of models of
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hierarchical administration". {62) Fifthly, there is the argument that formal
democratic procedures encompass strucural bias and that the authority vested
in public bureaucracies are not solelt a consequence of democracy. Instead they
are a manifestation of particular power structures whose 'deep rules'{63)
embody certain interests more than others, Therefore a case for action during
implementation that challenges the structural biases can be supported on
appeal to certain democratic norms, This could be achieved, for instance,
through introducing new issues or definitions of problems into the policy
process.
The Bottom-Up Approach: The Alter-mative
The above represents the arguments placed against the top-down approach by
bottom-up writers. We now have to look at the positive side, what they have to
offer as an alternative. Without doubt the bottom-up approach, devoid of the
simple starting point of' a sequential distinction between policy formulation
and implementation, is attempting to provide a more complex representation of
the implementation process. In general terms, the aptly named bottom-up
approach, through empirical investigation, builds up a picture of what
activities are being carried out collectively by the relevant actors around a
particular policy programme. To Hjern and Porter the key unit of analysis is
the "Ei]mplementation structure" which is composed of "a cluster of parts of
public and private organisations". Given that not only are several
organisations involved in implementing a single programme but a single
organisation is often engaged in implementing a number of programmes, "[a)n
implementation structure is comprised of subsets of members within
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organisations which view a programme as their primary (or an instrumentally
important) interest". Though not based on a single organisation the
implementation structure can for those involved be seen as an administrative
structure through which purposive actions are taken. In contrast to
organisations, however, implementation structures are less formal and have
fewer authoritative relations, are more dynamic and shifting, and decisions to
participate are based on consent and negotiation.{64) In a similar manner
Elinore has developed a 'backward mapping' approach to implementation that
takes as its starting point that "at which administrative actions intersect
private choices, It begins not with a statement of intent, but with a statement
of specific behaviour at the lowest level of the implementation process that
generates the need for a policy."{65) The role of policy makers should not be
to seek to secure maximum control over the implementation process but to
identify the most suitable means for affording those closest to the problem
the maximum incentives and opportunities to exercise their skills in problem
solving. Likewise flexibility through discretion rather than standardisation of
responses is advocated.{66)
Both Hjern and his colleagues and Elmore can be seen to be concerned to
provide a method for analysing and improving the implementation process. The
former in particular emphasise the need to reject the a priori assumptions of
organisational and economic approaches by adopting a "phenomenological"
approach which investigates and analyses behaviour in implementation
structures on, so to speak, its own terms. From this it is suggested a better,
fuller understanding of implementation will emerge that can act as a basis for
achieving 'improvement' in implementation. Elmore's position rests more firmly
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on the positive benefits that can accrue from not adopting a top-down control
approach to implementation, but on allowing skilled implementers that inaxinium
freedom in employing their expertise. Indeed, ultimately his prescriptions
could be regarded as a formula for formulating policies, Missing from both is
any clear conceptual distinction between policy and implementation. In fact,
Hjern and Porter, at one point somewhat confusingly suggest that there are
"substructures for policy making" within implementation structures{67) while
Elinore re-advocates that policy should not be treated as a theoretically sound
solution to a problem but more simply the most direct means of enabling
implementers on the ground to find solutions to problems. This seeming
conceptual laxity reflects that the concern of the bottom-up proponents has
not primarily been with the execution of a set of decisions called a policy but
with the analysis of the interconnection of actors around a particular policy
problem. How one defines and identifies policy and implementation is not,
therefore, particularly central. The implications of this will be discussed
presently.
Nonetheless, those associated with the School for Advanced Urban studies have
forthrightly adopted a bottom-up approach while seeking to maintain a
conceptual hold on 'policy' and 'implementation'. However, establishing a clear
conceptual distinction while emphasising the complexity of the policy process
is problematic in that it is difficult to sustain a consistent position.
Barrett and Fudge suggest that: "If we take implementation to describe the
day-by-day workings of an agency (whether it involves relations between
organisations or relations within organisations, then policy-making may be
seen as attempts to structure this operation in a way which limits the
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discretionary freedom of other actors." Such structuring can not only be
conducted by those at the 'top' but also "when lower level actors take
decisions which effectively limit heirarchical influence, pre-empt top
decision-making, or alter 'policies"{68) But there are problems. For one thing
Barrett and Hill have subsequently acknowledged that implementation involves
in addition to structuring day-to-day procedures, the putting into effect of
new policy innovations that have to be "translated into patterns of day-to-day
action",{69) Further, policy is not so much defined as characterised by
them,{70) with the result that employing the term at all at any point in the
discussion is rendered uncertain for the reader. The uncertainty is,
nonetheless, explicitly recognised: "Given the complexity of inter- and intra-
organisational linkages it nay be possible to define policy only in terms of
something that one group of actors wishes to see carried out by others -
which embraces the whole continuum of intentions, decisions, programmes and
procedures that variously feature or are perceived as policy in the sense of
frameworks that guide or constrain activity - or in terms of outcomes which
are necessarily results of both the policy-making and the implementation
processes."{71) Such a position may be regarded as a valid one in the face of
complexity, but it is only tenable so long as 'policy' - and by implication
'implementation' - cease to be held as key concepts in analysis. But this is
not the case and they employ both in their theoretical and empirical
deliberations.
The bottom-up approach, therefore, never clearly conceptualises 'policy' and
'implementation'. 'Policy', it is recognised is a label applied to various
decisions, but once initial policy proposals undergo implementation it is
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argued that it ceases to be constant. Nor is it the position of one set of
actors but the changing suni of bargains between numerous actors, The absence
of a constant policy throughout the implementation process leads to the oft-
made criticism of the approach that evaluation of a policy and its
implementation therefore become uncertain. Assessing the success or failure of
either soon becomes highly contestable at least, if not virtually impossible,
as both undergo change before reaching some final point of impact. As Majone
and Wildavsky observe: "Outside the static world of programmed decision, "good"
and "bad" take on multiple meaniiigs."{72) To Sabatier there is simply no policy
to evaluate.{73)
A FRAXEVORK FOR POLICY CHANGE
Where does the above debate leave the study and practice of implementation? As
Grant Jordan has aptly pointed out, "[i]inplementation sounds the most practical
and pragmatic of concerns, but it turns out to be an abstract concept."{73) The
preceding discussion, however, hopefully indicates that abstract matters are
directly related to practical concerns of understanding and making
prescriptions about the implementation process. Each approach channels
attention in a particular direction and confronts specific problems which
require explanation and/or resolution. If one can attempt to summarise the
differences between the two approaches: the top-down approach maintains the
centrality of policy in the policy process, but cannot readily handle the
dynamic complexities of the policy process, while the bottom-up can acconimodate
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such complexities but finds it difficult to incorporate any clear conception of
policy under implementation. Clearly the issue is not - despite the often
adversarial nature of the debate - a matter of which approach is right and
which is wrong. Rather, it is one of which is most appropriate in particular
circumstances. In any case, it is not impossible for analysis to study the
same events through one approach while paying attention to the insights
offered by the other. It indeed would be surprising if proponents did not
attempt to overcome some of the deficiencies identified in their general
approach.{74) The top-down approach is most appropriate when the following
conditions pertain:
1) there are reItively discrete phases of policy formulation and
implementation;
2) the objectives do not seriously conflict with each other (or are
appropriately weighted) and reasonably precise;
3) when implementation is (or can be) conducted through a
heirarchical structure;
4) when implementation involves (or can be organised to involve)
the application of routinised administrative rules rather than
the application of judgement based on skills;
5) where the behaviour of implementing agencies or sections is
directly related to a single policy;
6) where implementing agencies/officials do not command
significant power resources that has allowed them (or would
allow them) to circumvent top policy decisions;
7) where the analysis is conducted from the perspective of or on
behalf of top policy makers;
8) where it is not held desirable or necessary to consider factors
outside the remit of the policy affecting the policy problem;
9) where there does not exist or are not expected to occur, local
variables in implementation;
10) the policy is based on well-grounded experience rather than
experimental in nature.
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The more the above conditions pertain or are expected to pertain if one is
prescribing, the more appropriate the top-down approach. Conversly, the less
they pertain the more appropriate is the bottom-up. It has to be acknowledged
that how far any of these conditions pertain will be based on judgements which
themselves will reflect the predispositions of the analyst. This will be
especially true in the case of analysis which seeks to prescribe where
normative judgexneiits will be made as to how far implementers should have
influence over policy. Nonetheless, it should be possible to have a clearer
basis upon which to ascertain the more appropriate approach. What is
interesting in this respect is that proponents of the top-down approach are
commonly associated with certain areas of policy - environmental regulation -
while the bottom-up has notably been employed in the case of manpower policy
and economic developnient{75) though this is not to suggest that the subject
matter of policy is the key variable, only that some form of demarcation has
already evolved. There remains, for all that, problems, First, given that there
are a number of reasonably discrete factors to be taken into account when
determining which approach to adopt, it is more than likely that many policy
sectors will display indications in both directions, Adopting one or other
approach may prove to be far from adequate. Second, as we have already seen,
the bottom-up approach has yet to develop a conceptualisation of policy and
implementation that is widely accepted, and operationally useful. The bottom-up
approach currently is at its strongest as a critique of the top-down arguing
for an alternative approach to specific issues, rather than a distinctive,
alternative framework, It could, of course, be argued that concepts of policy
and implementation are no longer necessary, but this does not appear tenable.
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The bottom-up approach is predicated upon the notion that policy is not,
should not be, static during the implementation process. To make any sense one
has to have some idea of what policy and implementation are. Iloreover,
whatever the difficulties resulting from the ambiguity of these concepts, they
do still provide an indispensible means of representing intervention by public
authorities, Except in those circumstances where a top-down approach is
appropriate, the study of implementation is problematic. The core of the
problem is that the formal implementation process potentially entails two
distinctive types of choice, although they may be manifested in a single
decision: to adhere to the policy or not and thereby either confirm the policy
or change policy as a framework for what happens; and to translate the
framework as currently viewed into action. In other words,the implementation
process can involve not only the execution but also the changing of the plan
as it unfolds. The TDA takes the view that a choice not to confirm the policy
is undesirable - implementation failure - while to a BUA such a choice can
often be regarded as desirable - performance enhancement. From the latter
perspective policy in practice can no longer be viewed as the intentions of
formal policy makers, but instead has to be conceived as a framework for
action established through often loosly coordinated behaviour by a collection
of actors around a policy problem. What, therefore, has to be explained or
guided is the process of changing the formal policy in practice and subsequent
changes thereafter. But before this can be done there has to be established a
means for charting this form of change so that it can be distinguished from
other forms of change.
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\q ith this in mind, it is not surprising that a number of attempts have been
made	 to	 represent	 the	 policy	 process,	 and	 particularly	 the
policy/implementation distinction, not by reference to stages or functions but
to 'layers' or 'levels'.{76) The policy process is no longer viewed as a
sequence of discrete events, but a series of decisions and actions which
sustain or change different levels of policy activities. The key to such
attempts is the recognition of the interrelationship between the different
levels such that change at one level has implications for others. One approach
developed by Knoepfel and Weidner to study the implementation of programmes
designed to reduce suiphor dioxide emissions across a number of European
countries einphasises the importance of programme elements and structures. They
built up a model based upon a 'programme core', which in regulative policies
are usually concrete performance standards, with various 'programme shells'
being placed on top which are necessary for action to be taken (a monitoring
programme,	 detailed	 regulations	 governing	 emissions,	 administrative
organisations with the finance to enforce the regulations and administrative
processes and instruments). Such a framework demonstrates a useful means for
breaking a policy into a number of interrelated constituent levels that has
major advantages for comparative analysis, especially in respect of the
importance of interests and conflicts around different layers. The model
however is specifically designed for a particular policy area and, while
Whitmore has {77) successfully translated the approach with modifications to
the area of prevention of child abuse, it is not an approach that would readily
transfer to other policy areas or certain forms of analysis. Moreover, given an
absence of a detailed elaboration of the general methodology it is, as Sabatier
states "very complicated and, at times, difficult to understarid".C78)
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Sabatier himself has recently developed a framework synthesising top-down and
bottom-up approaches. The framework builds up from the policy sub-system of
actors concerned with a policy problem, but also incorporated are factors from
the top-down literature dealing with the manner in which legal and socio-
economic factors structure behaviour options and the validity of causal
theories behind specific programmes, Of major import is that consequently
attention "shifts from policy implementation to policy change over periods of
10-20 years",{'79) With change as the focus Sabatier works with the notion of
belief systems shared by various coalitions of actors, each seeking to realise
their interests in the policy area. On the premise that certain categories of
change are more likely than others he divides the belief system into three
parts: Deep (Normative) Core, consisting of fundamental normative axioms; Near
(Policy) Core, consisting of fundamental policy positions; and Secondary
Aspects consisting of decisions and information searches necessary to
implement core policy positions. Obviously change is most likely in the latter
and very unlikely in the former instance. The Near Core and Secondary Aspects
also apply to governmental action programmes.C80) Again we can see how policy
sectors can be divided into different levels. It must be re-stated, however,
that Sabatier's generally abstract framework is most appropriate f or long-term
changes and does not appear to provide a satisfactory link between descriptive
frameworks and prescriptions on implementation. Moreover, Sabatier still holds
to the view that policy change is, if not actually decided independently, then
sanctioned formally by Government legislation or decrees. This would certainly
not be accepted by bottom-up supporters without qualification.
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Thus, the framework presented below has been developed for analysing the
relationship between implementation and policy change without recourse to an
underlying sequenti.al logic. One major principle in the development of the
framework has been to achieve flexibility so that it can accommodate a variety
of circumstances and policy types, Existing concepts and representations have,
however, been built upon rather than attempting to break decisively with tried
and, importantly, familiar ways. In particular, the argument put forward by
Heclo{8i) is fully adhered to, namely that the phenomena in policy analysis are
not self-defining and, therefore, their identification in any particular
circumstance is a matter of judgement and interpretation by the analyst. The
validity of such judgements will in part be a function of the purpose of the
analysis.
The framework divides the policy process into different 'levels' which can be
maintained when the process is iterative, not being dependent on any
particular sequencing of events. The assumption upon which the framework rests
is that the policy process can be regarded as a series of choices over time
that collectively structure actions such as the delivery of social security
benefits, the application of pollution controls and the building of motorways.
Crucial to the framework is the tenet that not all choices are of equal
importance to the final form of action. For example, the choice to issue
general practitioners with a .restricted list of pharmeceutical products they
can prescribe on the NUS is more significant than the actual content of the
list. In suggesting that certain choices structure others, we are viewing one
choice (eg which new car to buy) as being resultant upon a causal choice (to
buy a new car), It should be noted, however, that causal choices are not
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necessarily made before resultant ones (eg if I choose to buy a new car it
will be a...), but before any other choice can lead to action a causal choice
must be made. Obviously the policy process, and probably purchasing a car for
that matter, do not follow a linear chain of causal and resultant choices but
entail a complex set of related but distinctive areas of choices. The point of
the above discussion is to indicate that each policy sector can inter alia be
viewed as a hierarchy of choices. Nonetheless, as the bottom-up perspective
indicates, it is not immutable that certain causal or higher choices delimit
resultant or lower ones, and those involved in future making of choices may
transgress the boundaries set by earlier choices, These earlier choices
therefore will have de facto been changed because of their failure to some
degree or other to bindingly delimit resultant choices, Of course a
straightforward top-down view would see such events as an act of non-
conformance to a de jure choice. Choices will not therefore be binding unless
at least of one of the following conditions pertains to them:
1. they are authoritatively backed;
2. they are backed by the necessary power over those who might not
otherwise be so bound;
3. they reflect a consensus among the relevant actors;
4. they are the product of negotiation which for the time being at
least is regarded as binding by the parties to the negotiations.
The policy process is therefore presented as establishing and then
reconstituting a structure of choices. For analytic purposes these choices can
he placed into three categories. The basis of the categorisation is to relate
the choices to the impact of their resultant action, on the grounds that
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different choices have or will have relatively different impacts upon the wider
society. Obviously making assessments of impact will be easier when the policy
has undergone implementation than when one is identifying intended impact but
the underlying principle will be the same. For example, the relative
significance of changes made in the area of health policy will be assessed
according to their impact upon health and health care provision. Such an
assessment, drawing possibly upon indicators from a number of disciplines,
will seek to measure how the innovation of a policy or a change to a policy
redistributes the imposition of constraints Keg appEe regulations) or the
conferment of opportunities Keg provides benefits) among different groups or
classes not only in extent but also, more ambiguously, in terms of nature.
There is, it has to be readily admitted, no absolute precision in such a method
of categorisation. In other words, there are bound to be disagreements as to
the relative significance of a particular choice in a policy sector. But
different assessments about the importance of various aspects of the policy
process are inevitable given that even describing policy and the policy
process entail the exercise of judgements.{82) What is being proposed is,
therefore, not a common basis for making judgeinents but a common means for
categorising them. This is achieved through relating choices within a policy
sector to the end product of the policy process - actual or intended impact
upon the wider system. Such an approach will provide a reasonably effective
method of maine.ining a distinction between policy and implementation over a
regularly changing iterative policy process. Indeed, it is contended that such
an exercise in distinguishing policy and implementation is often employed to
some degree in policy areas which are highly complex and/or where initial
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policy statements are ambiguous. For example, in his study of the Job Creation
Programme, Ridley noted that the programme as originally formulated sought to
apply very vague - if not actually nebulous - principles concerning which
projects to support under the programme. It was only when decisions were taken
concerning which projects to support was it possible to determine what
actually constituted the form of the policy. Nor was this a straightforward
exercise because as Ridley notes: "What is interesting...is how little one could
predict. from the original statement of principle."{83)
The three levels of choices contained in our framework are similar, but by no
means identical, to Sabatier's three levels of a belief system. In particular,
we are concerned to emphasise the interrelationships between the three levels.
The three levels are policy standards (values), strategic-policy and
operationaJ-i.mplementation, Each of these will be elaborated in turn.
A)	 Policy standards As Ken Young has pointed out: "The contention that
'values' operate within the policy process is hardly a matter for dispute.
Nevertheless, a host of problems stand in the way of an advance on this
statement."{84) The problem in linking values to actual policy decisions is
that the former are general and abstract while the latter are concrete and
specific. Young himself has developed the notion of the 'assumptive world'.{85)
Young's argument is that "an undersatnding of the assumptive world of
government actors is essential to successful policy analysis, for it enables us
to interpret events in the light of the meaning which the actors involved
ascribe to their actions in terms of postulated interests, motives or
goals",{8b) Importantly, as Young and Mills point out, the assumptive world
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contains not just a model of the world as it is, but also "as it might be
'these models represent probable situations, ideal situatIons, or dreaded
situations)".{87) Such cognitive models of the present and of possible futures
impose order on complexity by simplification, generalisation and selection.{88)
While such models will have a self-evident, taken for granted, character and
thereby tend toward stability rather than change{89) they do provide a useful
concept for analysing policy change and implementation. If such a model
remains constant then any change to policy must stay within the general
bounds of the model. This may happen when society itself changes or fails to
change as anticipated so that it no longer matches the model. One important
reason such events occur is because of' the failure of current policies to
achieve what was intended in line with the model. Conversely, the model itself
may change, most obviously because of a change of government personnel, which
will act as an impetus to policy change. In reality policy changes will
probably occur because of the interplay of changes in the model and society.
The important point is that changes to policy will occur by reference to the
model for as Cameron points out: "A major shift in policy must be justified on
the basis of a powerful system of beliefs that 'matches' or has a close
affinity with changing aspects of social structure."C90}
Obviously an important issue is how such a model comes to be determined and
who has influence to shape it at any time. To simply view it as the personal
preferences of a few people in government is highly misleading. The main
difficulty, however, is to represent such a model so that it can adequately be
related to policy choices. At this juncture the work of Vickers is instructive.
Vickers argued that policy making should not be seen solely in terms of the
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realisation of objectives but in norm holding behaviour. He notes that: "14en,
institutions and societies learn what to want as well as how to get, what to
be as well as what to do; and the two forms of adaption are closely
connected."{Ql) For him policy can be viewed as an attempt to apply particular
norms or standards which at any one time are a specific expression of values.
He cites the simple example of sub-standard housing setting off a response
that something ought to be done to bring housing up to 'standard', Of course
conceptions of what standards are desirable and feasible change over time.C92)
It is important to note in this respect that such a change in norms does not
necessarily lead directly to a change to policy. For one thing other 'mis-match
signals' may command greater attention, But there may be more far-reaching
consequences for policy even although it remains unchanged. To quote Vickers
again: "I recall an occasion when an important governing body debated for a
year what should be done in a situation which seemed to require a radical
solution. They finally decided that there was nothing to be done. No action
followed - yet nothing was ever the same again. The mental activity which
reached this negative conclusion radically changed their view and their
valuation of the situation. In particular, it changed their idea of what could
be put up with, a most important threshold in the regulative cycle."{93)
Norms should not, however be taken to just indicate some end point, but also
relate to what are acceptable standards creating the conditions that are to
realise the end point. For example, a policy to raise sub-standard housing
would have to encompass norms as to who was to pay (owners, occupiers, the
state), whether it was to be compulsory or by voluntary inducements, what are
the other norms of housing policy that should prevail (eg public versus
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private housing) and so on. We can also identify norms that are not specific
to the housing policy area but which nonetheless impinge upon it. Housing, like
many policy areas, must be formulated within some overall disposition
concerning the amounts of resources the state should and is capable of
mobilising and equally important the form of this acquisition and
redistribution. Thus it illustrate the point, any change to existing policies
aimed at the problem of poverty will reflect the dispositions of decision
makers about the global resources to be directed at policy problems and from
what sections of society they should be drawn given the intended beneficiaries.
Also one can identify norms that reflect dispositions about the desirable
degree of consent decision makers wish policies to generate. Policy makers for
instance may be prepared to forego to some extent their preferred objectives
in order to enhance the degree of consent, and included in the calculation will
be some level of consent that is valued in its own right. In other words the
extent to which policy makers are unwilling to impose decisions upon society
clearly delimits - though with varying degrees of import - the range of policy
options held to be valued.
Thus any policy can be seen inter alia as a set of choices that maintain
certain norms, these norms representing a simplified model of conditions that
are held to be feasible and desirable in society. (Such norms vary in the
degree with which they relate to the subject matter of a particular policy, but
they all impinge upon it.) Logically any policy decisions that transgress the
norms will be rejected. Like life itself, however, the policy process is never
simple. We have to recognise that the application of norms through policy may
not he the preserve of one set of actors (most obviously the government) but
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may be determined through a plethora of political processes by a range of
influential	 interests.	 The	 'source'	 of	 norms	 is	 not,	 therefore,	 a
Etraightforward process of identification. Furthermore, norms may when applied
come into conflict with each other - or at least be perceived to - and they
may have to be weighted against each other, The application of norms through
policy decisions, therefore is not simply a matter of ensuring that policy
decisions conform to the norms, but that they reflect the overall balance of
the various norms appropriate to the policy. This itself implies that analysing
norms on an individual basis will provide only a partial picture. Rather it is
their interrelatonship with and relative weighting to each other that will
provide a more accurate representation of the relationship between norms and
the policy. If one constructed a comprehensive list of the norms relating to a
particular policy area which were adhered to by two political parties with
distinctive ideologies, there would in all probability be a high degree of
overlap. What would, howver, be different would be the variations in weighting
afforded to each of them. Thus, for example, a liberal conservative party and a
democratic socialist party would 'both adhere to the norm of the efficiency of
the market in resource allocation, but the former would afford this far greater
prominence than the latter.
Bearing in mind the ultimate importance of the interrelationships of norms and
also that norms remain without concreteness until set against some actual
relations, for analytic purposes it is desirable to translate norms into a more
concrete form. This translation involves setting the norms in the context of
the particular social relations that policy is currently seeking to change or
maintain and in the context of their interrelationships. We will call such
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translated norms policy standards, The policy standards relating to any policy
area represent the fundamental choices about what relations can and should
exist within the relevant domain(s) of society and the role that the exercise
of public authority can play in achieving this. Conceptually these standards
can be seen to set or delimit boundaries of decisional choices, They provide
standards against which to appraise and assess policy options and the
development of policy. Vhile we talk of standards reflecting choices, it may be
that they remain tacit until some explicit choice over the form of policy has
to be made when they will become overt. It is important to emphasise that
policy reflects not only what is held as desirable but also what is perceived
as feasible; the standards are not some idealised version.
Standards are most obviously made explicit in particular circunistances: when
a) there are political demands for new norms to be encompassed in policy; b) a
policy is under review and evaluation; c) a new policy is, or is about to be,
initiated or reformulated; d) the decisions and actions of implementing
agencies are undermining the existing policy and hence possibly standards; and
e circumstances in the relevant domain of society are undergoing change not
anticipated by existing policy. In short, when standards come under challenge
they will be either reaffirmed or changed. Indeed, at such times governments,
as well as other political actors, are bound to justify their policy proposals
by appeals to the values and norms they represent. From such statements and
documents the analyst should be able to detect such standards though, of
course, probing and interpretation are likely to prove necessary.
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B. Strategic Policy Level. In simple terms the formulation of policy can be
seen as an exercise that determines a strategy for action. Upon the structure
of policy standards is elaborated a set of key or strategic actions that will
lead to the maintenance and/or realisation of the poiicy standards. In one
sense policy is conceived here in fairly conventional terms as a set or
pattern of binding decisions which collectively can be regarded for analytical
purposes as a reasonably coherent attempt to establish a strategic framework
within which action(s) is Care) taken to effect a certain category of change
in the wider social system. There are two basic components of policy choices:
One, there are the (strategic) objectives. Two, there is a programme or set of
programmes which provide a plan for action which should bring about the
realisation of the strategic objectives, Less in line with conventional views
of policy, we also recognise that policies are often negotiated compromises and
that once formulated the negotiating process does not cease but the attempts
to influence the shape of policy - the actual strategy pursued - continues.
This means that as policy is implemented the actual strategy pursued may vary.
The need for further compromise in initial policy statements remaining
ambiguous, particularly over objectives, and such ambiguity may not be really
resolved until decisions have to be taken on the 'bottom rung'. Thus
identifying a policy may have to involve moving beyond formal statements to
an extrapolation of the current pattern that emerges from these choices and
actions taken around the formal policy. It has to be emphasised that even
where the policy standards are sustained during formal formulation and
implementation the choosing of a strategic course of action is not an
automatic or purely technical exercise. There will be scope for a range of
value informed choices about cause and solution to the mis-match revealed by
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the standards held and conditions pertaining or forecast which forms the basis
of policy action.
C. The Operational-impleiiientation Level. A strategy of itself will not produce
the desired action: the plan contained within the policy has to be
operationalised and guided towards the objectives, that is implemented.
Implementation is defined here as those desisions and actions resultant upon
policy decisions taken to operationalise and follow through as appropriate the
programme and to overall realise the objectives. At this level an important
type of choice that has to be made before the policy, or more probably a part
thereof, is operationalised is that of whether to adhere to the bounds set by
policy choices. This can be regarded as a prior choice that has to be made
before other choices can be made at this level. This is not to imply that such
choices necessarily entail considerable deliberation; they may often be largely
an automatic response but are not likely when serious conflicts or problems
arise, Furthermore, it should not be taken to be implied that for an
implementing actor this amounts to a personal free choice because s/he will be
constrained by power and authority to some degree. Where a choice is made that
in some form leads to further choices being taken outside the bounds of the
policy, then the policy can be viewed at that point as having changed,
assuming that no action is successfully taken by others to ensure conformance.
The overall importance of this change to policy clearly depends on its overall
impact upon the overall strategy. If it is only a marginal one it may be
regarded of only minor or no significnce, but one must be wary of considerable
changes achieved through a series of minor adjustments over the various steps
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of implementation. We will consider presently the desirability of treating all
movements outside the bounds of the policy as a change to the policy.
The above definition is in itself fairly straightforward, compatible with the
conventional top-down perspective except for one important factor - namely
acceptance that implementation decisions and actions may move outside the
bounds of the policy. That is implementation can involve doing something
different than would have been predicted from a faithful execution of the
policy, without necessarily being held a priori a failure. The process of
implementation can be regarded as producing three relatively distinctive
e±fects: the partial execution of the original or formal policy; the partial
changing of that policy; and the execution of these changes to policy. The
crucial question is what assessment do we make of the second of these three
effects, Do we label such an effect implementation failure of the de Jure
policy? We certainly could, but if such change to the policy were clearly
associated with an obvious improvement in performance this would surely be the
kind of failure we - and perhaps more importantly the policy makers -
want.{94) So we might apply the term de facto policy change to these events.
However, the application of that term may appear no more than a rather hollow
euphemism if what was regarded as an effective policy was turned into a
thorough-going disaster when it was put into practice, say because of
incompetent management by implementing agencies. Quite obviously determining
success or failure or improvement involves making judgements and often as a
result of siding with one set of participants against others. But we can, it is
suggested, move towards a position that accepts implementation as
"evolutionary; that is it will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out
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policy."{95} without abandoning some means of assessing what the reformulation
adds up to. We, therefore, turn to the idea of policy development.
Policy Developient
Policy development is a form of policy change which occurs essentially where
decisions and actions at the level of implementation operate to enhance the
realisation of the strategic objectives of policy. This does not necessarily
imply policy success, but attempts at producing, during interim periods between
formal policy (re)formulations, a strategy that will lead to the attainment of
standards. One important source of such development may be difficulties and
obstacles encountered during implementation. For example, Industrial Training
Boards, under the 1964 Act were charged with increasing the quantity and
quality of training within their industries, which was to be achieved through a
levy/grant mechanism. If, however, certain boards discovered that such a
mechanism engendered employers' hostility to such a degree that the level of
training actually declined and decided therefore to abandon the levy/grant
system in favour of some other mechanism, then we would have policy
development where such a change led to an increase in the level and quality of
training. On the other hand, if such action had changed or significantly re-
ordered the relative weighting of the standards then we would have an example
of policy displacement. In some instance it may be relatively easy to identify
policy development because the initiatives are being taken centrally by top
policy making agencies, whereas it may be less easy in others due to the
possibility of a plethora of more minor initiatives taken by 'middle' and
street level bureaucrats aimed at achieving and maintaining the standards. that
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originally bounded the formulation of the policy. In any case it is possible
that a 'developmental view' may be taken from the outset where implementation
difficulties are anticipated but their nature and scope are uncertain.
Thus, two important points have to be made about the notion of policy
development. First, policy development does not necessarily imply that success
will ultimately be achieved - obstacles may simply not be overcome, or as they
are new ones may emerge. Policy development, rather represents an attempt,
while an original policy is being implemented, to improve the policy strategy
being pursued to obtain a greter realisation and maintenance of the standards
which stuctured the original or de jure policy. Relatedly, as the term
'development' implies, the process of policy development has to improve upon
what is already there - the de jure policy. This will place a major constraint
upon the scope for development - the range of the alternative choices that can
be taken - and the prospects for successful development - on what
improvements can be achieved, In respect of the latter it is important to note
that a completely misconceived policy strategy is likely to be beyond
redemption while a generally sound one may only require some 'fine tuning'.
Two, 'development' should not be seen as synonymous with 'good'. Policy
development is only desirable insofar as the standards embodied in the
original policy are held to be desirable by analysts or participants.
We now turn to the analytical and practical implications of policy development.
To repeat, policy development is a form of policy change. Analytically this at
a basic level means that analysing the process by which policies change
requires not simply looking at the formal periods of formulation but equally
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what happens in between. Indeed we can go further than simply arguing that it
is necessary for a comprehensive view of policy change. Where policy
development has proved, or is appearing, to be successful, formal periods of
formulation may to some notable degree simply involve the formal ratification
of such developments with their incorporation into the new de jur-e policy. Even
if during the formal process policy makers go beyond such developments, it
would nonetheless be the case that an important element in the equation and,
therefore, concern in understanding the sources of formal periods of policy
change is the prior process of policy development. Indeed, policy development
that has not proved successful in improving performance may also in a
negative sense contribute to periods of policy formulation. In essence, what is
being suggested is that, while policy development is something qualitatively
short of an attempt to formulate (or perhaps fashion) a holistic(96) strategy
in response to a problem, it does constitute a number of more discrete and
specific exercises in problem solving that are directly related and relevant to
those holistic exercises. Very simply, policy development - like the
implementation process more generally - will act as an important source of
information and crucially ideas concerning current thinking on the feasibility
and desirability of actions to tackle problems.
Thus the passage of policy developments during the process of implementing
some previously formally formulated policy can provide an important source of
hard, that is tested, evidence for the next occurance of formal formulation.
One very obvious period when there is likely to be a holistic review and a
formal re-formulation of policy is with the change of government or a
council's majority party. But this exercise in (re)forxnulaton will in part,
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possibly to a significant degree, reflect the different values and ideology and
hence standards they wish to see applied in various policy areas. Such policy
change is therefore a result most obviously of a decisive change in and/or of
the relative weighting of the standards. Standards, as already explained, are
not some expression of values per se but are their translation into the
present context of a particular aspect of society which lays down what is
desirable and feasible, Issues of desirability and feasibility are not drawn
from just an appeal to values but also upon observation and interpretation of
actualities. In other words, while politicians and others with influence over
policy seek to espouse and put into effect their ideas on policy issues, such
ideas are not formulated in a vacuum but by reference to wider thinking and
knowledge within society about issues. The pursuit of standards is an attempt
to reconcile values with perceived practicalities and recent and current
attempts to solve particular problems in the area will be a source - if
admittedly to quite varying degrees - of influence on the latter. Just as we
might note that Nrs Thatcher's philosophy and policies sought to effect change
in society, we must also acknowledge the other side of the coin that she
reflected the changing mood of opinion in many areas of society. Likewise the
individual policies of her government not only sought to change direction but
to some degree also latched on to emerging changes in direction though clearly
they were tailored - if not dressed up - to fit in with government doctrine.
Our discussion here has emphasised the idea of policy development and its part
in informing future periods of formal formulation. Such an emphasis has
resulted from the concern to avoid labelling all non-conformance as some sort
of failure, even from a policy maker's perspective. We should not, however,
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di;count the possibility of policy displacement - ie when the policy standards
are not fully sustained during implementation - as itself being an important
source of influence on the formal reformulation of policy and the determination
of standards that it should incorporate. Policy displacement may be the result
of the different standards combined with significant power held by
implementing actors. The policy sector in this case is constituted by a
fundaninetal conflict. If top policy makers, whether governement or council,
cannot or does not wish to impose its standards then one one of two events
are likely. One, the top policy makers may revise its standards downwards to
those that are viewed as sustainable. An example of this might be drawn from a
case where a government holds to the view that access to higher education
should be open to all with the neccessary qualifications but that this
educational sector should increase relatively the number of graduates in
certain types of technological disciplines. Upon finding that these
institutions have not made the necessary shifts in resources, the government
decides to make cuts in their funding and abandons the principle of access for
all because this standard is no longer seen as feasible in terms of a
particular value, wealth creation, Two, the top policy makers may adopt the
standards emmanating from below such that the framework of policy comes to be
set by key implementing actors. This is particularly said to be the case when
professionals play an important part in the implementation/delivery
process.{97) In the first case we can talk of 'withdrwal', in the second
'absorption'.
To sumniarise, therefore, in studying policy change one has to look not only at
the explicit periods of policy formulation but also the 'subterranean'
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 75
Chapter Two	 A Framework for- Policy Change
processes of policy development or displacement that accompanies the process
of implementing the present formal policy. Moreover, to gain the complete
picture it is necessary to address the interaction between processes of
development/displacement and periods of formal formulation. In doing so we
have somewhat reorientated the top-down and bottom-up debate: concern has
shifted from what is the policy, where does it come from and what happens to
it when it is implemented, to the issue of policy cbange per Se. This is the
line of argument put forward by Sabatier,{98) which he notes implies taking a
longer timescale than is sometimes afforded by implementation studies. It is
acknowledged that certain costs are involved in a reorientation. It is,
however, contended that these are significantly outweighed by the benefits
given the limitations of the top-down perspective with its sequential approach
in many policy areas where the distinction between formulation and
implementation cannot be very readily maintained.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion has highlighted certain limitations of both the top-
down and bottom-up approaches in their representations of the policy process.
These limitations render both approaches unsatisfactory - certainly without
considerable elaboration and qualifications - in providing an adequate
conceptual framework within which to study policy change. It has been
necessary, therefore, to develop an alternative and extended framework. But it
should be noted that such a framework is not based upon a total refutation of
either approach. Instead there has been an attempt to reformulate and integrate
them into a format that can accommodate other factors that we have identified
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as being important in explaining policy change. So we have constructed a
general framework for analysing policy change that focusses attention on the
structures, actions and interrelationships of three levels - policy standards,
strategic-policy, and operational-implementation. In other words, we have a
general organising framework which, although not seeking to lay down rigid
definitions, nonetheless allows us to approach the information relating to
industrial training policy in a structured and. coherent manner, particularly
over time when the dynamics of change could cumulatively be highly complex.
Thus, drawing upon the top-down perspective the framework takes as it starting
point a formal policy, but then drawing also on the bottom-up view it allows
us to chart the form of change to policy as it is implemented. The employment
of the notion of standards in the framework enables us to ,make a distinction
between two types of policy change during implementation: policy development
when standards of the formal policy prevail; and policy displacement when the
standards are in some way usurped. Such a distinction aids in identifying the
sources of formal policy change, that is whether it originates predominantly
from the top when policy development is incorporated in formal policy change,
or from the bottom when policy displacement is similarly incorporated. The
important point to note, however, is that the principal concern is not with
whether policies do or do not undergo change during implementation. It is
generally recognised that some modifications or adjustments to policy almost
always take place during implementation. The central concern rather is with
whether these changes do or do not lead to a change in the values embodied in
the policy as will be reflected in changing standards. Whilst the framework
allows policy change to be viewed as a product and an outcome of the
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implementation process, it recognises that policy change may also result from
a cbane in values held by those with influence over policy (or a change in
the personnel with influence and holding different values). The employment of
standards as a reasonably concrete expression of fundamental choices about
policy allows us to link values to policy change.
it is to the charting of policy change in the area of industrial training that
we now turn our attention.
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LTRODUCT ION
In .th4 the state took on broad responsibility for the promotion and, to a
ioi-e limited extent, the provision of industrial training with the passing of
tne Industrial Training Act, The Act, enacted by a Conservative Government,
marked a significant departure from the previous position of virtual non-
lfltervention in training matters, and as such can he regarded as marking a
clear change in the prevailing standards. Previously industrial training was
firmly considered to be the sole prerogative, with the obvious exceptions of
pubiic enterprises, of the private sector - a view shared by industry as well
as government. In this chapter we are concerned to understand the extent and
nature of the processes that led up to this change. In order to do so, it is
therefore necessary to firstly examine the assumptions prevelant in the years
preceding 1964 as they relate to the role of the state in the economy, of
which training was a part. This will allow us to study the changes that
ocnrred in the area of industrial training within the wider context of
onomic policy generally. Secondly, we snail examine the form and provision
Ana:./ysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 86
Ghapter Three	 Industrial Training 1945-1 962
01 industrial training in the 1950s ano early lG3Os in order to evince the
in between such views arid training arrangements. From these two sections it
will be evident in economic and industrial matters generally and industrial
training particularly that towards the end of the 1950s the views neld by
government that non-intervention into markets concerned with supply was the
most effective means of achieving a successfully performing national economy
cane unCer increasing challenge as the British economy began to aisplay
certain proolems. Such a challenge, however, created tensions with otfler norms
teat empnasised the desirability of voluntary arrangements between government,
ineustry and the unions. Given that industrial training was one of the areas
where this issue arose It is important to analyse how such tensions worked
themselves out. This we do in the third section where we examine how
government attempted to reconcile the conflict between the demands of
improving economic performance and maintaining certain relations between state
and industry
STATE AND ECONOXY 1945-1961: AK OVERVIEW
Inc period from the Second World War up to the early years of the 1960s has
often been characterised as a period of 'consensusus politics'. This referred to
the consensus that emerged out of wartime conditions among the main political
parties concerning the role of the state in the economy and welfare
provision.<l) The consensus was reaffirmec in statements and, actions through-
out the 95Os by the leaderships, if not all the members, of the Conservative
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anc abour Parties. Wj.tnin the bounds of the consensus the state was to piay a
role in managing the economy and was to be responcible for ensuring that
citi:ens had access to at least a minimum of welfare provision. Unlike we_lare
provision which was largely to be financed and supplied by the state itself
accorulng to principles of need rather than demana in the market, the economy
was to remain largely in private hands and be market based. Certainly a nun ocr
01 basic industries were nationalised by the Labour Governments 1945-51, hut
these Governments and the Conservative one after carried out a process of
removing almost all of the direct controls over the economy built up over the
wartime period and demobilisation,2) The state's role in the post war
political economy was not to intervene directly in the market.
Despite the market orientation of the post war economy the state was
nanetneless to play a central role, taking on responsibility for the general or
macro economic conditions. The White Paper of May 1944, Employment Policy, had
opened with a pledge made by all parties accepting "as one of their primary
aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of
employment after the war." {3) Furthermore, it was logical, in both practical
and intellectual terms, that the employment responsibility would spawn others.
n line with arguments put forward by Sir William Beveridge in Full Employment
in a Free Society,{4} the 1944 White Paper{5) recognised from the outset the
interrelated nature of macro economic parameters, and indicated that
governments would have also to be responsible for balance of payments
equilibrium and price and wage stability. These responsibilities, plus a fourth
one of economic growth which was subsequently added, were reiterated and
reaffirmed, often in the form of precise targets, by governments in the 1950s
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and indeed beyond. The actual statu:5 of afficial targets and pronouncements
wa never clearly defined, but it did reflect a deep-seated assumption on the
part of of both major parties that the government should 'manage the economy'.
Such an outlook, of course, was cemented and reinforced by the demands of the
eectorate, the international competitive pressures on the British economy arid
tce need for a healthy economoy to finance increasing welfare provision
Therefore. the major political outcome of the 'Keynesian Revolution' was this
acceptance by governments of responsibility for the successful management of
ne econoiny,viz. the simultaneous achievement of full employment, price
tability, balance of payments equilibrium and growth. As Prof. Kaldor later
noted: "The fact that these have come to be accepted as mandatory objectives
o policy, ie as ends that the public can legitimately expect from its
overnment, was the most important political result of the intellectual
revolution engendered by the the publication of Keynes 'General Theory of
Finployment' ." -(6)
Thus the apparent dilemma in a market orientation and increased state
responsibility was to be reconciled through the adoption of keynsian political
economy. Keynes himself had insisted that it was necessary to distinguish the
"Agenda" of government from the "Non Agenda", by which he meant that the
government's role "is not to do things which individuals are doing already.. but
dc do those things which at present are not done at all."{7) Furthermore, the
boundaries of such a division were for him self-evident: "If the State is able
to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the
instruments and basic reward to those who own them, it will have accomplished
a1 tnat is necessary."{B) The importance of Keynes's prognosis then was that
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ne appeared to have reconciled what in the 1930s many felt was irreconcilable,
the successful economy with the market based economy. As Prof. Hirsch put it:
"Tne invisible hand of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was not to be abandoned,
but merely guided by Keynesian economic controllers."9) The importance of
maintaining the market at the centre of resource allocation was that economic
actors could remain free from extensive state interference which would mean,
according to the widely held beliefs and assumptions, that freedom, voluntarism
and other liberal democratic norms could be preserved. Indeed, it appears that
the evidence o± the authoritarian axis powers,on the one hand, and Stalinist
Russia, on the other, had done much to impress in people's minds the view that
a major interventionist state and democracy were inconipatible.{lO) Such views
were certainly widely held in Britain where liberal values were deeply
entrenched, Economic success was equally important, however, because by
providing secure and increasing material welfare it would confer the necessary
legitimacy upon the system as a whole.
Like all theories, Keynes's was based upon a number of in-built assumptions
which needed to hold if the theory's prescriptions were to prove valid. These
assumptions have major implications for our study of the changing role of the
state in the economy in general and industrial training in particular that
emerged in the l6Os. The first assumption held by Keynes was that controlling
the aggregate level of demand - demand management - would he conducted by
technical, disinterested public officials rather than by politicians whose
political livelihood rested on the outcomes.<lt) In short, the economy would be
managed to economic, not political, ends. Second, and more importantly for our
present purposes was the assumption that the supply side could be 'left to
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itseif' if demand was right (the inversion of Say's law now the currency of
tile present Government). It was assumed that all the economic actors would
take decisions that were in aggregate compatible with the four national
economic objectives mentioned above; that is their decisions about investment
in both fixed and variable capital and price determination would ensure within
the aggregate level of' demand a high growth, fully employed and stable
economy. Finally, there was the assumption that the domestic economy would not
suffer major disturbances from international competition from say more
efficient foreign workers able to produce a given output more cheaply and to
undermine the domestic market.{12) Such assumptions for most of the lQ5Os did
not suffer any serious challenge as the British economy enjoyed a degree of
success not thought possible before the war. Keynesian demand inanagerint
appeared to be the panacea, allowing for not oniy full employment as Keynes
was principally concerned to achieve, but also for a generally healthy economy.
In such a climate the need to even consider intervention into the markets of
supply, either to 'enhance' the market or to 'displace' the market was highly
circumscribed. Most of the 1950s was a period of very limited activity by
governments in influencing private production beyond setting the macro
economic parameters of the economy.{13)
So for most of the l950s, and indeed the early 1960s, the Conservative
administrations sought to steer a middle course between a liberal conception
of free enterprise and interventionism.{14) Initially such a course seemed an
easy one to steer. The objectives of an expanding economy, relatively stable
prices and full employment could be achieved without recourse to direct
intervention in the private sector. As, however, events from 1955 demonstrate,
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th:s early success hac less to do with the Government's skill in handling the
economy and more to do with factors outside the control of Government (for
example, the fall in world commodity prices following the Korean Var, a
significant increase in personal savings and restraint in domestic
corisumption).{15) An expansionary pre-election budget in 1955 resulted in an
upsurge in inflation{16) and a subsequent balance of payments crisis.{l7) It
was around this time also that Britain went into relative decline vis a vis
her European neigbbours.{lS) During the l950s Britain achieved an annual
average growth in GNF of 2,2 per cent; France achieved 3.5 per cent, Italy 5.3
per cent and Germany 6.5 per cent.{19} Linked to this was the fact that
Britain's share of world trade was declining and that, again compared to other
industrial nations, capital investment was relatively low. As the crises
deepened and became more frequent, and as the need to respond to the 'political
market'{20) became, therefore, more imperative the result was the well-
documented economic cycles of 'stop-go'.
So, once the economy was at full-stretch its performance was found wanting.
What demand management was seemingly unable to achieve was high growth
without inflation, which in turn put some pressure on the external value of
sterling. In effect the Government was therefore to some extent forced to
choose betwwen the two. Inflation could be reduced by dampening down demand
in the economy, but this had an adverse demand on growth rates. There was,
however, one way out of the circle, namely intervention on the supp side of
the economy to increase the economy's capacity for growth without creating
serious inflation. Indeed 1956 did witness an attempt at intervention on the
supply side when the Government sought to negotiate a policy of voluntary wage
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restraint (which included an otfer to restrain prices), but which foundered
tnrougt. TUC opposition {21) In any case the relatively poor economic growth
rates, even when the economy was operating at full capacity, indicated the
fundamental structural nature of the problems facing the economy. However,
insofar as these problems were only partially perceived and understood and
because of the support for voluntarism in the economy, the Government remained
largely committed in the 1950s to relying largely on instruments of demand
management, The result of this was an attempt to balance inflationary
pressures against the need for growth which produced the response of 'stop-go'
measures. Government was, therefore, unable to ever escape the problems of
having to trade-off growth against inflation, never mind the more fundamental
questions hanging over the economy's structural capacity for growth. Thus as
the i5Os drew to a close we see an increasing pressure building up for the
Government to move into supply-side intervention. But such pressures posed a
problem for government in that they represented a challenge to the assuxnpton
that governmental intervention should and could be largely restricted to
demand intervention. Within this challenge were potential tensions between
pressures to influence the supply side in some effective manner to achieve
higher growth and the value that was widely shared and placed upon
voluntarism in economic and industrial arrangements. So rather than taking the
route of supply-side intervention, the Government chose instead to develop a
more flexible and sophisticated approach to demand management. These included
"much heavier reliance on selective hire purchase controls, fiscal policy and
direct instructions to the banks, a 'price plateau' for nationalised
±naustry...and a propaganda war to achieve 'restraint'..."{22}
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Significantly, there was no pressure for a change in the Government's approach
to the management of the economy troni within industry. There existed a general
consensus between both sides of industry and government about the
desirablility of voluntarism and hence the undesirability of intervention at
tne micro level. The trade unions - and in particular the TUC - were concerned
to preserve their autonomous posltion, especially in relation to collective
bargaining but also relative to other areas such as industrial training.
Voiuntarism was congruent with the pursuit oflabour's interests insofar as it
jeft them relatively unfettered at a time when their industrial strength was
high. In part, the Government's acquiescence to such autonomy was due to a
desire to achieve harmony and industrial peace{23} and secure the 'necessary'
cooperation of the unions in the management of the economy. Indeed in the
early l950s the government had taken a great deal of trouble to cultivate good
relations with the unions.{24) And despite worsening relations after 1955,C25)
which began to lead some Conservatives to claim that the price of industrial
peace was too high and could not be sustained by voluntarism,{26) neither
Government or the unions were disposed to place too much strain upon the
limited collaboration that existed.{27)
Similarly, employers were, in the main, able to pursue their own interests in
the context of a voluntarist approach, perhaps not surprisingly if one accepts
the view taken by Harris that:{28)
"business and Government in the period considered here shared
common assumptions. They tended to identify the same sorts of
things as problems, to describe those problems in the same way, and
to propose the same sorts of solutions. This is not to say that,
from time to time, there were not differences in emphasis, nor that
the Government did not diverge radically from opinion in one section
of business or one company, but only that business as a collective,
was more often at one with Government."
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Essentially then, the picture that emerges is one where the trade unions
vigorousLy sought to defend the status quo, willing to 'collaborate' with
government where the status quo was not under threat but refusing to
collaborate where it was, or might be{29) and where industry (in particular as
representea by the FBI) viewed its role as politically 'neutral' and adopted, in
the main, a policy of 'resposible cooperation' built upon the consultative
procedures established during and after the war, but at the same time
distanced itself from governinent{301 bringing its influence to bear in matters
of policy execution rather than formulation: and of Government also in some
senses maintaining its distance from producer groups in that, seeking to
control the economy through the mechanisms of demand management it did not,
in general{3l) have to enterinto a bargaining or ecbange relationship with
such groups.
Thus, throughout the 1950s there existed a situation where, despite increasing
evidence of economic difficulties and therefore increasing pressures to greater
intervention, the Government continued to prefer solutions based on voluntary
arrangements. Faith in market solutions had not yet been sufficiently shaken
to require some different course of action, Perhaps there was still a belief-
cum-hope that the problems of economic performance were temporary rather than
deeply embedded. In any case, such a stance was widely supported in industry. It
took the sterling crisis of 1961 to bring the Government around to the view
that the achievement of its economic objectives was also contingent upon some
more direct form of intervention to influence supply. As we shall see in the
final section this manifested itself in the 'dash for planning' although even
then the spectre of voluntarism was not readily shaken off. It was, of course,
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within this changed outlook that proposals for direct intervention into the
supply of trained manpower were being formulated. We therefore turn in the
foiowing section to review the provlslon of industrial training prior to 1961
aric. examine its relationship to prevailing views about the role of the state in
the economy and the way in which changes in such views were to herald, what
:n 5ose respects represented, a significant shift in attitudes towards the
Btate's role in industrial training.
IHD1JSTRIAL TRAIRIG 1945-1961
The views concerning the role of the state in the economy which prevailed in
this period are clearly reflected in the area of industrial training for most
of the 1950s. Writing in 1958 about the work of the Ministry of Labour and
iational Service, its former Permanent Secretary Sir Godfrey Ince stated that
"the Ministry has always accepted as a first principle that the primary
responsibility for training workers must rest with the employer. Government
training is intended to be only supplementary..."{32) Although employers might
be encouraged, even exhorted by government to improve training arrangements
at no time during the 1950s did the Government seek - or seem inclined - to
intervene directly in order to influence the distribution or quality of
manpower. Indeed, insofar as it existed, Government involvement in Training
declined following the post-war resettlement period, and there is little to
indicate from events or accounts of the period up to the late 1950s, that
government regarded the supply of manpower as an unduly problematic factor in
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economic performance, even despite it having some knowledge of labour
snortages in certain skilled occupations. Where Government was involved it was
initially to cope with demands created by and following the war and with the
young and disabled groups. Figures provided by Ince show that the peak period
was 1947 when 32,000 training places were provided in Government Training
Centres, (GTCs) which fell to approximately 2,000 in GTCs and 1,000 in
Residential Colleges for seriously disabled in the summer of 1959.{33) In fact,
the fall was not quite as gradual as these figures suggest, for by 1951 the
number of training places at GTCs had been reduced to about 4,000 (bc cit).
Up to 1951 most effort bad been concentrated upon training in the building
crafts, but after 1951 it was concentrated upon the requirements of ex-regular
servicemen and the disabled.
Government Training Centres were the most important form of what little
training intervention existed during this period. These originated in the
Ministry of Munitions during the First World War, and their subsequent 'growth'
and 'development' had been subject to considerable fluctuations, being largely
the result of ad-hoc responses to changing social and economic, not to mention
military, circumstances. They had been taken over in 1919 by the Ministry of
Labour and Ministry of Pensions for the resettlement of disabled ex-servicemen
and thereafter for training the able-bodied unemployed.(34) At the beginning of
the Second World War there were sixteen GTCs which again were converted to
munitions training and their number increased to a peak of 38 during the war
although towards the war's end they had declined to 17. However, the demand
for labour in the building trades, in the mining, agriculture and cotton
industries in the immediate post-war period led to another rapid expansion of
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the GTC to over eighty.{35 But as this demand was seen to be met they were
again reduced in number so that by 1961 only 14 remained.{36)
Therefore, during the post-war period the Governmnet Training Centres
continued as an ad hoc response to a limited number of specific and serious
bottlenecks in the supply of skilled labour. In any case, as the decline in
their numbers indicates, their main contribution came in the immediate post
war era. They did not represent anything approaching a comprehensive system
of intervention into training. Although the 1944 Employment White Paper had
made reference to the re-training needs of industry in general and the
consequent need for cooperation between employers and trade unions, within the
prevailing assumptions about the efficacy of the market and the need for
voluntarism no such system was established.
The nearest thing approaching this was the 1948 Employment and Training Act.
The Act which was an outcome of the 'Ince Report'{37) dealt largely with issues
of the youth employment service and "had little effect on vocational training
in industry and commerce."C38 Such other action as government did take was in
tne main confined to attempting to persuade industry to improve - largely
craft skill - training practices. This was carried cut through the advisory
machinery established by the Ministry of Labour. The two main bodies involved
in this regard were the National Joint Advisory Council (NJPIC) and its
executive committee, the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). They had been
established in 1939 and 1940 respectively and comprised representatives of the
British Employers' Confederation <BEC), the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and
toe nationalised industries. The NJAC advised the Ilinister oil industrial
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relations and manpower issues. Where training matters were considered by the
NJAC these primarily related to skills and the apprenticeship system.
Reflecting such an emphasis, in 1945 the JCC published a report - accepted by
the Minister - that "The Ministry of Labour and National Service should
encourage in each major industry, where one does not already exist, the
establishment of a National Joint Apprenticeship and Training Council or other
appropriate machinery..."{39) The effect of such prescriptions is difficult to
gauge as there is a dearth of information relating to training during this
period. It is, however, reasonable to assume that persuasion or exhortation
made little contribution to improving either the quantity or quality of
training provided by employers. Hence the need for the Minister to issue a
reminder in 1947 about the 3CC Report and the invitation by the NJAC in 1951
to a number of industries to examine whether craft training could he reformed
in terms of scope, length and entry age.(40) In 1957 the Ministers of Labour
and Employment - lain Macleod and Lord Hailsham - whilst optimistically
suggesting that significant advances had been made in establishing national
training and apprenticeship schemes, both made reference to the 'gap' in
implementation. Macleod stated that "Local implementation of nationally agreed
schemes is sometimes inadequate" whilst Hailshani claimed "the implementation
of these [schemes] has still in many areas to be worked out. .."{41)
It is difficult to know upon what grounds even such limited claims were made,
for a report published in 1956 by the National Institute of Industrial
Psychology (Nil?) on In-Plant Training in Britain{42) observed that "only a
very small proportion of the firms in the country have any organised form of
training for semi-skilled workers more complex than TWI [Training Within
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Industry] arid.. in certain industries it was impossible to find even the very
few examples needed br this survey."{43) Indeed, though the study did go on to
draw some tentative conclusions, it stated that they could not be considered to
be a proper evaluation of training schemes. And writing in 1959, Liepmari
argued: (44)
"It is a much reported fact that over one hundred National Schemes
have been established. But this mumber does not tell us much; the
'industries and sections of Industry' in which Schemes have been
agreed do not conform to any existing industrial classification and
cannot > therefore, be related to a total number of industries and
sections of industry.. Several important industries figure once or
even twice in the list of National Schemes, hut not with reference
to the occupations specific to the industry.. ,The wording and manner
of listing oi the National Schemes invite misinterpretation in
various respects. The most frequent form is a statement that over
one hundred schemes have been agreed > with the implication that the
number is a high one > whereas in fact it is meanigless."(pp 43-4)
Apart from those mentioned above >
 the only other area where the state had any
direct input in training was in the provision, by the J'Iinistry of Labour, of
Training Within Industry (TWI) which were courses for instructors, supervisors
and apprentice trainers. Such courses were established after the Second World
War and were provided free until 1962. By 1957 it was estimated that
approximately 600,000 had gone through this system.{45)
Thus, we can see that in the l950s state involvement in training existed very
much at the margin. By and large, where there was direct intervention in
training provision this had more to do with meeting changing, specific, social
or welfare needs, rather than economic objectives. One explanation of this lies
in the lack of information available: until 1963, apart from apprentice
training, there were no statistics available about the extent and form of
training undertaken within industry.{46) In other words bow far there was a
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training 'problem' and its nature was unclear. There were certainly indications
that all was not well, but these were clearly not regarded as sufficiently
serious to justify the state taking on more direct responsibility for improving
trainlng performance. In any case, a more prominent role for the state would
have conflicted with the value placed upon the autonomy of private actors,
which in this particular ares translated into the standards of voluntarism -
that industry, not governments, should have responsibility for industrial
training - and the efficacy of the market in the allocation of labour. Such
standards were not effectively challenged therefore while government could
content itself in the belief that there was no major problem in the training
field. So, not only was state intervention not desirable on normative grounds,
it was also unnecessary on practical grounds. Problems existed certainly, but
on both counts, the consensus view was that governments' role should be the
generally passive one of exhortation.
This generally passive prescription on the state's role in training would have
been fully understandable if the market was in practice proving effective, but
in fact such views persisted in spite of some indications to the contrary.
Allowing for limitations of the available statistics it has been estimated that
the l950s was a decade of serious shortages of skilled labour,The situation up
to 1958 can only be inferred from such figures, but Mukherjee for example,
suggests that the ratio of unemployed to vacancies for skilled workers of 1:4.9
in 1956 can be considered typical of the period 1950-57.{47) More reliable -
but still limited due to the method of compilation - information is available
for the years after 1956,{48) and based on this Mukherjee presented a picture
of national ekill shortages across a range of occupations:
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TABLE 1
Unerup 1 oyed and skilled vcc i 	 C: ratio) and 'excess' demand
(number) in the nain manual skilled occupational groups, 1956, 1960 and 1961
1961(a)	 1960(a)	 1956(a)
	
'Excess'	 Ratio of	 'Excess'	 Ratio of	 'Excess'	 Ratio of
	
Demand	 Ijnemployed	 Demand	 unemployed	 Demand	 Unemployed
(b)to Vacancies	 c:b)to Vacancies	 (b:Cto Vacancies
Draugntnren	 1,756	 1:5,1	 2,069	 1:6,6	 4,757	 1:22,2
Engineering and
allle'3 occupations
	
18,509	 1:3,3
	
18,737	 1:3,5
	
21,550	 1:5,1
Bu ii ' in';
occupations
	
11,788	 1:4,4
	
13,313	 1:4,9
	
10,117	 1:3,6
Vehicle building
occupations
	
805	 1:3,9
	
990	 1:4,7
	
1,064	 1:3,5
Woodor: ing
occupations
	
645	 1:3,1
	
614	 1:2,9
	
444	 1;2,2
Pr intl n
occ ups t ions
	
79	 1:1,4
	
176	 1:1,9	 411
(a)in September each year,
(u)number: vacancies less unemployed
Source: S Mu:herjee Chngig Manp'et Needs p 12,
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For a variety of reasons the above table probably represents an
underestimation of skill shortages during the period. For instance, some
employers will recruit directly without notifying vacancies to employment
exchanges; some applicants may be referred to firms that have not notified the
existence of specific vacancies; and of course national figures do not show up
regional imbalances and possible acute local shortages. Although the figures
disclose an overall decline in the extent of 'excess' demand over the three
periods, this may not represent an accurate picture of the problem. J'ukherjee
attributes the 'decline' not to any increase in intake of apprentices or total
supply of those formally qualified for those occupations. Instead he suggests
that this can be explained in the first place by the fact that unemployment
rose slightly over the period. Further, combined with this was the probability
that - particularly in engineering - employers' use of the employment exchange
system diminished because of its inability to meet demand, itself reflecting a
shortfall in supply. The shortfall it was claimed at the time was the result of
union restrictions on entry into skilled occupations.Employers therefore turned
to other methods of recruitment, in particular substitutes for time-served
craftesmen. This took the form of the upgrading, through on-the-job training,
of lesser qualified men. This thesis is supported, for example, by statistics
whion show a rise in skilled engineering occupations in the expanding services
sector where unionisation was much less pronounced, and where therefore union
restrictions on intake were weaker. In short, the existing evidence would not
suggest any significant increase in training during this period.
*	 *	 *	 *	 *
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One problem, as just indicated, which was held (indeed continues to be held.) to
hive an adverse affect on the supply of skilled labour was the control
traditionally exercised by trade unions over conditions of entry into skilled
occupations. There is no doubt that this came to be regarded as increasingly
problematic at least by government, if not industry. Even had the Government
deemed it desirable to intervene on these grounds, problems of political
feasibility were clearly perceived as a significant barrier. The age of entry,
tne length of training and the rates of pay were generally considered as being
matters for determination by unions in bargaining with employers. Fairly
obviously, control over supply means control over pay and employment prospects
which generally can be regarded as being the principal concern of trade
unions. The "quality and skill content of craft training is far less important
for this trade union purpose than the ability to regulate the number of
workers entering the system of training the outcome of which is the
entitlement to secure membership of a particular occupational category." With
some qualifications the "emphasis remains clearly attached to the issue of
numbers; and it is rarely that trade unions show any deep attachment to
questions about the content and quality of training.H{49} As we shall in due
cou;•e see such arguments retain currency today, together with criticisms
about the rigidities such a system creates. The ability of trade unions to
impose such restrictions is clearly greater at a time when employment levels
are high as in the 1950s. This is more so given a government committed to
voluntarism and 'keeping the peace' in industrial relations. The relative
strength of trade unions at this time was increasingly regarded as causing
inflationary pressures through rising wage costs that outstripped the growth
in productivity, especially in occupations where labour was scarce. But given
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he Government's non- interventionist line attempts at directly tackling the
problem were low key, operating through the Council for Prices, Productivity
and Incomes (CPPI) which made general prouncements about 'what the economy
could afford' in increased incomes. As Crouch notes: "The CFPI was not intended
to be an instrument of state intervention in income determination."{O But the
Council's first two reports gave support to the notion that to eradicate
inflation unemployment would have to be allowed to rise, and it was
instrumental in persuading the Government at the end of the l950s to use
deflation as a means of tackling cost-push inflationJ5l) While such a strategy
did provide some check on inflation by reducing trade union bargaining power,
it also had adverse consequences for aggregate activity and growth and did
nothing directly to tackle the problems of training. Into the 1960s this
strategy was superseded by attempts at greater intervention into wage
bargaining.
The response of employers to labour shortages was similarly not one which
sought to overcome the problem by provision of additional training. Instead
they 'contributed' to the wage-push inflationary situation through "the
tendency for employers to 'bid up' wage earnings as they competed for scarce
iabour."{52) And as Mddlemass notes, "to keep production lines active and
sustain export orders, they employers] tended to pay high wage increases in
such areas as engineering, where labour was scarce, and to hoard labour by
overmanning, in order to even out the peaks and troughs of the annual
cycle." {53)
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Nevertheless there was, within this generally complacent outlooK, one
development which indicated a growing awareness and concern by political and
inctustrial leaders that more positive action was required. In 1Q56
	 a sub-
committee of the Ministry of Labour's ational Joint Advisory Council was
established to enquire into:{54)
the arrangements for the training of young workers in industry, with
particular reference to the adequacy of intake into apprenticeship
and other forms of training, in the light of the expected increase
in the number of persons entering employment and the need to ensure
an adequate supply of trained workers for future needs."
The ensuing Report, 'Training for Skill' - usually referred to as the Carr
Report - was published in 1958. However, the impetus behind the Report owed
more to the realisation that there would be a 'bulge' in the number of school-
leavers in the early 1960s as a result of the increased birth rates following
the Second World War, than to any greatly enhanced concern about the
importance of training in meeting national economic objectives. Ionetheless, in
considering how best to tackle the problem of the 'bulge', the committee was
aso having to consider wider issues of labour supply. These ranged over the
problems of	 'poaching'; restrictions on entry age and length of
apprenticeships; the lack of recognised standards; and the links between
education and industry including the dividing line between general education
and vocational training. In line, however, with prevailing views regarding the
division of responsibilities between government and industry, what was
proposed was the establishment of a voluntary, advisory body which would
"collect and disseminate information about those aspects of training which are
common to more than one industry."{55) This body was to be the Industrial
Training Council (ITC) which, the Carr Report went on, would be a "small
Council.. consisting	 of	 representatives	 of	 the appropriate	 industrial
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organisations who would be selected because of their knowledge of, and
interest in, the training of young people.. .The Council would have no executive
powers. Its functions would be to help, encourage, and if necessary, to exhort.
But the responsibility for training in each individual industry would rest, as
now, on the industry concerned,"{56)
How far the committee believed that the establishment of such a Council would
be succesful in ensuring the implementation of its proposals - and hence
overcome the problems it had identified - is very much open to question. It
did cast an eye over practices in other countries such as France and
Germany:{57) hut whilst it did succeed in analysing some of the key problems
in training provision, its main objective - or perhaps its faith - appeared to
reside in the desire to ensure that, whatever the future arrangements, these
should fall firmly under the control of industry. Thus, as Grove was to point
out in 1962 "The Carr Committee was an 'interested' body, which perhaps
explains the complacency with which it regarded the manner of handling the
problems in other countries., .So far, little progress has been made towards
implementing its modest and often vaguely phrased rcommendations."C58} He
might have added that industry widely subscribed to the prevailing
volutaristic ethos and hence would not be inclined towards some more rigorous
solution with its implication of state involvement. Essentially, the Report was
about persuading industry to change its attitudes to training, presumably in
the belief that 011cc the rationality of the arguments had been revealed to
those responsible they would see the error of - and mend - their ways. This
was apparent in, for example, the argument over 'poaching' which was regarded
as a major cause of skill shortages because many employers found it cheaper to
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employ adults trained elsewhere than to bear the cost of training thernselve5.
The Carr Report found this 'irresponsible' and wondered "whether industries
have sufficiently reckoned the cost of not training - in terms of increasec
labour turnover, lower output, greater scrap, and the like."{59) Perry seeks to
explain the existence of poaching by claiming that:{60)
"the bulk of industry, the typical firm, had not reckoned the cost of
training: it had not even got past the starting point of
establishing criteria for evaluating the results of training. It was
not familiar with modern training techniques; and so its attempts at
training were frequently less effective than they should have been.
Vhen this happened it often did not know where to turn for advice.
Most companies were too absorbed in the many pressing problems of
tlie day to cast more than an anxious and helpless glance of their
training needs, and then solved their problem by resorting to the
perfectly legitimate, but what the Committee called "irresponsible",
expedient of recruiting their trained personnel in the open labour
market"
Anxiety and helplessness inthe face of pressing problems as an explanation of
poaching stretches the imagination rather far, A more feasible explanation
might be that employers were indeed aware of the costs and benefits of
training - in particular training in general or transferable skills - but some
of them chose not to bear the costs while they were able to enjoy the
benefits. Insofar as training in general or transferable skills could he
regarded as a collective good, then employers were being individually rational
'free riders'.{61)
So we can see that during the 1950s labour market problems, (ignoring the
wider issues of industrial relations){62) insofar as they were diagnosed, were
associated with 'bottlenecks' in the economy due to the shortage of skilled
labour, which imposed constraints on output during upswings in the economy.
This situation was generally viewed as being caused by two principal factors:
1.' the uncoordinated nature of trainiLg provision and; 2) the restrictive
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 108
Chapter Three	 Industrial Training 1945-1962
practices of trade unions - which in many instances were not opposed by
employers. Despite an increasing emphasis being placed on the importance of
labour supply to economic performance,{63) the response of the state - and
indeed industry - was to persist in attempting to find solutions based on the
standards of voluntarism and allocation through the market, State involvement
therefore amounted to Government support for the ITO (though it is important
to stress that it was not a Government body) and the provision of a limited
level of training through the GTCs. Such provision was, however, dominated by
social rather than economic objectives. As we shall see in the following
section, however, these standards were to become subject to increasing
challenges as unfavourable economic conditions persisted and as the climate of
opinion within industry towards state involvement also altered,
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING IDEAS FOR THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONONY
The situation at the latter end of the 1950s then was one in which the mixed
economy had clearly become consolidated, in that the Conservative Government
had made no significant attempts to shift the boundary between the public and
private sectors in industry or welfare provision. In accepting this division
the Government also accepted responsibilty for managing the economy through
the use of fiscal and monetary instruments directed towards setting the
aggregate level of demand. However, what may be discerned is a gradually
emerging concern to do with inadequacies of supply in respect of the behaviour
of the economy: the economic objectives of full employment, low inflation
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balance of payments equilibrium and economic growth were not capable of
simultaneous achievement through demand management. Market forces were not in
fact acting to ensure that supply matched demand. These changes began in the
mid-1950s, accelerated towards the end of the decade, and culminated in the
early l9Os in what is generally termed the the 'planning mood',{64) but which
we might also term as 'production' or 'supply management', which can be
regarded as the first serious, comprehensive attempt to intervene to influence
the productive process throughout the economy or at least in important sectors
of the economy. It must be emphasised, however, that the move to supply
management was a very gradual and hesitant process. One reason being that
this raised issues concerning the compatibility of such a move with
voluritarisin, the role of the market in such intervention - either 'market
enhancement' or 'market, displacement' - and the dependence of the state on
private bodies and actors for the implementation of its interventionist
policies.
So, although the l950s may be characterised as a decade where voluntarism
reigned supreme and governmental 'intervention' rested very largely on the
intermttment exhortation of producers in the market, there was a qualitative
shift in the latter half of the l9SOs that presaged the changes of the early
l960s. This shift we might term the 'formalisation of exhortation'. Although
not a governmental body itself the establishment in 1958 of the Industrial
Training Council may be regarded as an early instance of this process of
fonnalisation in that the ITC had the support of government, including modest
financial contributions. Instances can he seen in other - and to some extent
related - policy areas, for example, the setting up of the Council for Prices,
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Productivity and Incomes (CPPI) in 1957 following the sterling crisis. Wnilst
its worh was "pitched entirely at the exhortatory or normative level",{65) the
FPI was important in the shaping of policy in the early 1960s by "persuading
the government to switch direction towards an incomes policy" that had
implications for "the possibility of involvement strategies emerging from the
pursuit of a common national interest; the possibility of at least an active if
not a coercive state.. "'(66)
Exortating producers to encourage industrial decision making that was more
compatible with governmental objectives was also stepped up over a range of
matters to with investment, exports, wage restraint and training, as well as
the supply of manpower generally. Although this increased concern was an
important factor in shaping the direction of change in the early 1960s it did
not in the late l950s involve any major structural or substantial changes in
the government's overall approach which was "to set the rules but not to
become involved in a positive, creative, ongoing sense with playing the
game... .lt was left to industry to operate on its own within the framework
provided by government."{67) Nevertheless, the indications of this increased
and wider concern were evident in a variety of govrnmental measures to which
Young himself refers. For example "the use of public purchasing power to
reduce the number of aircraft companies, and the introduction of the 1959
Cotton Act. Incentives were offered in this case for modernisation, and the
orderly elimination of excess capacity. There are many other examples in the
later 195Dm and early 1960s of the provision of finance for industry and
commerce, and of government sponsored reorganisation and reconstruction,"{68)
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Put another way, then, the adoption of 'planning' by the Conservative
Government from l6l onwards was, in many ways, not quite the radical shift
in policy that some commentators have ascribed it to but an outcome of the
percetveo. failure of more orthodox economic management. Rather it represented
a step on the way towards direct intervention in industry. As Polanyi puts it:
"The story of planning in the 1960s may be regarued as a kind of progressive
'escalation' from the highly tentative and very unofficial first endeavours of
the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes.., to the more definite and
clear-cut semi-official exercise in indicative planning begun by the creation
of the National Economic Development Council in 196l..."<69} It was, of course,
a break with the past in terms of the creation a range of institutions for
intervention, but the mode of intervention, as we shall see, was very firmly
rooted in the assumptions of the l950s regarding the division of
responsibilities - both in terms of ownership and control - between industry
and the state, Just as it applied to economic and other forms of industrial
planning, so also it applied to labour market planning and the provision of
industrial training, both in terms of the form that policies took and the
nature of the interventions in terms of the continued reliance on persuasion
and exhortation which was inherent in them. Planning, in this context certainly
implied a more active (though of course not necessarily interventionist) state
but one also where government could still maintain its role as referee.
Thus the failure of formalised exhortation in the late 1950s to achieve a
Da!ance between supply and demand and a comparably favourable rate of
economic growth led to the 'institutionalisation' of exhortation by way of the
various planning mechanisms established after 1961 and in particular, of
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course, the setting up of/National Economic Development Council (NED. . As
sost observers have noted, however, the 'planning mood' was not confined to
government but some important sectors of industry which, as they became
increasingly disillusioned with existing policy, became enamoured of the
notion of indicative planning. The turning point here is usually regarded as
being the FBI's Brighton Conference of 1Q60 which:{70)
"marked the culmination of an effort to assess Britain's economic
policies in view of the country's continuing inability to achieve a
smoother and more rapid rate of economic growth.. .But more rapid
growth rested on a more efficiently organised economy. Some form of
organisation, some form of economic planning, anathema in British
industry for nearly a decade, was now viewed by growing numbers of
industrial figures as the necessary foundation for more rapid
growth. By the early 1960s many had come to believe that a type of
planning could be devised and, indeed, was being used by the French,
that was non-imperative, provided for a maximum of industrial
influence on the Govrnment, and still retained a market-based
economy. The almost magic solution of 'indicative planning' bridged
the gap between the free market and a policy of sustained economic
growth for British industry. Indicative planning appeared to make
both possible at once"
This was true for Government just as much as for induthialists. "A
Conservative Government, at its wits end, clutched at planning as one more
e:pedient to evade unpopular policy choices."C71) Planning in Britain 'caught
on' in the early 1960s because, just as with Keynesianisin a decade or so
earlier, it seemed to promise relatively painless decision making - it offered
something to those actors whose cooperation government viewed as being
necessary to the achievement of its industrial and economic objectives and at
the same time fitted prevailing conservative values. Reflecting this mood Roy
Harrod stated in 1Q61 that:{72)
°It has been suggested that before agreement could be secured in
sufficiently wide circles among workers for anything like a more
rational wages policy, it would be necessary to have something in
the nature of a planned economy. It is hoped that this would not
mean detailed direction and control. Rather it might be sufficient
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to nave something in the nature of the French plan, which has been
flaying some influence on thinking here, the implementation of which
is largely on a voluntary basis. Some compromise of this sort might
not be too far from the Ideology of a Conservative Government, and
yet go far enough to make those called upon to implement a more
rational wages policy feel that the whole economic effort of the
country had a more rational guidance."
Nevertheless, not all relevant participants were immediately converted to the
form of machinery proposed. The Cabinet's acceptance of an indepencent body
such as the NEDC was not straightforward. As Leruez claims, despite a
Conservative Party that now contained "fewer and fewer of the old liberals,
while many of the new generation of back-benchers tended to see themselves as
spokesmen for a new middle class of technicians and engineers"{73) not opposed
to some form of planning to secure higher growth rates and living standards,
the Cabinet resisted its establishment. It was only folowing the 'crisis
budget' of 21 July 1961 that the Cabinet, being presented with something of a
.fait accompli, came to accept the coming into being of what in typically
derisory Eritisb fashion became known as 'Neddy'.
Sinilarly the TUC took a long time in becoming convinced of the benefits of
membership of 'Neddy'. This reticence was not, however, the result of
ideological stances but because "they did not fuliy trust the government.. In
fact the TUG was in two minds. It was attracted by Chancellor Lloyd's idea
because this offered them an opportunity to influence economic policy, but it
was at the same time worried that acceptance might be seen as condoning the
pay pause or any subsequent introduction of an incomes policy."{74 it was, in
etfect, at least in early discussions of planning, industrial employers who
were keenest on the introduction of 'French-style', or indicative planning.
Interestingiy enough, Leruez suggests that French civil servants - for whatever
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reason - seemed particularly anxious to convert the British. Industrialists,
according to Hayward, believed that planning "would simultaneously increase
husinesn influence on public policy and actually reduce government interference
in industry. They were encouraged in this belief by French planners who
emphasised the indicative' aspects of their work so as not to frighten British
business men and civil servants who consulted them,"{'75)
The composition of 'Ieddy' is worthy of note in that it reflected the
government's preoc.c.upation with involving those actors, or at least their
representatives, central to achieving economic growth and the removal of
oDstacles to industrial production
	 Its membership was limited to
representatives of government (4), private industry (6), the TUC (6), the
nationalised industries (2) plus two independent experts: it excluded
representatives of other economic interests, for example, the City, agriculture
or unions outside the TUC.C76)
CONCLUS IONS
In conclusion, the assumptions of governnlEnt, concerning the role of state -
particularly as it related to economic and industrial matters - was different
in some important respects by the early 1960s from what it had been a decade
or o earlier. The significant change was the acceptance by government of the
need to exercise a greater degree of influence over the behaviour of private
producers if faster rates of economic growth were to be achieved. Such an
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outlook came to he held alongside and did not displace the view that the
market was ultimately the most efficient allocator of resources. In other
words, the outlook tended to be more clearly orientated towards 'market
enhancement' rather than 'market displacement'. Increased influence in this
context means, therefore, that governmental action would be directed towards
supplementing	 or enhancing the market and not towards supplanting or
displacing it. The difficulty with this view is, of course, that there is an
Inherent dilemma involved in seeking to extend govermental intervention so as
to bring industry more into line with 'national' objectives without it sooner
or later involving control and displacing the market. Attempts to resolve these
tensions led, in the main, to the development of economic and other policies
including industrial training - in which state influence could be brought to
bear whilst at the same time maintaining a reasonably clear distinction
between the roles of the public and private sectors. The most obvious
institutional expression of this being the establishment of the I(EDC: a forum
in which the government could seek to influnce the decisions of private actors
without intervening directly itself. Therefore, between 1951 and 1961
governments moved from being primarily involved in the management of demand
to, additionally, the management of supply. But this rested on the continuing
belief in the ultimate efficacy of the market and the value of voluntarism. The
government's response was to change its mode of influencing private decisions
from the ad hoc to the increasingly more fornalised and ultimately regulatory.
And as we shall see in the following chapter such views - together with rather
more specific ones concerning the working of the labour market - were
extremely important in shaping the policy, and indeed its subsequent
implementation, in the area of industrial training.
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In short, the difficulties encountered in finding effective solutions to
economic and industrial problems presented a challenge to the standard that
the supply side could, and should, be left to the market. Such a challenge led
to a modification of the prevailing standards such that the state now had a
legitimate role to play in removing obstacles to and enhancing the market.
Such a role was, however, an indirect one and was to be based upon securing
the voluntary cooperation of producer groups: ultimate responsibility for
decisions about production was still held to belong to industry.
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POLICY CHANGE: THR 1964- IND UTR IAL
TRA IN ING ACT
In the previous chapter we examined the increasing trend of government to
become involved in intervention in the supply side of the economy. As we shall
further iee, industrial training formed a part of this wider trend with the
passing of the 1964 Industrial Training Act. That being so, it remains
imperative to examine in detail the actual process that led to the change in
the state's role in training provision represented by the Act, not only to
explain why this change occurred and to detail its incidence, but also as an
important explanatory factor of the form of intervention that was finally
adopted. While industrial training was part of a wider trend of supply side
intervention, it is important to note that, compared to other cases like
economic planning or incomes policy, intervention in training was a much less
salient political issue. It further differed from these in the related respect
that the process leading to change was largely an internal one - that is
internal to the public authorities, There were no powerful outside interests
pushing government, reluctantly or otherwise, into intervening in this area,
and no effective lobby for government to draw support from.
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Before going on to look in detail at the policy that finally emerged, however,
what we need to do is to clearly establish what constituted the basis of the
broad change in outlook on the part of the Government towards industrial
training. The clearest expression of this changed outlook is to be found in the
1962 White Paper. U) From there we can go on to consider why this change
occurred, This will involve a consideration of the processes leading to change
and an assessment of the role, not only of the public authorities, but of other
actors within these processes. Thereafter, we shall consider in more detail the
final form of the policy and programmes as contained in the 1964 Industrial
Training Act, A comparison of the provisions of the Act with the proposals
contained in the White Paper will allow for an appraisal of the extent to which
the Government's original intentions prevailed over any externally exerted
pressures.
THE CRAIGED OUTLOOK OF GOVERL)(EJT TOVARDS ILDUSTRIAL TRAIJING
The decision by the Government to intervene in the area of industrial training
might be interpreted as a response to an increasingly salient political issue
that had 'arrived' on the political agenda. Recent studies in the field of
policy analysis have utilised the concept of the political agenda to explain
changing governmental action and sought to address such questions as how and
why issues arrive on the political agenda and, once there, how they are
'processed' by policy makers in the overall management of the that agenda.{2)
These seem pertinent questions to consider In relation to the decision to
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 123
Chapter Four
	
The 1964 Industrial Training Act
legislate on the issue of industrial training. There are though, some
difficulties associated with the concept which render its application to
training policy during this period not altogether helpful. The customary
treatment in the literature is that the political agenda - or policy agenda{3)
- is made up of those issues to which policy makers are having in some way or
other to respond. But lack of a reasonably precise definition of the
constitu.ent components, and hence the boundaries, of the political agenda make
It problematical to readily differentiate between an issue that is on the
agenda and one that is not. What in particular often remains unclear in this
respect is the distinctive nature of responses made by government to an issue
that allows it to be identified as being on the agenda. The heart of this
problem lies in the sheer variety of responses that a government can make. If
for instance, a group of cat fanciers (4) claimed that a national governmental
body should be established to enhance the welfare of cats and the government
responded by refusing to entertain such a request it could hardly be claimed
that	 this was an issue on the political agenda. On the other hand, simply
because a government does not respond positively is not a case for discounting
such action for it may "be absurd to deny that by studied inaction in certain
situations governments are expressing something that is just as much a public
policy as any big spending decision."{5) Consistent purposive inaction by
government, especially against pressures to the contrary, can in some respects
be regarded as a 'policy'. Thus, it may be possible to talk of there being a
policy on industrial training prior to the 192 White Paper which, in turn,
might imply that the issue of training had been or was placed on the political
agenda some considerable time before the early 1960s.
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What, therefore, appears to be of central importance is not that an issue
commands attention or a response per se but that the government's assumptions
and standards about a particular issue are coming under some form of effective
challenge such that they are either undergoing change or the government is
having to reaffirm and possibly maintain theni by some form of purposive
action (eg a 'placebo policy'){6) and/or inaction (eg sitting out 'the issue
attention cycle') {7) Such a challenge can occur because of either concrete
pressures from outside or from internal processes, or both. Furthermore, a
challenge can occur through a reasonably immediate, tangible series of events
like riots highlighting inner city decay and racial discriminationC8) or it
can be a reasonably gradual, drawn out process. Perhaps not surprisingly most
studies of the political agenda have foc.ussed upon issues that captured
attentiQn relatively rapidly and from external pressures; but we have to be
cognisant of the possibility that purposive action or inaction by government
may be the outcome of a rather different process.
Such is certainly the case in the examination of industrial training in the
early 1960s where the process of change was largely internal. In one sense
this is not altogether surprising given the absence of a clearly identifiable
'policy community' or network. It does perhaps mean though that such a
situation may have implications for policy output. Insofar as such internal
processes suggest the need for change then government retains greater
Initiative over the initial formulation and content of policy than where the
resultant changes have been the subject of a bargaining process within a
'policy community'. It may even be the case, as far as training was concerned,
that the authorities kept the issue of intervention largely out of any public
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debate in order to retain the initiative as and when intervention appeared
feasible, There is some evidence to support such a view f or in 1961 studies
were being carried out within the Ninistry of Labour into legislative options
on industrial training. Yet the Parliamentary Secretary at the time, Peter
Thomas, stated in Narch 1961 that: "For the time being the principle that the
main responsibility for providing industrial training lies with industry, as
endorsed by the Carr and Crowther Reports, must remain the basis of
Government policy... .It would be not only inopportune but disastrous if industry
were to reduce its efforts because it felt that the Government would step in
and take over training in the forseeable future...".{9) What we can clearly say
is that the 1952 White Paper and subsequent legislation indicated that the
government's standards had undergone some significant process of challenge,
though how significant remains to be elaborated. We shall now turn to examine
what these changed standards were.
A preliminary point to note is that the changed standards did not signify some
'quantum leap' in the Government's thinking about training. Indeed in respect
to some of them the Government had been expressing similar views for a number
of years (see chapter 3). The changes in effect represented a significant
modification to previously held standards such that the gap between the
existing and desired state of affairs was perceptibly wider by the early 1960s
than it had been in the previous decade. Thus greater weighting was attached
to closing this gap. What these changes were have been extrapolated from the
1962 White Paper, but before going on to discuss the standards they are set
out in summary form below.
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1. Industry should ultimately determine its own training needs;
decisions regarding the amount of training undertaken should
reside with industry.
2,	 The state should have a coordinating role in the training
market in line with national requirements of removing skill
shortages
3. The state should create the machinery necessary for the
effective coordination of industrial training.
4. The role of the state should be to influence and indicate
desired levels of training, not to determine them.
5. Influence upon industry to increase training provision should
be brought to bear through a system of financial incentives
and penalties.
6. The costs of training should be equitably distributed between
employers.
7. The state should have a role in inducing positive attitudes
amongst producers \towards the benefits of training.
8. Access to skills should be freely available, but that this
should be determined through collective bargaining between
employers and employees. Greater flexibility should, however, be
aided by bringing together employers and employees within the
coordinating machinery.
These standards were to set the broad framework for industrial training
policy. It is evident that they are fairly general and lack any real
specificity. Further, not all of them were of equal weight, and drawing upon
statements made in the White Paper and elsewhere, it is claimed that the
greatest weight was attached to numers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. As with other related
areas of intervention into supply, the policies derived from such standards
were meant to be indicative of the direction in which ameliorative action
needed to be taken. There does seem to have been an assumption built into the
above standards that as long as the obstacles to the achievement of a
satisfactory level of training were removed, then the problem would be
resolved. Such obstacles were seen as the poachers of skilled labour and the
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lack of satisfactory coordinating machinery. This probably explains the fact
that no incompatibility seems to have been admitted between the standards that
the determination of the total volume of training should be left to industry,
and that the amount and kind of training that was provided by industry should
be in line with national objectives.
So by 1962 the Government's view of the training problem was that the quality
and amount of training provided by industry were insufficient to meet national
economic and industrial needs. The most serious aspect of this being the
shortage of skilled workers that had existed since the war but which
increasingly had come to be seen as "an important factor in holding back the
rate of economic expansion. 0 {1O) This was viewed as particularly crucial given
that - despite some increase in the previous two years - it remained "doubtful
whether the number of new entrants into skilled occupations will be sufficient
to match future needs... .ET]echnological progress requires an increasing
proportion of trained and technical manpower in the working population, with a
correspondingly smaller demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour."{ll)
Priority should, therefore, be given to increasing and improving craft
apprentice training. {12)
Narket coordination was not therefore functioning in a way that would overcome
these problems which were considered to be thwarting the achievement of
macro-economic objectives. That is, there was one "serious weakness" in then
existing arrangements. This was that "the amount and quality of industrial
training are left to the unco-ordinated decisions of a large number of
individual firms,"{13) So, there was perceived to be a widening gap between
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 128
Chapter Four	 The 1964 IndustrIal Training Act
national and sectoral interests: that is, the sum of the interests of
individual industrial sectors did not add up to the national aggregated
economic interest. The result was a shortfall of appropriately trained workers.
What, therefore, had been effectively challenged was the belief that the market
would provide a 'self-correcting' mechanism for these 'imperfections'.
Therefore, given these imperfections and given the importance of industrial
training to the attainment of economic objectives, the previously held standard
that the state had only a marginal role, largely dictated by social objectives,
was changed to one whereby the state was seen to have an important role to
play in achieving coordination of training provision.
However, given the continued adherence to the principle of voluntarism and the
belief that industry was ultimately the best judge of its own needs, such a
coordinating role should ensure that any new arrangements would leave training
decisions in the hands of industry, and in particular, employers,{14) Thus The
role of the state, and hence industrial training policy, was to be market
improving rather than market displacing.{15) Or as the White Paper put it
there was to be an improvement in "the existing partnership between industry,
the Government and the education authorities in the provision of industrial
training."{16) In other words the state should not become a major supplier of
training, its role lay in supplementing the efforts of industry. What should be
provided therefore was an appropriate mechanism for aggregating individual
sectoral interests in line with national interests. In effect, this meant that
there should exist a range of institutions, that would be monitored by
Government, but that would be significantly based upon industrial self
regulation.C17) Nevertheless, employers would not be willing to invest in
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training without some form of incentives{18) and penalties{19} and these
should be incorporated in future arrangements.
Thus through the creation of adequate machinery, the state would be
contributing towards the removal of perc&ved barriers or obstacles to
effective training provision - on the one hand the 'poachers' of skilled labour
and on the other trade unions' power to resist attempts to reform the
apprenticeship system - which would result in a greater degree of
flexibility.{20) Allied to this was the problem of bow the burden of training
should be allocated between employers. The Government's opinion was that the
burden of training costs were unfairly borne by relatively few firms: "While
the benefits of training are shared by all, the cost is borne only by those
firms which decide to undertake training themselves." So 'poaching' was not
only unacceptable on economic grounds, it was also considered unacceptable
according to some sort of moral criteria. That is, we can identify a àtandard
that concerning equity in distribution of training costs.
Thus the change in standards gave greater weight to enhancing the role of the
state in industrial training. These standards shaped the strategic policy
choices and the associated programmes, perhaps most importantly in that action
was to be set within a voluntary framework. But, as we shall see, although
vo].untarism was still the 'order of the day' what constituted voluntary
arrangements post-1962 was certainly different to those of pre-1962. In
particular, it meant that action was to be based upon agreement, voluntarily
reached through the mechanisms set up by the state. However, before going on
to discuss the programmatic element of the policy it is necessary to examine
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more closely the processes leading to change. That is, we have examined the
changes that took place in the standards; we now need to look more closely at
how and why they came about in order to explain firstly, why industrial
training policy took the form that it did at the time, and secondly, to provide
a basis for our subsequent analysis of the implementation of the policy.
*	 *	 4	 *
Our focus to this point has clearly been upon Government as the primary
'actor' initiating change in this area. The reason being that internal
processes, it is argued, were of greater significance in leading to a change In
standards than was any direct political pressures for change exerted from the
wider environment. This is not, of course, to suggest that the Government was
operating in some vacuum, unaffected by less tangible influences or certain
more manifest constraints, These are the less direct influences and constraints
within which governments may be operating due to the power of certain
interests or categories of actors due to their structural positions in society.
Here the decisions and choices open to government may be curbed or structured
by the needs of such actors either because at the one extreme their and the
government's interests coincide, or, at the other, because of the sanctions at
the disposal of such actors and that may be applied should government act in
a way contrary to their interests. This situation in respect of government and
capital in market economies is analysed by LindblomHe describes the
privileged position that capital enjoys and argues that many choices will be
made by government in anticipation of the interests of capital: thus the
niobilisation of group representation is unnecessary In relation to some issues.
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What, therefore, is being argued is: that the impetus for change in industrial
training policy that occurred in the early 1960s was governmental; that other
interests exerted little direct pressure for change, such pressure as there was
caine, in the main, as a reaction to government proposals; that notwithstanding
the above, the policy proposals put forward by government were formulated
having regard to the interests of industry - and in particular industrial
capital. In order to test the validity of these propositions we shall therefore
in the following section, examine the part played by the various actors inthis
process of change.
THE PROCESSES OF CHAIGE
One view of industrial training during this period would seem to suggest that
the move to state Involvement in training was largely the result of pressure
from the more 'progressive' and enlightened elements of industry and commerce,
For instance, that as "pressure on the Government continued throughout the
remainder of 1962" it was "no longer possible to take refuge behind an
Industrial Training Council whose own members were coining to the conclusion
that the Carr recipe would not cure the deep-seated malaise by toothless
exhortation, and were beginning to say so publicly. The need for a more
drastic solution bad become inescapable." The picture presented is that of
pressure building up to an extent that the Goverrunent eventually and somewhat
reluctantly abandons its position of 'holding the ring' in industrial training
in favour of a more radical and interventionist approach. Our examination of
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training prior to 1962, however, indicates that such a view oversimplifies the
nature of the issues and forces leading to the apparent turn-around of
governmental policy. It also discloses that the part played by groups in the
policy formulation process was a marginal one. A change in wider opinion and
attitudes indicating support for some form of intervention may have influenced
the Government's decision, but it is argued here that what significance it had
had more to do with when rather than whether to intervene. Also certain
qualifications need to be made about the nature of this support. Firstly, much
of the increased interest in, dicussion and criticism of industrial training
was the result of considerations about how to handle the problems and
opportunities presented by the forthcoming 'bulge' of school leavers. Secondly,
the increased attention given to training matters was largely confined to what
might be termed the 'informed public' - certain sections of industry, education,
academia and training providers - wider public discussion being virtually non-
existent.{25) Thirdly, despite this increased awareness it is not possible to
identify an undifferentiated group, particularly within industry, actively
supporting intervention by government in training. )[ost of the calls for state
intervention at the time came in fact from education interests in respect of
the education and training of young people.{26) In other words, there might
have been a heightened awareness and. recognition of shortcomings inherent in
the existing arrangements, but this by no means reflected some industry-wide
conversion to the benefits of governmental action. Indeed, as we shall
presently see, it is highly probable that a significant section of industry
considered that there was more to be lost than gained through state
intervention in training.
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The situation in the two years prior to 1962 then was one of growing concern
in some quarters with the unsatisfactoriness of training and a recognition
that a remedy for the 'problem' was required. But this concern was not
exhibited by all affected or interested parties, nor did it, more significantly,
represent anything approaching a consensus about the desired solution. In fact,
the evidence suggests that many employers and trade unions would have
preferred to maintain the status quo. For example, some employers were content
.
to allow trade unions to retain their traditional control over apprentice
intake: this not only kept numbers down but also thereby, the costs of
training, especially at a time when the wages of apprentices were at an
historically high level and a greater proportion were attending day-release
classes (i.e. were non-productive). Further, employer costs would only be
increased if the period of apprenticeship was reduced and skilled rates had,
therefore, to be paid at an earlier age.{27) This applied in particular to small
firms. The lack of impact of the Carr Report and its progeny the ITC in
securing a voluntary increase in the amount of training undertaken prior to
1962 is attributable to the low priority attached by the majority of industry
to training relative to other economic considerations. It could, indeed, be
argued that it was not in the economic interest of individual firms to augment
their training output. Liepinan, for example, argued a similar point:<28}
"employers and trade unions have found a modus vivendi as regards
apprenticeship which is a compromise of a sort.,,The employers have
acquiesced in the continued recognition of de--skilled occupations as
apprenticeable trades and thereby in the existence of a privileged
group of workers, non-justified by a superior skill; they have also
by and large agreed to the rigid demarcation between the jobs not
only of craftsmen but also of dilutees, In leaving the majority of
workers, who are outside the apprenticeship system, without training
which is required in the national interest, the attitude of the two
sides of industry is the same, for different reasons: the employers'
reason is the costs of training..."
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Thus, whilst the FBI's 1960 Brighton Conference may be said to have marked a
turning point in the adoption of planning, no such turning point can be
readily identified relating to the decision to intervene in the area of
industrial training for there was no significant pressure being exerted by the
majority of employers for change. Entwlstle's examination of the attitudes of
the BEC membership supports such a view. These ranged from providers of
'excellent training schemes' to those that were hostile to any improvement or
expansion in training provision. This division was reflected in the BEC's
pronouncements which, for the most part, re-stated industrial orthodoxy -
training was the responsibility of industry - with the occasional exhortation
to firms to improve their training effort. Therefore, "during the period 1958-
62 the ConfederatIon was first of all directly opposed to such a policy [of
governmental intervention], then later non-committal about it, and only in
early 1962 was there a belated, tentative and vaguely-worded admission of the
need for Government intervention."{29} It may be reasoned that employers would
be far less likely to lobby for measures designed to increase the total
volume of training than they would to lobby for economic planning. The reason
being that the type of training being discussed - generally transferable skills
training as opposed to training that is job-specific - imposes direct, tangible
and additional costs on the firm. If as we discussed earlier, such training may
be likened to a collective good then it is in the interest of individual
employers to let others bear the cost, not to press for measures that will
increase their share of those costs. Participation in economic planning on the
other hand is not only 'costless' In this sense but addltlonaBy - at the
national level - may be seen to enhance organisatlonal status in a way that
participation in training would not.
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As far as the other side of industry was concerned the situation was matched
by the lack of interest or pressure on the part of the TUC and most trade
unions in any form of governmental intervention. Certainly the General Council
of the TUC was concerned over issues such as the 'bulge' and education. It was,
though, largely silent over the reform of the apprenticeship system, perhaps
not surprisingly given that the General Council was principally composed of
representatives of the main craft unions, To quote Liepman again: "The trade
unions have acquiesced in the scanty training given to great numbers of craft
apprentices and in dilution, i.e. the up-grading, without formal training, of
semi-skilled operatives.. .[T]he craft unions' motive is that of maintaining
exclusiveness of training as a means of protecting the privileges of their
inembers."{30) Although, manifestly it was the craft unions which were most
insistent on retaining 	 traditional arrangements, occasional doubts about
industry's ability to deliver the goods were heard from this quarter. W.J.
Carron, for instance, President of the Amalgamated Engineering Union had said
in l97 that:{31)
"we are painfully aware of many other firms where little or no
provision is made iii this [training] direction. It is in regard to
these latter, fairly numerous, establishments that increasing concern
is being felt by those responsible in the trade union
movement,.. .There seems to me no means of influencing these
circumstances within the present framework of our legislative
provisions... .Finally, and with utmost sincerity, I emphasise the need
for tri-partite planning ."
In the main, where demands were made for reform these came from the general
workers' unions, although even here such demands were muted and it was not
until we move into 1961 that there was any significant call for state
intervention to be the basis of such reform.{32)
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Clearly neither the bulk of employers nor trade unions, whether individually or
through their representative associations, were leading lights in forcing the
issue of industrial training onto a wider public platform in the early 1960s.
Significantly, however, neither group resisted the move toward state
involvement when this began to look increasingly likely during 1962. There
was, in fact, a perceptible change iii industry's attitude towards the issue
from 1960 onwards which represented a growing if perhaps grudging -
acceptance that state intervention was probably inevitable.
This was demonstrated in the lead up to, and publication of a NJAC Working
Party Report, published in February 1962,{33) The Working Party, composed of
representatives of the TUG, BEC, nationalised Industries, and chaired by an
official from the Xinistry of Labour, examined the state of manpower and
training in industry. It had been established following the submission - at the
request of the Xinistry of Labour - of a paper from the BEG, suggesting that
the Council should give some attention to encouraging employers to broaden
their training effort and in view of the shortage of skilled workers,
discourage the hoarding of labour. The conclusions contained In the Working
Party's report stressed the need for increases in apprentice training, re-
training of adults, and broader-based training, and ended with the statement
that: "While the primary responsibility must remain with industry, the
Government may need in future to play a ].arger role in industrial training, If
this principle is accepted, it will be necessary to examine more closely the
form which the Government's contribution might take and the conditions under
which more training of adults might be undertaken."{34) Thus for the first time
the principle that some form of state involvement in training was necessary if
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training was to be improved was being formally - if only tentatively -
expounded by both sides of industry. Contained in this was the implicit
acknowledgement that existing 'voluntary arrangements' bad failed to secure
such improvements.
One significant aspect of this change in industry's attitude is that it allowed
those within the administration who were in favour of legislative provision to
press for its introduction. That is, potential opposition was now judged to be
a less constraining factor. Such a view is supported by reference to a
statement made by the '(inister of Labour, John Hare, in January 1963, in which
he said: "It would have been a mistake to have tried to 'swop horses in mid-
stream.' But far more important, I believe that general industrial opinion is
now willing to accept fundamental changes in training to an extent that it
would not have agreed to even one or two years ago. In any sphere of life, in
making changes, the hardest, most time-consuming and yet utterly essential
step is to obtain acceptance of the idea that change in fact Is necessary. TM {35)
It is debatable, however, whether the extent of opposition to legislative
proposals would have been as great as the above passage suggests. For although
interest in training issues increased from the mid-1950s onwards, such
interest was confined to a relatively small section of those affected and,
importantly, never became a politically controversial issue. Even had there
been an earlier 'challenge' to the consensus over the division of
responsibility for training it is doubtful whether this would have given rise
to large-scale opposition.
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The Government did in fact embark, albiet in a limited way, on a course of
action contrary to prevailing vo].untaristic principles when, in April 1960, it
was announced that provision was to be made at eight Government Training
Centres for training three hundred first year engineering apprentices. And in
June that year a Circular was issued by the Ministry of Education requesting
local authorities to develop courses in technical colleges for first year
apprentices in basic skills training as well as education. Both these schemes
were aimed at the small-to-medium sized firm. There is no evidence to suggest
that either of these measures caused any problems with either side of
Industry, although there was an additional social objective tied in with these
measures as they were to some extent connected to the problem of the 'bulge'
of school leavers and opposition on these grounds was perhaps less likely or
defensible.{36) This does, however conflict with earlier assessments of the
schemes. Referring to Rare's speech to the BACIE Conference of Sepember 1960,
Gertrude Williams points out that Hare claimed the scheme "for providing the
first year of apprenticeship in government training centres.. .had had a most
disappointing response as there had been to the technical college courses
offered with the sane purpose in mind."{37) 1evertheless, it is clear that even
had the Government been anxious to abandon the 'Carr' doctrine at an earlier
stage, its view was that there would have been at worst opposition from
industry (in particular trade unions, disagreements with whom the Conservative
Government had been anxious to avoid, (see chapter 3) and at best - and
probably more crucially - lack of the cooperation necessary to ensure effective
implementation of any policy proposals.
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In line with our earlier discussion, what has been demonstrated so far is that
it is not possible to identify a point at which it can be said that industrial
training, as an issue, had 'arrived' on the political agenda, nor is it possible
to identify pressure being exerted by groups that was, by itself, strong enough
to have forced the issue onto the agenda. Indeed, by this token one might
claim that industrial training had in some form been on the political agenda
throughout the period being examined insofar as it was an issue to which, from
time to time, the Government - or its representatives - gave some attention,
even if only to conclude that responsibility for training should continue to
reside in industry and the role of the state should not be increased, But this,
therefore, tells us little about why change occurred in this area. What the
previous examination does reveal, however, is that the challenge to the
prevailing standards was not the result of external pressure. Rather, it is
proposed here, it was more the result of an internal re-assessment within -the
governmental aild administrative machine. It is to this process of re-
assessment that we now turn to examine.
]IFLUBJGES VITHIN GOVE1JEJT
In a wider context we have already seen that, from the mid-1950s onwards
there was a higher acceptance than formerly by Government of the existence of
imperfections, or dysfunctions, in the working of the market, which led to
increased state involvement in the management of supply. Further, that it was
logical that this involvement should come to embrace the supply of labour. The
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more specific reasons for this may be summarised as follows, Firstly, it was
becoming increasingly clear that industry was not either capable or willing -
or both - to voluntarily improve existing training arrangements. Secondly,
there was a gradual increase in the attention that was being given to training
issues; initially a response to the 'bulge' but thereafter incorporating wider
questions including, for instance, those of education.{38) This served not only
to heighten interest in the issue but, due to the greater amount of information
being produced (especially the increasing number of reports that dealt directly
or indirectly with training, {39) also enhanced awareness about the nature and
scale of the problems and predictions of future consequences should existing
conditions persist. Thirdly, the dissemination of this information and views
about training were assisted by the increasingly frequent contacts - formal
and informal - between interested parties, particularly following publication
of the Carr Report in 1958. Although neither the NJAC nor the hG were
terribly potent forces in instigating reforms {40} constituted as they were on
an advisory and voluntary basis, perhaps their real significance was that they
acted as a forum for discussion of these issues. Members of these bodies also
became frequent contributors to a successLon of conferences organised by, for
example the British Association for Commercial and Industrial Education
(BACIE). In addition such contact was probably increased due to developments
in other areas such as the establishment of the NEDC, Indeed the first report
of the NEDC{41) stressed the relationship between improving apprenticeship and
other training arrangements if the planned for 4% economic growth was to be
achieved. {42)
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Not only then was the problem more prominent - even if not entirely visible -
by 1962, but fourthly, there was a growing climate of opinion in some quarters
in favour of governmental intervention. Some of this was in the form of
positive support whilst some was more negative but arguably equally as
important in that it exhibited a lack of overt hostility on the part of
industry. It is probably, however, no coincidence that the Government made no
mention of its intention to intervene in training until after the pay-pause -
introduced in the July 1961 emergency budget and which created a considerable
amount of hostility between the TUC and the Government - was ended in March
1962.
In essence, whilst there may have been a process f re-assessment taking
place, the Government's attitude - at least until publication of the White Paper
- was cautious insofar as there was clearly a desire to proceed on the basis
of agreement. It was not out to impose a solution upon hostile participants -
real or imaginary. Lack of opposition thus meant that governmental involvement
came to be viewed as politically, as well as technically, feasible. This lack of
opposition was no doubt influenced by the enthusiasm for, or the
'swallowing'{43) by Government and industry of 'indicative planning' which had
clearly become the 'flavour of the month'. The Government believed that it had
found a formula for combining intervention with voluntarism and the adoption
of indicative planning may be viewed as marking a threshold that the
Government had crossed, Having crossed this threshold to intervention in the
economic sphere, a similar form of intervention in the labour market was,
perhaps, the next logical and acceptable step. Industrial interests too, had
crossed this threshold. Whilst it was earlier argued that Industrial
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organisations would be more likely to lobby for participation and state
involvement in economic planning than, say, industrial training, nonetheless it
is likely that intervention in training would have been less favourably
recieved without this form of Intervention elsewhere. Finally, in support of
the argument of an 'internal' re-assessment, the evidence indicates that
officia.Z support for Intervention had existed for some time (to at least as far
back as the establisment of the Carr Committee) within the Ministry of Labour
and that this was Important in influencing the Government's decision.
One Idea that had been around for some time was that of introducing some form
of levy/grant system or a remissable tax as a means of increasing training
output. Such proposals had been mooted by a variety of individuals since at
least 1958.{44) It had also been put forward within the Ministry. In answer to
a Parliamentary question put down by Reg. Prentice, then opposition spokesman,
on 27 March 1961, the Minister of Labour stated that the Department was
investigating the French taxe d'apprentissage levy system.{45) A visit to
France by a team of officials had in fact been carried out In January of that
year which had resulted in the production of a report, subsequently considered
by the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet, recommending the adoption of
a similar scheme for Britain. This in turn led to the appointment of an Inter-
departmental working party to consider the options available. This was the
culmination of attempts by certain individuals within the Department, unhappy
about the ability of the 'Carr doctrine' to induce change through exhortation,
to have the Issue of some form of training levy considered.(46)
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It did, however, require the appointment in September 1960 of a Minister, John
Hare, with a keen interest in training Issues to give Impetus to the proposals
and 'steer' them towards legislation. Although we noted earlier the virtual lack
of outside pressure for reform, Hare could hardly fail to be aware that where
criticisms of existing training arrangements were being made and remedies
propounded, they were coming from the education sector, and many of them
envisaged a larger role for the Ministry of Education.<47) This was a time
when virtually the entire educational system was coming under scrutiny, many
aspects of which touched upon what was Increasingly seen as the closely
related field of industrial training, and claims were being made that the plans
for improving the educational sector were not being matched within industry
especially in relation to vocational training. Not surprisingly Hare (as well
presumably as Departmental officials) appear(s) not to have been too enamoured
of what might be regarded as a take-over bid of training by education. This
territorial 'contest' may have some significance in explaining the greater
prominence given by the Minister to training issues as well as the firm
attempt to re-establish the Department's sovereignty over industrial training.
Thus the statement in the House of Commons in March 1961 by the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Labour that: "we can expect education to play a
growing part in industrial training.. .But I suggest that this does not mean
that industrial training can be regarded, in the forseeable future, as lying
wholly or even mainly in the educational system."{48}
Thus the convergence of three factors: Departmental officials convinced of the
need to abandon the 'Carr doctrine'; a new Minister keen to secure improvements
in training and; the desire to fend off encroachments from the Ministry of
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Education, set within the context of a Government increasingly seeing the
solution to the nations economic ills in improving the structure of the
economy, combined to point towards the introduction of training legislation.
There were, however, initial problems which cast some doubt over the
feasibility of legislation as envisaged at the time. The scheme originally
favoured by the inter-Departmental working party (see above) was similar to
that operating in France whereby a new national tax would raise the requisite
revenue and firms would obtain refunds for providing approved schemes.
Although there were other foreign models to draw on{49) it is, perhaps, not
surprising given the enthusiasm for French style planning at the time, that
the French training system should have been the one that was looked to for a
solution. Closer examination, however, revealed both technical and political
problems inherent in the adoption of such a scheine.{O) Some doubts were for
instance raised in the working party by representatives of the Inland Revenue
and the Treasury who were worried about the cost of collecting such a tax and
the possibility of its avoidance, Knowledge that such an option was being
considered clearly 'spread' outside the confines of Cabinet and official
committees: concern was expressed that such a tax would prove a disincentive
to employers particularly in recruiting apprentices.{51) Certainly additional
information received by the working party at the end of 1961 confirmed that
unless the levy was included in a wider payroll tax the cost of its collection
would be disproportionately high. But of equal significance was the realisatlon
that the French model was inappropriate for Britain as it lay outside the
bounds of what was deemed an acceptable - in terms of the prevailing
standards - form of governmental Intervention. As with many other policy
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areas, industrial training and vocational education in France was highly
centralised and subject to a good deal of administrative control. As Williams
pointed out in respect of France:C52)
"Whatever its provenance, all vocational education is supervised and
partly financed by the State. The Directorate of Technical and
Vocational Education, which is a branch of the Kinistry of
Education, administers the publicly provided establishments,
including those provided by public bodies, reviews the curricula,
allocates grants and organises the examinations... Each Department
too has a body of technical advisers.. .to which the Government
Directorate delegates its functions for the area."
To introduce a similar system in Britain would have conflicted with the
Government's standards that allocation was most efficiently achieved through
the market, that the major responsibility for training lay with employers and
that the role of the state was to be supportive and facilitative rather than
predominantly coercive. As the Governement was still in effect searching for a
solution where intervention could be combined with a voluntary approach, a
scheme based on the French model was unacceptable.
So it seems that in late 1961 the proposals were abandoned with little else on
offer. The only other option considered during the deliberations of the working
party had been a flexible industry-by-industry scheme, but this seems to have
been discredited owing to the desire of the majority of officials to see a
nationaly based system introduced. Having discredited this second option It
did not seem feasible to reurrect it.{53) Given this situation It is possible
that legislation on industrial training would have been much longer delayed
had it not been for the speeches made at the Hay 1962 BACIE Conference -
'Industrial Training - Whose Responsibility?'. In particular the proposals put
forward by Gertrude Williams appear to have re-animated work on the
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levy/rebate scheme. Of significant note among her recommendations was the view
that new arrangements were needed that should build upon traditional
practices, which, in effect, meant retaining the principle of industry
responsibility within a 'radically' reorganised framework. She recommended
inter alia the setting up of a compulsory, tri-partite Apprenticeship Authority
in each industry; apprentices to be indentured not to individual firms but to
the Authority; apprentice wages to be paid by the Authority from a fund
contributed by employers other than those exempted for providing approved
training; different grades of skill to require different periods of training all
of which would, however, culminate in a test.{54)
It is indeed relatively easy to trace the influence of these proposals in the
subsequent White Paper. So much was in fact acknowledged by John Hare when
addressing the January 1963 BACIE Conference, held to discuss the White Paper.
Hare stated: "those of you who heard her then Cthe previous spring] wi..11 have
no difficulty in seeing that these ideas have had an influence on Government
thinking."{SS) Interestingly Gertrude Williams had published a book during the
period when the Carr Committee was deliberating based on research conducted
since 1954. It might be assumed that this contributed to the debate at that
time.{56) Present at the conference of the previous spring had been J.G.
Stewart, Under Secretary at the Xinister of Labour, who was one of the
officials who had, for some time, been in favour of intervention (originally
along French lines). Gertrude Williams' recommendations were readiliy grasped
as offering the kind of solutions which would overcome the difficulties
previously referred to. The key lay in the fact that they contained no
requirement for the imposition of a national tax, thus Treasury and Inland
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Revenue objections could be discounted. Further, such a scheme was apposite in
that it seemed to retain a degree of flexibility and voluntarism within a
framework that could contain a sufficiently coercive capability. The inter-
Departmental Working Party was re-convened (minus Treasury and Inland Revenue
officials) and its report - which formed the basis of the White Paper - went
before the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet in October 1962. Given the
economic recession of that summer and given the rise in unemployment
especially among school leavers, the Cabinet obviously concurred in the view
that early publication of a white paper was desirable; this duly appeared on 5
Decenber 1962.
TEE 1962 VEITE PAPER AID TEE 1964 ]IDUSTRIAL TRAIlING ACT
Whilst there can be little doubt that the Government would have preferred
industry to put its own house in order in the matter of training, in the face
of increasing evidence that this was unlikely one can identify a growing
determination by Government to tackle the training problem. As we have seen,
however, the Government proceeded cautiously in deciding to legislate insofar
as it was concerned to 'carry' industrial opinion with it. The approach adopted
was a mixture of on the one hand cajoling, persuading and exhorting industry
by appeals to 'rational' argument and the national interest and on the other
showing industry the 'yellow card'. If industry was not going to be reasonable
and play the game then the Government could claim to have given fair warning
if the 'red card' had finally to be produced - even if the Government had
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decided to operate a slightly different set of rules, The flavour of the
message being conveyed can be seen by reference to Hare's address to the Nay
1962 BACIE Conference.{57} Hare told his audience that figures showed that
there had been some improvement during the previous two years due to "a new
awareness among enlightened leaders on both sides of industry" and "a growing
recognition in many firms that acceptance of the responsibility for industrial
training means a responsibility for producing results." He praised the schemes
established in Government Training Centres and Technical Colleges in their
role as "standard setter and stimulator." But, "Ls]atisfactory as the results
may have been so far, I am absolutely certain that they do not represent
anything like the maximum effort of which industry Is capable...The sense of
urgency in these matters is not by any means general. Nor is the quality of
the training being given always all that it should be." He went on "our
experience (in the past two years) does not bear out the view that industry is
incapable of delivering the goods" however, "We must, and we do watch the
developing situation very closely, and if things do not continue well, then we
must be ready to adapt our actions accordingly." And finally, "We have seen
even in the past 18 months or so the emergence of new forms of direct
training by the public authorities. The State is not now merely standing on
the sidelines exhorting others. The public authorities are directly in the field
themselves. Nothing stands still. New possibilities are always challenging us.
What has happened in the past two years shows that the Government's attitude
is not rigid or doctrinaire - and certainly won't be in the future." Hare was
as good as his word. Having dropped a few hints that were not picked up,
having found a scheme that fitted the changed standards and having judged that
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opposition from industry was unlikely, the Government consolidated its
commitment to introducing legislation.
The period between publication of the White Paper in December 1962 and the
passing of the Industrial Training Act in March 1964 was set aside for
dicussions with "representatives of employers 4 and workers' organisations" and
"appropriate representative bodies in the educational world".{58) It is fairly
clear that it was the Government's intention to have a policy that would have
an impact, despite its 'voluntaristic' orientation: It was not In other words a
'placebo' policy. As the Ninister himself put it: "the national interest is
involved here and it is my intention to see that the national interest is not
neglected. Of one thing I can assure you, I certainly do not intend to
Introduce a Bill into Parliament merely to give legislative sanction to the
status qua." {59) It was for this reason perhaps, that, notwithstanding the
brevity <three and a half pages) of the White Paper, it set out fairly clearly
and forcefully not only the case for intervention and the strategic policy
choices but also the outline of the associated programme elements In the form
of the structure and possible functions of the proposed new training
organisations. In one sense the policy could be described as a radical one in
that it marked out a new area of responsibility for the state. It was not,
however, entirely innovatory In character as it was to be built upon
traditional arrangements f or training. Or, put another way, the Yhite Paper's
proposals were seen as both "evolutionary in that they build on the system we
already have" and "revolutionary" in that they will introduce compulsion where
none existed before".{60) The Xinistry seemed clear about the objectives of the
policy and the type of structures and powers required to achieve them. At this
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stage the initiative clearly remained with the Government. Nevertheless the
White Paper did leave some of the details to be filled in at later stages - the
first of which was the period of consultation prior to the passage of the Bill.
Even so, as we shall presently see, the amount of 'filling in' that was left to
be done appears to have been kept to a minimum.
There were a number of changes made to the Government's original proposals
arising out of the consultation exercise. We shall, therefore, examine the
proposals contained in the White Paper and compare these with those that were
contained in the Act. A study of the nature and sources of the changes that
were incorporated into the Act should then allow for an appraisal of the
extent to which such changes were consistent with the standards previously
outlined and thus how far - if at all - the Government was forced to modify
those standards in order to accommodate other interests upon whom they were
to be dependent for the implementation of the policy. It is in fact the
contention that the differences between the White Paper proposals and the
provisions of the Act were essentially changes to the programmatic elements of
the policy: the standards and the intended impact of the policy remained
relatively unaltered. The implications of this for the development of the
policy together with an analysis of its implementation up to 1972 will be
provided in the following chapter.
One of the most important proposals in the White Paper was the granting of
statutory powers to the Ninister of Labour to establish Boards, to be
responsible for a1l aspects of training in individual industries."{61) The
purpose of the Boards, through the use of levies and grants, was to provide a
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 151
Chapter Four	 The 1 q64 Industrial Training Act
system of deterrants and incentives which would operate so as to induce
industry to change its behaviour in a direction that would lead to the
achieveirtent of the following policy objectives:{62)
Ci) to enable decisions on the scale of training to be better
related to economic needs and technological developments;
(ii) to improve the overall quality of industrial training and to
establish minimum standards; and
(iii)to enable the cost to be more fairly spread.
In order to achieve these objectives the possible functions that Boards might
be empowered to undertake were set down as:{63)
(1) Establishing policy for training in the industry, including such
questions as admission to training (apprenticeship or otherwise),
length of training, registration of trainees, and a provision for
appropriate attendance at colleges of further education.
(2) Establishing standards of training and syllabuses for different
occupations in the industry, taking Into account the associated
technical education required.
(3) Providing advice and assistance about training to firms in
industry.
(4) Devising tests to be taken by apprentices and other trainees on
completion of training and, if necessary, at Intermediate stages -
for example, at the end of the first year.
(5) Establishing qualifications and tests for instructors.
(6) Establishing and running training courses in its own training
centres.
(7) Paying grants to firms to reimburse them all or part of the
costs incurred in the provision of approved training.
(8) Paying allowances to trainees not. taken on by firms while being
trained in public, or the Board's own, centres.
(9) CollectIng money from establishments In the industry by means
of a levy.
(10) Borrowing.
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The White Paper also went on to suggest that even though legislation along
such lines would leave the Boards with 'latitude' to decide their activities,
the main priority for action should be in securing an improvement in first-
year training. "The wider provision of opportunities for systematic training in
the first year of apprenticeship would do much to improve our whole system by
remedying it at its wealcest point, that is to say, the haphazard and narrow
training given all too often at the beginning."{64} As we shall presently see
this was a sentiment that was to re-surface much later with the advent of the
Youth Training Scheme in 1963. A Board that did concentrate its efforts on
first year training, it was further suggested, might even consider bearing the
costs, including the wages of such training.{65)
Despite the fact that there had previously besu relatively few voices calling
for training reform, and attitudes within industry having been unenthusiastic
or at best lukewarm, the reception given to the White Paper was, in general,
positive. Employers and unions were now publicly welcoming the proposals.{66)
Whilst we have already discussed, with reference to planning, how a change in
the broad climate of opinion can have significant effects in other, specific
policy areas, we may discern two other - though not unrelated - reasons for
the 'change of heart' on the part of industry. First, in view of the apparent
evidence and growth in criticism of training arrangements, continued
opposition to intervention would have been difficult to sustain given that it
was now largely accepted that industry had failed in 'its responsibility' and
was, by implication, therefore, partly to blame for Britain's poor economic
performance. Second, having accepted that intervention was probably inevitable,
industrial interests would wish to secure their own part in future
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arrangements and be in a position to influence impending legislation and
policy. Such influence could best be ensured from inside rather than outside
the formal decision-making process. Not having held the initiative prior to
1962, neither side of industry would presumably wish to be in a position where
they could nt take the initiative in the future. Thus the likelihood, or
actuality, of legislation which impinges upon the activities of outside
interests, was almost inevitably to lead to the development of a more clearly
defined network of interests where only a loose network had existed before.
The process of consultation resulted in some changes being incorporated in the
subsequent Industrial Training Bill and a refinement - or filling in - of some
of the programme elements of the policy. But with one possible exception -
provision for the establishment of a Central Training Council (CTC) - such
changes were fairly marginal. One possible reason might have been that despite
some criticisms of the White Paper <although some accounts seem to suggest
that these were considerable they do seem to overstate the criticisms {67)) the
Government seemed determined to see its proposals implemented as originally
set out. This, however, might suggest rather more opposition than there does
in fact seem to have been at the time the White Paper was published. As we
shall see, despite the criticisms (most of which in fact came from education
and direct training organisations) there was little in either the White Paper
or the Bill which gave rise to direct conflict. Indeed, the Bill received an
unopposed second reading in the House of Commons, and it was not until later -
c1969/7O - that industrial training was to become a politically controversial
issue. We shall therefore move on to consider the changes that were made to
the proposals contained in the White Paper and incorporated in the Act.
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Briefly, these were, a lessening of the boards' authority in some respects;
giving boards an additional research function; extending the Act to cover all
occupations; and establishing a Central Training Council.
The Industrial Training Act thus retained most of the envisaged structures
(Industrial Training Boards) and functions but the overall tone and emphasis
of the Act was more permissive than the White Paper. The three objectives to
do with improving the quantity, quality and sharing ci costs were retained{68)
And although the same Issues are dealt with - type of training, standards and
tests of competence, provision of courses, raising of levies and payment of
grants etc - the wording is less specific and more general. Compare, for
example, the proposed function (1) above from the White Paper to do with
establishing training policies for industries, to the statement In the Act that
Boards: {69)
"shall from time to time consider such employments in the Industry
as appear to require consideration and publish recommendations with
regard to the nature and length of the training for any such
employment and the further education to be associated with the
training, the persons by and to whom the training ought to be given,
the standards to be attained as a result of the training and the
methods of ascertaining whether those standards have been attained."
Clearly, establishing policy and publishing recommendations - albeit in respect
of the same things - point towards different conceptions not just of the
functions of ITBs but also of the exercise of those functions, In other words
the power of boards to influence firms' training activities was to be more
indirect; their role leaned more toward persuasion than direction. During the
consultation process the Government had clearly given ground in 'behind the
scenes' negotiations to industrialists' demands for greater autonomy from
regulation. This signified that even among the better informed and committed
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representatives of industry there was stil antipathy towards state interference
even in the mild form of the White Paper. A further instance of this related to
the composition of the boards. Although no major structural changes were
proposed there were some significant changes In nembership status Implied:
thus, it was only employer and employee representatives who were entitled to
vote on matters relating to the imposition of a levy; educational
representatives were entitled to vote on all other matters; Departmental
representatives (most notably of the Ministry of Labour, the Department of
Education and Science and the Scottish Education Department) could attend and
participate but were to have no vote; and the Chairman, who was to be a person
having industrial or commercial experience, was similarly excluded from voting
on the levy.{7O)
It appears, however, that the Government did not view the relaxing of the
proposed powers of the boards that occurred between the publication of the
white Paper and the introduction of legislation as particularly damaging to the
overall aims of the policy. But it would be wrong to imply that the
consultation process was simply a one-way process of watering down the White
Paper. Other provisions in effect marked an enhancement of the policy
proposals and were a response to external criticism and pressure.
Firstly, a Central Training Council was to be established with the duty of:C71)
advising him [the Minister] on the exercise of his
functions under this Act and on any other matter relating to
industrial or commercial training which be may refer to it... .The
Central Training Council shall from time to time, and whenever
directed by the Minister, make to him a Report of its activities,
and the Minister shall lay a copy of every such report before
Parliament."
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The CTC was to be a co-ordinating body but, as its functions under the Act
suggest, one with little independence. The CTC membership was: six employer
representatives; six employee representatives; two representatives from the
nationalised industries; no more than six chairmen of ITBs; and twelve others
to be appointed following consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Minister of Education. (72) The establishment of the CTC was largely due to
pressure from the TUG as well as a number of opposition APe who argued the
need for a strong central authority. The TUG in fact pressed for the kind of
body that was to be set up some ten years later in the form of the Manpower
Services Commission, The TUC argument was that: Nwe needed a strong central
authority to draw its strength both from its statutory responsibilities and
from public money which it would ma]e available in grants for those industries
which suitably improved their training arrangements.. .We said that without a
substantial contribution from the Government, and without inspection and
strong local supervision, it was possible that the activities of some of the
proposed Boards would be a bare minimuni...".{73) The Government's preference,
however, was clearly for a considerably less powerful central body.
Industrial Training Boards were also granted additional functions. Firstly, to
enable them to "carry on or assist other persons in carrying on research into
any matter relating to training for employment in the industry."{74) Between
December 1962 and March 1964 therefore research into training matters had
assumed a degree of significance it had not previously attained. This may be
linked with the power granted to liEs to obtain, on behalf of the Minister,
returns and information from employers "necessary for the purposes of this
Act."{75) Secondly, in response to criticisms of the narrowness of conception
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of the White Paper, the Act was wider in scope in terms of occupational
coverage. Boards' attention would thus extend to all occupations, including
management, whereas in the White Paper the emphasis had been upon 'trainees'
and apprentices. Nonetheless, having conceded the point, the Government's views
about where the Boards' priority should lie was clear, The Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, William Whitelaw, for instance, stated: "I
feel that it would be right for the boards to turn their attention first to the
training of the young".{76) Such sentiments were not out of line with those of
employers, some of whom had been opposed to the Inclusion of management
training. A little while later, the Minister of Labour also re-stated the
position thus: (77)
"[T]he main purpose of the Bill as I see it is to improve the supply
and the quality of our skilled manpower and it Is to this that I
shall expect the boards to turn their early attention. The need to
Improve training for higher management Is of first class importance
also, but though this will not be excluded from the scope of the
boards I think that most people would agree that the major
contribution will have to be made by other agencies."
SUXXARY AR]) CONCLUSIONS
To overcome, therefore, the aforementioned weaknesses In training arrangements
and in line with the modified standards about the nature of training and the
role of the State in its provision, the 1964 Industrial Training Act provided
for the establishment of new structures which, through the use of a levy/grant
mechanism, was designed to Improve training and, in particular increase the
supply of skilled workers. State involvement was to take the form of a
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'partnership' between Government, industry and education. In effect the Act was
attempting to strike a balance between what the Government judged to be the
needs of both industry and the national economy - meeting both without
thwarting either, Intervention therefore was not to result in further direct
provision of training by the state or its agencies, except in marginal
circumstances, through the Government Training Centres. Instead, consistent
with the standard that held that industry's requirements were best determined
and met by itself, reponsibility for training provision was to remain In
industry's hands. As William Whitelaw, then Parliamentary Secretary to the
Ninistry of Labour said in the House of Commons: "We must remember. ...that the
basic job of training must be one for industry. Anything that we say about
training in the Government training centres for apprentices should be looked
at against that background."{'78) Devoid of any powers of compulsion to make
firms train, the Boards had to rely on the judicial application of the
levy/grant mechanism to increase the supply of skilled labour by making it
financially attractive for firms to train over and above their immediate
requirements - such firms being 'subsidised' by the levy imposed on those who
used skilled labour but did not train. It was also presumably hoped that the
attitudes of those firms who came into the latter category would change in
that if they were incurring the costs of training they would be as well to
provide it for themselves. In these two 'non-compulsory' ways, therefore, the
supply of skilled labour was expected to increase. Further, the standard of
training was to be raised by boards withholding grants from any firm that did
not meet the standards they recommended. This had implications not only for
employers but also for trade unions, because It would no longer be so strongly
in the interests of employers to acquiesce in forms of training that were
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regarded as outmoded or inflexible, ie the apprenticeship system. Thus the Act
was intended to change the behaviour of unions in the field of training, but
this was to be achieved indirectly through employers being brought under
financial pressures to renegotiate arrangements with trade unions through
collective bargaining. The actual rate of levy was to be determined by
individual boards having regard to their policy and plans, administrative
expenses, research activities and, although not of major import in total
training provision, any direct or externally financed training. In practice,
however, it is important to reiterate that only the industrial representatives
on the boards were allowed to vote on levy matters. Included in the levy
provisions was a discretionary power to exempt certain classes of employers -
in actuality small firms - from payment of the levy.
During the formal period of policy formulation, dating from the early 1960s, it
is apparent that the Government was giving the lead in the area of industrial
training, and that industry and the trade unions in particular, lagged behind.
The initiative was largely internal to the Government and the )tinlstry of
Labour. However, despite the fact that industry and the unions were not taking
the Initiative at this time neither were they strongly opposed to intervention
when it came. For one thing, industrial training was not a politically salient
issue: apart from the relatively few 'better informed' individuals and groups it
attracted only limited interest, although this did gradually Increase following
publication of the Carr Report in 1958. This took the form of growing crItid.m
- mainly from the educational sector - and a greater awareness that there
existed a 'training problem'. This problem centred around the scarcity of
skilled labour. Thus the lack of any strong opposition was probably a
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significant factor in persuading the Government that intervention was
politically feasible. In any case the standards incorporated in the policy,
that industry should retain responsibility for training and the state's role
should be a facilitating one, were ones that were widely agreed. In other
words, although the Government took the initiative and set out the standards
that it wished to see pertain, it clearly had an eye to what would be
acceptable to industry. So although there had been an absence of direct
external pressure and influence towards intervention, the Importance of
indirect influence should not be discounted. Finally, intervention in the
training field was more widely regarded as being acceptable due to the belief,
made manifest in the adoption of indicative planning, that government could
combine intervention with volunrisni to influence production. Thus a relatively
similar form of intervention could be devised for industrial training,
Overall then the Industrial Training Act attempted to rely predominantly on
voluntarism and private decision making rather than on compulsion and public
decision making. The Hinistry of Labour itself pointed out that "[Tihe only
obligation on an employer will be to comply with requests for information and
to pay the levy."{79) Thus the Act provided the machinery but the "effective
operation of that machinery requires that employers and trade unions show real
readiness to re-examine existing arrangements critically and to accept the
changes which such a re-appraisal shows to be necessaryu.<80} Although the Act
was less regulatory i character than the White Paper it did nonetheless
reflect the Government's belief that the behaviour of employers - or at least
those that did not train and/or 'poached' - would be changed through financial
incentives and penalties. Therefore, we can conclude in general terms that the
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Act was a weak instrument of intervention, though what this actually meant for
training provision and skills supply in practice, that is how weak it was
relative to the scale and nature of the 'training problem' can only be
accurately assessed when we examine the implementation of the policy
programme in the following chapters.
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IND U.ST1? IAI TRA IN 11W 1964--i 970
IKTRODUCT 101
The focus of this chapter is on the implementation of the 1964 Industrial
Training Act up to 1970, and certain aspects of labour market or manpower
policy upon which this had a bearing. Ye stop at 1970 for three main reasons.
The first being that by 1970 the training board 'picture' was complete in that
no other boards were created after this time (although some were to
disappear). The second relates to the change in government, and consequent
changes in values, that occurred in 1970, and which we would expect would have
implications for change in this policy area. The third is that 1970 marked a
'break' as it marked the beginning of a major review of the Industrial Training
Act, the culmination of which was the 1973 Employment and Training Act.
Our main attention therefore will be directed towards: 1) assessing how far
the policy and programmes of the 1964 Act were intellectually and politically
soundly based insofar as they provided a coherent framework for the
achievement of the objectives through the process of implementation; ii)
whether, during that process we can identify aspects of non-conformance
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(intended or unintended) or policy development such that the policy was
changed or modified; and iii) finally, through our analysis of the above,
providing a basis for our consideration in chapter six of the interaction
between implementation and policy change.
THE UHDERLYIJG FEASIBILITY OF TEE POLICY
Technic1 Fesibi1ity
This section provides a preliminary assessment of the extent to which the
policy and its associated programmes were soundly based, technically and
politically, to achieve the objectives of the policy. The starting point
therefore is an examination of the way in which the training problem was
defined. Clearly expressed in both the White Paper and the Industrial Training
Act, was the view that insofar as industrial training was concerned the main
problem was the shortfall of skilled workers. The major cause was assumed to
reside in employers who did little or no training but who instead 'poached'
their skilled workforce from those that did. by offering higher rates of pay.
Shortages occurred because firms, having no 'property rights' in trained
labour, were reluctant to invest in further training provision where this would
be lost to competitors. There may, however, be other reasons why labour or
skill shortages occur. Lindley,{i) for example, argues that there are three main
causes: (a) firms do not plan ahead; (b) manpower planning is done badly; (c)
manpower planning is done reasonably well but firms find it uneconomic to
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invest in training t meet future shortages, Whilst these may raise additional
questions as to why, for instance, firms do not engage in manpower planning, -
the costs of collecting the necessary data may, for example, be thought to
outweigh possible pay-of fs - the assumption of policy makers at the time was
thhat the explanation largely resided in the third of these causes. Thus the
White Paper stated that individual firms "may lack the necessary economic
incentive to invest in training people who, once trained, may leave them for
other Jobs. While the benefits of training are shared by all, the cost is borne
only by those firms which decide to undertake training themselves."{2) Hence
the 'strategic decision' in the policy to make it uzieconomic for employers not
to train through the use of financial penalties.
The fact was, however, that there was a lack of any, even reasonably precise,
information regarding the relative costs and benefits of different types of
training which must, therefore, raise considerable doubts about the causal
explanation proffered in the White Paper. The evidence that does exist does
not, fr example, point to a scarcity of young people wishing to take up
apprenticeships.{3) Indeed, the provision in the Bill for ITBs to foster
research had emerged in response to increasing evidence and criticism that the
nature and scale of the training problem was only vaguely understood due to
the inadequacy of manpower statistics. It was for this reason, in addition to
the prevalent mood for forward planning, that the Manpower Research Unit was
established within the Ministry of Labour.{4) Until this time the only
organisation that appears to have been seriously concerned to assess future
manpower requirements in industry was the Committee on Scientific Manpower, of
the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, and which produced a number of
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reports between 1953 and 1963,{5) In other words, the poaching argument seems
to have become the 'accepted wisdom' without any substantial evidence by which
to verify it. One possible reason might be the difficulty of collecting and
measuring the necessary information because of the complex tasks involved in
separating the costs of production from the resource costs of training.C6) Or,
more likely perhaps, additional information was not sought because the cause
of shortages was assu.n7ed to be known. The training problem, as well as its
solution, was set out in economic terms (apart from a brief reference to the
rising number of school leavers neither White Paper nor Bill placed any
emphasis on possible social objectives). It is, however, at least questionable
as to how far the economic causal explanation offered was sound. There may
also be some truth in Lindley's assertion that the acceptance of the poaching
argument was, in fact, no more than the dressing up in a 'pseudo-economic
guise', of a moral iudgement. That is, all employers would henceforth be
expected to do their fair share of tramnin.{7}
But despite the lack of evidence in support of poaching as a cause of skill
shortages, we cannot simply assume that there was no correlation, and in any
case it is highly unlikely, given the complexity of the issues involved, that
the evidence could ever be conclusive. Nevertheless there is considerable doubt
about the extent to which poaching does in fact constitute a distortion to the
working of the the labour market resulting in skills shortages. Poaching only
applies to training which is in general or transferable skills: training which
is job specific is only of value to individual firms.{8} However, McCormick and
Manley, C9) for example, argue that employers will only undertake general skills
training where the outlay of training costs is likely to be recovered. But
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further, the costs of general training is actually borne by employees in the
form of offsetting reduced present earnings against the prospect of enhanced
future earnings. This is clearly contrary to the assumptions built into the
industrial training legislation which regards virtually the entire costs as
being borne by employers. Therefore, "a shortage of skilled workers may arise
for the following reasons. First, if there is a shortage of workers trained in
general skills, it may be because workers are ignorant of the long-run
earnings that can be earned by possessing these skills or are unable to bear
the costs of acquiring them.... Ignorance can be dispelled by the dissemination
of information about earnings, whilst financial disability could be overcome by
giving workers subsidies in the same way as university students receive
grants. If, on the other hand, there is a shortage of workers with specific
skills, the employers have only themselves to blame for not offering higher
wages."{iO) Such prescriptions are open to a number of criticisms, for example,
someone who for economic reasons cannot afford to bear the costs of general
training is unlikely to be tempted by some type of grant unless this was in
addition to wages being received. Nonetheless, their analysis does suggest the
possibility that skill shortages do not necessarily occur through poaching, in
which case legislation that concentrates upon employers rather than employees
is aimed at the wrong target and is unlikely to have the desired impact.
So, the 1964 Act was formulated in response to a problem perceived as a lack
of skilled labour. But the 'causal theory' upon which the policy was based was
predicated on a number of assumptions, and not a lot of evidence. There seems
to have been little attempt to get to grips with the complexity of the issues,
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which as we shall see later, surrounded the training 'problem'. Thus the
'technical efficacy' of the policy could be open to serious doubt.
Political feasibility
There is another important element in relation to feasibility, which is the
extent to which the policy and programmes were capable of changing the
behaviour of producer groups so as to achieve a degree of conformance
necessary for the realisation of the policy objectives, that is its political
feasibility. Irrespective of technical issues - for instance, where the policy
is aimed at the wrong source then changing the behaviour of actors is unlikely
to produce the desired results - it is important to consider the degree to
which there was agreement surrounding the policy. There are, however, two
interrelated sides to such an issue. The first concerns the orientation or
attitudes of producer groups towards the objectives and the programme, which
indicates the extent to which such behaviour needs to be changed. The extent
to which, In other words, there is a potential 'conformance gap'. The second
concerns how far the policy builds into the programmes appropriate mechanisms
for tackling or closing this conformance gap.
Ye have already examined the attitudes of certain interests to the issue of
state intervention in training and concluded that the Government judged there
to be a sufficient degree of support for, or consent to, intervention from
producer groups to make implementation feasible, But there are a number of
points to be made about this. Firstly, the evidence for this view came as we
have seen from an 'informed' but relatively small section of industry. The
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views expressed by these individuals, or group representatives were not
necessarily typical of producer groups as a whole and indeed, insofar as they
were positively oriented to training legislation were not the prime target of
the policy. The policy was aimed at those who did little or no training and
they were the least vocal in the training debate. The most vocal were not,
therefore, representative of those most likely to be in conflict with the
intervention, as was indeed recognised in the 1962 White Paper.{11) Secondly,
although the issue of industrial training engendered increasing interest in the
early 1960s, it never became a politically controversial issue. One indication
of this could be the fact that the Industrial Training Bill recieved a second
reading in the Commons without a division and failed to attract much attention
at the time. Thus industrial training appeared to be an area where conflict
was 'low level'.
Such a view, however, may have been misleading. Given that the Issue did not
generate controversy in the national political arena it was much less likely to
claim the attention of those who had a potential, practical interest in the
matter. Their interest, and therefore, possibly their opposition, may only
become evident at the point where they become directly affected i.e. during
implementation of the policy. Just how far industrial training issues permeated
the level of the individual firm or trade union at the time may be indicated
by Perry's observation that when the first set of ITBs began sending out their
levy demands some firms returned them with the comment that they were not
interested in 'joining'. (12) Such lack of knowledge may also be deduced from a
reference to two courses organised by BACIE for training officers during 1963.
Due to lack of takers, the first ran at half strength while the second had to
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be cancelled - this at a time when industry might have been expected to be
'gearing up' for the imminent change.{13}
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that when industrial training policy was being
formulated the extent of the 'conformance gap' was possibly misperceived. It
was certainly likely that there existed some latent opposition but its
magnitude would only be revealed during the policy's implementation. How far
then did the policy acknowledge this and how far did it provide for
mechanisms to bridge the conformance gap, that is to accommodate the political
processes to be encountered during implementation? Bounded as the policy was
by the standards of voluntarism and market efficiency the Government eschewed
the use of coercive power relying instead mainly upon - to use Etzioni's
terminology{14) - remunerative power, with a little normative thrown in, to
achieve the policy objectives. Thus the main instruments of change - the ITBs
- were to rely upon financial inducements or penalties, backed up by
exhortation and persuasion to achieve the objectives of policy. On this basis
doubts were expressed about the Boards' permissive functions and 'lack of
teeth'. Given that ITBs could only issue recommendations about training, their
only sanction against those not conforming was the witholding of a grant. The
effectiveness of this would depend on a number of factors, for example the
rate at which the levy was set, the the cost of meeting the board's
recommendations, how far employers might be able to absorb or pass on the
levy as a cost to customers, or how skilfully boards operated as consensus
buiding structures. Some of these indeed are factors that we shall be following
up later
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One feature of the legislation that generated some debate and disagreement at
the time was the issue of 'inclusion'. The most important aspect of which -
and one that was to become increasingly significant - was the status of the
small firm. Given that the legislation was directed against the so called
'poachers' the fact that ITBs were empowered to exempt small firms meant the
potential exclusion of one of the main 'causes' of the training problem, as
poachers were commonly believed to be predominantly smaller firms. However,
following criticism on this the Government stated that this should be taken to
mean establishments employing five or fewer persons. {15) If Boards followed
this guideline then tboe exiuded from the provisions of the Act could be
considered marginal.
In practice, the main foundation for building change through the new ITB
structures was the form of involvement of sectional interests - in effect,
self-regulation. The incorporation of such interests in the decision-making
process and granting majority membership of ITBs to producer groups was
conceived as the basis for bridging the conformance gap. It was an
acknowledgement of the need or desire for continued interdependence and thus
also an acknowledgement of some degree of conflict of interest - for clearly
if there is no interdependence there is no conflict. Succecscully ach veing the
objectives of industrial training policy was therefore to be significantly
dependent upon structures and individuals over whom the Government was
capable of exerting only indirect influence: inevitably so given that training
was still viewed as primarily a matter for industry. However, securing the
participation of industry in the implementation process obtains at least their
implicit acceptance of the objectives of the policy{16) and thus increases the
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influence of government in the policy area
	 and thereby the chances of
bridging the conformance gap, although the extent of this will also be
dependent on a range of other factors.
It was the need to secure such participation that also influenced the
structuring of ITBs on an industry, rather than some other basis, at some
possible cost to effectiveness, At least two other options existed which might
have influenced the boards' structure based on a) occupations and b)
geographic regions. Either of these would have cut horizontally across industry
and, technically at least, might be argued to be superior to a vertical
industry-based structure. The reason being that a greater degree of
coordination and uniformity In the application of training standards would
have been likely. Thus some of the overlaps inherent in industry-based boards
- for example where many different boards would cover the same occupations
such as engineering - or the need to establish coordinating mechanisms, would
have been avoided. What weighed most heavily with policy-makers, therefore,
was the political rather than the technical feasibility of the programmes.
Given that the Intervention was innovatory,{17) that the working out of the
policy was subject to uncertainty, and that much would depend on 'trial and
error',{18) - that, In other words, the policy was developmental in character -
as close an involvement by and with industry was clearly seen to be necessary.
Thus: {19}
"Instead of being an external agency, an industry based training
board can tie Itself closely to the interests, problems and
preoccupations of the firms which compose the industry.. ,close
collaboration between the two is essential to bring about acceptance
and implementation of the recommendations made by the Board. To
come within reach of the deep pervasive changes held to be
necessary, the agent of change has to resort to intervention with a
kindly face."
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But we might also add the important point that employers' organisations were
in any case structured on an industry basis, not on occupation or region
(apart from Chambers of Commerce which were, however considerably weaker).
There were, therefore, clearly identifiable organisatioris which the government
could incorporate (as happened in other policy, areas) into the decision-making
process. Indeed to have proceeded on any other basis might have created
difficulties by way of opposition from such groups. It should be added that
this applies less of course to trade union organisation where occupation may
be said to provide the dominant mode. We may - if only tentatively here -
conclude from this that Government wished the most effective, or organised,
voice to be that of employers. Finally, this close identification of interests
between board and industry was to be engendered by boards being established
as semi-autonomous structures - or to use a word not then in vogue, 'quangos'.
(20) Consequently boards might hope to be considered at least as much the
'creatures' of industry as of the state.
To summarise this part of the discussion, we have been concerned with the
feasibility of training policy insofar as it provided an intellectually and
politically coherent framework for action. The conclusions to be drawn are
firstly that the 'theory' underpinning the policy may have been based on a
misleading premise, viz: that skills (and in the main this may be taken as
referring to craft) shortages are caused by the disincentive effects of
poaching. If such reasoning is found wanting then the assumption that a
strategy of equalising the burden of training costs will lead to the
achievement of the policy's objectives, ie an increase in the quantity and
quality of training, also remains open to doubt. Secondly, that given the
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Government's desire to proceed with legislation set within a voluntary
framework, the consent and participation of industrial interests was crucial to
the achievement of the policy objectives. This significantly influenced the
shape and powers of the machinery that was established.
TEE LABOUR PARTY'S APPROACH
Before going on to look at the implementation of industrial training policy, we
need to take account of how far the election of a Labour Government in the
autumn of 1964 led to a change in the standards surrounding the policy and
the implications of this for the policy's implementation and subsequent
changes. Like the Conservatives the Labour Party - not unnaturaUy perhaps -
had enthusiastically adopted the concept of planning, in particular as a means
to increasing economic growth, and adopted a 'supply-side' view of economic
management.{21} The 'consensus' between the two main parties on the
desirability and priority attached to economic growth should not, however, lead
to the conclusion that the Labour and Conservative Parties' committhent to
planning were virtually ldentical.{22) Even observers such as Hayward appear
to see little difference between the two approaches until after the 'demise' of
Labour's National Plan in 1966.{23) The Labour' Party's approach to planning
differed in two important respects from that of the Conservative s: firstly in
terms of the objectives that planning was designed to secure and secondly the
way in which the instruments of planning were to be used.{24)
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Under Labour planning was to have more 'bite' than the 'toothless tripartism'
(pace Hayward) of Conservative style planning. Above all it was to be a more
comprehensive, coordinated and long-term strategy for securing increased
national output ,though largely through a more effective use of the planning
mechanisms already in existence (principally the NEDC and the EDCs) and the
creation of other institutions (for example, the Department of Economic
Affairs), It was within this context, therefore, that the Government should,
with some keenness, utilise the mechanisms available under the 1964 Industrial
Training Act - the Industrial Training Boards - for an adequate and
appropriately trained labour force was viewed as crucial to the achievement of
the Governnient	 economic objectives. Supply constraints - in this case labour
- was regarded as one of the most pressing problems confronting
government. (25) In words reminiscent of the 1962 White Paper, the Government
stated that: "Shortages of skilled workers have long been a serious obstacle to
economic growth."{26) So, although the Labour Government set out to make
planning more effective, considerable emphasis was still being placed upon
securing change through voluntary agreement. As such there was no impetus
towards a change in policy at the time.
In general then the Industrial Training Act provided an acceptable framework
for the pursuit of Labour's objectives in the area of industrial training. This
does not, however, mean that as the policy was implemented it was likely to
'evolve' in the the same manner or direction as it might under a Conservative
administration. Further, given the developmental characteristic of the policy
and the lack of clarity surrounding the policy's objectives, - which
effectively meant that many decisions were left to the implementation process
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- the Labour Government did not regard the Act as imposing unacceptable
constraints upon the kind of future choices they might wish to see made -
either by themselves or producer groups - in the area of industrial training.
As Ray Gunter, then opposition spokesman had said. during the Debate on the
Second Reading: {27)
"how it [the Bill] works will depend on the personnel who man the
machinery. The Bill gives the broad outlines for industry to get
down to this major task. But, because it is a machinery Bill, because
we are only setting the broad pattern of how we may bring together
the separate parts of industry, coupled with our educationists there
are a host of questions that are not answered in the Bill... ,It could
well be that in a year or two we shall want to look at certain
aspects of this measure again in the light of experience."
Compatibility of standards, therefore, does not preclude differences in
weighting or emphasis being given to the standards. Some idea of these and the
different interpretation of the 'potentialities' of the policy by the Labour
Government may be gained by reference to the National Plan of 1965 and in
which the issue of labour supply figured prominently. For instance, greater
weighting was given to the legitimacy of the state's role in influencing the
working of the labour market and training policy was regarded as part of a
wider 'active manpower policy'.{28) This was to involve a range of initiatives
and interventions designed to Improve the operation of the labour market which
would in turn contribute to the achievement of the planned for levels of
growth. Based on replies received to the industrial Inquiry the plan predicted
continuing and acute shortages, particularly of skilled manpower, in the
construction and engineering industries which, if not overcome, would "retard
the application of new production and management techniques on which
productivity increases may depend."{29) But given that the rate of growth of
the working population was slowing down so that the increased productivity
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required to reach the 25 per cent growth target by 1970 could not be met by
increased amployment, this meant that it would have to be met by increased
output per head of the working population. Not only, therefore, was an increase
in the quantity and quality of trained labour valued in its own right, it was
also regarded as a crucial part of the Government's overall plan for the
economy.
Thus, in addition to increasing the level and quantity of skilled labour
through the ITB structures, it was also considered essential to adopt or
develop a range of other measures designed to improve the efficient use of
available manpower. These included: a) Improving facilities for the accelerated
training and retraining of adult workers - particularly from declining
industries in the less prosperous regions - through increased training
provision at Government Training Centres; b) to end the under-utilisatlon of
labour and to enhance mobility through the introduction of earnings related
unemployment benefit, lump-sum redundancy payments (under the Redundancy
Payments Act 1965), and improvement of the employment exchange service; c) the
development of a comprehensive information system regarding future skills
requirements by industry and by region; d) the tackling of restrictive
practices in industry. The 'active manpower policy' was thus seen to have close
links with other policy areas, in particular industrial policy and regional
policy. The organisations listed as being actively involved were: Government;
industry (or management and unions); NJAC; ITBs; EDCs; and Regional Economic
Planning Councils and Boards. These measures were further supplemented with
the introduction in May 1966 of the Selective Employment Tax and in September
1967 of the Regional Employment Premium.{30) Additionally, in relation to the
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regions, the Ministry of Labour instituted a scheme in July 1966 which
provided financial assistance and Ministry instructors (including Training
Vithin Industry) directly to firms within development districts (extended to
development areas with the passage of the 1966 Industrial Development Act).
And on 18 December 1967, Roy Hattersley, then Parliamentary Secretary to the
Xinister of Labour, announced a new scheme of grants to firms in development
areas to overcome shortages of skilled labour. Under the scheme two types of
grants for craft apprentice training were available to firms which were:
capital grants towards the cost of providing additional off-the-job training
places or; per capita grants to employers taking on additional trainees. (31)
The election of a Labour Government in 1964 did. not, therefore, mark a sharp
break with the past. Indeed, there was a high degree of continuity in the
general outlook towards economic intervention. Thus the Labour Government in
industrial training, as it did in other policy areas, built upon and then
extended the initiative begun under the Conservatives. There was certainly no
sudden change of direction as implied in the adversarial model of British
politics.{32) Whether Labour in due course went in the same direction as the
Conservatives would have gone is obviously not possible to judge with any
certainty. But what we shall see when we look at the implementation is that
overall the Labour Government appeared happy to work with the framework laid
down by the Conservative administration and did not seek to introduce any
stronger element of central direction in training. In other words, there seemed
to be, to all intents and purposes, a shared set of Ideas concerning industrial
training between the two parties at this time.
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THE TRAIlING XACIIRY
The Labour Government lost little time in starting to implement the provisions
of the Industrial Training Act. Before going on to examine the implementation
of the Act, however, we shall look in more detail at the machinery that either
existed or was set up to deliver industrial training policy. The first three
ITBs were in fact set up by the Conservatives before losing office in 1964.
These were the Wool, Jute and Flax ITB established in June, and the Iron and
Steel and Engineering ITBs in July. The Central Training Council was also
established in Nay of that year. Thereafter the number of boards expanded
rapidly. By the time of the publication of the National Plan a further six
boards had been established covering construction, shipbuilding, gas, water,
electricity, and ceramics, glass and mineral products. By Novemebr 1966
seventeen boards were in existence, and there were plans to increase their
number to thirty. They did in fact 'peak at twent nine by the beginning of
1970. Table 5.1 sets out the number of boards in existence in 1972.
As can be seen from the table the boards covered a range of industries,{33)
There were some significant omissions such as banking and insurance and
although the Labour government proposed to introduce boards for these sectors,
other factors - in the form of opposition from banking and insurance
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TABLE 5,1
BOARD	 Date	 No, of	 No, of	 No, of
established	 establishments	 employees	 Staff
Agricultural,	 Aug 66	 79,000	 245,000	 295
horticultural
and forestry
Air transport and
	
Mar 67
	 2,895	 93,262	 51
travel
Carpet	 Mar 66	 266	 45,054	 18
Ceramics, glass and 	 July 65	 2,703	 342,409	 120
mineral products
Chemical and allied 	 Oct 67	 3,800	 460,000	 102
products
Clothing and allied	 Oct 69	 7,544	 324,891	 43
products
Construction	 July 64	 47,018	 1,136,500	 607
Cotton and allied	 July 66	 1,697	 199,680	 57
products
Distributive	 July 68	 111,000	 1,400,000	 293
Electricity supply	 June 65	 17	 199.500	 7
Engineering	 July 64	 24,870	 3,326,000	 915
Foundry IIC
	
Mar 65
	 1,562	 151,198	 81
Food, drink and
	
July 68
	 70,307	 1,214,778	 145
tobacco
Furniture and timber	 Dec 65	 4,319	 211,902	 112
Footwear, leather and 	 Nov 68	 2,061	 134,000	 40
fur skin
Gas	 June 65	 13	 115,684	 19
Hotel and catering	 Nov 66	 108,000	 680,000	 295
Iron and steel	 July 64	 581	 299,732	 72
Knitting, lace and net 	 Mar 66	 1,670	 159,922	 55
Man-made fibres	 Feb 66	 43	 52,497	 4
Paper and paper products	 May 68	 1,730	 220,000	 80
Petroleum	 May 67	 1,498	 84,487	 46
Printing and publishing	 May 68	 10,336	 369,197	 149
Road transport	 Sept 66	 53,352	 890,000	 806
Rubber and plastics	 Aug 67	 2,053	 301,025	 64
processing
Shipbuilding	 Nov 64	 1,020	 115,800	 63
Water supply	 June 65	 205	 42,169	 145
Wool, jute and flax 	 June 64	 1,849	 144,951	 60
Totals	 541,419	 12,959,638	 - 4,744
Source: Department of Employment 'Training for the Future - A Plan for Discussion' HMSO 1972 pp 64-65
Notes; In addition there were two voluntary boards covering Local 6overnment and the Merchant Navy,
A board for Hairdressing and allied trades had been established in december 1969 but subsequently wound up,
The Foundry Industry Training Committe is a Committee of the Engineering ITBI
The Agricultural Board is financed through the annual Farm Price Review not through levies,
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organisations and the 1970 general election - i.ntervened so that they never
were, in fact, established. It is difficult to discern any precise logic
governing the order in which boards were set up. Perry claims that there was a
'general intention ' to set up boards first in those industries with practical
training experience on the assumption that they would make fewer mistakes and
serve as examples to later boards with less experience.{34) Whilst an OECD
Report declared that "Boards were established first for industries where the
promotion of vocational training seemed specially urgent or where the
organisations of management and labour showed great interest in it, and where
the latter had special experience of vocational training, In this way the good
and bad experiences of the first Boards can be used by later ones."(35} What
seems to be indicated from the sequencing of boards' establishment is that
political considerations, in the form of resistance from sections of industry,
were particularly influential - except in the later cases of banking and
insurance.
Relating the different experiences of boards would be crucially dependent upon
the capacity of the machinery to respond in this way. Information about the
'good and bad experiences' of boards was to be disseminated by the Central
Training Council. As previously noted (Chapter 4) the CTC was an advisory, not
an executive body, its terms of reference being to advise the Minister of
Labour "on the exercise of his functions under this Act and on any other
natter relating to industrial or commercial training which he may refer to
it,"{36} Constituted for three year terms of office the memebership of the CTC
again reflected the emphasis on industry participati.on.{37) In addition to the
thirty three members (six each of employer, employee, education, ITB chairmen,
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two from the nationalised industries, twelve others of whom six were to be
appointed following consultation with the Secretary of State and the Minister
of Education, and the chairman) the Council also contained representatives of
the Ministry of Labour, Department of Education and Science, Scottish Education
Department and other Government Departments. The first chairman was Sir John
Hunter, Chairman of Associated Shipbuilders who served until 1968 when Frank
Cousins, General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union took
over. Cousins remained as chairman until the Council was disbanded under the
1973 Employment and Training Act.
Obviously too large and unweildy as a deliberating and decision-making body,
the Council set up seven advisory Committees: General Policy Committee (this
committee was entirely composed of members of the CTC); Research Committee;
Scottish Committee; Welsh Comittee; Commercial and Clerical Training Committee;
Training of Training Officers Committee (which had formerly existed within the
Xinistry of Labour) and Management Training Comm1ttee the last three covering
occupations which were common to most industries. In addition, although not
strictly a committee of the CTC, there existed the Industrial Training Service
(ITS). Originally established in 1960 by the Industrial Training Council as a
consultative body for industry In the area of training development work, Its
functions were carried over in the new arrangements. The fourteen members - or
directors - of the ITS were also all members of the CTC, The ITS in fact
became self-financing by 1969, and it survived the 19'73 reorganisation when it
was incorporated into the newly formed Manpower Services Commission.
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The CTC operated mainly through issuing memoranda and reports (including, in
all, three Reports to the 1'linister: September 1965; June 1967 and; March
1969).These ranged over topics such as Industrial Training and Further
Education, Safety Training, Training of Training Officers and Instructors as
well as more general guidelines Issued (through the Minister) to ITBs in order
to facilitate a consistent approach to, for example, training standards and the
raising of levies. Almost from the outset the structure of the CTC was the
subject of criticism from a number of quarters. This had mainly to do with its
lack of executive authority and inadequate secretariat arrangements (civil
servants on secondment). These limited the Council's ability to conduct in-
depth studies, to follow through on the implementation of recommendations, or
to be in a position to make authoritative judgements about the efficiency and
effectiveness of Individual boards. Getting industry to respond to either
longer-term or cross-sector training needs required, it was argued, a much
stronger central authority. The Council generally met every two to three
months and there was a fairly close relationship between the Council, its
conmittes and the Training Branch within the Ministry of Labour. As Page put
it, "The CTC operates from Ministry of Labour territory at 32 St James's
Square, London SW1."{38) This was perhaps the chief source of whatever
influence the CTC had on training matters. Given its advisory nature, its size,
voluntary membership, and infrequency of meetings, its 'clout' resided in the
fact that its recommendations were taken into account by the Ministry in
deciding on grant provisions and the approval of Boards' training
recommendations.
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Vhat executive authority was allocated under the Act resided with the Ministry
of Labour. However, Page's interpretation that "The Industrial Training Act
made no bones about it that the Ministry of Labour was to become a real
executive power in the training land" (39) seems grossly overstated. Such is
based on the assumption that because the Government now had a 'financial
stake' in the form of t50 million for grant allocations and loans tight control
would be exercised from the centre. Grants were made available to cover:
(a) the administrative expenditure incurred by boards during their
first twelve months existence (such expenditure thereafter to
be covered from levy income);
(b) 50 per cent of the costs of sending people on approved
training officer, supervisor and instructor courses for the
first twelve months, thereafter 25 per cent (these grants were
also available to firms not coming within the scope of an ITB);
(c) a contribution towards sandwich course costs (also
available to firms outwith the scope of ITBs);
(d) 50 per cent of the cost of research sponsored by an ITB and
approved by the Minister (after advice from the CTC Research
Committee);
(e) 25 per cent of the costs of providing additional off-the-job
training - excluding trainees' wages - up to 1970.
Loans, on the other hand, were made to provide ITBs with working capital or to
finance the acquisition of fixed assets, during the early stages of their
existence.
Other forms of control available to the Minister under the Act were: in the
event of an ITB failing to produce proposals within a reasonable time of a
Minister's request, or if such proposals were unsatisfactory, then the Minister
was allowed to require the ITB to produce such proposals, or fresh ones, within
a specified period of time; in the event of failure to produce satisfactory
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proposals then the Minister was allowed to declare the ITB to be in default in
which case its members had to resign and new ones be appointed; the Minister
was allowed to amend or revoke an industrial Training Order to change the
scope of an ITB or disband it - in either case he had to consult the ITB, and
employer and employee organisations beforehand; in the event of an ITB being
wound up the Minister was allowed to make an additional levy on employers to
cover any deficits. Given that the intention of the Act was to establish a
decentra.lised decision-making structure,{40) such controls would seem to
represent no more than the normal establishment of a code of
acccuntability{41) not, as we shall presently see, the somewhat 'draconian'
centralisation of power suggested by Page.
The other main responsibilitiea of the Ministry of Labour relating to
Industrial training of which we need to give some account to complete the
picture, were those for the Government Training Centres (GTCs) and manpower
research. We shall, however, postpone our consideration of the GTCs to a later
section, as this should be seen in relation to the implementation of the ITA
and the impact it had upon wider labour market policy. As far as manpower
research was concerned reference has already been made to the inadequacy of
the statistical information and the consequent establishment of the Manpower
Research Unit within the Ministry of Labour. Its original purpose was
conceived as the collection and interpretation of information necessary for the
pursuit of the objectives of industrial training policy. However, given the
wider commit ment of the Labour Government to industrial planning the remit of
the Unit was similarly widened. It was for instance closely involved In the
Industrial Inquiry for the National Plan; with the National Economic
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Development Office in the preparation of its national manpower surveys; with
the Department of Economic Affairs especially in the area of regional manpower
planning; and with ITBs and EDCs for particular industrial sectors. Although
the Ministry of Labour's functions in the area of industrial training expanded
following the passage of the ITA, such expansion was relatively modest. An
improved statistical capability for manpower forecasting and planning was
necessary but the ITB structure was conceived to operate free from close
central supervision and direction, while the expansion of the vocational
training schemes provided in GTCs was comparatively slow.
t!PLEXENTATION: TEE ROLE OF THE BOARDS
The 1964 Act had made provision for the establishment of decentralised
machinery - ITEs - with a fair amount of discretion to make decisions
affecting industrial training in the light of the varying needs of different
sectors of industry In this section we are concerned to examine the ways in
which the ITBs interpreted their roles in the period under study. During their
first few years of operation boards' primary concerns were with setting the
rate of levy, assessing the training needs for their industries and in deciding
upon the nature and level of grants. Clearly the three are interrelated but the
approach that boards adopted to these issues varied considerably. To some
extent this was to be expected for the industries that ITBs were serving
varied in such things as size - in terms of number of establishments,
emloyees, as well as the size of establishments in scope; in the degree to
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which the activities of firms covered were homogeneous; in resources; and in
terms of training practices and traditions. But the divergent practices adopted
by boards were also influenced by the differing interpretations that ITBs
applied to their roles. From their inception each board had an important
operational choice to make: given that it was Government policy that ITBs
should be regarded as part of the industry that they covered, what approach
would best ensure their acceptance by industry.
There was no doubt some degree of role conflict inherent in such a position
for in reality ITBs were not simply in existence to serve the needs of their
Industries, but also to ensure the achievement of wider, national economic
objectives. If these objectives were compatible or reconcilable then there
would have been little to concern the boards: if they were not then boards
would have to make a judgement about where to place the emphasis and the
right balance to strike. Important here is the extent to which the Kinistry of
Labour attempted, or refrained from attempts, to exercise close control over
the activities of the boards. In fact the evidence indicates that within the
general requirements of the Act boards were given considerable autonomy or
discretion in exercising their functions, in particular as they related to
levy/grant schemes. In the words of Roy Hattersley, "Wisely, the Government has
given most boards a free hand, treating their submission of grant and levy
proposals as a formality rather than as an opportunity for interference."{42)
Apart from guidance by the CTC, the main source of central 'control' was the
Departmental Assessors who sat in on board meetings. "In practice through its
AEsessors appointed to ITBs the Department has had knowledge of Boards'
intentions and has been able to advise ITBs at a formative stage about the
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Department's policy aims and on the likely acceptability of ITB's proposals and
has thus usually been able to ensure that levy and grant proposals submitted.
formally for approval are. acceptable in principle." {43) The above passage tends
to suggest rather more influence exerted on boards by such means than other
evidence would indicate. The system of assessors certainly did not manage to
generate a uniform pattern in ITB proposals - especially in relation to levy
and grant - even where the Ministry's view was clearly articulated, In the
early years in matters of interpretation and discretionary decisions the views
of ITBs generally appears to have prevailed over the Ministry in areas of
conflict or dissension.
The different approaches adopted by boards to the level at which levy should
be set may be seen by reference to table 5.2. From the beginning, the
Engineering Industry Training Board CEITB), unlike the other boards, opted for
a high levy of 2.5 per cent of payroll, while the lowest - Electricity Supply -
was set at only 0.02 per cent. Some later ITBs adopted more complex levy/grant
systems. The Ceramics, Glass and Mineral Products ITB (CGMP/ITB), for instance,
introduced a differential levy whereby the pottery, glass and allied products
industries were levied 1.5 per cent of payroll whereas only 0.75 per cent was
levied on the other industries within the board's scope. This example was later
folowed by other boards such as Vool, Jute and Flax, Hotel and Catering and
Chemical and Allied Products. In part this reflected a much more cautious
approach by the majority of boards, but it also reflected a different rationale
and set of objectives between boards. The 2.5 per cent levied by the EITB was
generally equivalent to the estimated cost of the total training provided
within the engineering industry, thus the grants paid out were also roughly
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TABLE 5,2
DETAILS OF LEVY ORDERS
1965 LEVY ORDERS
Industrial Training Board 	 I	 Basis of Assessment	 I	 Yield
Construction	 0,5 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 6,052,388
Engineering	 I 2,5 per cent, of total emoluments	 I	 75,600,000
Iron and Steel	 I £7 per employee	 I	 2,304,185
Shipbuilding	 055 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 604,412
wool	 I 0,75 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 818,469
1966 LEVY ORDERS
Industrial Training Board	 I	 Basis of Assessment	 I	 Anticipated YIEld
Construction	 1 per cent, of total emoluments	 I	 15,000,000
Electricity Supply	 I 0.02 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 50,000
Furniture and Timber	 I 0,9 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 1,760,000
Gas	 I 0,25 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 300,000
Iron and Steel	 £14 lOs Cd per employee 	 4,785,000
Shipbuilding	 I 1,25 per cent , of total emoluments I 	 1,513,000
Water Supply	 I 1,1 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 400,000
Wool Jute and Flax	 I 1 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 1,286,000
1967 LEVY ORDERS IN PROCESS OF PREPRAT1ON
Industrial Training Board 	 I	 Basis of Assessment	 I	 Anticipated Yield
Carpet	 I 0,5 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 170,000
Engineering	 I 2,5 per cent, of total emoluments 	 I	 83,000,000
Source: Nin gh Rpor from fh EsUats Coai g te' 'Manpower Training for Industry' Session 1966-67
HC 548 (HMSO, July 1967) p 50,
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equivalent to total expenditure. The approach adopted by other boards was to
make grants available for specific, more easily identifiable, forms of training
on the assumption that "where the need for systematic training schemes was
not widely accepted, it was regarded as justifiable for Training Boards to
begin cautiously in order to build up good-will. If the training organisation
is expanded more rapidly than the industry is prepared to accept, or a board
lays down at the outset unrealistically high standards of training, its efforts
may be counter-productive."{44) Also, the fact that accurately assessing total
training costs - initially at least - was extremely difficult may have put
some boards off this approach. As the EITB discovered few firms actually knew
how much their training cost them,{45)
We can see, therfore, that Judgements varied, not only from board to board but
between boards and the centre, about the best way to achieve the conformance
of employers to the Act's objectives. Certainly, problems of acceptance in an
enviroment where the prevailing culture was one of suspicion of state
intervention and the desire to maintain the autonomy of private capital
against the state (46) were real enough, and it Is understandable that boards
would not wish to alienate their 'clientele', What is less clear is why, despite
same closing of the levy gap in subsequent years, there should have been such
marked differences. As the levy income of boards would vary significantly,
from the standpoint of resources at least, It could be anticipated that some
boards would have a greater impact than others. This lack of a coordinated
approach was Indeed picked up by the CTC in its first report (47) to the
Kinister. Whilst accepting some degree of divergence as Inevitable, the Council
concluded that every board should, as soon as practicable, aim to adopt
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schemes which would cover the full cost of training. It was recommended that
the Ninister, without attempting to impose complete uniformity should use the
powers of approval over boards proposals to this end, The Xinister, Ray
Gunter, accepted this recommendation which then became the broad intention of
the !(inistry.{48)
Some boards it seems, either refused to accept the logic of this
recommédation, or felt that its application was too problematic.{49} Whether
because it felt that there were real difficulties, or because it felt unable to
significantly influence boards decisions in this area, the CTC considerably
modified its subsequent views and recommendations. In its second report it
stated that Experience has shown that these difficulties are very real and
that a gradual approach to the objective of a fair redistribution of costs has
many advantages."{50) By the time of its third and final report the Council
seemed to have virtually accepted the existence of variations, or at least that
it could do little about them: "All the boards are pursuing common
objectives.. .But their ,Judgement of the best way to achieve these objectives,
having regard to customs, practices and training needs of their industries, has
led to a wide variety of . levy and grant schemes," The report went on "It may
be a matter of judgement, having regard to the circumstances of the industry
and the total policies of the board, what level of levy and grant will provide
the most effective incentive to good training. This is not to dismiss the case
for sharing the costs of training more evenly between employers... .But it is to
argue that total training costs should not be the main determinant of the
level at which levy Is fixed." (1} In effect the CTC can be seen as - If not
exactly graciously - accepting the fragmentation that, perhaps to an extent
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inevitably, was developing in the iinplenientation of the Industrial Training
Act.
The high rate of levy was in fact severely criticised by the Estimates
Committee in its Tinth Report and, if anything, it suppported an even more
cautious approach than most other boards had adopted. The Committee claimed
that the levy/grant system, far from achieving the purpose of the ITA, was
actually "impeding the Boards from proper consideration of future training
policy and is not serving as a proper incentive to firms to improve their
training." It therefore went on "it should be the policy of a new Board to
think first and to act afterwards, to avoid establishing a bureaucracy to
administer a system which may be overtaken by events and to concentrate on
long term planning of future needs., .the Ministry of Labour should notify
Industrial Training Boards that the Ninister will not approve a proposal for
levy which exceeds the minimum sufficient to cover administrative expenses so
that Boards will make their first task a comprehensive study of the long term
needs of industry." (52) To effectively remove the power of levy from the Boards
- if only temporarily - would have been, to use the words of the CTC,
'premature' and 'unrealistic'. (53)
Ironically, however, it is the EITB that has often been cited as the most
'successful' of all the ITBs and. certainly the high rate of levy by itself did
not seem to alientate employers within the industry. The reasons why the EITB
adopted that particular course of,action appear to be twofold, Firstly for what
has been termed 'psychological' reasons and secondly for its 'shock effect'. The
EITB judged that adopting a gradualist approach would simply attract criticism
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from employers each time the levy needed to be raised. Starting with a high
levy not only got "firms to swallow the bitter medicine in one gulp",{54) it
also meant that inducing firms to improve the quantity and quality of training
could be done without having to raise additional levy. Further the "request to
pay such a high amount was meant to be a shock, which would draw the
attention of the higher executives to the training issue. It seems that this
intention succeeded."{55} In brief, the EITB was demonstrating that 'it meant
business' and one means at least of getting management to seriously consider
training matters was to make a significant impact on the firm's budget, It has
been claimed {56) that it was not, in fact the level of levy which caused
employers' complaints in the engineering industry but the complexity of the
paperwork involved in claiming grants.
Ve have considered in some detail the levy policies of the ITBs during their
early years of operation. One reason being that the operationalisation of this
aspect of the Act was to generate a considerable amount of criticism at the
beginning of the 1970s. Ye shall be returning to this shortly. The other side
of the levy coin was of course the grant policies that ITBs adopted. An
examination of these reveals boards' training priorities and something of the
ways in which ITBs interpreted their roles under the Act. There were three
main ways open to boards for the making of grants: to reimburse costs; to pay
a fixed amount; and to pay grant as a percentage of levy. As referred to in
the third report from the CTC, it appears that - as with levies - boards
adopted a variety of approaches to the payment of grant as well as the
training recommendations and criteria for eligibility that went alongside
them.{57) To some extent - and in line with the provisions of the Act - this
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reflected the views of the Individual boards about the training needs and
standards in operation within their industries. Where It was Judged that
training standards were in little need of improvement - such as Electricity
Supply or Xanmade Fibres - -then there was nt much point in engaging iii a
redistribution of training costs: both levies and grants were minimal.{58) The
majority concentrated their initial efforts on increasing off-the-job training,
particularly for first year craft apprentices, and on improving or up-grading
current training practices. The extent to which boards attempted to raise the
general level of training across occupations within their industries varied
considerably - some ITBs again adopting a more gradualist approach than
others. Generally speaking, the latter were those boards which also opted for
setting a low levy and grants tended to be of fixed amounts (e.g. on a per
capita basis) for specific programmmes of training, for instance for operators,
technicians, technologists, and training officers. Additionally some boards
began to take into account such things as safety training and the
establisment's training facilities In determining the level of grant, while
others did not. The one area where boards did adopt a more consistent approach
was in respect of management training, as the activities involved were seen to
cut across most industries. It was not until after some prodding from the CTC,
however, that recommendations for management training began to be
developed.{59) In later years the emphasis of boards shifted somewhat to grant
schemes related to the systems of training in operation within individual
firms. These took into account the method by which firms assessed their
training needs, established training plans and moved towards the achievement
of the plans. However, although this change of emphasis was common to most
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ITEs it continued to overlie significant differences in the levy/grant schemes
of individual boards.
Thus depending on the type of training, the way in which it was carried out
and the extent to which it was in line with board recommendations, a firm
might have recet'ved in grant a proportion, the equivalent, or in excess of the
amount of levy assessed on it, The main difficulty confronting boards during
these years was in ensuring that they had an effective means of assessing
firms' training activities for grant purposes. The larger the levy the greater
was the amount available in grants, which meant the more complex was the task
of assessment. An ITB such as engineering could not possibly hope to visit the
near 30,000 establishments that came within its scope, even with its relatively
large 'army' of 150 training officers. It had instead to rely on assessment
based on two questionnaires: one measuring quantity, the other quality. The
problems surrounding the verification of information obtained in such a manner
are fairly obvious,{0)
To give a round picture, some further areas of boards' activities should be
referred to at this point. ]'!ost boards, but especially those covering large
numbers of small to medium sized firms encouraged the development of group
training schemes. For the smaller firm such schemes offered a much more cost
effective means of providing training. A variety of organisational approaches
were adopted including, for example, larger firms providing off-the-job
training for apprentices of smaller establishinents.{61} Some boards also
carried out direct training in their own centres for employees of small firms,
but this was never planned to be on a more than limited scale. There can be
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little doubt that the rise in the number of such schemes, from about 80 ft
1964 to over 300 in 1968 {62) was due to the weight attached to them by some
boards, in particular the engineering board. However, a survey conducted at the
time by the EITB d.icovered that whilst on average 21 firms participated in
such schemes, the average number of employees for each firm was 120,(63) to
some extent therefore lessening the case for their utility to the small firm.
Finally, it appears, most boards moved fairly quickly in the areas of research
and consultancy and advisory services, Thus, for instance, the Knitting, Lace
and Net ITB sponsored research on the cost of training, Wool, Jute and Flax
sponsored research on training needs and. labour turnover in small firms while
the Foundry Industry Training Committee looked at management career
patterns.{64) The boards' advisory services were mainly carried out through
their training staff in the field, of which there were 850 in all by the end of
August 1968.{65)
ASSESS1G THE LXPLEENTATIOK OF THE IKDUSTRL&L TRAIIIIG ACT
Having looked at the establishment and organisation of the ITB system together
with a consideration of the roles and priorities adopted by the boards, we
turn our attention in this section to an assessment of the implementation of
training policy up to about 1970, together with some related issues of its
impact, and the implications of these for policy change. An important concern
here is to clarify the extent to which, if at all, the operational choices made
by ITBs served to modify the strategy contained in the policy. Thereafter, to
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clarify the extent to which any such modifications may be seen as 'displacing'
the original intentions of the policy by those responsible for its
implementation, or as a 'development' designed to overcome limitations in the
original policy. This should then contribute to our assessment of the degree to
which the operationalisation of the policy contributed to the process of
change in this policy area which culminated in the 1973 Employment and
Training Act which we shall be considering in the following chapter. We shall,
therefore, proceed by an examination of the impact of the ITBs with regard to
the issues that attained prominence at the time, the problems that were seen
to derive from the Act's implementation and the criticisms that were directed
at the ITBs themselves.
The criticisms of the operation of the Industrial Training Act centred on
four main areas, although they are of course inter-related. These were: the
extent to which the objectives of the Act were being achieved; the adverse
effect on small firms; overly bureaucratic boards and duplication of activities
between boards; and the ineffectiveness of the CTC as a central coordinating
mechanism. Whilst these Issues became problematic during the implementation of
the Act, it should be borne in mind that they may not necessarily be regarded
as simply pertaining to the imlementation level: that is they may be due to
shortcomings or limitations at the strategic policy level.
Some of these difficulties became apparent fairly quickly whilst others were
slower to materialise. But all gradually became Increasingly prominent. A
principal reason for this, It is claimed here, was the way in which, from the
beginning of its formation in 1965, the CBI kept an extremely close 'watching
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brief' over developiuents,{66) Generally speaking it adopted a stance which
attempted to be both supportive and constructively critical; Having given its
'blessing' to the ITA the CBI was committed to its 'successful' implementation
but was no doubt aware that not all its constituent membership would adopt
such a benevolent attitude. The right kind of balance had therefore not only to
be struck, but be seen to be struck, between support for the objectives of the
Act and the protection of those interests which might be adverely affected by
its operation. As early as 1966, for instance, the CBI announced that it had
begun a general review of the Act which inter alia bad led to discussions with
the Ministry of Labour on a wide range of matters including criticisms of the
ways in which the Act was being applied - especially by the EITB.(67) This
review led to the statements in 1968 that; "More headway should have been made
in tackling some of the fundamental issues which have long bedevilled our
training situation." And further, that "As the paymaster in this operation,
industry will be increasingly concerned to see that it gets value for money in
terms of all the things which the Act sets out to achieve." (68) Because of this
close interest and the information which it gathered, the CBI was - apart from
the Ministry of Labour/DEP - probably the only organisation to have a fairly
clear idea of the impact that the Act was having upon industry as a whole. In
fact, in view of the Ministry's stance of letting boards get on with the job
themselves, it could well be that the CBI had a fuller or clearer picture than
had the Department. The CBI	 was, therefore, In a relatively favourable
position to exert pressure for change where this was deemed necessary. As we
shall see later this was so on certain occasions between 1970-73, but prior to
then the CBI was instrumental in bringing some of these issues to the fore.
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Achievement of the Act's objectives
Increases in quality
The three main objectives of the 1964 Act were to increase the quantity and
quality of industrial training and to spread the costs between employers. We
shall, therefore, consider the first two of these here, but leave the third to
be examined when we look at the effect of the Act on small firms, as the two
are Intimately connected, To assess how far the objectives of the Act were
being achieved was dependent upon having suitable indicators by which
performance could be measured.{69} 	 - l(aking a quantitative assessment,
whilst subject to certain difficulties, Is relatively easy in comparison to a
qualitative one. It was certainly claimed at the time, by the Ninister, by the
ITBs and by the CTC that the Act had resulted in a significant Increase in
both the quantity and quality of training. Yet it is difficult to see on what
grounds claims about improvements in quality were made other than being based
on an assumption that more training ipso facto equals better training Whilst
there may be a degree of accuracy in this assumption there is certainly no
universal truth contained in it. There is In fact no doubt that during the
first five or six years of the Act's operation training activity increased,{70)
but the propensity was, it would seem, to base measures of quality on the same,
or similar, Indicators as measurement of quantity: output was tending to be
measured in terms of input. For instance, the Secretary of State for
Employment and Productivity, Barbara Castle, stated in 1969 that there was
"hard evidence of how the quality of training has been raised." This 'hard
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evidence' turned out to be no more than the publication and approval of over
120 ITE training recommendations covering all types of occupations.{71)
Admittedly, such recommendations were linked to the incentive of grant and
were designed to improve training standards. But there are three closely
connected issues here which raise questions about the magnitude of such
improvements as were indicated by grant levels. The first concerns the matter
of who is doing the assessing and. the competence or expertise involved.
Initially at least, there was no available poe1 of training personnel required
by ITBs. In order to at least partially fill this gap ITBs apparently engaged
in some 'poaching' of their own by offering more attractive salaries than were
available in industry. Such poaching was perhaps not too difficult given the
general position of training officers within industry prior to 1964, h1ch was
to be "responsible mainly for training at shop floor level...training for what
were regarded as traditional, well-known or well-authenticated skills.. .working
with a limited range of teaching techniques... .Tbe Training Officer was in the
training job often because he himself had been good at the job he was
teaching, and he was reasonably articulate. He was often the poor cousin of the
technical college teacher, of relatively low status in his firm, relatively
poorly paid, and knowing little about the results of his work."{72) A further
source of recruitment for ITBs apparently was retired officers from the armed
forces, <73)
Apart from the resentment that such 'creaming off' from industry caused{74)
this indicates that beards were likely not only to be publishing
recommendations but making decisions about training standards in industry and
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hence grants on the advice of an inadequate - in terms of numbers and quality
- supporting staff. Related to this is the second point that, in one sense,
early decisions about grant eligibility may be seen as setting some form of
precedent. This would make it much more difficult thereafter to alter the basis
upon which grants were made, not least because of the complaints that such
action would be likely to engender, Thus the best that might be hoped for
would be a gradual 'push' effect on quality - as boards' staff became more
qualified and as there was a general refining of methods and tightening up on
grant conditions. And thirdly, it might reasonably be supposed that as the
ITBs developed, so too would their own administrative interests. It would not,
therefore, necessarily be disadvantageous to the promotion of those interests
to claim that Increases in the amount of grant paid out were indications of
rising training quality. In sum, we can see that whilst it can be claimed that
there was inevitably some Increase in the quality of training, determining the
magnitude of the increase was virtually impossible as there was no 'objective'
method of evaluating the training recommendations arid standards laid down by
individual boards, nor means whereby their impact could be assessed. This was
one of the consequences of the Department's deliberate policy of non-
interference in boards' activities. As 1'tukherjee stated, "DEP interest has
remained centred on evaluating each Boards' performance within the parameters
which the Board has determined for itself."<75)
Increases in quantity
The second issue in relation to the objectives concerns the nature, or value,
of the increased volume of training. Because of the already noted anxiety of
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many boards to speedily establish a levy/grant system before appropriate
mechanisms existed for adequately assessing training needs and standards in
Industry, many firms were able to take financial advantage of such a state of
af:falrs. That is, many companies - especially the larger ones - adopted an
entrepreneurial attitude towards training, i.e. maximise benefits (ITB grants)
and minimise costs (Training and levy). Because firms that trained in excess
of tbe average for an industry could obtain more in grant than they paid out
In levy, It was considered that the levy/grant system was producing 'training
for grant' rather than training for productivity or to meet future skills
shortages.{'76} lkany firms were able to claim up to four or five times the
amount paid out. Perhaps the most extreme example arose in the Construction
ITB which got Itself into considerable financial difficulties in the operation
of its levy/grant system, ultimately requiring an 8millIon loan from the
Government. in 1967 over 20 per cent of establishments in the construction
Industry had received grants of between two and four times the levy paid,
whilst one firm had actually managed to claim twelve times its levy.{77) One
of the reasons why this could occur was the tendency to base levy assessments
on grounds other than detailed analyses of manpower and training needs.
Thus it is questionable how far the increase in the quantity of training
reflected the real needs of industry, or how far it represented the most
convenient means of obtaining a larger slice of the grant cake. It was, for
example, the view of a significant section of employer members who took part
in the CBI's appraisal of the ITA that many firms were employing training
staff - or changing the designation of existing staff to that of 'training
officer' - in order to have someone available to complete the ITB forms and
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qualify for the maximun possible grant. The implication being that actual
training was a secondary consideration. Indeed it is likely that some training
that was in excess of the average for the industry simply reflected a higher
than average labour turn-over, so that some employers felt aggrieved that the
grant structure was tending to support firms with poor labour relations.{78) A
final point to note in connection with quantity is that it was difficult to
ascertain precisely how much of any increase was the result of ITB pressure
and how much might in any case have taken place. A not untypical response
from a member trade association to the CBI review pointed out that training
was steadily increasing in the industry in 1967 before the establishment of
the ITB and "It is difficult.. .to say that the quantity has been significantly
effected(sic) by the Board since 1967."{79)
Spreading the costs and the siiall firm
The third objective of the ITA that we are considering in the context of
implementation is that of the re-distribution of training costs. Because,
however, such re-distribution was supposed to work against 'poachers', i.e.
generally small to medium sized firms, this issue cannot be considered in
isolation from the factors that gave rise to vociferous complaints from the
small firm sector and so we shall consider these together. Given the rationale
of the Act it might be assumed that such complaints were no more than was to
be expected and that they were simply pleas for a return to the status quo
ante. This was apparently the view taken by the CTC in 1967, although couched
in diplomatic terms, While "it cannot be denied that a number of smaller
employers genuinely believe that the levy and grant system is bound to operate
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to their disadvantage, either because their training needs are modest or
because of the form of training they are able to provide", the problem was
seen as "to a large extent one of communication.' It was important, therefore
that boards take these complaints seriously 1 if for no other reason than that
"in most industries the majority of firms are small, employing fewer than 100
employees" and "boards can ill afford to lose the goodwill of these
employers".{BO) By 1969 the views of the CTC had undergone some re-assessment,
which suggested that there was in reality some basis for such complaints:
although some were either a form of protest or exaggeration, "many do
undoubtedly reflect a major problem which must be of concern to the Council
and all training boards."{81)
In essence the complaints centred around the claim that the operation of the
Act was working against the small firm and in favour of the large: the
inequity that had been claimed to have existed prior to 1964 had not so much
been reduced as reversed. The costs of complying with the Act in terms of
fulfilling the requirements of the ITBs far outweighed any advantages to be
derived it was stated. Such costs might include time spent in filling in
complicated forms; the employment of specialist staff; and releasing workers
for off-the-job training. This was compounded by the lack of flexibility and
communication on the part of some boards towards such firms. One reason was
that boards were generally unaware of the needs of such firms resulting from
"the absence of anyone to represent the small man on the Central Training
Council or the training boards."{82) The result was that many such employers
came to regard the levy as simply another form of taxation. It was estimated
"that some 5,000 firms pay the levy and make no attempt whatsoever to recoup
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their losses - many simply add the levy on to their prices."{83} However
justified such complaints (and given the absence of adequate cost benefit
analyses across the board, justification is really another word for conjecture)
the strength of feeling behind them was certainly sufficient to Induce a
response from most ITBs and Government,
The Government responded by acknowledging and giving credence to such
difficulties. In June l99 Roy Hattersley sympathetically stated: "We must make
an increasing allowance for the needs of small firms. Boards are making great
efforts to take into account the small firms, to improve communications with
them and to help provide them with training services and advice. Clearly
training is often more difficult to organise in the small firm than in the
large." (84) One month later the President of the Board of Trade, Anthony
Crosland, announced the establishment of a Committee of Inquiry on Small firms
- known as the Bolton CommIttee.{8) One of the problem areas that was to
figure prominently in the Report was the effect of the operation of the ITA,
and the recommendations of the Bolton Committee were to have a significant
influence upon subsequent legislation. As far as the ITBs were concerned, it is
clear that, sooner or later, the majority took steps to respond to these
criticisms. By the time that the Bolton Committee reported in 1971 there were
twenty nine boards of which twenty four had small firms in scope. Of these
twenty four, twenty were operating systems of differential levies and/or
payroll 'cut of fs' before levy became chargeable. For example, the Ceramics,
Glass and Aineral Products ITB exempted the first t6,000 of earnings from levy
and its levy varied between O.757 and 1.5% of total emoluments by sector; while
the Chemicals and Allied Products ITB had a 25,OOO exemption cut off but a
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single, 1.5% levy. The most complex and far reaching of all was the system
applied by the Wool, Jute and Flax ITB which bad thirteen rates of levy
between nil and 1.5% and a cut off of 7,000.{86}
ITBs also increasingly adopted a system which came to be known as 'netting'
whereby money was collected or paid out In a single transaction: the sum due
being the net amount after allowing grant to be offset against levy. Fourteen
of the twenty four boards above were operating such procedures by 1971.C87)
setting was an attempt to simplify and introduce greater flexibility into the
paperwork involved in the levy grant system and. whilst not being a measure
specifically designed for the benefit of small firms, no doubt went some way
towards meeting some of their complaints. In addition to developing advisory
services for small firms the other area where, from the beginning, boards had
tried to encourage training in small firms was in the development of group
training schemes (see above). By 1971 some 712 such schemes were in operation
and of these 215 were In the construction industry and 170 In the engineering
industry. {88)
We can conclude from the foregoing, therefore, that as far as achieving the
objective of a fair distribution of training costs was concerned, two important
factors in this context militated against this, Firstly, with the exception of
the EITB, the initial decisions to opt for low levies meant that the full cost
of training was not being re-distributed. Although this was viewed as applying
In the short term, few boards found it possible thereafter to increase their
levies to a rate that would cover the full cost of training. This was due to
the second factor which was the amount of criticism that the levy/grant system
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generated, in particular from small firms. By responding to this with
differential levies and cut of fs (applicable to the EITB from 1970), ITBs not
only abandoned cost spreading as an objective but • also the rather more
implicit objective in the Act that the financial incentive should be a means of
Improving training in all firms regardless of size.
Bureaucracy and duplication
Some of the reasons for the criticisms that ITBs were overly bureaucratic in
operation are, of course, to be found in the above. Certainly in the early years
of operation, fulfilling the boards requirements, for 'mple, for information
was a complex and time-consuming business especially where, as we might
assume was the case for the vast majority of firms, such information either
did not exist or did not exist in a readily accessible form. No doubt some
element of criticism would have existed regardless of how sensitive boards
were to the needs of firms, simply because any form of additional cost or
regulation is negatively regarded. Nonetheless, there were certain common
features such as complexity, inflexibility - especially where the needs of
individual firms were seen to vary - and boards adopting somewhat
'dictatorial' postures that suggests some more tangible basis to such claims.
It is, however,to an extent, difficult to generalise about the accuracy of such
criticisms given as we have already discussed, the different approaches and
attitudes adopted by boards themselves towards the firms in their industries.
The corollary to this is, of course, that firms' experiences would differ and
so too would their perceptions of the boards. This may in part explain
apparent contradictions in the complaints and criticisms of the board system
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in general: on the one hand board staff were too 'inspectorial', boards were
financially inefficient and spent too much on buidings and employing too many
staff, whilst on the other hand there was claimed to be a lack of personal
contact, often due to boards employing inadequate numbers of training staff.
The other aspect that was a cause of dissatisfaction was the duplication
inherent in the industry based board stucture and the way in which companies
could be brought within the scope of more than one ITB. For the purposes of
the Act the relevant organisational unit was the 'establishment', This, however,
meant that where a company bad a number of subsidiaries, then depending on
the nature of the activities therein, it could fall under a different board
from that of the parent company. One such firm that responded to the CBI's
survey reported that through its subsidiaries it was involved with nine ITBs,
and as all these establishments had works canteens, 'ith the Hotel and
Catering ITB also. This latter point similarly featured as a prominent
complaint amongst other respondents. {69) Some of the difficulties arose because
the training policies and recommendations of the boards differed. In this
connection another company 'in scope' to both the construction and engineering
ITBs reported that certain apprentices did not receive certificates from the
EITB if they had trained only to the CITBs schemes. And finally, it was
claimed that all of this placed additional burdens on the parent company which
was having to answer queries and provide guidelines to subsidiaries. The main
mechanism designed to avoid such problems was the CTC which we shall be
examining in a moment. Boards themselves, however, had authority under the Act
to create structures and procedures to avoid or overcome duplication. Thus a
board may "join with one or more other industrial training boards in
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appointing joint comniittees.,.".{90) The most notable example of such a
development was the Joint Committee for Training in the Foundry Industry set
up by the EITB and the Iron and Steel ITB. Other, more normal means of
achieving cooperation and coordination were joint sub-committees or working
parties. Also one ITB could request another to undertake training in a
particular establishment on its behalf or an ITB could adopt the training
recommendations and regulations of another board. Despite these provisions
they were clearly not widely used. There was a "Reluctance on the part of
Boards to collaborate on joint ventures, or to share accumulated experience;
some worthwhile joint projects (eg in applied research) not undertaken,"{91)
Such reluctance may be taken as indicative of the development of inter-
organisatiorial rivalries
The Central Training Council
e turn finally in this section to the Central Training Council. It is evident
from our discussions so far that some of the reservations expressed prior to
the passage of the ITA regarding the CTC's role as a coordinating mechanism
were borne out by subsequent events. Being at one, remove from the delivery of
policy, the Council did not generate a great deal of criticism or comment from
employers. Indeed it is likely that the majority were only vaguely aware of the
CTCs existence very few respondents to the CBI survey, for example, made
reference to the Council. Only a small proportion of ITB chairmen were
represented on the Council and there is some evidence to indicate that boards
felt 'divorced' from the Council's work,{92) Given that boards' primary 'loyalty'
lay with their industries the advice of the council was, it would seem, ignored
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or given low priority where this was judged by boards to be not in the
immediate interests of their industry. And as we shall explore further, the
Council was virtually ineffective in ensuring that boards' activities
contributed to the achievement of wider labour market objectives. There was, In
this respect, an inherent contradiction - or perhaps dilemma - in the position
of the Ministry of Labour/Department of Employment. On the one hand it
commended the work of the Council and exhorted boards to follow the training
recommendations laid down by it, but on the other was anxious not to interfere
- or be seen to be interfering - and to preserve the autonomy of the ITBs. It
can even be argued that the Department made it less, not more, likely that the
Council would not be regarded as the authoritative voice on training matters
through attempting to foster its own links with the boards. This was reflected
in Roy Hattersley's statement that: "I hope that the boards do not and will not
see the Central Training Council as something which stands between them and
the Ministry.., they may be reassured to know we are giving active
consideration to organising formal procedures by which chairmen of boards
could have the regular opportunity of discussing mutual problems with the
Ministry. Obviously the Informal opportunity has always existed and has been
used." {93)
As early as 1967 the operation of the CTC had been the subject of unfavourable
comments from the Commons' Estimates Committee, which had declared itself as
not 'entirely happy' with the CTCs achievements. {94) The Committee therefore
proposed a review of the Council's work. It was two years before the Secretary
of State accepted the recommendation and in 1969 he announced the
establishment of a committee: "To review the functions and organisation of the
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Central Training Council and to make recommendations.. .on whether any changes
are necessary."{95) Of all the organisations and individuals that bad given
evidence to the select corn ittee, however, only the TUG had called for radical
change, similar in fact to the views it had put forward in 1963 and which had
been "strenuously opposed by the Ministry of Labour", The TUG stated that the
"General Council see no reason so far to depart from their view as to the the
need for a more powerful and more independent central body to give strength
and direction to the work of the Boards." {96) Interestingly enough, despite the
fact that Frank Cousins (who was also at the time Chairman of the CTC)
chaired the Review Committee, the views of the General Council again failed to
prevail. Minor modifications, not radical change, were the order of the day.
This seemed to broadly reflect the balance of evidence submitted to the
Comniittee,{97) Following publication of the Review Committees report the CBI
commented that "It was gratifying that the,. .recommendations were closely in
line with the CBI's own evidence,"{96) The recommendations were that the
advisory character of the CTC should be retained but that it should take a
more positive role in initiating and influencing the work of the ITBs. There
was, in effect, an i.nplici.t acknowledgement of the CTC's 'lack of teeth' in the
proposals about what needed to be done{99) but, apart from some reorganisatlon
of its committee structure, there was little to indicate how Its role could be
performed more effectively. In other words It was to carry on doing the same
job, only better. It is probable, however, that in view of the general disquiet
over the operation of the ITA, that It was not considered propitious timing to
disturb what had already been established by recommending a strengthening in
the powers of the CTC.
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STATE PROVISION AID GOVERINENT TRAINING CENTRES
Before moving to our concluding section we turn to consider the related
developments that were occurring in the area of state-sponsored vocational
training .The importance attached to this type of training provision clearly
grew during this period (and indeed continued in the 1970s, see Chapter 6).
There was a steady expansion in the training and retraining functions, the
first of which came in 1963 when the Chancellor announced in his budget
statement that facilities in GTCs would be doubled.ClOO) This in fact amounted
to the provision of 18 new centres - a relatively insignificant number
according to the Labour opposition when it was considered that in 1962 GTCs
only numbered 13 and the total number of trainees as at oveinber 1962 was
2,317, of which 1,188 were either disabled people or able-bodied ex-Regular
soldiers.{l0l) By 1967 the number of GTCs stood at 32 with 6,400 places;C102)
by December 1968 there were 42 and 9,000 respectively{103) and in July 1971
52 and 10,700.{104) Although somewhat difficult to quantify, the approximate
cost of adult training in GTCs, including the cost of trainees' allowances, was
estimated to be about 8.1 million in 1967/68, with an additional expenditure
of over 2 .6 million by departments other than the DEP on the provision of
premises, heat, light, power and other services.{105)
Although the social role of GTCs was never abandoned it became increasingly
marginal to the emphasis placed on economic objectives of growth and within
that the need to increase the supply of skills in those occupations - and
regions - where persistent shortages occurred, in particular construction and
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TABLE 5.3
GOVERNMENT TRAINING CENTRES
Places available, Places Occupied and Numbers awaiting admission, November 1966
Scotland	 Wales	 ----l;n------------
Trade-----------------------------------------awaiting
	
A	 B	 A	 B	 A	 B	 A	 B	 admission
Bricklaying	 80	 67	 48	 45	 512	 404	 640	 516	 240
Carpentry	 192	 176	 64	 62	 544	 473	 800	 711	 434
Heating and ventilating fitting	 -	 -	 16	 16	 144	 131	 160	 150	 95
House painting and decorating	 -	 -	 -	 -	 36	 28	 36	 28	 66
Plastering	 -	 -	 -	 -	 128	 85	 128	 85	 17
Plumbing	 -	 -	 -	 -	 192	 163	 192	 163	 165
Slating and Tiling 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 16	 13	 16	 13	 5
Contractors' plant maintenance	 -	 -	 32	 32	 192	 177	 224	 209	 160
Electrical contracting 	 -	 -	 12	 12	 108	 94	 120	
106	 90
Street masonry and paving 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 60	 42	 60	
42	 5
Draughtsaanship	 16	 13	 36	 16	 128	 94	 160	
121	 34
Draughtsmanship assessment/workshop 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 24	 14	 24	
14	 3
Fitting - general	 -	 -	 48	 21	 204	 173	 252	
194	 102
Fitting - jig and tool 	 12	 5	 24	 25	 36	 27	 72	
57	 9
Sheet metal work	 -	 -	 -	 -	 96	 84	
96	 84	 22
Instrument bench and machine work	 24	 24	 -	 -	 108	 108	
132	 132	 62
Centre lathe turning	 70	 63	 20	 19	 250	 206	
340	 288	 266
Capstan setting operating 	 120	 108	 40	 40	 320	 288	
180	 436	 526
Milling setting operating	 60	 56	 20	 20	 210	 177	
290	 253	 253
Precision grinding	 40	 33	 10	 10	 100	 101	
150	 144	 130
Welding - electric arc	 -	 -	 36	 34	 204	
196	 240	 230	 555
Welding - oxy-acetylene 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 60	 57	
60	 114
Agriculatural machinery repairing 	 64	 60	 -	 -	 80	
54	 144	 114	 86
Boot and shoe repairing 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 16	 10	
16	 10	 -
Canteen cooking	 3	 2	 3	 3	 24	 20	
30	 25	 34
Furniture - cabinet making	 -	 -	 -	 -	 12	 10	
12	 10	 2
Scientific (bench) glassblowing 	 -	 -	 -	 12	 31	
11	 1
Hairdressing (men's) 	 36	 18	 12	 10	 144	 129	 192	
157	 51
Instrument maintenance	 24	 21	 12	 11	 48	 43	
84	 75	 34
Motor repairing	 88	 79	 56	 56	 372	 338	
516	 473	 389
Heavy vehicle repairing 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 12	 12	 12	
12	 19
Radio, television and electronic	 48	 34	 24	 11	 252	 207	 324	
252	 270
servicing
Screen process printing 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 24	 23	 24	 23	 30
Storekeeping	 4	 1	 2	 1	 17	 12	 23	 14	 50
Tailoring (retail bespoke)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 36	 33	 36	 33	 24
Typewriter repairing	 -	 -	 -	 -	 108	 86	 108	 86	 52
Vehicle building - body building 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 16	 15	 16	 15	 22
Vehicle building - coach painting 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 16	 7	 16	 7	 17
Watch and clock repairing 	 12	 12	 -	 -	 72	 57	 84	 69	 Ii
Woodcutting machining	 -	 -	 -	 -	 80	 58	 80	 58	 20
	
893	 770 495	 444	 5013	 4263	 6401	 5477	 4465
Source: Ninth Report fro the Estiates Coaiitte Session 1966-67, HC 548, (HMSO, 1967) p 30,
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engineering. Table 5.3 shows the number of places avilab1e, occupied, and
awaiting admission for different occupations at GTCs as at November 1966.
Increased state provision should not, however, be taken to indicate a change in
government standards concerning the division of responsibility for training
between the state and industry, despite a more generally interventionist
approach from 1966 onwards,{106) That Government-sponsored training provision
should continue to be a residual element of total training provision remained a
basic assumption of both industry and Government throughout the period. Dne
illustration of this being the statement in the memorandum submitted by the
Ninister of Labour to the Estimates Committee in January 1967 that: "training
at all levels below the professional, Including the industrial training of
apprentices and the training of factory workers in semi-skilled processes, has
always been primarily the responsibility of industry.... This situation has not
been basically altered by the coming into force of the Industrial Training Act
1964 and the setting up of industrial training boards. The Government is now
much more closely involved with industrial training but industry still retains
the major responsibility for the provision of training."{107) But whilst we are
claiming that there was no change in standards, we can also see that
developments at the Implementation level were subjecting those standards to
challenge. The result was a 'tension' between the two sides of training policy:
government committed to a residual role but, in the face of continuing evidence
of skill shortages and the apparent lack of impact by ITBs in this area, being
more drawn into marginal increases In state provision
The expansion of the GTCs was also a result of the emphasis upon the need to
improve the efficient working of the labour market at a time when the labour
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force was growing less slowly than target outputs required. Traditional
apprenticeships took 4-5 years to complete; the majority of courses at GTCs
took six months. GTCs were therefore seen as increasingly important
mechanisms for the rapid redeplyoment of labour and training to meet the
additional demand for skill. Nonetheless, significant as this expansion was in
Its own terms, even by 1970 it represented only a tenth of total industrial
training provision, or 0.01 per cent of the labour force.{10B) That people
trained on such schemes found difficulty in gaining subsequent employment
because of trade union opposition has often been cited as a reason why GTC
expansion was not carried further. It was, however, clearly stated in the
Donovan Report, a considerable amount of whose deliberations centred upon
restrictive practices in industry and their impact upon the provision of
training, that "This expansion [of GTCs] is being carried out with the full co-
operation of employers' representatives, and leaders of the unions
concerned," {109) It was not the leadership that posed the real problem. The
questioning of witnesses from the Ministry of Labour and the TUG indicates
that the real source of the problem as far as national objectives were
concerned resided in the autonomy that local branches had in deciding who
would be granted union membership: in some branches this obviously meant only
those who had served a specified period of time as an apprentice prior to the
age of 20 or 21 years.{110) Although in many instances this would be contrary
to the views expressed and agreements reached at national level, the trade
unions' leadership were reluctant to press their views where local opposition
existed.
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How significant this problem was regarded at the time is not altogether clear.
Certainly, unlike practices in some other countries such as Sweden where state
sponsored retraining is available to individuals regardless of their subsequent
employment prospects, the attitude of the !4:lnistry of Labour had always been
to link the courses and places available in GTCs to the demand (existing and
future) for labour and the likelihood that such trainees would be accepted as
skilled men on entering employment.C1i1) There was some indication in the
inistry's evidence to the Donovan Commission that strong local trade union
opposition would curtail the activities of GTCs, but the view was also
expressed that the problem was a relatively small scale one. Certainly some
observers have expressed the view that "The main problem is not the acceptance
of the retrained men: with determination this could be overcome. The real
problem is the puny size of the retraining effort,"{112) Whether or not the
acceptance of 'dilutees' as GTC trainees were known constituted a significant
problem in ateinpts to overcome skill shortages will be explored further when
we examine industrial training at the level of the firm. What we can say,
however, is that it did not appear to be the major constraining factor in the
1960s in holding back the rate of expansion undergone by GTCs. Indeed the
expansion that took place between 1966-68 was actually speeded up as a
response to increases levels of unemploynient.C113) Of greater significance in
this respect was the belief that state-sponsored training should remain
residual to the efforts of industry.
CONCLUSIONS
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In our assessment of the implementation of the ITA up t 1970, a number of
important factors emerge. The one crucial assumption underpinning the Act's
conception - and its subsequent acceptance by the Labour Government - had
been that the behaviour and attitudes of industry not only could but, in line
with prevailing standards, should best be changed through organisations whose
membership was principally drawn from Industry. And that within the broad
limits set down in the legislative framework such organisations should be
allowed considerable operational autonomy. Implicit in such arrangements,
however, was an acknowledgement of political constraints: a recognition that
there was not complete consensus among affected interests to state
intervention in industrial training. Government was dependent upon private
actors in order to achieve its broad policy objectives, but as Young has
pointed out with reference to the similar concerns of industrial policy,
"bitter experience has shown that independent, private sector firms cannot be
relied upon to complete projects partly sponsored by governinent."{114) As
evidenced by the findings of the Devlin Commission,{115} one important reason
was the fragmentary character and weakness of many business
organisations. {116) The ineffectiveness of such organisations (not just in
terms of resources but also in terms of the degree of 'control' over the
membership) therefore was likely to militate against the development of a
system of industrial self-regulation necessary, at least from government's
point of view, for training policy to be effective.
Such organisational 'imperatives' produced a fragmented structure which had a
number of significant consequences. Firstly there was a considerable degree of
variation in the way that ITBs Interpreted their functions and in the
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priorities that they adopted. Vhilst this In part reflected their industry
focus nevertheless there was an absence of any real capacity to evaluate the
Individual achievements of ITBs within their own industries. Secondly and
partly related to the first point, the overall impact of the Act was unclear as
there were no satisfactory or comprehensive mechanisms for monitoring and
evaluating the performance - whether in relation to the objectives of the Act,
or some ather set of objectives - of those organisations engaged in the
delivery of policy. There was no way of making comparisons between boards'
effectiveness because there appeared to be no common or agreed criteria upon
which to base such comparisons. Nuch of the 'evidence' of Improvements, or
otherwise, in training was either impressionistic or rested upon rather dubious
statistics, The fragmentary nature of the ITB structure had no compensating
mechanism with sufficient influence, or with a willingness to exert such
influence, to achieve a greater degree of coordination.
In the final analysis, by the time the ITB network was complete, around
1969/70, the impetus and direction of industrial training policy had become
Increasingly subject to uncertainty. This largely resulted from the growing
ambiguity surrounding the extent to which ITBs were contributing to the
achievement of the policy objectives. This is not to Imply that there was a
lessening of commitment by the Government toward the ITB system per se but
rather, that there was a growing awareness of shortcomings inherent in the
system. In 1969 and 1970 Roy Hattersley and Barbara Castle both made speeches
extolling the virtues of the Act's achievements, but which then proceeded to
elaborate problems and aspects in need of improvement but without any firm
proposals for cbange.{117) This may be represented as posing a challenge to
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the prevailing standards, in particular as regards the division of
responsibility between the state and private industry, but which as yet
generated no clear response from the Government, Such pressure was evident in
the expanding role given to the GTCS. A major factor in this expansion was the
way in which boards interpreted their roles, which to all intents and purposes
effectively excluded from their activities training for wider labour market
needs. Certainly one of the objectives of industrial training legislation was
to close the gap between demand and supply of labour. ITBs were either not
inclined, or were unable, to close that gap for two principal reasons. First,
engaging in activities to increase the supply of skills through adult
retraining have clear industrial relations implications and it is evident that
most boards wished to avoid treading a path that might bring them into direct
conflict with trade unions. {1l8) Second, that the direction that boards'
activities took were primarily influenced by industrial pressure, in particular
the desire to avoid evoking a critical reaction to board proposals. Hence the
emphasis in training recommendations became less to do with the needs of
industry and more to do with meeting the training needs of individual firms
within the industry. Thus ITBs, established as intermediate organisations,
designed to achieve greater consistency between governmental objectives and
the needs of industry were not operating as originally conceived. The 'pull' of
industrial interests was stronger than the 'push' of governmental intervention.
Thus, in terms of our framework, we can see that by 1970 there had occurred a
number of de facto changes to industrial training policy. The clearest
expression of these were to be seen in the watering down of the objectives of
the Act, in particular the equalisation of costs. These changes had arisen at
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the implementation level partly In response to problems of technical
feasibility and and partly to avoid generating hostility on the part of those
whose behaviour the policy was designed to change - industrial interests, The
policy had established a weak and fragmented structure to tackle a global
training problem. Implicit in the policy was an assumption that the aggregate
efforts of ITBs would equal the achievement of national objectives which were
to eradicate skills shortages and contribute to an improved economic
performance. That this did not happen was in part due to the limitations and
contradictions inherent in the legislative framework and in part to the way in
which ITBs chose to interpret their roles within that. In other words there
was a degree of incompatibility between the standards of improving the
performance of the labour market so as to enhance industrial and economic
performance, and. securing such improvements though voluntary agreement. The
standard of voluntarism had resulted in the establishment of a form of
machinery that relied heavily upon self-regulation by industry, the effective
operation of which required a significant change in attitude towards training
on the part of the majority of employers and trade unions. Such a change in
attitude did not materlalise on any extensive or consistent scale. Inevitably
ITEs identified with their industries, and neither they, nor the firms within
their Industries appear to have attached much priority to the achievement of
national objectives: there is certainly no evidence to indicate that national
and sectoral priorities were seen as synonymous, indeed if anything the
contrary would be indicated. Whilst ITBs were obviously concerned to increase
the quantity and quality of training they can be said to have moved outside
the bounds of the strategic framework laid down by the policy insofar as they
sought to accommodate the pressure of interests from their 'constituencies' at
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the expense of wider national interests. This especially applied to what was
by 1970 a virtual abandonment of the objective of achieving a redistribution
of training costs. Such changes may be said to represent a displacement of the
Qriginal policy. Whether or not they were likely to lead to a modification in
the standards resulting in, for example, such changes being incorporated into
policy, we shall consider in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 IX
POL ICY CHANGE: TH.E 19 '73 RMPLQ YI4EN T
AND TRAINING ACT
The groundswell of criticism relating to the operation of the 1964 Industrial
Training Act 'peaked' at about the same time that the 1970 General Election
produced an unexpected Conservative victory. Opponents of the Act might well
have felt justified in anticipating, if not the repeal of the legislation, some
significant diminution of its provisions. During the previous four years the
Labour Party initiated its policy of selective intervention in industry, and
despite its acknowledgement of the weaknesses inherent in the training board
structure, was clearly committed to its perpetuation, if not indeed its
extension, suitably iniproved.{1) No such assumption, however, could be made
about the incoming Conservative Government with its different doctrinal
outlook, which we are now going on to consider.
THE CONSERVATIVE S' APPROACH TO THE ECOJOXY
Since losing the 1964 election, and under Edward Heath's leadership, the
Conservative Party had distanced itself from the kind of voluntary
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collectivism that had. developed in the 1960s, in pursuit of a set of
programmes more heavily influenced by market liberalism. Whilst this was not
the result of some 'right wing' takeover(2) it was, as various observers have
pointed out, the consequence of greater pressure from the right wing tendency
within the party. The economic crises of the 1960s, the loss of the 1954
election, gave greater authority to those within the party who would challenge
the post-war consensus.{3) This, plus that after 1964 Conservative policy
making was removed from the influence of the civil service and powerful
interest groups such as the TUC{4) meant that the programmes were largely the
product of the party. By 1970 the Conservatives may have been one of the best
prepared opposition parties, but many of the policies were worked out in
relative 'isolation' from the wider political system, the consequences of which
inter alia were problems encountered in attempting to implement such policies.
The outcome was the philosophy of 'disengagement',{5} the central
characteristics of which might be summarised as less government, greater
competition, and the introduction of more rational decision making techniques
in the policy process, {6) in particular business methods and management
techniques. Although gradual, by the time of the 1970 Seisdon Park
Conference{7} it represented a clear rejection of the commitment to economic
planning exhibited by the pre-1964 Conservative leadership. The emphasis was
still upon higher productivity and economic growth, but by other means. In the
public sector nationalisation was to be halted and certain Industries were to
be 'privatised' or returned to the private sector and wherever possible parts
of the public sector were to be 'hived off' as semi autonomous agencies. The
thinking here was heavily influenced. by the Report of the Fulton Committee,
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1966-68 an 'The Civil Service',{8) One of the clearest expressions of this 'new
style of government' was to be found in the 1970 White Paper on the
reorganisation of central government. {9) As for the private sector the
Government sought to abandon the previous policies of intervention 1 to "close
down all the boards and agencies of intervention, to reintroduce criteria of
competitive efficiency into industry, to undertake a big reduction in taxation1
and. to introthce legislation that would reduce the bargaining strength of the
trade unions."{iO) The role of Government should be limited to setting or
creating the climate within which private industry could function efficiently
and productively and - with a few exceptions such as aircraft, shipbuilding
and. new technologies- the 'lame ducks' of industry should be left to their
fate, Faith in the 'new managerialism' was the hallmark of the Conservatives in
the early 1970s.
The creation of a more competitive economic environment would result in higher
productivity which would, in turn, provide the necessary incentive for
management to tackle restrictive practices in industry, -the eradication of
which - along with the regulation of incomes - were seen to be management
responsibilities. In other words, the 'share out' of this increased productivity
should be a matter for industry not government - or rather not as a result of
deals struck between government and the great interest groups, about whom the
Government exhibited a great deal of 'suspicion'.(li) Not only were
interventionist bodies. such as the Prices and Incomes Board, the Industrial
Reorgariisation Corporation{12) and to a lesser extent the Little Ieddies
therefore undesirable {13) they were also unecessary. Ionetbeless, the vigorous
pursuit of a 'competition policy' signified one area in respect of industry
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where the state was seen to have a legitimate role, Here the regulatory
activities of the state were set not to diminish, but rather to increase.{14)
Industrial training policy 'straddled' the divide of these two approaches: as
at 1970 there existed a range of interventionist boards which under the
philosophy of 'disengagement' appeared ripe for abolition;{15) on the other
band an important facet in achieving a more competitive economic environment
was the view that the function of public policy was "to stimulate the labour
market into operating with maximum efficiency",{16) thus implying an
enhancement of some form of intervention.
TRAIHIG FOR THE FUTURE
Predictably enough perhaps, a review of industrial training policy was included
in the 1970 Conservative election manifesto,{17) but the priority attached to
reform in this area is indicated by its inclusion in the Queen's speech.{18) As
far as the Government was concerned, given the amount of criticism that had
been generated, the indications were that any moves to decrease the operation
of the Industrial Training Act would have the support of the employers' side
of industry. It is therefore unlikely that any opposition encountered from the
labour side weighed heavily with a Government which, in any case, was
determined to curb the powers of the trade unions and which, initially at
least, eschewed consultation and bargaining as a desirable form of formulating
policies. In any event, it might even have been considered that the trade union
movement would have little energy to spare to oppose measures In the area of
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Industrial training when confronted with industrial relations legislation. The
latter might in fact have had. some substance had not the review on training
taken an inordinately long time to complete, It was initially due for
completion at the end of 1970(19) but by the beginning of 1971 it was clear
that there was developing some impatience and uncertainty (particularly on the
part of ITBs) due to the non-appearance of the review, On 23 February 1971
Robert Carr told the House of Commons that these "are complex and important
questions and I now anticipate that it will be some months before I am in a
position to publish a consultative document." Meantime he went on to issue
guidelines to ITBs which gave some indication of the direction of the
Government's thoughts. These included. greater financial efficiency in relation
to grant schemes and administration; greater selectivity of choice in training
priorities; no increase in the rate of levy; a general introduction of the
'netting' principle; and. significantly greater exemption for small firms. (20)
The reasons why publication of the review was delayed are not entirely clear,
but the evidence that does exist suggests that there was a considerable amount
of inter-departmental conflict - in particular between the Employment and
Education Departments (21)- and possibly disagreement between the views of
Department of Employment officials and some sections of the Government, over
the future shape of, and responsibility for, the training system. Further, there
is little to indicate that the Government had a very clear conception of what
future arrangements should be, certainly Robert Carr, once again In the
'training seat' as Secretary of State for Employment, made no definitive
statement before early 1972. It is of course, likely that what also contributed
to the delay was the amount of the Department and Ministers' time and effort
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that had been consumed over the formulation and introduction of the industrial
relations legislation.
It can be surmised with relative certainty, however, that DE officials with
responsibility for training were supportive of some form of continued
intervention. Some of the, by now senior, officials at the DE bad been
associated with various aspects of industrial training as far back as the Ca.rr
Report1 One example is John Cassels who in 1973 was appointed as the first
Chief Executive of the Training Services Agency. Cassels had joined the
l'hnistry of Labour as Assistant Principal in 1954 and bad risen to Under-
Secretary by 1968. He had also been Secretary to the Donovan Commission and
was at the Prices and Incomes Board until its abolition in 1971, thereafter
spending eighteen months on secondment to Dunlop before returning to the DE in
1972,{22> Given that one of the formative influences on training legislation
pre-1964 had been from officials within the Kinistry (see Chapter 4) it seems
unlikely that there would not have been some resistence If it was thought that
the Government's Inclination was to dismantle the structure established under
the 1964 Industrial Training Act. It was certainly rumoured at the time that
six years experience had convinced John Hare, the former )tinister of Labour,
that the training board system had been a mistake.{23) However, given the
difficulties that the Department had experienced in achieving coordination of
boards' activities some support for more effective mechanisms of control
probably existed.
The Government finally published Its proposals Training for the Future in
February 1972, in the form of a consultative document{24) which was in fact
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made up of two components. First, decisions already taken to increase the
amount of training provided by government to 'meet the needs of individuals'.
Second, proposals for consultation an the 'widest possible basis'. Precisely
why the Government decided upon a full-scale consultation exercise is not
absolutely clear. There are, however, a number of factors that suggest
themselves as likely explanations. Firstly the evidence points to the fact that
there was a considerable amount of internal disagreement over future
arrangements (see above). Consultation may, therefore, have been seen as a
means of legitinilsing the Government's proposals - especially if, as seems
likely, It was assumed that the weight of 'external opinion' would favour those
proposals. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, some dissension could be
anticipated from external groups, in particular the ITBs and the TUG. Whilst
the objections of the boards might be 'played down', the TUG was by 1972 a
different matter. The TUG General Council had been 'gravely affronted' by the
Government's refusal to consult over the Industrial Relations Bill{25) and this
had produced a significant degree of hostility on the part of the TUG. (The
CBI on the other hand were consulted, but their views were all but ignored,)As
the Government's priorities began to change and in particular as it wished to
reach an agreement on pay{26} the Government - especially Robert Carr, sponsor
of the Industrial Relations Bill and now sponsor of Training for the Future -
were anxious to adopt a more conciliatory approach and to assuage the
hostility that had built up. The Government was thus at considerable pains to
give reassurances of the genuineness of the exercise: "let me emphasise that
the proposals in "Training for the Future" are genuinely for discussion and
consultation, and we are very anxious to listen to those who are interested in,
and involved in, training. We shall not refuse to make changes in our plans if
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people's arguments carry conviction with us. When we talk about consultation
we mean It, as we demonstrated recently with the first and final drafts of the
Code of Industrial Relations Practice."{27}
As far as the firm decisions went, the Vocational Training Scheme was to be
expanded into a more comprehensive and widely available Training Opportunities
Programmme (TOPS) and followed on increased measures in July 1971. This
involved increasing the capacity of GTCs and making greater use of further
education college facilities to raise the throughput of trainees from the then
16,650 a year to 100,000 a year as soon as possible, but with an interim
target of not less than 60-70,000 by 1975.{28) A figure of 100,000 had
interestingly first been mentioned in a speech in Scotland by Edward Heath in
November 1969 when he "pledged the next Conservative Party to an
unprecedented prgramme of training...".{29} A total of 64 GTCs (to become known
as Skilicentres) were to be operating by 1975, compared to the 1972 total of
52, and the running costs of the scheme were estimated to rise from 25m in
1972/73 to about .60m a year.{30} It was also planned to increase the range of
courses available: "The main demand is expected to be for training for skilled
manual and non-manual occupations, ranging from craft, technician and
equivalent commercial and clerical skills, and through to professional and
managerial qualifications. But where possible courses will be maintained in
semi-skilled occupations, and in such clerical occupations as typing and
machine operating."{31} Thus we can see that It was not so much intervention
in training per se that was regarded as undesirable by the Conservative
administration, but the particular form that intervention had taken following
the 1964 Act. Although it should be added that even here, direct intervention
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through the GTC/Skillcentre network was to be regarded as marginal to that
carried out by industry.
As for the proposals that formed the basis of the consultation exercise,
although not recommeinnding full-scale abolition of the ITB structure, had the
Governments's plans been implemented the boards would have been stripped of
their powers and rendered virtually impotent in Influencing firms' training
decisions. The rationale for this move apparently was that boards had largely
achieved the objectives set by the 1964 Act: they had rendered such a 'shock'
to industry that they had secured a "permanent shift in attitude in British
lndustry...".{32) This argument had been around since the late 1960s although
the Labour Government for one was not convinced of its efficacy. In 1969, for
example, Barbara Castle had stated that there would be no 'withering away' of
the levy incentive in the forseeable future.{33} By 1972, however, new the
Government was convinced of its soundness. (34) As the Government saw it,
therefore, "There is a danger that levy/grant might become an obstacle to the
development of boards' other activities..,,The Government proposes to introduce
legislation to relieve boards of the obligations to raise a levy."{35) The
document stated that the Inherent limitations of the ITB system were: the
impossibility of covering the whole economy due to the heterogeneous nature of
industry; it was ill-suited to deal with the problems of small firms; it was
ill-suited to to deal with occupations common to many or all industries;
management training was not sufficiently dissimilar from one industry to
another to make an industry based system the best approach; ITBs were not
equipped to deal with local and regional labour market needs and
retraining. {36) The existing fragmented and uncoordinated structure therefore
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left significant gaps in training provision which could oniy be overcome by
fairly drastic re-shaping of the existing machinery.
Vhat was proposed, following the abolition of levy/grant schemes, was that
boards should continue, in an advisory capacity, to analyse and develop
programmes to meet the needs of their industries, including standard setting
and the development of 'model' training programmes, encouragement of group
training schemes, and the provision of advisory services to firms. The boards
would have remained as then constituted, for the document commented that it
was "desirable to continue to have the help and commitment of employers, trade
unionists and. educationists to the development of adequate training programmes
in particular industries",{37) but ihey would have been considerably
streamlined and subsumed within a new National Training Agency which it was
proposed to establish{38) and which would 'assist' boards in carrying out their
responsibilities. Boards' staff were to become the employees of the Agency
which would also assume responsibility for the provision of boards' premises.
In addition, and most importantly, as boards would no longer derive any income
from levy the cost of their activities (which would now be 'relatively modest')
would be funded by the Agency. Thus, in order to "bring together responsibility
for the various policies", to "remove the risk of duplication and waste of
effort between the various programmes", to "manage the greatly expanded
Training Opportunities Scheme" and to "fill the gaps within the present
structure of the Boards"{39) the functions of this proposed Agency would be
to:{40)
(a) take on responsibility from the Department of Employment for
the Training Opportunities Scheme and for all other
governmental schemes for promoting training;
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(b) co-ordinate the work of the Boards on matters of general
concern and carry out standard-setting and similar functions
for occupations which cut across industrial lines, including
management;
Cc) meet the cost of approved training programmes of work by
Boards when they cease to operate levy/grant schemes;
Cd) develop an effective national training advisory service for
employers and operate this itself in sectors not covered by
the Boards.
In conformity with the Government's preference for hiving-off and the
establishment of accountable management units, it was proposed that the
Agency's status be that of a non-departmental body. Unlike the body finally
set up - the Manpower Services Commission - no provision was made for
industrial, or other, representation. Instead it was to be composed of a chief
executive, a board of full-time executive directors, and be staffed by non-
civil servants. The Minister would be responsible for giving general guidelines
and directions but the Agency would be responsible for day-to-day operations
as well as playing an important part in decisions of general policy.{41)
The proposals contained in Training for the Future represented an attempt to
overcome the weaknesses of the existing system within a framework set by
standards concerning the desirable division of responsibility between the
state and private organisations, and the most efficient means of managing the
training system. Yet it was never made entirely clear in Training for- the
Future where the balance lay in the ascription of 'blame' for the difficulties
encountered in the 1964 Act's implementation: whether due to intellectual
limitations of the original policy or to the way in which boards had chosen to
interpret that policy. There did, in fact, appear to be a peculiar logic
operating whereby it could on the one hand be claimed that boards had achieved
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one of the primary purposes of the Act (ie more and better training
accompanied by a permanent shift in employers' attitudes) but on the other
gave credence to the criticisms levelled at the ITBs - as, for example, the way
in which the findings of the Bolton 1eport were 'uncritically' accepted by the
Government. The Bolton Committee was firmly convinced that the "machinery set
up under the Industrial Training Act is fundamentally inappropriate to the
needs of most small firms..." on the grounds of: administrative costs; the
inappropriateness of a board's requirements to the needs of the small firm;
there was less need for continuous training in small firms; and the
inappropriateness of the levy/grant mechanism to secure improvements in
training. {42) As it was almost unanimously held that there were no
satisfactory indicators by which to measure boards' effectiveness, it would
seem to follow that measures of ineffectiveness would be similary problematic.
Despite the length of time that it took to complete the review it contained
little evidence to support either contention. As it was put in the document,
"Precise measurement of the achievements of the Boards is difficult because the
statistical data is incomplete, because qualitative judgements are inevitably
involved, and because of the problem of comparing what actually happened with
what might have been expected to happen had there been no Board system."{43)
Only 'broad conclusions' could be drawn. Thus there were inherent
contradictions in Training for the Future such as the claim that a permanent
shift in attitudes had been secured while later stating '9ore recently however
the volume of training in industry has fallen off. It is generally believed
this is mainly the result of a slower rate of economic growth involving both
pressure on firms' costs and higher unemployment."{44) In a sense these
statements emphasise the difficulty of assessment: the volume of training is
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influenced by factors other than the operation of ITBs, for example, the level
of unemployment, general economic conditions, employers future expectations
regarding the performance of the economy, regional aid policies, labour
shortages, labour turnover and the substitutability of capital and labour.{45)
As presented the balance of evidence was fairly 'evenly divided' about the
achievements of the board system. That the Government came down in favour of
greatly reducing their functions and scope seems to have been due to its
desire to see a reduction in intervention in this area of training provision.
Given that it was still held that the needs of industry were best determined
by industry - and most industrial opinion seemed to be iii favour of reducing
intervention - in the absence of positive evidence that the system was more
efficiently managed by ITBs than it would have been if left to firms, then
there was little to justify retention of the existing board system, But to base
the running down of the board system on their having achieved a permanent
shift in industrial attitudes appears to have been a non-sequitur. I'!aintaining
and improving the ITB system never seemed to be an option that received
serious consideration by the Government, which might indicate that it was, all
along, predisposed towards diminishing the board system. What was being
proposed was a shift in the balance of training provision: handing back to
industry what was 'rightly theirs' and allowing employers to get on with the
job of training without interference, while the state extended its activities at
the margin to fill the gaps necessary for the achievement of national economic
objectives.
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The expansion of government-sponsored vocational training was consistent with
the Government's views on the importance of stimulating the labour market to
perform more efficiently. It might legitimately be argued, therefore, that this
represented an abandonment of the standard that the main responsibility for
providing training should reside with Industry and that government provision
should be largely residual, The adherence to this standard had in the past
resulted in a number of limitations pertaining to the supply of labour. These
were: in scale - in relation to the overall numbers trained and when compared
to similar schemes operating in other Western European countries;{46) in range
- in terms of courses offered, the majority of which were in skilled trades in
the engineering and construction industries; and in responsiveness - there was
little or no spare capacity to be taken up during periods of high demand,
resulting in under-provision.{47) The net result, it was claimed, was that
serious skill shortages persisted even in periods of high unemployment.
Despite the planned scale of increase in adult retraining, however, the
Government was adamant that it was not 'poaching' on employers' territory:
"Government schemes will never compare in scale with the provision by
employers themselves, since they aim at filling important gaps in the system,
and not at taking over functions which properly belong to employers."C48)
Taking this together with the planned concurrent scaling down of the scope of
ITBs, however, it is clear that the standard of voluntarism was still strongly
adhered to.
The TOPS scheme was designed to complement, not supplant {49) industry's
responsibility and was therefore still claimed to be residual. Thus the
exclusion from the schemes of anyone under the age of 19 years, and the
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retention of the principle that trainees would be unemployed or prepared to
give up their present employment to obtain a place. In one essential respect
such claims were entirely accurate. 7hilst the 1964 Act had been established
on economic grounds, to be judged on economic criteria, what was being
proposed in Training for the Future was the extension of industrial training
policy to meet social objectives. {50) Thus the document made a clear
distinction between meeting the needs of industry (read economic objectives)
and meeting the needs of the individual (read social objectives), and it quoted
the CTC's interpretation of the 1964 Act as being:{51)
"to ensure that enough workers with the requisite skills are
available in the right places at the right time to do efficiently
the jobs needing to be done.to provide better opportunities to
individuals to develop their skills and use their abilities to the
full ."
This, it was claimed "emphasised the dual aspect of training - the economic
gains which can result to individual enterprises and to the community, and the
social importance of wider opportunities for individuals, Future policies must
provide for both."{52) But the distinction is not as neat as this suggests, and
the expansion can be seen to represent some distancinS' from the standard of
industry responsibility: if the state's role was still residual, then residual
had acquired a somewhat different meaning to that operating pre-1970.
The purpose of meeting the needs of individuals therefore was twofold: to train
individuals to meet national (or macro) economic needs which went beyond the
needs of particular industries - that is in general or transferable skills in
order to raise the general level of skills in the labour force; and to train
individuals to enable them to obtain employment which they could not get
without first aquiring new skills. Although not stated in the consultative
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document, given our contention that this was also a response to rising
unemployment, we might add a third function, and one which was to assume even
greater importance, which was that of acting as a counter-cyclical instrument.
The social objectives were clearly different from those previously operating
and which had related to the training needs of groups such as the disabled and
ex-regular servicemerit. The development of TOPS can therefore be regarded as,
at least in part, the first significant governmental response in the training
area to unemployment.{53) Not only was eligibility and the range of courses to
be widened but training allowances were to be made more generous so as to
make a TOPS course a more attractive option than the dole.{54} In some cases
the allowance could be 5 a week more than unemployment/supplementary benefit)
And in order to enhance labour mobility financial assistance for moving area
was increased, (55)
TRA]IIJG FOR THE FUTURE: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS
The proposals contained in Training for the Future were primarily the product
of the interaction of two variables. The first was the Government's judgenient
of, in the light of its operation, the capacity of the structures established
under the 19M Act to 'deliver the goods'. The second was a change in
standards, post 1970, that related to the division of responsibility between
the public and private sectors for the provision of industrial training.
However, as the consultation process was to demonstrate, such standards by no
means formed the basis of a consensus between affected and interested parties
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and were subject to challenge. The pressure brought to bear by outside
interests was of sufficient strength to mean that the standards could not be
sustained: the Government was constrained to modify them and reformulate its
strategic policy choices. We therefore turn to examine this process in more
detail.
The Government received 'well over 1,000 representations' in the four months
allowed for consultation,{56) Investigation certainly suggests that the vast
majority of such representations were critical of key parts of the proposals
as they related to training within industry. This undoubtedly applied to the
main interests involved: the TUG, the CBI and the ITBs.{57) It is highly likely
that the Government was caught unawares by the amount of hostility towards
its proposals, one important reason for this being the 'political isolation'
referred to earlier and, therefore the lack of contributions and influence of
the main interest groups during the period when policies were being
formulated. While such opposition was by no means a universal plea for
retention of the existing system, it was a clear indication that a return to a
situation similar to that existing prior to 1964 was unacceptable to 'majority
opinion'. Announcing the changes resulting from the consultation exercise,
Naurice Nacmillan, who had succeeded Robert Carr as Secretary of State in
April 1972, declared:{58)
"As to the opinions that we considered, there are those which
training boards put forward as agreed views, those which their
members, both employers and employees, put forward separately and
those put forward separately by the educationists. The main point of
them, and the key to the criticisms, such as they were, of the plan
set out in "Training for the Future" was that a financial sanction
was required.
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This was, however, a somewhat disingenuous statement, It was certainly a major
area of divergence (although the degree of comini ment to the mechanism of the
levy/grant system ar, but it was by no means the only basis of the
criticisms. The others centred around the status and functions of the National
Training Agency, and the resultant loss of boards' autonomy. We shall,
theref ore, go on to look at these issues in the context of the dynamics of the
consultation process and the reasons why the various interests were able to
succesfully exert pressure for change.
We have already referred to one important factor in this context which was the
Government's desire to adopt a cor.ciliatory and accommodating approach
towards the TUG, and perhaps to a lesser, but still significant extent towards
the CBI. Another influential factor was the sheer weight of the opposition.
That the Department had received over 1,000 submissions to Training for the
Future indicates the extent to which there had developed a 'community of
interests'{59) within this policy area.
As far as employer input was concerned, many operated on three fronts: more
informal representations direct from the company to the Department, or even
NPs; representations through the relevant employers organisations and/or trade
associations; and representations through the CBI. The persistence of informal,
as well the more formal, arrangements as one of the 'striking features' of
business representation in Britain has been noted by several observers.{60)
Nonetheless, although the views of the wider 'community' were not unimportant -
In this case particularly because there seemed to exist some general agreement
the greatest weight, from the employers' side, was attached by the
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Government to the views espoused by the CBI, A number of reasons seem to
account for this. Firstly, the CBI could claim to be an authoritative voice on
industrial training having kept a continual 	 tch upon and taken regular
soundings about the Act's operation since 1966.{61) Secondly, there was the
desire of the Heath Government for a restructuring of relations to include a
much greater degree of closeness and effective collaboration between
government and industry.{62) And thirdly, the importance attached to efficient
management predisposed the Government towards dealing with a strong and
efficient central organisation rather than a range of - in many cases less
efficient - bodies, Many civil servants are similarly sceptical about the
organisational capabilities of most trade associations,{63) The comment of a
former Education Officer of one of the largest trade associations in the
construction industry makes a telling point in this respect:{64)
"It was, and still is, very easy far the staff of a trade association
to oppose a Government initiative or to call for the abolition of
some regulation, whether in safety, product liability, environmental
control, employment or taxation. It is no problem to act in these
areas for firms' interests without consultation and have the action
endorsed later. One even gets a reputation f or being a brave
champion of the industry's well being, when in fact no personal
risks are being taken at all. On the other hand, to prepare a
strategy or plan to act in essentially positive ways requires both
considerable personal motivation, tact and major allies In the
industry."
Thus it was to the CBI that the Government turned to listen about the views of
employers. However, as we shall see, the views of the officials of the CBI and
the majority of its membership did not co-incide in all respects.
Training Opportunities and the ITBs: Reactions to the propc.als
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In general, across the wider range of views expressed, the TOPS measures were
positively received although two areas of criticism may be discerned. The first
relates to the economic rationale and benefits to be derived from retraining
and the inadequacy of the increased provision. The costs of retraining relative
to the benefits were estimated to be small.{65) But given that the increase in
unemployment was largely structural, with as many as an estimated 600,000
workers a year having to change their jobs through redundancy, the planned
expansion was likely to fall significantly short in terms of the labour force
it was supposed to serve. {66) Second, the increased emphasis on the social
objectives of training led to criticisms that insufficient attention was being
paid to ensuring that the output would match the demand for labour.{67} In its
evidence to the DE the Manpower Society argued that wRetraining. without a
clear idea of jobs to be filled could lead to a large number of "trained
unemployed"."{68) It was, for example, claimed that in the trades for which
training had been given at GTCS there were 75,000 persons unemployed,{69)
nearly half of all GTC places being in engineering and over a quarter in
construction although employment in these industries bad declined during the
previous five years by 7.6% and 23% respectively. {70) In other words, many
critics argued, a manpower -planning capacity superior to that existing was
required if the measures were to be effective.
Although interest in the field of manpower planning bad grown significantly
during the previous decade,C71) there were still significant inadequacies in
"existing manpower information gathering and forecasting techniques... .While
british manpower statistics are among the best in the world, there are
deficiencies including the divided responibility for their collection and
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Bz-itain	 Page 254
Chapter Six	 Rmployment and Training Act 1973
dissemlnation."{72) This applied also to unemployment statistics which under-
stated inter alia a general downturn in labour demand and presented an
inadequate picture of the incidence of unemployment by Industry &nd
occupational group.C73) Despite its claim to be a major review of training
facilities in Britain, and despite being 18 months in the making, Training for
the Future was virtually silent on this topic. Taken as a whole, however, the
above were not regarded - either by government or wider interests - as
seriously undermining the TOPS proposals.
Turning to the other proposals, as Macmillan's statement above demonstrates,
many of the criticisms were sceptical of the claim that abandoning the
levy/grant system would not lead to a falling off In training provision. The
Director of the EITB, for example, claimed: ('74)
"The need for finance to help secure the supply of skill has been
dramatically Illustrated in the last year when, in the present
difficult economic situation, the Board intervened by offering 2,500
training awards to school leavers. The incentive mechanism of the
levy/grant scheme is complex, but, to sum it up crudely, we find
that small firms have responded to the offer of grant, whereas
larger firms have been concerned to avoid having to pay a levy.
Even over the last year the small firms have kept up their
recruitment and standards of first year craft and techician training
under the incentive of cash sum grants. The reduction of 6,000 in
the normal Intake of 26,000 for basic craft and technician training
was almost entirely in the larger firms."
The view of the TUG was that there was little evidence to support the ending
of levy/grant and that there had been "much uninformed criticism of the work
of the industrial training boards and a concerted campaign from certain
quarters and from one newspaper." And, therefore, "the General Council of the
TUC would not accept that the levy/grant system should be dismantled."(75)
Numerous other organisations and individuals expressed similar views and
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reservations.C76) The CM was, however, more circumspect in its attitude to
levy/grant. The recommendations of the CBI were formulated in the light of a
major review of members' attitudes that it had initiated in April 1970, and
further consultation following the publication of Training for the Future.{77)
In its 1970 revIew the CBI received the views of some two hundred
organisations and firms together with the results of Regional Councils'
discussions, the findings of which were published in February 1971,{78) The
submissions received were by no means unanimous about future levy/grant
arrangements - a few were fully supportive of the ITB system and 'their' beard
- but there was a clear majority in favour of its abolition or drastic
amendment, In its statement the CM commented however that "employers still
give general support to the principles and intentions of the Industrial
Training Act" but that this "endorsement is more qualified than before..."{79)
And later it concluded "No one expected that they CITBs] would be able to
improve the state of training without a fair period of trial and error. Neither
was it to be expected that they would prove to be popular instruments. What
worries the CBI is their high degree of continuing unpopularity amongst
employers." (80}
Nevertheless, despite this high degree of unpopularity - which was certainly
borne out by an examination of the submissions - the CBI called for no
'disengagement' or sweeping away of the Act's provisions which, had it done so
one might assume would have caused no great expressions of regret from its
membership. Rather, the CBI recommended a series of changes within the
existing framework designed to improve the operation of the Act in its
members' interests. The view was that "this is not the time for precipitate
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action, but rather for re-defining objectives and re-fashioning machinery and
practices in the light of experience, and for exploiting and building upon the
undoubted areas of success, with the object of getting effective training
accepted throughout industry and commerce. The momentum is clearly present and
the CBI will play its full part in helping it forward on constructive
llnes."(Bl) There was certainly no claim here of a permanent shift of attitude
having been secured. The suggestions upon which particular emphasis was laid
in respect of future action were that there should be{82}
(a) A more measured pace overall, with action based on experience,
evidence and, above all, thorough consultation.
(b) A progressive shift of emphsi away from the mechanics of
grant and levy, with attendant high rates and cost-sharing
aims, towards a monitoring role and the provision of a high-
quality consultative service.
(C) Long-term planning, based on consultation, to set objectives in
terms of training developments, manpower forecasting and
levy/grant policy, set against a time scale.
(d) Better financial control and information,a more discriminating
use of levy and grants, particularly where small firms are
concerned, and a very circumspect approach to capital projects.
(e) A review of the statutory framework, to assist in eliminating
both major and minor anomalies
(f) Kore emphasis on re-training and more consistent emphasis on
safety, health and hygiene.
(g) A greater measure of central influence by the Department of
Employment.
Some similarities can clearly be discerned between the GEl's views and the
proposals contained in Training for the Futur-e, particularly in respect of the
direction of change - a movement away from levy grant towards a consultancy
role for ITBs. The major difference stemmed from the fact that the
Government's proposals were singularly more radical, both in substance and
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timing, than those put :forward by the CBI. This raises two crucial questions:
why did the CBI not take the opportunity, presented by the arrival of a
Government wishing to reduce the size of the public sector, to try to rid
itself of what many of its members regarded as an encumbrance; why, following
the publication of Training for the Future, did the CBI apparently continue to
hold on to its more moderate views? The reasons, it is claimed, reside in a
combination of four factors. Firstly, that the views expressed reflected the
thinking of CBI officials concerned with education and training - particularly
that of the Director of Education and Training. Secondly, that certain of the
proposals in Tz-ining fez- the Future were seen by the CBL to be out line with
the interests of employers. Thirdly, the CBI was less in tune, or aware of,
Governmental thinking than it was with the thinking of DE officials. And
finally, the GEl was concerned to preserve its relationship with the TUG in the
training field.
In relation to the first point, since 1964 the CBI had consistently given its
support to the principles behind the Act while keeping a wary eye on its
operation. This position had not changed by the early 1970s despite the
increasing volume of criticism from its members. During the 1970 review, for
example, in response to a letter from a member company which complained
bitterly about the Act's operation and in particular the levy/grant
arrangements, a CEI official replied that although unable to commit the CBI to
a particular line at that stage, "I think it is likely to find that levy and
grant are the best method of fulfilling the intentions of the Act, though it
may well recommend measures to overcome certain anomalies."{83) This line was
reinforced in late 1970 by the appointment to the position of CBI Director of
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Education and Training of Micheal Bury, who until then had been the Director
of an ITB.Whilst there can be little doubt that the Director's loyalties lay
with his new employers, and there may indeed have been some advantage in
having a 'poacher turn gamekeeper', his views were clearly informed not simply
on the basis of an awareness of problems on the employers' side but also on
the side of the ITBs. The problems that had been encountered, he believed, were
primarily the result of early difficulties stemming from lack of experience and
poor advice from the centre (the CTC and the DE?) {84}
Secondly, it was believed that much of the inflexibility of which boards were
accused resulted from the inflexibilities built into the Act. Future legislation
should therefore allow boards the power to exempt establishments from the
payment of all or part of the levy and empower the Secretary of State to
transfer an establishment from the scope of one board to another where this
was agreeable to the employer and the boards. Thus, given that most boards had
or were overcoming the early problems and seemed to be moving in the right
direction as far as the interests of employers were concerned, modifications,
nt radical change was required. Although a gradual phasing out of the
levy/grant system was desirable the CBI view clearly departed from the
Government's that this should no longer be a statutory obligation of ITBs, as
the following comment from the Director of Education and Training illustrates:
")y personal feeling, having seen both methods of work, is that the national
interest probably requires that training should always have a bit of a
statutory push behind it.C85) These views were clearly imprinted upon
subsequent documents and communications under the imprimatur of the CBI and
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it is suggested bad an important bearing upon the eventual shape of the
legislation.
Vhilst it was stated earlier that the Government may have been taken unawares
by the degree of hostility it encountered in respect of its proposals, by the
same token the CBI seems to have been similarly taken unawares by the extent
of the proposed changes. Commenting upon the likely impact on future training
arrangements within industry the CBI's Director of Education and Training
referred to the "discrepancy here between the policy, proposed in the document,
of a simultaneous phasing out of general levy/grant schemes after 1972/73 and
the policy hitherto advocated by the CDI of progressively running down the
levy/grant element in each particular industry in step with the development of
sound standards of training..I think we shall have to work hard not to lose
the ground which has 'teen gained, albeit at the cost of a good deal of rough
Justice and hard feelings, in the past few years."{66) One reason why the CDI
may not have been expecting such radical proposals relates to our third point
above, that, at least as at the end of 1970, 'informal' contacts between the CBI
and officials from the DE Planning Branch showed that "their [DE] views were
very much in line with ours{871 Thus the CBI's expectations were more than
likely that the final proposals would be broadly similar to the line taken by
DE officials in their discussions. This also fits our earlier contention that
the Government, or perhaps the Secretary of State, was out of step with
departmental officials regarding future developments, this being one reason for
the delay in the production of the consultative document. Certainly the CB1
believed - mistakenly as it turned out - that their and the final proposals
would be largely the same.
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Finally, it is suggested that the CBI felt that the proposals should also be
reasonably palatable to the trade unions. An important principle introduced by
1964 Act had been the sharing of responsibility in the provision of training
by employers and unions. It was, for instance, the CBI's views that "the
development of Industrial Training will suffer if there is not a reasonable
measure of political agreement on the subject",{88) Actions that aroused the
hostility of the unions were likely to upset what was, in general, viewed as a
cooperative, non-partisan approach to training, (89) Such hostility might also
have spilled over into the closely related field of industrial relations. The
CBI had. in fact built up a fairly 'close' working relationship with the TUC
during the period up to the passage of the Industrial Relations Act.{90) But
unlike events surrounding the processing of the Industrial Relations Act this
relationship was utilised to good effect in the sphere of industrial training.
It is though, fair to say that there was a greater distance between the CBI
and the TUG over levy/grant arrangements than other aspects of Training for
the Future. The TUG was strongly committed to the retention of the financial
incentive of levy/grant: the CBI's reservations had more to do with the
precipitate way in which it was planned to phase it out. As, however, sugested
in the preceding discussion, there was something of a gap between the views of
CBI officers and the wider membership. Such was acknowledged by the CBI's
Director of Education and Training when he stated that:{91)
I feel, however, that I should be far less than frank if I were to give the
meeting the impression that the uneasiness felt by many people connected with
Industrial training will be reflected in the general opinions ultimately
expressed by industry. If I may use a medical analogy, the patient, having been
told that his condition required a long and in some respects disagreeable
treatment, has now been told authoritatively that he is better. To expect him
In these circumstances to say that nonetheless he would prefer to continue
with the treatment would be unrealistic.
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This gap was re-affirmed, if not widened, during the consultation period. By
April it became clear that "Although a number of employers were of the opinion
that without the influence of levy/grant systems the current training effort
might deteriorate, it was clear that the majority generally welcomed the
prospect of an end to the present system in 1973."{92) Nonetheless, although
publicly recognising that this was so, and clearly stating that it was "ready
to support individual industries when they have decided what course will be in
their best interests"{93) the GBI was clearly still worried by the effects that
such a course of action would have upon industrial training. It is, therefore,
suggested - and subsequent events lend credence to the view - that the CBI did
not, in its negotiations with government argue too strongly in support of this
proposal. The reasons why are to be found in the greater concern about, and
desire to change, the functions and status of the proposed new Training
Agency, and the belief that the cooperation and agreement of the trade unions
ws necessary to the succesful operation of future arrangements.
The decisive influence of joint CBI, TUG action
The CBI had consistently opposed the establishment of a central executive body
In the training field: the TUG on the other hand. had consistently argued. for
the establishment of some kind of central manpower board or commission.
Indeed, the TUG's proposals about the structure and functions that such a body
would posses were already developed in some detail.{94) We might, therefore,
have expected a parting of the ways between the TUG and the CBI over the
establishment of a central training Agency. Not so: both were united in their
opposition to the Agency by the belief that it would in some important
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 262
Chapter Sii
	
Employment and Training Act 1973
respects breach the principle of Industry responsibility for training. Both
organisations were concerned that industry's control over 'its own' training
arrangements would be seriously weakened in a situation where boards' staff
would be the Agency's employees, and their plans and finances would require
the approval of an Agency with no employer and trade union representation,
accountable only to the Secretary of State.
The CBI and the TUG were thus at one, the CBI stating that: "It is therefore
considered that the new structure should provide for employers and trade
unions, inter alia, to share in the responsibility for both the financial and
policy work of the Agency";{95) whilst the TUG position was that the "exact
construction of the manpower board is something we would be quite willing to
discuss, though obviously we would regard it as essential that the TUG and the
CBI were Included."{96) This was the crucial aspect. the CBI wanted greater
coordination of boards' activities not grater cantrol.The GBI's Director-General
even went as far as to claim that "Absurd though the idea may seem, when first
compared with the alternative of a free government-run service, it might well
be that a few substantial industries with a tradition of running their own
training affairs would do well to examine the merits of retaining an ITB with
a general levy/grant scheme as the price for keeping a greater degee of
control and effectiveness than might otherwise be possible." {97)
The TUC and the CBI engaged in discussions of their own at this time, Although
there were some clear differences of emphasis, they had, by June 1972
established a considerable amount of common ground. And it was on this basis
that a joint letter, signed by Victor Feather, General Secretary of the TUG and.
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Campbell Adainson, Director General of the CDI, was sent to Maurice Macmillan
at the DE, The letter contained the statement that: "If the Government decides
to proceed along the lines proposed in TrainiJW for the Future, we shall, in
the interests of the employers and. workpeople who will be affected, take such
steps as are open to us to counteract the loss of impetus which we believe
will result."{9S) A significant development was the movement that had occurred
in the CBI's position regarding the establishment of a National Manpower Board
along the lines proposed by the TUG. Although it had not examined this
possibility in its own evidence, the CBI was not now 'opposed t it in general
principle'.
The letter set out three areas of major concern which the Government was
requested to re-examine before reaching any final decision. Firstly, it was
felt that interest within industry in participating in the work of ITBs would
considerably diminish if, and when, they were subsumed within an agency
nanaged only by appointed officals. How far employers would be prepared to
utilise - even a free - advisory service where staff were not expert in
particular industries was in doubt. Any such an Agency, therefore, "should have
a board of management, including representatives of employers and trade
unions, to which the staff of the NTA should be accountable. The Board should
be small enough to be effective - we suggest a chairman and, say, eight
enbers - and appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with the
representative bodies concerned." {9) Secondly, concern was expressed that the
funds proposed for the NTA would be inadequate as incentives for training
especially if there was a cessation of levy/grant systems. And finally,
although supporting the objectives of the Training Opportunities Scheme, disqut
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was felt about the separation of training from the employment services, in
other words the view was that training was not being effectively coordinated
with other aspects of manpower policy. The employment services had, in fact,
recently undergone 'modernisation' with the creation of the Employment Services
Agency - within the Department of Employment - following publication of
'People and Jobs'.{lOO) Thus the letter went on "we feel that very careful
consideration will need to be given to ensuring that training opportunities for
individuals are reasonably matched with employment opportunities. Close
consultation with employers and. trade unions will be essential."{101) The
Government had considered (in one short paragraph) in Tr&inin' for the Future
the creation of a wider organisation concerned with manpower services in
general, but: "The Secreatary of State has, however, decided that at this point
of time it is not possible to think in terms of anything like a National
)tanpower Commission as a body separate from the Department."{102) The TUG and
CBI claimed that it was possible. A month and a half later, so did the
Government,
A final interesting and additional insight into a rather more Indirect
Influence upon the Government's decision to create a Manpower Services
Commission, (see below) was the part played in this process by an 'academic
expert', Santosh Mukherjee. In both the work cited earlier and in a 1972
publication, which provided a comparative analysis of labour market policy in
Sweden and the UK, Mukherjee, strongly influenced by the model of the Swedish
Labour Market Board, argued for the establishment of a Manpower Commission
for the UK.{103) There is no doubt that officials within the DE at the time
were aware of Kukherjee's work. It is also interesting to note that DE
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officials attached little significance to this work as being in any way a
formative influence upon the creation of the Xanpower Services Commission.
Investigating the Impact (or lack thereof) of academic research findings upon
decision making in the sphere of social policy, Patricia Thomas notes the
comment of one such senior official that "the fact that an academic
commentator had suggested the creation of a Nanpower Services Commission
would not have had the slightest effect."{104) Such may or may not have been
the case. But it begins to lack a degree of credibility when set against the
proffered civil service Inerpretation of what actually was supposed to have
been the case. Thus:C105)
"The reasons it was set up were partly socio-economlc, partly politicaL Like
Mukherjee, civil servants and their 1'!inlsters were aware of the growing number
of unemployed and the lack of facilities for retraining and redeploying them.
The Department of Employment considered it Inappropriate that employment
services were caught up in the Department. The Conservative Government was at
the time anxious both to reduce the number of civil servants by 'hiving off'
sections of the civil service to quasi-independent bodies and to instil more
management discipline into areas of the civil service where it might be
suitable, Thus the Employment Services Agency (ESA) and the Training Services
Agency (TSA) were established as inter-departmental agencies. The
Confederation of British Industries advised against the creation of two
separate bodies and the government saw the creation of a I(anpower Services
Commission as a way of coordinating them and collaborating with the CBI and
TIJC,,'
Yhile not materially inaccurate, by presenting only part of the story the above
paints a distinctly different impression of the influences at work. Civil
servants and their Xinisters were, after all it would seem, Intending all along
to create a I(anpower Services Commission; perhaps the proposals disappeared at
the printers. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that, by itself, Mukherjee's work
would have induced the Government's change of mind. But it also is almost
certainly the case that it had a significant, though indirect, influence in
shaping the change In policy. This was because Mukherjee, as well as being a
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former Economic Advisor at the DEP and the Treasury, had also been senior
assistant to Len Murray at the TUC. The TUC proposals for a Manpower
Commission bore an uncanny resemblance to those propounded by Mukherjee.
EV PROPOSALS: THE 1973 EMPLOYXENT AID TRAINING ACT
The impression of the Government's position during this period is one of it
having a general stance on industrial training, but a not very clear view about
what it wished to do. It had formulated its proposals without the close
involvement of industry, but under the impression that they would meet with
the approval of employers. Confronted with an unexpected degree of opposition,
the Government 'retreated' in some important respects.Thus, under considerable
pressure, most notably the joint CBI/TUC approach, Maurice Macmillan, on 8
August 1972, announced some significant alterations to the Government's
proposals on training. Except for small firms which would henceforth be wholly
exempt from levy, the levy/grant system was retained, but in a modified form.
Levies would no longer be allowed to exceed 1 per cent of payroll and ITBs
would be required to exempt from levy all firms which satisfied the beard that
it was training to meet its own needs. The case for bringing the employment
and. training services together bad clearly been accepted, but before reaching a
final conclusion on the form of organisation, it was proposed to "have further
talks with the Tt.JC and CBI. The purpose will be twofold: to co-ordinate the
eiiiployment and training services, and to involve employers and employees in
both these activities, "Meantime, stated the Minister he was "reorganising the
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training services within my Department under a Chief Executive to match the
management structure of the Employment Services Agency."C106)
The response of the TYJC and the CBI was, this time round, much more positive.
Speaking to a BACIE conference organised to discuss the decision the CBI's
Director of Education and Training neatly side-stepped the "the fact that the
retention of levies, even in a restricted form, will be unwelcome to the
majority of employers"C107} by claiming that the Government's decision was
compatible with the CBI's objective of phasing out levies as quickly as was
compatible with the rate of training progress in each industry. In any case a
'judicious amount of leverage' was necessary due to the importance and inherent
nature of the training function. What seems not to have been altogether
compatible was the views expressed by the majority of CBI members with the
views of its permanent officers. The TUC on the other hand felt that the
Government had not yet moved far enough: for example it wished to see a higher
levy exemption limit, an extension in boards' scope, and an 'objective
examination' of the training needs of small firms rather than a blanket
exemption system. {1O&}
The future shape of what was to become the largest, most important public
sector training organisation in Britain - the l(anpower Services Commission -
was hammered out in a number of meetings between DE officials, )tinisters, the
TUC and the CBI between October 1972 and 22 November 1972 when the Secretary
of State announced the decision to establish a 1(anpower Services Commission
(XSC).{109) although debate and discussion continued through the period
covering the publication of the Education and Training White Paper{11O) in
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March 1973 and. the passage of the Act in July 1973.{111) The TUG kept up its
pressure for the Inclusion of a variety of measures in the legislation. It
proposed, for instance, that the Commission should have powers to mount
temporary job creation schemes on a substantial scale; that there should be
enabling provision for the introduction of the compulsory notification of
vacancies to the ESA; that boards' authority in relation to small firms should
be maintained; and that the levy limit should be raised above 1 per cent. It
was only on the last point that the Government were prepared to move, if only
marginally. In February the Government announced that the legislation would
permit an order to be made providing for ITBs to levy above 1 per cent, if the
Secretary of State considered It appropriate, if it had the agreement of
industry and subject to an affirmative resolution in both Houses of
Parliament. (112)
The 1973 Employment and Training Act entirely replaced the 1948 Employment
and Training Act and substantially amended the 19F4 Industrial Training Act,
and was to come into effect on 1 August 1974, It was a complex piece of
legislation: replacing the 1964 Act would. have been aciministrativelj and
technically much easier but was not seriously contemplated because it "would
have greatly alarmed the industrial training boards which regard the Act as a
kind of charter".{113) The Act provided for the creation of "three bodies
corporate" - the Nanpower Services Commision, the Employment Services Agency
and the Training Services Agency. The MSC was to be composed of ten members
appointed by the Secretary of State: three after consultation with
organisations representing employers (the CDI), three after consultation with
organisations representing employees (the TUG), two representing local
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authorities, one concerned with education, and a full-time chairman, The
Agencies were to consist of three persons: a director appointed by the
Commission with the approval of the Secretary of State arid two others
appointed by the Commission following consultation with the director. The
Commission and its Agencies were "not to be regarded as servants or,. ..as
agents of the Crown..."{114) unless "performing functions by arrangement on
behalf of a (inister".C115) And the staff of the Commission and Agencies were
not to be civil servants.{116) The Commission was to have only a small staff,
the operation of the employment and training services and coordination of the
work of ITBs was to fall to the Agencies subject to the direction of the
Commission. The powers of the Commission were to be 'broadly comparable' with
those of the Secretary of State under the 1948 Act. The Cbmmission was to be
financed by an annual grant-in-aid (although some income would accrue from
fees, eg training within industry scheme, professional and executive
recruitment scheme (PERA)) and would be required to submit accounts to
parliament. It was also liable to examination by the Public Accounts Committee
and the (then) Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons.
Industrial training boards were now to be 'pulled In' to what was intended to
be a more coordinated approach to labour market policy. Boards were to retain
much of the autonomy that Training for the Future had threatened to remove -
in particular boards' staff were not to become the employees of the Commission
- and that the Government had seen as the cause of many of the previous
difficulties. These difficulties were to be overcome by the new relationship
between boards and the Commission, or more particularly the TSD. The
relationship between the CommissionfTSD and boards was a complex one. Boards
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were to be left with "both the authority and the responsibility to secure
adequate training in their industries, and it will be for each board to
identify needs and priorities in its own industry, and to develop its
activities accordingly."{117) The Commission, on the other hand "will have a
co-ordinating role, and one aspect of its work will be to ensure that the
resources at its disposal are used. effectively and with a due sense of
priorities".{lle) The forward plans and budgets of boards were to be discussed
and agreed with the Commission, providing in theory a basis on which to
"compare the results achieved in practice with what it was planned to
achieve".{119) The Commission was also to be responsible for approving Boards'
proposals for grant schemes and training recommendations, and although the
Secretary of State was to retain the responsibility for establishing,
abolishing or amending the scope of a board this was now only to be done
following a recommendation from the Commission.
As stated above levy/grant was to become a levy/grant/exemption system, small
firms were to be wholly exempt and except in 'quite exceptional circumstances'
the rate of levy was subject to an upper limit of 1 per cent of payroll. Boards
no longer had the duty to raise a levy, but had a power to do so. As many
firms would. no longer be paying a levy the administrative expenses of boards
were to be met from the Commission's grant-in-aid, as were grants to boards to
encourage key training activities. The only industry to object to this
provision was the Foundry industry.{120) On this point, one interesting
amendment was made to the Bill as a result of representations from the
Construction Industry Training Board. This was that where it could be shown
that where there was substantial suport from employers (more than half) a
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board may be allowed not to exempt some, or all, firms that trained to meet
their own needs, where this was necessary to encourage adequate training iii
the industry (ie the levy/grant system could be retained, although subject to
fairly stringent criteria).
SUULRY AID CONCLUSIONS
The 1973 Employment and Training Act sought to provide a more coherent
framework for the implementation of industrial training policy. Statutory,
industry based boards were to be retained, with limited powers and with the
same basic fuictons. There was, however, a re-ordering of boards' priorities
which in effect formalised the developments of the previous eight or nine
years. That is, industrial training policy had undergone a prior process of
development which was a significant element in the policy change that occurred
in 1973, So, formally abandoned was the objective of equalising the costs of
training between employers, and boards were now to concentrate upon increasing
the quantity and quality of training insofar as this was consistent with the
business needs of individual employers. The hived-off Training Services Agency
was to be the main integrating mechanism - for both board and non-board
sectors - which also had responsibility for the state's share of training
provision in the TOPS Scheme. Combined with. the Employment Services Agency
the two Agencies were to represent a new coordinated approach to labour market
policy, oversight of which was to be the responsibility of the Kanpower
Services Commission. It is clear that the Act did not set out to create
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institutions with extensive new powers. The functions of the NSC and its two
Agencies were initially limited to a certain of those previously exercised by
the Minister, The Act was therefore about creating the right institutions for
the effective implementation and management of industrial training policy.
Our analysis of the events leading to the Act discloses that the interaction of
three factors were primarily responsible for the ultimate shape that the
policy took. These factors were views about the way in which the 1964 Act
had been implemented and the Impact that it had had; the advent of a
government with a different set of norms, which initially gave impetus to
changing the policy, but which themselves were subject to a number of changes
thereafter; and the need to take cognisance of the views of the 'community of
Interests' that had in effect been created by the 1964 Act and could thus
claim an authoritative voice on training matters. As far as the division of
responsibility for industrial training was concerned, it is clear that the
Conservative Government held to the view that the main responsibility resided
with industry. Therefore at this level there was no change in the prevailing
standards or norms. However, given that the Government in the first half had
adopted a philosophy of disengagement and was committed to enhancing
managerial efficiency in the public sector, this meant that a different
perspective was held of the utility of the training board system. In the first
instance the Government was not convinced that ITBs were the most efficient or
effective mechanisms for securing improvements In training and they were
accordingly seen as one of the areas where the state had become too involved
in the affairs of the private sector. The Government's original proposals
therefore would have effectively turned boards into purely 'voluntary' bodies
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whose survival would have required the support of their constituencies. Such
support was not likely to be forthcoming.
The fact that such views were not entirely shared by industry, however, seems
to have taken the Government 'off guard' and led to a reformulation of the
proposals. There had., In effect, developed a consensus between both sides of
industry - firstly at the sector level through participation in the board
system, but also at the national level through the greater involvement In
training matters by the peak associations, although it is important to note
that such consensus was not the same at each level. Such Involvement not only
enhances the amount of influence that organisations may have over policy, It
also confers status upon them, The Government's proposals threatened to remove
both. On the one hand statutory powers were to be vested In semi-autonomous
agencies with no external representation and on the other the status of the
ITBs - and thereby of the organisations represented on them - was to be so
reduced that Industry would be unwilling to serve on them. The challenge to
the proposals therefore may be represented as Industrial Interests seeking to
retain - and indeed in the case of the peak associations enhance - their
influence and status over industrial training policy. Although the Government
was not prepared to retain the status quo so far as the boards were concerned,
It was prepared to concede in large part to the demands of industrial
interests. There were two main reasons for this: firstly the desire to
establish a greater degree of cooperation and collaboration with industry; and
secondly the Government's general change in stance and priorities that had
occurred. between 1970-73.
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Foundry Industry Training Committee, letter to the author dated 4
February 1981.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
I1fPLE1EH TA T ION AND THE .7'IA.NPO WER
SER V ICES CQfM 155 ION
The Manpower Services Commission(NSC) was officially 'born' on 1 January 1974.
Since that time its operations in its various spheres have attracted some
scrutiny, and a fair amount of criticism, the bulk of such attention having
been devoted to aspects of its operations in relation to 'Special
Programmes'.{l) It is not, therefore, the intention in this chapter to rehearse
these issues again, although some reference to them will need to be made, but
to focus attention on the nature of the MSC as a decision making institution,
and on the Training Services Agency's (later the Training Services Division)
role in shaping policy and policy change in the area of industrial training, in
particular the implications of the relationship with Industrial Training
kards,
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE XAJPOWER SERVICES COXXISSIOJ
The supposedly 'novel' character of the MSC generated some debate amongst
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political scientists during the mid-late 1970s about whether or not it could
be regarded as a corporatist institution. This has implications not simply for
the way in which decisions are processed and the kind of decisions that
emerge, but for the subsequent implementation of such decisions. It is not the
intention here, however, to become entangled in the complexities of the issues
surrounding what corporatism is (or is not) ,C2) but to question some of the
premises upon which this label has been applied to the 1(SC,
The attention that the NSG attracted, and indeed continues to attract,{S} as a
corporatist body, perhaps found its clearest expression in the statement of
Grant's that the }SC is one of the "most unambiguously corporate institutions
in Britairi."{4) Here three characteristics that distinguish the XSC from other
organisations are claimed to confer the corporatist status upon it,{5) These
are firstly, that its creation was specifically linked, by Naurice l(acmillan,
the then Employment Secretary, to the philosophy of 'tripartism'.{ô) Secondly,
through the NSC, the CBI and TUG are directly involved in the executive
operations of government, that is their participation is not simply on an
administrative or advisory basis. And thirdly, the major producer groups are
given both power and responsibility for the decisions and actions taken. Thus
the MSG has been seen as the product of the post-1972 Seisdon 1tan era, the
'new' doctrine of which was increased intervention into production through
attempts to involve the peak associations in the formulation of policy. And the
1973 Employment and Training Act represented an endeavour to overcome at the
central (or 'trans-sectoral) level the failings inherent in the ITB system at
the sectoral (or meso) level. Or, as put by Vickerstaff, "lW)ith the creation of
the HSC, policy moved away from the attempt to create a meso-level neo-
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corporatist consensus, opting instead for a national tripartite legitimating
body, and effectively, heralding a more active role for the state."{7)
A number of difficulties confront us over this classification however, one of
which ignores the events prior to the much quoted statement by Kaurice
Kacmilan in 1973, The assumption that it was the Government's intention to
establish a tripartite or corporatist body is based on an inadequate, or
partial knowledge of events leading to the HSC's creation.{8) As we saw in the
previous chapter, the composition of the Commission was not prompted by the
Government's desire to create a tripartite institution. The initial proposals
had far more to do with organisational objectives and the desire to create
separate, accountable management units, As Howells notes the "DE was a prime
field for applying these ideas, since most of its services were clear
candidates for hiving off".{9) There is no evidence to suggest that the
incorporation of groups in such a structure was given any real consideration
until proposed by the TUC and CBI. Clearly, when it came to the push, the
Government did not oppose such representation, but this had as much to do with
attempting to re-establish relations between the Government and the TUC and to
reach agreement over pay and prices,{lO) as it did with any belief that the
participation and cooperation of producer groups was necessary to secure
agreement and implementation of manpower policy - although such might have
come to be seen as an additional advantage. The point is that although the HSC
may have come to display certain characteristics inherent in corporatist
institutions, it was not originally conceived as such. Further, the composition
of the Commission cannot really be labelled tripartite in the sense in which
It is used by such writers to describe the relationship between the
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government 1 labour and capital, and as applied to other bodies such as the
EDC. The reason being that a) it contains no governmental representatives and
b) interests other than producer groups (ie labour and capital) are represented
on the Commission, Indeed, certain writers would appear to classify the MSC as
tripartite based on the erroneous claim that it comprises "matched proportions
of representatives drawn rfom the CBI and the TUC, together with a third
element composed of 'the State'. ..",{il)
Related to the above is the status of the membership. Given that the !(SC was
both an advisory and executive body its members were not expected to act as
delegates but as group representatives who In the words of Macmillan "must
keep in mind the general views and. interests of those who helped to put them
there",{12) But we may also note the comment of Sir Denis Barnes, first
chairman of the MSC, that "just as individual Commissioners are expected to
bring to the Commission the view of their constituent organisations, so also
they have a responsibility to support within these organisations decisions
they take as Commissioners".{13} This aspect more readily seems to fit the
conception of corporatist arrangements whereby the incorporation of groups
into the decision making process is designed to remove, or at least alleviate,
the threat posed by group autonomy to the interests of the state: the granting
of functional representation enhances compliance through the regulation of the
behaviour of group members. Even here, however, one might question bow far
such a view could not be taken of purely advisory bodies such as the NEDC,
where consistent failure by one or more parties to support the 'agreed line'
would render such organisations profitless.
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There is little doubt that the performance of executive functions by such
bodies is consistent with corporatist theorising. But must we then ipso facto
regard the KSC as corporatist? One way of avoiding this has been the claim
that the type of executive functions exercised are not really those to do with
policy formulaticn.C14) But, despite the fact that the Secretary of State
retained responsibility for general manpower policy,{15) it was clearly stated
by the Government that "(Ms far as the employment and training services are
concerned, the KSC certainly will be the policy making body."(16) Even so, such
a combination of policy and administrative functions may be exercised by other
organisations, similarly constituted, {1 7) most notably perhaps Industrial
Training Boards themselves.
The essence of the argument here, therefore, is that in some respects the }ISC
displays certain characteristics consistent with what one might expect to find
in corporatist institutions, but that these are neither exclusive to the MSC
nor such that they allow us to dub it an 'unambiguously' tripartite or
corporatist structure. In other words, the actual structure of the organisation
is not of the central concern. A much more important issue which the
corporatist debate has raised, is whether, and to what extent, the
incorporation of groups into formal positions with executive and
administrative responsibilities leads such groups to act less in a self
interested and more in a 'public regarding' manner. Within the confines of
industrial training policy this in itself could be regarded as significant in
that it could be seen as a moving away from, or a re-casting of, the
voluntarism prominent in previous policies in that the role of the peak
associations was to be a quasi-public one whereby their status is that of
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Intermediaries between their members and the state, In other words those from
peak associations lost some of their purely private representative role to a
public regulatory role.{19) The question that arises, therefore is how
significant, if at all, was this dual role, and what at the end of the day it
actually meant in practice for industrial training. As we shall discover, there
is little evidence to suggest that where the representatives on the MSC
perceived the interests of their membership to be seriously threatened, that
group autonomy was abandoned. A premium may have been placed on obtaining
accoinodations, bargains and compromises, but as we shall see, dissension and
refusal of support did occur when interests were threatened.
The evidence presented above would suggest that the outlook of the post-'72
Heath Government was in part important to the development of the MSC, but it
also more fundamentally indicates that when viewed in a longer term
perspective of the evolution of industrial training policy it is not such a
radical and innovatory a development as has been portrayed in much of the
literature, particularly that written in the 1970s. Similarly, we have seen that
the pre-1972 outlook of the Heath Government had an important influence upon
its creation. In some significant respects, whilst the genesis of the KSC is
important to the above discussion, a full assessment of some of the issues
raised depends crucially upon an examination of the way In which the
Commission and its Agencies subsequently operated and the decisions they
reached. This we shall be doing in the present chapter when we examine some of
the early activities of the HSC, although a more detailed analysis will be
provided when we look at the internal working of the Commision during the
period that it undertook the review of the 1973 Employment and Training Act.
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However, before going on to look at the operation of the 1'SC in its early
years, we need to briefly consider the general stance of the Labour Party
towards intervention in the economy, industry and the labour market. It did,
after all, fall to the Labour Government elected in Xarch 1974, to implement
the 1973 Employment and Training Act.
The 1974 Labour Government
There is little doubt that in opposition the Labour Party, if not so evidently
the leadership, displayed a far more strongly interventionist stance than it
previously had In respect of its proposed policies for industry it sought to
tackle the issue of the autonomy of private capital head on. Influential upon
the Party's thinking in the early were the ideas of Dr Stuart Holland, former
adviser to Harold Wilson and lecturer in Economics and History at Sussex
University before becoming a Labour KP In 1979. Holland's basic tenet was that
British manufacturing Industry was dominated by a handful of large, powerful
and usually transnational, companies in each sector, These so called meso-
economic sectors were immune both from the influence of the competitive market
(being price makers) and government fiscal and monetary policies (being
transnational). For Holland this in large measure accounted for the failure of
previous 'indicative planning' exercises. {20) It was, therefore, deemed
necessary for a Labour Government to intervene more directly In the affairs of
private industry to ensure a greater convergence between its behaviour and the
requirements of government policy.
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 288
Chapter Seven	 Implementation and the KSC
As worked out by Labour in Opposition there were to be two main prongs in the
attempt to gain greater influence over the private sector. First, the
government was to take a major stake in the ownership of manufacturing
industry through a National Enterprise Board (NEB) to afford some direct
control and significant indirect influence of the behaviour of firms. The NEB
would be able to secure its stake - originally intended as some 25 of the
largest manufacuring companies - in private companies by compulsory purchase
if need be. Second, there was to be introduced compulsory planning agreements
between the government and the largest manufacturing companies which was
designed to extract information about companies' future behaviour and through
such 'contracts' commit them to particular plans for investment, employment,
trade and so on, thereby making government economic planning more realistic
and achievable.{21) In the case of manpower and training the Party was not so
forthright on its challenge to the autonomy of private capital. This may well
have reflected the lower priority attached to training compared to industrial
policy, perhaps itself a reflection of greater enthusiasm for previous
arrangements, that training introduced the more problematic issue of trade
union involvement and interests, and. that trade union concerns were firmly
focussed on industrial relations legislation. Nonetheless, Labour's Progranme
1973 did outline proposals for a major expansion of resources for training
drawn from government and a new general training levy and. a more powerful
National Manpower Board in place of the MSC.{22)
There is considerable evidence from its proposals in opposition that Labour
would be considerably more interventionist and. less prone to respect the
independence of firms and thus less reliant on voluntarist arrangements.
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)(oreover, under the 'Social Contract' it was committed to a major extension of
employee rights within the firm. In the event, the Party's proposals were
considerably watered down by the key figures within the leadership who clearly
were not ideologically in sympathy with the initiatives produced by the wider
party. For example, the IEB was not given powers of compulsory purchase and
was severely circumscribed financially such that over 90 per cent of its
turnover was accounted for by British Leyland and. Rolls Royce which were
transferred to it in 1976. Likewise, planning agreements were rendered both
voluntary and vague and only one was concluded with a private company, Chrysler
(UK) Ltd. {23) Interestingly planning agreements as developed by Industry
Secretary Varley could have included training in their contents.{24) Yhether
this, or indeed any other part of Labour's more interventionist stance, would
have proved successful is a proposition that was never put to the test. The
Labour Government, particularly after the more radical members of the
government had been outmanouvred, preferred to maintain a strong voluntarist
ethos in its handling of its relations with industry. Thus, just as Labour had
taken over the operation of the 1964 Industrial Training Act essentially
unaltered, it likewise took over the operation of the 1973 Act and the MSC
largely intact.
THE KAIPOVER SERVICES COXXISSION AN]) THE TRAINING SERVICES AGENCY: TRAINING
ENTREPRENEURS
By the time the XSC was officially set up on 1 April 1972, the two executive
Agencies - Employment Services (ESA) and Training Services (TSA)- for whose
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operations it assumed broad responsibility had been effectively functioning for
some time, (see Chapter 6). The TSA - whose senior officials were to be
appointed by the Commission - was divided into three Operating Divisions: the
TOPS Division, responsible for meeting the training needs of individuals
primarily through the Training Opportunities Scheme; the Industry Division,
responsible for promoting training in industry in both the ITB and non- ITB
sectors; and the Training Directorate, responsible for developing the TSA's
competence and expertise in training and training methods, In addition there
were three support branches: for planning and inteThgence; corporate services;
and marketing and public relations. To a considerable extent the Agencies'
plans and programmes bad been formulated by April 1974, which, taken with the
fact that little thought had been given to how the Commission should actually
operate{25) meant that the Impact of the Commission (meaning here the
Commissioners plus the small number of supporting staff) upon setting an
agenda for training and taking decisions was severely circumscribed during the
first year or so. Thus it was TSA officials who were, early on, at the
forefront in taking the initiative, with the Commission itself somewhere in the
background.
One significant aspect of this was that the TSA was not, In fact, to lose its
civil service ethos: strong pressure from the staff associations meant the
retention of civil service status (26) which resulted In the organisational
'curiosity' of a fringe body with Crown status.{27) And the first 'independent'
chairman of the MSC was Sir Denis Barnes, till then Permanent Secretary at the
DE. One other factor contributing to the relative Imbalance between Comniision
and Agencies was their sizes in terms of staff. As at 1975 the immediate staff
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of the Commission numbered about 50, divided between a Secretariat and an
audit unit, which was supplemented by around forty others with the creation of
a Manpower Intelligence and Planning Unit. On the other hand by 1976 the staff
of the ESA was about 13,000, with 7,000 in the TSA,{28) This in fact
represented an increase for the TSA of around 1,300 staff above that planned
at the time that it was taken over by the MSC. These figures may be further
broken down as follows: 100 technical and 450 non-technical staff at
headquarters; 20 technical and 500 non-technical staff in regional offices;
2,150 technical and 900 non-technical staff in skilicentres, See J Vellens 'The
Vork of the Manpower Services Commission' Industrial and Commercial Training,
March 1974. As far as training staff were concerned we can of course add to
this figure a further 6,000 employed by the ITBs. The original MSC/Agencies
structure was to result in a lack of coordination and common purpose, and from
1976 onwards there were moves to reorganise so as to achieve a greater degree
of central capability and corporate identity (see below).
Decision makfrg in the early years
The first formal meeting of the nascent Commission took place on 9 January
1974 although an informal one had taken place in December 1973,{29) and
altogether during 1974 the Commission held 17 meetings.{30) The four point
work programme agreed at the first formal meeting was:{31)
The Chief Executives of the Employment Service Agency and the
Training Service Agency should present details of their present
operations and long-term plans.
To analyse the present information available on manpower
forecasting with a view to improving manpower intelligence and
information.
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To hold meetings in different parts of the country to discuss with
employers and trade unions how the Commission can best serve them.
To see at first hand. the work of the Agencies throughout the
country.
Originally then, it seems clear that the initiative for establishing priorities
for action in industrial training lay with the TSA. It was, by the time the
Commission was set up, well prepared with programmes for action This was
indicated in the announcement, on the day on which it became a statutory body
under the NSC, that, the TSA had already submitted its first five year plan
which had been 'welcomed' by the XSC.{32) The Plan had. in fact been under
preparation since December 1972.{33) It was, said John Cassels TSA's chief
executive, a plan that directed resources to "particular priority areas where
the pay-off, economically or socially, or both, was likely to be the
greatest".{34) The Plan's purpose was stated as being:{35)
(a) to help the Commission to decide on the role and aims of the
TSA, and the activities it should carry out;
(b) to enable the Commission to decide what resources to seek from
the Government for the Agency's activities;
(C) to provide a basis for discussion about resources with the
Government;
(d) to provide a framework within which the Commission can take
decisions on individual issues as the work of the Agency
develops.
Other purposes of the plan were seen to be to help:
(e) the Agency itself to be clear about its task, to do it, and to
acocunt for what it has done;
(f) coordinate the work of the ITBs;
(g) focus national efforts to improve training and provide a basis
for public discussion of national training priorities.
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One of the main messages that was conveyed, both in the Plan and in the
numerous public speeches and writings that senior TSA officials were at the
time giving, {36} was that the TSA saw its role within the training system as
that of catalyst and coordinator.{37) The 'high profile' adopted by the TSA
was, from the start a deliberate policy and seemed to contain a mixture of
educative and propagandist functions. For example, "The Agency's Marketing
]'tanager will.. .seek to focus national attention on high priority training
problems and will give particular attention to the development of a programme
for publicising the benefits of training and the contribution it can make.,. ,In
addition, in conjunction with the Commission's Director of Information, he will
seek to develop and project a corporate image by promoting and publicising the
Activities of the Agency, conducting press and public relations.. ."C38} It is
worth mentioning that the corporate image to be promoted was that of the
Agency's, not the Commission's.
An interesting indication that the thinking of the 1(SC with regard to the
benefits of good 'public relations' was, however, proceeding along similar
lines, and the kind of strategy likely to be followed was given by Sir Denis
Barnes: "Suppose we had some Idea which would needs say, £50 million to put
into operation. If we thought that we could get what we wanted without a
public debate we wouldn't promote it, but if not we might wish to muster
public support".{39) Thus both the Commission and Agency were fairly quick off
the mark to try to establish a basis of support within their relevant
constituencies. The Plan set out three major aims to enable the TSA to pursue
its catalyst/coordinator role. These were:'{40)
1. To help through training to secure the efficiency and effective
performance of the country's manpower;
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2. To help individuals through training to fulfill the needs and
aspirations they have for their own employment;
3. To increase the effectiveness and. efficiency of training.
These were then translated into four major sets of programmes,structured to
meet the criterion that they should comprise activities for which common
objectives could be set and specific strategies developed. They were also
claimed to highlight key trade-offs between programmes in allocating
resources, The programmes were: {41)
1, Meeting training needs in industry. Here expenditure was
estimated to rise from about £9in in 1974/75 to over .45m by
197B/79 at constant prices;
2. Meeting training needs of individuals. Expenditure was estimated
to rise from £?7m in 1974/75 to over 125m in 1978/79 at
constant prices;
3. Improving training effectiveness and efficiency. An expenditure
increase from .3m to 1m between 1974/75 and 1978/79
4. Managing the TSA. An increase in expenditure from about .77m to
over ,1m in real terms.
A survey of contemporary sources leaves little doubt that both the Commission
and the TSA embraced the roles and functions that they had been given to
perform with enthusiasm, if not to say gusto, and a there was a clear feeling
that here, at last, was the organisational structure potentially capable of
delivering what had been intended but not achieved by the 1964 Act. The
impression conveyed was that the XSC and TSA - perhaps bearing in mind the
experience of the ITBs - wanted not only to be accepted, but liked. The
organisations clearly wished to be regarded as an - if not the - authoritative
voice in manpower policy. The approach of the MSC and the Agencies was
'consumer' oriented in that a prime responsibility was regarded. as reacting to
the needs of its 'customers': "Like an entrepreneur, much of our work is
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opportunistic and responsive, but whereas the business entrepreneur has as his
goal staying in business and maxinlising his return on capital investment in
cash terms, the [Training] Directorate's investment is professional manpower
and the desired return is In terms of Improved training".C42) There are of
course those who would not see such functions and the motivations behind them
as entirely dissimilar.
Iii this respect the HSC'S first Annual Report stated that, "being conscious of
the need to respond to the employment and training requirements of all parts
of the country" it was to establish a network of over 100 advisory District
Xanpower Committees (DMCs) . {43) One hundred and twenty five D](Cs were
established by Ocober 1975. Their composition mirrored that of the XSC itself
wherein they contained an !(SC appointed chairman, 9 members appointed by
employers, 9 by trade unions, 2 local authority representatives, 2
educationalists, and 3 co-opted members, Their function was to advise the MSC
on:{44)
the operation of the local labour market, identifying employment
trends and problems and advising on plans to deal with them;
current services, by acting as a local 'consumer council';
promoting the sevices of the NSC locally;
the development of wider policy issues
Widening the Coi!zission 's sphere of responsibility
It soon became apparent, however, that the Commission (and presumably the TSA
also) felt that the functions and powers that it had been given under the 1973
Act were not sufficient for the role that in the Commission ' view such a body
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should perform.{45) The Commission wished to develop a general manpower
strategy, claiming that without such a capbility the provision of effective
employment and training services would be extremely difficult. Structured as it
was, and with its limited remit, employment and training arrangements were
still considered to be too fragmentary. The Commission should therefore:{46)
be in a position to express constructive views on any policies
affecting the labour market and to propose practical solutions to
problems which may range from the short-term to the long-term
fundamental questions concerning the effective use of the country's
manpower resources, whether or not the Commission is itself in a
position to take action on them."
What, it transpired, the Commission was involved in was a take-over bid for
those responsibilities that remained with the Secretary of State, namely the
development of a comprehensive manpower policy, and executive functions in
relation to, for example, sheltered employment for disabled persons, work
creation programmes, oversight of the careers service, and redundancy
provisions. It added support to its proposal for central authority by arguing
that, in any case, the Xinister was too preoccupied with other issues to give
the 'concentrated and. undivided attention' necessary to the development of
manpower policy. In similar vein Sir Denis Barnes, speaking at the Xay I74
BACIE conference, put forward his opinion that prior to the MSC's
establishment the organisation of employment and training services had been
inefficient. He went on "very important employment and. training matters did
not receive the attention they deserved because the Secretary of State and the
Permanent Secretary were, inevitably, involved in other time-consuming and
important Issues such as industrial relations and incomes policy." He left the
audience to draw its own conclusions from the following remark that the
conference "was to have been opened by the Secretary of State . but instead (r
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Harold Walker undertook the job because the Secretary of State was, as we are
all well aware, preoccupied with more demanding and immediate issues than
employment and trainlng."{47) Although difficulties might exist in finding
lines of demarcation between the responsibilities of the Commission and the
DE, the Commission's view was that this was not insurmountable: the guiding
principle should be that matters primarily concerned with advice to Ministers
regarding their dealings with colleagues and Parliament should remain with the
Department, otherwise responsibility should reside with the Commission. The
final riposte was:{48)
Whatever the details of the arrangements finally agreed, we are
convinced that only by a radical extension of the present role and
responsibilities of the Commission beyond those envisaged by the
Employment and Training Act, 1973, can a new dynamic be given to
the development of manpower policies in this country."
The attitude of the Labour Government to the proposals emanating from the
Commission was ambivalent. As Sir Denis Barnes complained elsewhere: "In its
[the Government's] policy statements it has said it wants to see the
transformation of the Commission into a powerful body responsible for
developing and carrying out a comprehensive manpower policy. But it has
neither said what it thinks should constitute a comprehensive manpower policy,
nor has it been able to agree to -the Commission's views of the main elements
of such a policy."{49)
It seems that the Government, having inherited a new set of training
arrangements - as indeed had happened with the Labour Government ten years
earlier - was thereafter uncertain as to how it should proceed. Whilst the new
arrangements were not inconsistent with the wider industrial and economic
goals that the Government was pursuing, it appears to have been content -
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initially at least - to implement the arrangements as they stood. This was in
spite of the manifesto committment to "develop an active manpower policy with
a powerful NATIONAL LABOUR BOARD." {50) The Secretary of State until April
1976, Micheal Foot, (thereafter Albert Booth) may indeed have been proccupied
with other matters that were regarded as having greater priority. For one
thing, any further extension of the I(SC's role would have had considerable
expenditure implications; the 11:SC's annual expenditure by 1976 bad already
reached some .25O million and was planned to rise to &363 million in the
following year.{51)It is thus unlikely that the Treasury, with only limited and.
indirect control over the MSC's expenditure, would have been in favour of such
a development that would have pushed spending up. It was also clear that as
far as Industrial Training Boards were concerned, although the Labour Party in
opposition had opposed the changes introduced under the '73 Act, they were not,
on taking office, inclined to alter the Act's provisions. As Harold Walker, the
Parliamentary Under Secretary at the DR put it: "Perhaps the most important
need now.. .is to give the training boards a period of stability and the chance
to settle down to their new job in co-operation with the Ifanpower Services
Commission without subjecting them to yet more upheaval or reorganisation" . (52)
One further ?ignificant factor contributing to the Government's vacillations at
this time was that the advice of officials at the DR was at odds with what the
Commission was seeking. DR officials were not supportive of the department's
remaining manpower responsibilities being transferred to the }tSC. Such a view
Is confirmed in the conflict that emerged between the DR and Commission over
the appointment of a successor to Sir Denis Barnes who retired in March 1976.
The DE wanted a less independent, part-time chairman, which would facilitate
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Its attempts to re-establish control, for it was felt at the time that the
"Commission's activities have also created annoyance among Sir Denis's former
colleagues at the Department of Employment. Some of them now make little
attempt to disguise their belief that the XSC's main aim has been to build an
empire at the DE's expense".{53} But 'helped along' by a deteriorating
unemployment situation and a worsening economic performance both the Treasury
and DE lost out to the I(SC/TSA's zealous pursuit of its aims. One important
factor in this being the replacement of Sir Denis Barnes with the no less
Independent, full-time, Richard O'Brien as Chaiman of the XSC. {54)
The conclusion, therefore, seems inescapable that the response of the
Commission was to lament the fact that it did not have responsibility for
manpower policy, but to proceed as though it did, or at least soon would have.
Its strategy - together with the TSA - was to move swiftly in initiating large
scale research programmes, in particular the collection and coordination of
information about the supply and. demand for manpower, many of which it must
be added disappeared into the mists of time.{55} The intention seems to have
been to build up a degree of competence that would be difficult to rival: if
the Commission did not posess formal or legitimate authority then it the next
best thing was to become the authoritative voice in terms of expertise and
credibility. One of the first problems looming on the horizon had been the
prospect of a continuing rise in the level of unemployment. At its first
neeting the Commission had decided to draw up contingency plans against the
eventuality of a deteriorating employment situation. This was to include
examining the possibilities for accelerating an increase in training; enhancing
nobility; developing special schemes to help redundant workers; and special
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studies of those most likely to be affected, such as school-leavers, older
workers and the disabled.{56) As we have already seen some of these included
areas for which the MSC did not have responsibility. Santosh Nukheriee - with
the assistance of a senior ](SC official - was commissioned to carry out a
study of the likely effects on different groups in the labour market of various
levels of future unemployment, and of the type of policies which might ease
them, The TSA was also concerned about this issue. The programmes contained in
the first five year plan were, as it openly stated, based on the asumption that
unemployment would not rise substantially above then existing levels.
}everthe1ess the Agency was undertaking an "urgent study of action that might
be taken if unemployment levels should rise substantially above present levels,
In such a situation, it would be necessary for the Commission to seek a very
substantial increase in its grant-in-aid in order to take effective action".{7}
The main result of these initiatives was Mukherjee's study which the
Commission decided to publish in order to 'stimulate discussion'.{58) The
pessimistic conclusion was that the extent of future economic growth would be
insufficient to prevent rises in productivity being translated into
unemployment. Further, just as previous high levels of unemployment had not
alleviated the problem of skill shortage, there was no reason to assume that
they would do so in the future unless more was known about the causes of skill
shortages, upon which action could then be based. The report set out to
justify, by reference to costs and savings that would be involved
(psychological, social and economic), firstly the establishment of a programme
of job creation, and secondly a large scale training effort aimed at those
Within the 24 to 5 age group. A memorandum summarising the contingency plans
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was submitted to the Secretary of State at the end of 1974. It was rejected in
June 1975 only to be accepted, despite public expenditure constraints, in
September following the publication of the latest unemployment figures.{59) The
scheme was launched in October 1975 with 30m being provided by the
Government,{60) and was to provide jobs for 15,00 unemployed persons. The Job
Creation Programme (JCP) was administered directly by the Commission. This
was additional to the contingency plans for a series of âpecial training
measures submitted by the Commission (as a result of the TSA study) to the DE
early iii 1975. In the Xarch budget, the Chancellor had made tSOm available for
these schemes, which was then topped up by a further £2lin in the course of
the year. {61) By December 1975, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey
was reported as stating that in the matter of industrial training alone was he
prepared to see an increase in public spending aver the next few years.{62}
Yben the need arose, the MSC/TSA were thus ready with appropriate programmes
for action.
Consequently, by the end of its second year of operation, the 1{SC had: obtained
the agreement of the Secretary of State that the Commission should "be the
main executive body operating in the labour market, develop into an
authoritative centre for information and intelligence on employment matters,
promote an overall manpower strategy and be an important point of influence on
policies directly concerned with the working of the labour market" (even if
these were as yet somewhat vague);{63) taken over new responsibilities with a
concomtant increase in its budget; and begun moving towards developing a
more coordinated organisational structure that seemed to be pointing towards
giving the Commission a greater degree of executive control over the two
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Agencies. This last development was indicated by the creation in late 1975 of
two new senior level posts in the Office of the MSC; those of Director,
anpower Services Commission and Director of Manpower Intelligence and
Planning. The first of these was in some respects a post of responsibility
without power in that it carried no line responsibility in relation to the Chief
Executives of the either the TSA or ESA, but the Director was to report
straight to the XSC Chairman. The function of the Director was a general
coordinating one, plus advising the Commission on resources, the efficient
achievement of the Commission's programmes and directing the programmes for
which the Commission was itself responsible.{64} Despite the lack of executive
authority, the creation of such a post was important in that it may be seen as
a preparatory move in the Commission's plan to tighten overall control and
expand its jurisdiction and functions. Of equal significance was the fact that
the person appointed to the post was John Cassels, until then chief executive
of the TSA. Similarly the Commission's concern that the three organisations
should not be viewed in isolation but as a corporate whole{65) was reinforced
by the innovatory step taken by the new chairman, Richard O'Brien, to institute
a Chairman's Management Committee. As Howels po t nts out, the Committee
'brought together the most senior officials in the MSC under the chairman,
bereas the other Commissioners were not involved In NSC's internal
aianagemetxt and organization, the CMC gave the chairman the opportunity to play
a full part in these jnatters."{66) These preliminary steps were consolidated
when the Commission and Agencies were restructured in April 1978 into a
'single manpower body".{7) The TSA and ESA were abolished as separate
organisations and became executive arms of the Commission with the titles of
Training Services Division (TSD) and Employment Services Division (ESD) . {68)
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COO1IDIATIJG TRAIJLIG POLICY: RELLTIONS BETVEEK TEE TSA AID ITBS
In the foregoing section we examined the development of the wider aims of the
Commission and the TSA. One of the primary purposes behind the creation of
these organisations, however, was to achieve the coordination that had been
implicit in the 1964 Industrial Training Act, but which had failed to
materlalise. We move on in this section, therefore, to consider how wthe TSA
approached this task, which Importantly depended upon the relationship which
was developed between it and the Industrial Training Boards.
The crucial question confronting the TSA and ITBs in respect of their future
relationship was "how to discharge its [TSA's] responsibilities for maintaining
and improving the performance of the Board system and for ensuring that
Exchequer funds are used effectively, while also ensuring that the Boards
continue to have the autonomy necessary to retain authority in their industries
and to pursue particular policies according to the varying needs and
circumstances of their industries."{69) The achievement of such an aim was, in
the view of Geoffrey Holland Director of Planning and Intelligence at the TSA,
"a tremendously difficult job" due to the diverse nature - in terms of
employees and establishments covered, geographical spread, general approaches
to training, and length of experience - of the 23 ITBs. (70) From the outset the
statements of TSA officials can be seen as attempting to quell the fears
(whether rightly or wrongly held is another matter) that TSA control over the
operating costs and the financing of key training activities of ITBs would in
effect mean TSA interference and would weaken the autonomy of boards, making
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them less repsonsible and responsive to their industries. However, although the
potential for TSA intervention clearly existed, such interventions needed to be
structured in such a way that the independence of ITEs was not seen to be
threatened thus resulting in resentment and lack of cooperation with, possibly
even opposition to, TSA's aims.
The TSA clearly wanted to get ITBs on their side: getting off on the 'wrong
foot' with ITBs was something to be avoided due to boards' undoubted capacity
to adversly affect the achievement of TSA goals. Mutual cooperation was,
therefore, likely to be more effective - and less costly - than coercion, So
the emphasis was placed on the TSA's support for the necessity of a relatively
autonomous industry-by-industry approach with the TSA claiming that its
endeavours were to supplement, not supplant, ITB responsibilities. The TSA
envisaged its relationship with boards should develop on the basis of a
'partnership', the keystone of which would be joint TSA/ITB consideration of
the five year plans and budgets of boards. Thus the role of the board, as set
out in the first five year plan, would be to "define their aims explicitly; draw
up programmes for achieving them, with targets stated as clearly as possible;
show the consideration given to the alternative means of accomplishing
objectives; and identify all the resources required for individual programmes
(staff, grants, direct training facilities, etc.)", while the Agency's role was
specified as being "to probe and question in order to clarify the importance
of the priorities selected, to assure itself that the proposed
levy/grant/exemption schemes are appropriate, and to ensure that funds to be
provided by the Agency are used to best effect".{71) Somewhat ominously,
however, the plan went on to remind boards that the TSA now held the purse
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strings by stating that the "probing and questioning role is particularly
necessary because Boards' requests for resources are always likely to exceed
what can be provided.. .and the Agency will therefore always be faced with
choices". {72}
One purpose of the hiving off of employment and training functions under the
Act, as we have already discussed, was to create more accountable, cost
effective, management units. Traditional departmental organisation, it could be
c1aied, due to lack of clarity surrounding separate functions, did not provide
a suitable context within which systems of accountable management could
flourish, On the other hand "Et]he new system of separate, individually
accountable agnecies gives an opportunity to set up clear management
structures with everyone knowing who is responsible for what".C73) Thus, from
the outset the managerial aim of the TSA was to achieve an optimum delegation
of responsibility together with the establishment of objectives and measures
af performance.{74) This meant the organisation of operational plans into
programmes and sub-programmes of activity with the intention of focussing
attention upon outputs against which progress could be measured. Stress was
laid upon building into programmes from the beginning means by which
effective monitoring and evaluation could be carried out.C75) Numerical
indicators of performance were, wherever possible, developed for this purpose
by both TSA and ESA {76) One of the primary objectives of the TSA was to get
ITBs to operate along similar lines, but, as we shall see, not always to great
effect.
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Coordinating the work of ITBs was the responsibility of the Industry Division
of the TSA and was to be achieved through 'Dialogues'. For this purpose four
'dialogue teams' were set up, each broadly responsible for liatng with six
boards. Each team contained four members - a team leader and three others
concerned with finance, training and manpower. One object of establishing this
kind of structure was not only to facilitate a dialogue between an ITB and the
TSA, but -to allow I or cross-fertilisation of ideas and a coordinated approach
between ITBs under the same dialogue team as well as across dialogue teams .The
early importance attached to establishing good relations with the ITBs was
evidenced by the fact that when the dialogue teams were first established TSA
officials underwent a period of training - particularly in planning and
budgeting techniques - which included sessions of simulated discussions with
boards, prior to initiating meetings with ITB staff. And instead of summoning
ITB staff to TSA offices to discuss training plans, TSA staff made a point of
going out to the ITBs, {77) These dialogues then were the main instruments by
which the TSA was to influence the activities of the boards: through the
development of five year plans and systems for monitoring and evaluating their
worlz, the accountability of boards would be increased. And so presumably would
the control exerted by the TSA,
It soon became evident to TSA members of the dialogue teams that the divergent
practices adopted by boards In monitoring and evaluating their programmes did
ot lend themselves to any form of systematic and coherent means whereby
boards' achievements could be assessed.{78) To overcome this, the TSA
recommended in its 1976 strategic review that a Steering Group be established
whose remit would be to oversee work on the development of: "general
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guidelines for monitoring and evaluation of aims and achievements which ITBs
should apply taking into account the different ways in which Boards collect
thforxnation",{79) Henibership of the Steering Group comprised three senior ITB
officers (from the Furniture and Timber, Chemical and Allied Products, and
'iool, Jute and Flax ITBs), TSA officers and the Dean of the Thames Valley
Regional Xanagement Centre. Essentially the group sought to identify (a) the
types of questions that might reasonably be asked by those with an interest in
the performance of ITBs (eg interests within industry, the 1'SC and TSA,
Parliamentary Committees) and (b) the sort of information, or indicators, that
might reasonably be regarded as relevant to those questions. Parallel with this
an experimental and pilot project was undertaken with four ITBs (Air Transport
and Travel, Chemical and Allied Products, Furniture and Timber and Engineering,
although the last of these did not complete the project) to determine how they
monitored achievements and the extent to which criteria for judging
effectiveness had been developed. The project was iot however,concerned with
the effectiveness of ITBs insofar as programmes of activity to achieve agreed
objectives were not subject to question, nor was it concerned to assess the
validity of ITBS' monitored data. The categories of data that were examined
were ITBs':{80)
- objectives;
- programmes;
- monitoring systems;
- data obtained from monitoring;
- evaluation systems;
- criteria of effectiveness employed;
- extent to which expenditure could be related to
achievements;
- ITB views about limitations of monitoring and evaluation
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An initial difficulty with the pilot project was that some "quite serious
communication problems have been experienced in carrying out this work which
stens from a lack of common understanding of the meaning of "monitoring" and
"evaluation" in relation to the work of ITBs" The TSA Survey Unit therefore
spent some time clarifying the definition of these and other terms (such as
'policy',	 'aim',	 'objective'	 (strategic,	 operational)	 and	 'criteria	 of
effectiveness'), but noted that while "the definitions reflect the views of
different ITBs, and of different individuals within an ITB, they are not
necessarily acceptable to each of the three ITBs, nor necessarily are they the
definitions to be used In the remaining stages of the project". (81) Clearly,
anbiguity or disagreement about definitions would make it difficult to
construct a framework that would erve as a basis for providing comparative
assessments of ITB operations.
The result of these studies nonetheless was the issuing of 'Guidelines for the
Xonitoring and Evaluation of ITBs' (reproduced as Appendix 1) which were to
form the basic framework for Dialogue Teams' and ITBs' discussions on future
plans and monitoring and evaluation arrangements. Despite these endeavours,
however, the general impression gained - particularly from discussions with
some of those involved in the development of the guidelines - was that whIl5t
In theory boards regarded such procedures as having some validity, In practIce
they remained to be convinced. The comments from boards indicate that the
guidelines were acceptable only if certain qualifications or limitations were
held to apply. For instance, the Furniture and Timber ITB (one of the 'pilot'
boards) commented that assessment of training standards was limited, by: the
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15 month review visit cycle of a training adviser and the two yearly visit of
a claims examiner; restrictions placed upon the board since 1971 in the
collection of basic data about manpower and training in their industries; lack
of information regarding economic and environmental trends, and productivity,
profitability and labour turnover in their industries; the extra cost involved
in certain of the monitoring activities; and the 'irreducible element' of
subjectivity In certain measures.{82) Other, more general comments made the
point that the guidelines would need to be used by individual boards in ways
approporiate to them and that as it was often difficult to isolate the outcome
of an ITB intervention it was essential that exchanges of information took
place on methods found to be effective. (83) It would seem that although the
guidelines remained operational there was a gradual acceptance that achieving
a consistent and coherent approach to monitoring and evaluation was unlikely.
For instce in the 1977 Review and Plan it was acknowledged that the 'TSA had
hoped that.. .the introduction of levy exemption.. .for firms meeting their own
training needs would provide one measure of progress, namely the extent to
which exemption was granted Experience to date suggests however that it will
be virtually impossible to isolate exemption from any other measures
available..."{84) And two years later, John Cassels was admitting that "there
are some programmes which, with the best will in the world, it is exceedingly
difficult to subject to monitoring In numerical terms, For example, the impact
of Industrial Training Boards on their industries to a considerable extent
sinply does not lend itself to this, and one is then driven back on a more
qualitative approach". {85}
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Some of those interviewed by the author, and who had been involved at various
times in the dialogue process {86) were generally of the opinion that their
utilItSj - where any was acknowledged - was extremely limited. One TSA
official, who was responsible for advising the dialogue teams on ITB research
activities claimed that board staff were, on the whole, reluctant to follow the
advice and recommendations of the TSA. This did not seem to manifest itself in
overt hostility on the part of board staff but rather in paying 'lip service'
to the procedural rules, and thereafter carrying on much as before.{87} The
ITBs it seems exhibited a degree of suspicion about MSC/TSA involvement in
their work and in general guarded their independence. For many board staff
their survival was largely dependent upon their being seen as part of and
valuable to the economic well-being of their industries as perceived mainly by
employers, and not as instruments of state intervention under the control of a
central organisation. This probably became more pronounced as criticisms of
the rapid expansion - in terms of staff, budget and functions - of the XSC
began to mount during the late 1970s.{88) On the other hand, ITB staff were
fairly cynical about the way in which the dialogue teams operated, although one
person commented that as the teams did not seem to have any clear cut remit
It was somewhat difficult to criticise them for not doing their job as no-one
was really sure what it was intended to be, It was also claimed that, contrary
to one of the supposed functions of the dialogue teams, TSA officials did not
pass information from one board to another.{89) Many of the comments were
critical of the lack of expertise exhibited by TSA staff which seemed to
derive from their civil service, ie non-training background. {90}
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However valid the difficulties inherent in constructing effective systems of
ionitoring and evaluation, and however valid the criticisms of the TSA, it
effectively meant that board staff viewed the dialogue process as at best of
limited value and at worst as something that diverted boards' concentration
from their industries. There was clearly a lack of communication - one board
official for instance claimed that there had only been four meetings between
the board and the dialogue team during the previous two years (1977/76) -
which surely limited the ability of the TSA to influence board decisions.
Indeed none of the board staff interviewed allowed for the possibility that
there had been any significant loss of board's autonomy to establish its own
policies. However, on another issue a number of board officers did feel that
there was undue interference in their ability to control the pay, conditions of
service and appointment of staff, which largely came through pressures from
the Treasury and Civil Service Department (CSD). Certainly the CSD seems to
have interpreted its role in rendering ITBs publicly accountable in a much
more detailed manner than was enviseged under the 1973 Act. This view is
supported by Jordan's comment that "[tlhe report of a Civil Service College
forum.. .stated that since units would not be accountable to the same extent to
Parliament, people could be encouraged to contact Chief Executives direct
rather than through parent Departments".{91) This was an issue that caused not
a little resentment. Overall, it would seem that where influence was being
brought to bear on ITBs it was in the areas of pay, staffing and so on. Little
Influence seems to have been exerted in relation to the main function of
boards, that of improving training effectiveness. ITBs were thus being rendered
accountable in management, but not policy terms.
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The evidence suggests that almost from the outset there existed some inter-
organisational tension between the staff of ITBs and the TSA. But despite this
those board staff who were interviewed did not feel overly constrained in
their decision making, at least iii relation to training, by the influence
brought to bear by TSA staff, There are likely to be two reasons for this -
although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first, and most
obvious, is that boards possessed sufficient autonomy to be able to disregard
or give less weighting to the priorities established by the TSA where these
were seen to conflict with boards' (ie industry) interests. The second is that
the TSA was content to leave boards to establish their own priorities as long
as they could account for their actions. The evidence does not suggest that the
latter was, in fact, altogether the case. Given this situation, as the MSC/TSA
became increasingly concerned with the development of a national manpower
strategy it was important that the work of the ITBs should fit into the
national pattern and early XSC/TSA documents stressed this.{92) Ve should,
however, be wary of concluding that the influence of the TSA completely
insignificant as there are certain indications to the contrary which were also
- though generally obliquely - alluded to by some of the ITB staff. One senior
official of the Chemical ITB represented the changing priorities of ITBs during
the previous ten or so years by reference to dIagrams 1 and 2. These it was
claimed showed how boards' activities had changed over the previous decade,
inter alia due to formal changes in training policy and the activities and
priorities adopted by the NSC/TSA.
These diagrams demonstrate that, even if a somewhat narrow coneption of the
rationale for ITBs was adopted - viz that they existed to serve the training
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Diagram 1
ITBs' Dominant Priorities 1964-78
100	 Industry	 National	 Young
1964	 1973	 1978
Diagram 2
Dominant Organisational Issues
100 Levy/grant	 Training	 Levy	 Mannower
1964	 1970	 1972	 1974	 1976	 1978
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needs of the firms within their industries - they were operating in and
influenced by a much wider environment than that of the firms within their
sectors. This environment indeed extended beyond that of the 1'SC/TSA.
According to certain ITB officials the organisations that could be considered
to be part of an ITB's environment from an 'influencing standpoint' would
include the TUC and the CBI, trade associations and individual firms, trade
unions, educational establishments, professional institutes, DE/DES/SED,
gover.nment bodies such as the Itealth and. Safety Executive and the NEDC as
well as its Economic Development Committees, and the media.{93} In other words,
ITBs were subject to a wide range of different and at time conflicting
pressures and influences. Nevertheless, what is at issue is whether, even in
spite of different sources of pressures, the aggregate of boards' activities
was being perceived by the TSA as operating so as to secure the "development
of industry-wide training needs and also of national training priárlties".{94)
The short answer seems to be that they were perceived not to be. If such was
the case, then in order to secure the achievement of national objectives two
possible options would appear to suggest themselves. Either, the TSA could
exert greater effort and resources in seeking to ensure ITBs' compliance, or
the TSA could itself attempt to more directly influence the realisation of
industry-wide arid national training objectives and needs. Whilst encouraging
boards to take a strategic view of the training needs of their industries the
evidence does indicate that TSA officials were unconvinced that ITBs were the
appropriate instruments for securing national training objectives - or even
industry-wide objectives - as over a decade of ITB activity had apparently
done little to alleviate severe shortages of key skills in the labour market.
Thus the second option of more direct TSA involvement was the one that was,
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fairly early on, adopted. For evidence of this we therefore turn to examine in
the final section the development of the 'Training for Skills ' programme. Our
objective here, however, is twofold. Firstly to demonstrate that within the
overall context of industrial training policy, the activities of ITBs were
becoming increasingly marginal, and secondly to provide an analysis of the
processes by which the Kanpower Services Commission determined the direction
that training policy took.
TRAIffIJG FOR (VITAL] SKILLS
Some of the tensions that we have identified as existing between the TSA and
ITBs can be related to the gradual, but significant shift in emphasis, that
began to occur in industrial training policy from around 1975. This
represented a move away from the importance attached to industry based
training towards greater weighting being given to a developing a national
training system. In two major areas of the Commissions operations - TOPS and
training for the needs of industry - the provision of more training in key
skills, particularly to meet wider economic objectives was increasingly
stressed. One of the first major initiatives in this direction was the attempt
by the TSA to establish a programme of training for vital skills. This section
is concerned to examine the fate of this initiative and the reasons why it
failed to get off the ground and was replaced by a 'watered down' version of
the original. It additionally sheds some light upon our earlier discussion of
the nature of the 1(SC relating to the extent to which we might characterise it
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as a corporatist body - in terms not simply of its institutional
characteristics, but of its decision making processes.
The proposals contained in a consultative document Training for Vital Skills,
published in mid-1976,{95) had their origin in a TSP document published a year
earlier, Vocational Preparation for Young People.{96} This document was also
concerned with inadequacies in vocational preparation for young people and
contributed to the establishment of Unified Vocational Preparation pilot
schemes run jointly by the DES and TSA. The arguments contained in Training
for Vital Skills in respect of the definition of the training problem -
shortages of key skilled workers particularly during periods of economic
upturn constraining economic expansion - together with its causes - poaching
and cutbacks during recessions - were little different to those that held
currency prior to the passage of the 1964 Industrial Training Bill. The 1964
solution was however now regarded as inadequate in that "although it provided
a mechanism for relieving individual employers of at least part of the cost of
training. ..it did not provide a means by which the training boards could ensure
that overall levels of recruitment into an industry were sufficient to meet the
industry's long-term needs." But even more importantly, N(tihe Employment and
Training Act 1973 offers little promise of an improvement in the propects for
long-term training in transferable skills". (97) Although discussion of the
causes of skill shortages was by 1976 much more sophisticated than it had
been in the early 1960s,{98) Training for Vital Skills concluded that "[t]here
is good reason to believe that, taking all employers together, industry has
never provided as much training in vital skills as the economy requires."{99)
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In fact a number of initiatives had been taken by governments since 1971
whereby funds had been channelled through ITBs to finance the initial stages
of transferable skill training - in other words to maintain apprenticeship
recruitment above the level where employers who engaged in training were
meeting their own needs.{100) Such an approach however was seen to offer only
marginal benefits and could not permanently ensure stability in intakes.
InTrain1n' for Vital Skills it was in consequence argued that the best way of
overcoming existing Inadequacies in training young people in transferable
skills was to remove - in part or full - individual employers' obligation to
meet the cost of training. This could be achieved through some kind of
collective funding arrangement from which employers would be refunded the cost
of providing tranferable skills training for the initial period,{1O1}
Training for Vital Skills therefore, clearly represented a move to introduce a
major change in the framework for industrial training provision. It may
certainly be regarded as a serious proposal for overcoming skill shortages by
tackling what, in effect, was viewed as a root cause of the problem - financial
contraints in terms of employers' continued reluctance to adequately invest in
training. While designed to increase and maintain the level of transferable
skills training there can be discerned a consistency In the standards
underlying this and earlier training policy initiatives, For instance, it did
not challenge but re-affirmed the principle of industry's responsibility for
training provision.{102} However, It also reaffirmed earlier assumptions that
the amount of training provided by industry had considerably "fallen short of
real needs"{103) and that a crucial factor in achieving future economic growth
would be an increase in the available stock of such skills,{104) such an
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increase being an essential component of the Government's industrial
strategy. (105) Vhilst the standard governing the division of responsibility
between the state and employers for the provision of training was therefore
still being adhered to - further increases in TOPS training were not up for
consideration{106) - the role of the state, or its agencies, was thought to
require enhancement in terms of its capacity to coordinate, direct and shape
the training system. The TSA's role in this respect would have been
considerably enlarged: although not effectively challenging the position of
ITBs, the TSA/ITB relationship would have been significantly altered due to
the more specific nature of the functions that ITBs would be performing on
behalf of the TSA. ITBs would have become more akin to agents of the centre.
For example, an important element of Training for Vital Skills would be the
establishment of national targets for occupational entry, derived from
appraisals of local labour market needs. Boards would then be required to
enter into 'training contracts' with the TSA covering occupational targets and
the size of the collective fund; individual boards would then enter 'training
contracts' with individual employers specifying the number of trainees to be
recruited and other relevant matters. There was, however, Just over 40% of
industries and sectors of employment that lay outside the scope of ITBs. It
was here that the role of the TSA was set to expand most significantly for it
would need to take on additional functions that elsewhere were performed by
the boards. Such an expansion did of course have expenditure implications but
the cynical view might be taken that no additional net administrative costs
would be involved due to a trade-off between the TSA and the Treasury: it was
proposed that the operational costs of boards should be returned to industry.
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Ie can therefore state that broadly similar standards arid objectives underlay
the proposals in Training for Vital Skills as those that had shaped previous
policy initiatives. We can, however, identify some differences in the weighting
attached to theni. For instance prime importance was still placed upon the
desirability of industry determining its own training needs, but with the state
having a coordinating role to influence training levels to meet national
manpower requirements. However, having - formally in 1973 but earlier in
practice - abandoned the standard that training costs should be equitably
distributed, together with a downgrading of the standard that influence should
be brought to bear through a system of financial incentives and penalties,
such standards were once again being applied in the face of continuing skills
shortages. What, in effect, was being acknowledged was that the changes
introduced under the 1973 Employment and Training Act had failed to resolve
the training problem. In which case a radically different solution was being
put forward,
There had, in fact, been some indications of support for the type of solution
proposed - ie collective funding - following publication of Vocational
Preparation for Young People but these could. not - carrectl as it turned out
- be taken for granted as far as the present proposals were concerned. Thus
the document commented that the scheme "could not work without the
understanding and support of all those concerned with and for training.. .These
proposals are therefore put forward as a basis for consultation, and without
any commitment to the introduction of the scheme."{107)
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In common with the consultative document Training for the Future, Ti-a ining for-
Vital Skills produced almost universal disapprobation: but this time it seems,
because the proposals were too radical. Comments were received from some 500
organisations C108) and it was only the TUG - and to some extent educational
interests - that were generally supportive of the recommendations, regarding
them as a first step to a coherent policy on vocational preparation for young
people.C109) The main weight of opinion, however, was firmly against on the
grounds that increasing the supply of young people into long term training
occupations was not the most significant factor in overcoming skills
shortages. Various organisations pointed to the importance of other factors:
pay and status; restrictive practices; the efficient use of manpower and
retention of skilled workers.{110)
The majority of ITBs were obviously concerned that the implementation of
collective funding would seriously jeopardise their relations with firms due to
the additional financial and administrative costs involved. This was especially
so in relation to the proposals for returning boards' operating costs to
industry. Thus as the Food, Drink and Tobacco ITB stated "public funding has
led to greatly improved relationships with industry. The removal of the cost
factor has freed companies to seek advice more openly and thus for the Board
to achieve more progress. Reversion to industry funding would be damaging to
this improved relationship."{lll) Boards generally accepted the need for more
training in vital skills - perhaps naturally enough as this would increase
their own spheres of activity - but were opposed to the means put forward,
suggesting instead that there was sufficient scope under the 1973 Act to
achieve such an objective.
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The maui opposition, however, to collective funding came from employers. The
CBI's stated position bad in fact shifted ground considerably. Following
publication of Vocational Preparation for Young People the CBI reported that
there was "considerable support, In principle, from employers for the concept,
subject to a number of reservations" Following publication of Training for
Vital Skills, however, there was "now little support and much criticism for the
concept of collective funding."{112) The reasons for the hardening of attitude
on the part of the CBI were that, whilst collective funding may have been
acceptable in principle, as worked out, the details were unpalatable to the
vast majority of CBI members. In particular, the greatest hostility came from
engineering employers,{113) - clearly a key factor in view of the strategic
position of engineering in the provision of transferable skills training. In
addition to some of other factors mentioned above, what seems to have been
behind the employers' opposition was a fear that such a system would have
opened the way for a greater degree of Intervention by the state in the
affairs of industry coupled with an increasingly bureaucratic, Having managed
to get rid of some of the more 'bureaucratic' elements of training intervention
after 1973, the prospect of its return was not greeted with enthusiasm.
The proposals for collective funding were therefore dropped, as were those on
the funding of ITB operating costs, in the main due to opposition from
employers - but also apparently in the light of views expressed by the
chairmen of a number of ITBs. It was the view of some board officials{114)
that at least some of the opposition from boards arose because of the 'high
handed' manner of the TSA which had not discussed the issues with boards
before publication of the consultative document. Thereafter, according to John
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Golding,{115) at the time a junior minister at the DE with responsibility for
training, talks were held directly between the DE and ITB chairmen (which it
appears was not popular with senior TSA officials); five of these boards were
'extremely well led' and their views were crucial.{11) Despite the opposition
to collective funding, there was nonetheless general support for action to
tackle skill shortages. The DE and. the NSC were anxious to 'maintain the
momentum' and in consequence established a Task Group chaired by the
Commission's Chairman, including representatives of trade unions, employers arid
ITBs, and education, as well as TSA officials. Its - extremely broad - terms of
reference were:
uTo consider the range of possibilities for action which would help
to ease the problems ensuing from skill sliortages;to examine in
particular the extent to which training measures and financial
mechanisms can play a part in maintaining an adequate skilled
workforce; and to pay special attention to the systematic
recruitment of young people."
The outcome - some eighteen months after the publication of the consultative
document - was Training for Skills: A Programme for Act.Ion{117} published in
December 1977 .The report set out three main aims which may be summarised as
follows:
a) alleviating serious skill imbalances;
b) ensuring that recruitmeflt into long term training occupations
remains at a level required by long term economic needs;
c) securing reforms in the patterns of industrial training
necesssary to meet the needs of industry and individuals,
The implementation of the programme was to be achieved through:
a) the preparation of manpower plans by industry and commerce,
supported by ITBs or other organisations;
b) XSC action to meet cross-sectoral needs;
C) the identification by ITBs of areas where additional help is
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required to meet key training objectives;
d) the provision of funds where needed by the MSC.
The 1TBs were asked to submit their proposals for action to the 1{SC by the
autumn of 1978, for Implementation In autumn the following year.
In one sense this document was more 'revolutionary'{118) in that it challenged
the basis of the existing apprenticeship system by effectively calling for an
end to time-serving as a basis for skilled status, and for it to be replaced
by agreed standards arid flexibility on age of entry.{119} However, in practice,
there was little or no strucural change required, and there were no mechanisms
built into the programme to ensure that the behaviour af those most closely
involved with the delivery of transferable skills training - notably employers
and employees - would conform to that required for the achievement of the
programme's objectives. And as we shall see in later chapters the objectives
set out in Training for Skills, in particular as they relate to the reform of
the apprenticeship system, remained largely unfulfilled, although the
engineering industry did make a more determined effort in this dIerction, At
the same time that the Task Group was cogitiating upon the Training for Skills
issues, the Engineering ITB - mainly at the behest of its Chairman, Hugh
Scanlon, and Director, J Xoon - set up its own working party, the membership
of which overlapped with that of the Task Group. The product of the working
party's deliberations was the Board's Information Paper ITo. 49 (IF 49){120)
which proposed a new form of apprenticeship system based upon modules (121)
and which incorporated standards and off-the-job-training into tests of
coinpetence.{122) Some seven years later, however, it was acknowledged that
little progress had been made in implementing IP 49.(123)
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It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in essence the Training for
Skills report was little wore than a call for a wore systematic approach to
training, where everyone was encouraged to do what they were already doing,
but to do it more effectively. But it was also a reflection of the belief that
in those areas where private interests have the main responsibility for 'policy
delivery' then their agreement to what is being proposed is necessary to
provide a basis for subsequent action, No such agreement was forthcoming on
Training for Vital Skills. On the other hand all the interests could agree on
the Training for Skills programme: the important question, however, was
whether they could, and would, deliver.
A NATIONAL TRAINING SYSTEX?
There are a number of developments that we can identify from the foregoing
study of the 1(30 and TSA/TSD during this period. The first is that there was
now a clear central focus for the initiation and development of manpower
policy, and training in particular. Industrial training now had a national
agency seeking to give direction and greater authority to the development of a
coherent training system. Indeed, the 'dominant' role that the MSC secured in
the development of manpower policy was greater than that envisaged under the
1973 Employment and Training Act. In organisational terms the NSC expanded
rapidly in terms of size, budget and functions, and by the time of its
reorganisation in 1978 may be said to have achieved its aspiration of becoming
the authoritative voice in manpower policy. Total 1(30 expenditure increased
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from l25 million in 1975 to 61l million in 1980, and table 6.1 sets out the
proportion of this devoted to training services and special programmes.
TABLE 6.1
Training Services and Special Programmes Expenditure: 1975-1980
Meeting the training 	 Meeting the training 	 Special
needs of industry (1) 	 needs of individuals (2)	 programmes (3)
	
'000s	 '000s	 '000s
1975	 14,405	 67,266	 -
1976	 49,069	 -	 116,548	 30,000
1977	 68.120	 182.900	 38,000
1978	 90,000	 194,000	 95,400
1979	 99,200	 210,600	 161,700
1980	 97,700	 221,500	 197,000
(1) Includes operating costs of ITEs and grants for training schemes
(2)TOPS, including training in skilicentres, other institutions, fees and
allowances.
(3) Includes Job creation, Special Temporary Allowance, Community Industry, and
Youth Opportunities Programme
Source: MSC Annual Reports
One palpable reason for this growth was the worsening economic and employment
conditions from September 1975 onwards that resulted in the establishment of
special measures to combat unemployment. But two other reasons are also
important. Firstly, given that the MSC had been created to tackle the problems
of a training system that was perceived not to be operating at an optimal
level, there was an internal logic to the l'tSC's claim that to effectively
perform its functions there was a need to widen its spheres of responsibility.
Despite the increasing importance given to social objectives during this
period, the importance attached by the MSC - or more particularly the TSA - to
economic objectives with the emphasis upon adjusting the supply of labour <the
sovereignty of demand tended to be taken for granted) remained paramount.{124)
And secondly, from the beginning both the Commission and the TSA operated to
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apply considerable, and ultimately successful, pressure on the DE - or more
particularly Ministers - to enhance their roles.
Nevertheless, such an expansion - relatively speaking - was more in form than
in substance. The reason being that the agencies were operating under a number
of constraints, some of which had been around since the 1960s and beyond. Four
are important in this context. Firstly the MSC and TSA were formulating
proposals and taking decisi.ons within the framework o the same standards
regarding the division of responsibility between the state and the private
sector that had provided the framework for previous policy initiatives.
Although in general the boundary between public and private was now less clear
cut,{i25) in the field of industrial training it was still firmly held that the
main responsibility for the provision of training resided with industry.
Secondly, due to the adherence to this standard, what the 1973 Act established
was an agency that gave greater direction and impetus nationally to training
policy, but did not overcome the constraints imposed by the need to obtain the
consent and support of producer groups for training initiatives. Thirdly, the
MSC was subject to constraints imposed by its sponsoring department - the DE,
in that the Minister did retain ultimate control for its actions and decisions
affecting the division of responsibilities between the DE and MSC, although as
we have seen the balance shifted in the NSC's favour during this period.
Finally there were limitations upon the MSC's ability to develop a coherent
manpower policy which derived from the departmental division of responibility
for training that pre-dated and post-dated the MSC's establishment. The
functions given to the 1(SC were those that had previously only resided with
the DE. Thus for example, in the area of job creation the MSC's competence was
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limited to the creation of temporary measures - long term 'job creation' rested
with the Department of Industry through the operation of the Industry Act,{126)
Further, the 1975 Industry Act - through Planning Agreements - gave the Dol
powers to enter into training agreements with companies, Thus at this time we
cannot conclude that in this area there existed a coherent policy: indeed it
was unlikely to exist given that there was a split between the DE and Dol with
no ]Jason at all on these issues.{127)
Picking up on our earlier discussion about whether or not the MSC can be
regarded as a corporatist agency the evidence does not suggest that it can be
'unambiguousiy' characterised as such. Clearly the SC was a different type of
organisation and in terms of training there was now a different kind of body
in the driving seat, But it was not a body that was able to dramatically alter
the course of training policy. Of greater significance from our point of view
is not whether the 1tSC was corporatist or not, but the implications that the
existence of this 'new type' of body had for the development of industrial
training policy. One fact that seems to emerge, however, is that operating
within such a structure, the peak organisations did generate a fair amount of
agreement over training issues and came to form a more solid, tightly knit
training community at the national level. For example, Xichael Bury of the CBI
and Ken Graham of the TUG, were said to have formed an 'unofficial committee'
to discuss issues outside the NSC.-C128) The TUC certainly believed that the
Commission had generated a "high level of consensus" on training objectives at
the national level.{129) It is likely that acting in dual roles - representative
and executive - made the reaching of agreements easier than if such groups had
been acting in a representative capacity only. Where agreement is being sought
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to decisions through the 'normal' departmental consultative process positions
are more likely to remain entrenched than in a situation where such groups
have the additional responsibility of reaching and executing decision. In such
a position the representative role is likely to be watered down. Even so, this
will not always apply, as our examination of the Training for Vital Skills
issue has demonstrated, disagreements clearly existed which were based upon
individual or self regarding interests, and which were pursued at the expense
of national considerations. Thus it might be argued that the consensus that
existed in training in the late 1970s was simply the old consensus of the
1950s and 1960s writ large. It was not, in other words, the type of consensus
that in the main generated the kind of public regarding decisions that
government was looking for. The emphasis still rested upon the primacy of the
pursuit of self interest.
CCNCLUS IONS
As the XSC expanded and consolidated its role in labour market policy then,
there was a discernable shift in the balance of the relationship between the
Commission and the DE, If there was any doubt in 1974, there was no room for
doubt by 1978, that the NSC was not simply an administrative arm of the
department but was a highly independent source of external pressure on the DE
with the ability to take and carry through its initiatives, This was not purely
to do with the taking over of more functions from the Department although this
was important. The Commission and Agencies possessed two key resources which
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they came to deploy to considerable effect. These were firstly the level of
information, analytic capacity and expertise which were built up and which
gradually placed the Ririister and Department in a more dependent position vis
a v.is the Commission. And secondly the capacity of the Commission to generate
agreement and thus the support of key producer groups, in particular in
relation to the status of the organisation, thereby making it difficult for the
Department to effectively challenge XSC initiatives.
There is, however, one important qualification that should be made to the
above. This has to do with how much control over labour market policy actually
resided in the Commission qua Commission. As far as the Commission itself was
concerned, apart from its Chairman, the Commissioners were part-time members,
meeting on average once every four weeks. With the best will in the world it is
difficult to imagine that the members could have a thorough grasp of the
activities of its executive agencies (later Divisions) let alone be in a
position of strength to guide the direction of policy. In other words, the
Commission was heavily dependent upon the permanent officials for advice and
guidance - a situation not unlike the normal Departmental ?inisterial, civil
service relationship. The development of industrial training policy, it is
claimed, was largely the product of officials within the TSA/TSD, In one very
important respect such officials were now better placed to influence and shape
policy, being freer from the normal. Hinisterial constraints and other
Departmental pressures. Clearly this has to be balanced by the fact that they
were less independent from, indeed more accountable to, representative
interests than in normal departmental consultations and in that sense they
were operating under different constraints. But It Is held that whilst the
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balance was different, this did not amount to a fundamental difference in the
ability of permanent officials to have a significant impact upon training
policy. If anything, the independent status of the TSA - particularly in its
early years - enhanced their influence. We might indeed posit that whereas
private interests had been given a public role in this area, so public
interests (permanent officials) had been - perhaps unwittingly - through the
creation of a semi-independent agency given a semi-private role in their
ability to act as an 'outside' source of pressure.
Finally, the establishment of the 1'!SC clearly changed the nature of the
relationship between ITBs and the centre. Despite TSA statements to the
contrary, there is an evident contrast with the situation in the 1960s when
ITBs were virtually left to themselves to secure their objectives, a situation
which in fact had produced the difficulties that the 1973 Act was designed to
overcome. There was now a different framework and a different emphasis and
ITBs were being 'trawled in' to be used as instruments of national training
policy. This created tensions between ITBs and the TSA, which is illustrated by
the comment of one ITB Director that: "Training Boards welcomed the concept of
the MSC, a powerful central body to act as the instrument to establish a
national strategy. One of the problems arising out of a lational Tra.nng
Policy is that, aside from the fact that it does not always match up to the
needs of the nation, it rarely matches the needs of individual industries."{130)
What therefore we are claiming is that at the national level the creation of an
independent and authoritative agency was a significant change in the area of
inc\tirial training policy. But training does not take place at the national
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level, it takes place at the level of the firm. The question that remains to be
answered therefore is how far the training system, as it existed by 1978, was
able to influence the activities of those concerned with training below the
national level. As the history of Training for- Vital Skills and Training for
Skills would indicate, the grasp of the centre was not terribly strong. Ta go
some way towards answering this question therefore, it is necessary to examine
training activity at the level of the firm in order to make an assessment of
the impact that the training system had where it counted - within the firm.
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So far we have examined industrial training policy as it has developed from
its inception and through a number of stages that have modified the original
structures and arrangements for the achievement of wider national objectives.
These objectives are summarised as adjusting the supply of labour to meet
demand so as to enhance the attainment of wider economic goals. Fundamentally,
industrial training policy was attempting to do two things. Not only was it,
through the policy instruments we have discussed, attempting to change the
behaviour of private actors, it ' as also attempti to create a cltat% ot
environment where such behaviour became more or less autonomously generated.
In other words, the long-term aim was the establishment of a dynamic 'virtuous
training circle'. Industrial training policy was premised on the assumption
that there was a national training need, the meeting of which would provide
collective benefits but that at present firms were not meeting this need. In
crude terms the suggestion is that business in general does not recognise what
is in its own best Interest, and policy initiatives are directed towards
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securing a recognition of this, followed by the appropriate action. What seems
to be missing from this is any clear-cut or logical reasons why firms should
change their behaviour to fit in with wider national objectives. There are a
range of factors influencing firms' decisions about training. To be effective,
in its own terms, therefore, the policy had to address the most important
factors, to the approp'ri ate degree, and also recognise the farm in which these
factors were inter-connected. What, as our discussion in previous chapters
indicates, is that the policy was addressing only a limited range of these
factors. An implicit assumption of the policy was that financial incentives and
penalties together with the 'educative' role of the ITBs would be sufficient.
Therefore a fundamental question about training policy and its implementation
is how far cost factors were amongst those which were predominant in
influencing firms' decisions on training. Or put another way, was the policy
targeted correctly?
The tenor of much of the implementation literature is to see the difficulties
of implementation in terms of the resistance or non-compliance of iniplementers
and target groups. However, training not only confers benefits at the national
level, it is obviously necessary and beneficial to Individual firms and firms
will not simply refuse to undertake training far the sake of it. Thus we must
look beyond the possibility of non-compliance to the issue of the
compatibility of the logic contained within national training policy and the
logic by which individual firms address questions of training. How far was the
'implementation gap', in fact based upon different perceptions of the nature of
training problems and their possible remedy held by national policy makers and
individual firms. Further, we must also consider the efficacy of implementing a
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policy which has regulatory and educative strands to it, particularly where the
same agencies have this dual role. The question arises as to whether the
performance of these two roles may generate tensions and indeed to some
degree cancel each other out. At a basic level this raises the matter of
whether regulators make good educators - and vice versa - and how far they
are seen as such by those they seek to influence in this way.
Bearing these points in mind what we are going to look at in this chapter is
the position of the firm in industrial training and the impact that policy was
having upon this. This chapter is based upon two detailed case studies of the
chemical and pottery industries which were conducted primarily between 1978-
1980, but with some follow-up interviews conducted in later years. The
principal aim of these case studies was to assess, after due time, the
implementation of the training policy that emerged in 1973, and provides a
complementary study to the examination of the evolution of policy at the
national level by examining the impact of that policy upon two sectors. The
information gathered was both qualitative and quantitative. This chapter will
draw largely upon the qualitative material to make an evaluation about what
was 'going on'. The quantitative material has been used to support and verify
the qualitative, particularly to take account of inevitable variations in
perceptions amongst participants. So, for example, when a spokesperson for a
company claimed to be carying out extensive trai.ning - and quite genuinely
perceived this to be the case - such claims could be given greater validity by
reference to such quantitative measures as training schedules, plans and costs.
Although most of the information was derived from a standard schedule of
questions (see Appendix 1) put to management and training staff, additional
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information was gathered from other persons with an interest and knowledge in
training such as shop stewards, training instructors and trainees themselves.
Again such information was used to support and broaden the overall picture
built up from official company spokespeople. Finally Information was also
obtained - both to widen and to provide comparisons - from officials and
members of the relevant training boards. One further point needs to be made in
relation to the data. For the most part reference is made to the 'views' of
firms as though there existed a unanimity of opinion. Obviously there were
differences in perception and opinion amongst the personnel concerned with
training. However, In the main, given our present concerns it has not been
necessary to afford much attention to such differences. This is because firstly
we are concerned with the relationship between firm and board and whilst
disagreements within the firm may impinge upon this relationship, internal
decision making and conflict resolution within the firm can be held to precede
firm-board interaction. VhIle it is not denied that internal conflict may
affect the firm's training decisions our primary interest Is In the impact of
policy upon these decisions, not the internal decision making of firms. In any
case the evidence In the case studies suggests that even where internal
disagreement existed, the firm presented what amounted to a unified face to
the board, Therefore, what was attempted was to aggregate or 	 t'm
general stance of the firm.
The chapter begins with a brief survey of the two industries, followed by a
consideration of the structure and priorities of the two relevant ITBs: the
Chemical and Allied Products Industry Training Board arid the Ceramics, Glass
and Mineral Products Industry Training Board. Thereafter we move on to
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consider firms' attitudes towards training and the extent to which this was
affected by the the ITBs and/or other factors. An important consideration here
is the image that firms had of the board and the board/firm relationship. From
there an assessment is made of the extent to which boards bad an impact upon
the amount and standard of training undertaken by firms insofar as this was
(a) directed towards meeting the needs of the firm and (b) meeting wider
industry or national needs.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TO INDUSTRIES
The Chemical Industry
The chemical industry occupies an important strategic position in the UK
economy. A relatively new and growing industry, by 1977 it employed around 5
per cent of all those in UK manufacturing and had a capital spending
programme accounting for some 15 per cent of the total of all manufacturing
industry.Cl) And the index of production for the chemicals sector for the years
1970-76 was 28 per cent as against 3 per cent for all manufacturing industry,
with nearly one-third of its production being exported.{2) Although for most of
the 1960s and early 1970s labour productivity in the '3K chemicals sector
compared unfavourably with five major Western European couiitries, it did fare
better than most other manufacturing sectors in the UK. And it was only in the
UK chemicals and textiles sectors that there was, in fact, a faster overall
rise in the rate of growth of labour productivity for the period 1969-73 than
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in the other EEC countries.<3) in terms of the Standard Industrial
Classification the chemicals sector comprised: general chemicals (inorganic);
general chemicals <organic); miscellaneous general chemicals; res iris, plastics
and synthetic rubber; dyestuffs and pigments; fertilisers; explosives.
At the time of our study, the industry comprised around 3,000 manufacturing
companies employing some 430,000 people.{4) The number of these that came
within the leviable category covered by the Chemical and Allied Products
Industry Training Board (CAP/ITB) (at 1 April 1978) was 450 employers with
1,264 establishments and 219,000 employees, whose distribution by size was:{5)
330<73%)	 small firms	 (200 or less)	 13,700 employees
85(19%)	 medium firms	 (201 to 1000)	 41,400 employees
35 (8%)	 large firms	 (greater than 1000)	 164,600 employees
From the above figures it can readily be seen that the industry is dominated
by a small number of major firms, of which ICI is the largest. It has, for
instance been estimated that ICI produces some 35 per cent of the total output
f the chemicals sector.{6)
Similarly, as far as employer representation is concerned the Industry is
dominated by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA). Formed in 1965, the
CIA is both a trade association and an employers' organisation{7) which, in
addition to individual companies also organises a number of smaller affiliated
organisations	 (for	 example, the British Disiu:fectant Xanufacturers'
Association), One of the main problems that has confronted the CIA has been in
relation to the disparity in the size of firms that it represents. ]'lost of the
CIA's income is naturally derived from the membership of a few large firms,
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but it has always been anxious to avoid appearing to be dominated by these
companies in respect of its policy making.{8) It has not, however, always
proved possible to maintain the right balance between the demands companies
of different sizes.{9) The CIA has always maintained an actIve interest in
training matters. It has a Training Policy Committee that reports to the main
Industrial Relations Committee and has developed a range of training courses
for its members, particularly in the area of health and safety and industrial
relations
The Pottery Industry
Mainly concentrated in North Staffordshire, the pottery industry, in contrast
to chemicals, occupies a traditional place in British manufacturing industry.
And until fairly recently this was evident not only in its methods of
production, but also in the nature of its management and industrial
relations.{l0} The industry could generally be characterised by los.
productivity, low profitability and low pay, but with a history of 'harmonious'
industrial relations reflecting a weak trade union base. Given the nature of
the products the industry has also contained a high proportion of craft based
skills, for example, mouldmakers, modellers, engravers and painters. The past
twenty years or so has, however, witnessed some restructuring which has
Involved Increased mechanisatlon and consequent 'de-skilling' and contraction
of the labour force, For example, between 1978 and mid-1982 some 45 plants
were closed with the loss of over 6,000 jobs, while number of operatives In
membership to the main trade union - the Ceramic and Allied Trade Union
(CATU) - declined from 51,120 in December 1978, to 28,935 in June 1982.
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Additionally there has been a depletion, though by no means the disappearance,
of many of the traditional family based firms resulting from a series of
mergers that have produced several dominant groups in the industry, such as
those of Wedgewood and Doulton.{11) From over 300 firms operating in the mid-
1960s the number at the end of the 1970s was placed around 260 - a number of
which were part of the wider industry groups.{12)
The major representative of employer interests is the British Ceramic
Nanufacturers' Association (BCMF), which claims a membership of in excess of
60 per cent of pottery firms. Unlike the Chemical Industries Association, it
has never, apart from its representation on the Ceramics ITB, displayed any
significant interest in training matters. The pottery - or ceramic - industry,
in fact covers the manufacture of a range of products that may be broken down
into several components. The British Ceramic Manufacturers' Federation (BCKF),
for example, lists these as: bone china and earthenware tableware;
ornamentalware; ceramic wall and floor tiles; sanitaryware; ceramic insulators;
and industrial ceramics. The Ceramics, Glass and lUneral Products ITB, however,
had a slightly different classification and this is given below together with
the numbers employed at 5 April 1979.U3)
Domestic ware	 37,724
Industrial and electrical
porcelain	 3,369
Sanitaryware	 7,087
Glazed tiles	 5,704
Miled materials	 927
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Studio pottery	 647
Others	 1,713
It can be seen that by far the most significant is the domestic ware sector
(tableware and ornamentaiware in the BCfF's classification). The one thing that
the industry has in common with the chemicals sector is that it is highly
export oriented. In 1979, the industry exported in excess of 40 per cent of its
total output, with tableware in the lead at 44 per cent although this did in
fact represent a drop over previous years from around 50 per cent.{14)There
are no precise figures available for the total number of establishments that
came within scope to the Training Board, data normally being presented by the
ITB in terms of employees. However, it is estimated that in 1978 there were
approximately 250 companies in scope to the Board which represented some
55,442 employees.{15)
Apart from the importance of exports to both the chemical and pottery
industries, any significant similarity between them ends at that point. The
former is a relatively new, capital intensive and geographically dispersed
industry, while the latter has only fairly recently begun a sustained process
of modernisation. The geographical concentration of the pottery industry
resulted in the development of paternalistic and insular - If not parochial -
managerial attitudes. These were only challenged when competition from abroad,
in the form of cheap imports, forced the industry to examine and restructure
in terms of plant, machinery and processes.
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TEE INDUSTRIAL TRAilING BOARDS: STRUCTURE, OBJECTIVES ALl) PROCEDURES
The Chemical and Allied Products Indu&try Training Board
The Chemical and Allied Products Industry Training Board (CAP/ITB) was
constituted in October 1967. Apart from the full Board, the CAP/ITE established
In 1970 a network of twelve sub-committees that were functionally based.{.16)
These sub-committees were composed of employer, employee, educational and
other representatives, though not necessarily on an equal basis as membership
was determined by the nature of the function - for example, membership of the
Small Companies Advisory Panel was confined to employers, whilst the Research
Sub-Committee was composed of employer and educational members only, plus one
permanent Board staff member. The Permanent staff structure, as at 1978, was
organised - under the control of the Director - under three separate functional
units Training; Manpower Planning and Research; Finance and Administration, In
1980, reflecting a greater emphasis upon and desire to be seen in an advisory
role, the structure was reorganised along the following lines: Specialist
Advisory Services and Development Work; Planning Manpower and Advisory
Services; Personnel; Finance and Administration.
Since its inception a consistently stated objective of the CAP/ITB in relation
variously to levy/grant/exemption bad been to concentrate its resources upon
advisory services and decrease the rate of levy. In this sense it may be said
to have been operating in anticipation of certain of the provisions of the
1973 Act. In 1971, for instance, the board announced proposals to reduce the
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levy from 1.5 per cent (itself a reduction on the previous year) to 1.25 per
cent for 1971/72 with a rise in the exemption level to firms with emoluments
of 25,000 or less. Additionally the board had adopted the system of netting
grants against levy with the result that only about 10 per cent of levy was
actually collected.{17) During the subsequent two years the levy was further
reduced so that for the year 1973/74 it was set at 0.75 per cent with an
exemption limit of 80,0O0 per annum emoluments - being roughly equivalent to
50 employees. These continued to be the limits set under the statutory levy
exemption provisions and bad remained unchanged at 1979. At this time there
were 1,394 firms in scope of the Board, 823 of which were excluded from levy
by the emoluments limit. Of the remainder 371 possessed two year and 108
possessed one year exemption certificates while a further 43 had not gained a
full exemption but were receiving a percentage offset. Thus of those not
excluded, over 90 per cent of leviable firms were exempt - most wholly,{18)
In line with this approach, the Board adopted on 1 August 1972 a Training
Development Review (TDR) scheme. This was the Board's alternative to levy
grant and was optional for firms who qualified according to grant/levy ratio
criteria, - in other words it was for those firms which already in the Board's
view provided sound training to meet their own needs. It was described as a
'business oriented approach' and was based upon a series of 'dialogues' which
took "a forward look at the firm's training in relation to its business
objectives with accent on quality, rather than a historical review with its
focus on quantity....The Board's approach throughout the Review will be flexible
so as to be sensitive to the needs of the firm".{19} In conjunction with Levy
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Offset Review, TDR - modified in 1976 and 1980 - provided the basis for
statutory exemption introduced under the 1973 Act.{20)
In 1971 the Board had stated that the "prime objective of training is to make
the best possible use of human resources with respect to Industry, the firm
and the individual"{2l) By 1979 this fairly straightforward objective had been
transformed into an 'overall strategy' which required the board to: {22)
(a) Provide a greater manpower dimension to its operating role.
(b) Ensure that its advisory work with firms embraces labour
market issues, particularly skill imbalances which are
predominantly local in nature.
(c) Strengthen its links, at local level, with the education system,
trade unions, Training Services Division and other ITBs.
(d) Increase its involvement in the area of young people and their
transition from school to work.
(e) Develop its competence in the craft and process areas and
especially in training of instrument maintenance staff.
(f) Provide a strengthened specialist advisory service in selected
areas to complement the advisory work with firms,
(g) !'aintairi a level of development activity consistent with the
needs of the Board's operating programmes.
(b) Review its management information systems, including data
processing facilities, in the light of the above, and the need
for increased manpower information.
The above account provides an indication not only of the extent to which the
priorities of the CAP/ITB had altered during this period, but also of the
different kinds and sources of pressures being exerted on the board and a
greater degree of ambiguity in later years surrounding its role in the training
system. For instance, on one level the emphasis was very much on developing
and strengthening links at the local level, whilst both industry and national
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labour market needs were gaining increasing prominence. In addition to the
above, the Board had also placed considerable importance upon initiating
research programmes and the 1978 Annual Report, for example, lists seventeen
ongoing or recently completed projects.{23) Despite these different pressures -
which will be explored more fully in the following sections - the CAP/ITB had
consistently attempted to develop an advisory, rather than a regulatory role
and image. How far it was perceived in such a manner by the firms within its
industry we shall see shortly.
The Ceramics Glass and Xineral Products Industry Training Board
The Ceramics, Glass and Mineral Products ITB (CGMP/ITB) was the first multi-
industry board to be formed (July 1965). For organisational purposes the Board
grouped together five main industries with a wide number of sub-sectors:
extractive; cement and cement products; bricks and refactories; pottery; glass.
For each industry there was set up Industrial Committees which were sub-
committees of the Board, the membership of which was primarily drawn from
employer, employee and educational representatives.
Of the 250 or so firms in the pottery industry in scope to the Board, 136 were
above the exclusion limit for levy liability. Of these 60 (44.1%) were exempt
from levy. Of the 55,442 employees in eligible companies, 36,443 (or 65,7%)
were in the exempt category. For the Board's purposes the pottery industry was
the third largest employer (although all were roughly equivalent except cement
employing 72,350).{24) Like the Chemicals Board, Ceramics had opted for
relatively low levy levels although, unlike Chemicals, it had gone for
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differential rates. Thus initially, levy rates were set at 1.5 per cent of
emoluments for pottery and glass and 0.75 per cent for the remainder. Some
minor reductions were made in 1970 and in 1973 the rates, which remained in
being thereafter, were reduced to 0.65 per cent for pottery and glass and 0.5
per cent for the remainder. The exclusion limit was 50 employees or 150,000
per annum emoluments.
Initially the adequacy of a firm's training was judged by the extent to which
it satisfied criteria for grant - eg the number of training instructors, and
'sound' training programmes. By 1972, however, the Board had shifted its
emphasis somewhat from quality and quantity towards the establishment of
different criteria based on a systems approach to training. This was the
'Dynamic Approach to Training' (DAT) which encouraged firms to analyse
existing manpower and identify training needs arising from current and future
business activities and incorporated training planning, implementing and
evaluating elements. The criteria developed under the DAT scheme were utilised
as the criteria for granting statutory exemption under the 1973 Act. The
scheme operated in two stages. Firstly, firms applying for exemption had ci)
to provide evidence that they had been operating a sound training system for
at least two years prior to the application and <ii) in the year prior to
application all the principal DAT criteria had been met through grant
assessment. Secondly, for those firms qualifying under stage 1, visits and
'dialogues' were conducted by Board assessment teams with senior management to
determine that a training system was operating at all levels of management and
across the units comprising the company.{25) See also the Board's Exeniption
Guidance and Instructions Reference Book) Exemptions could be granted
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conditionally or unconditionally and for periods of 1-3 years, partial
exemptions were not operated until 1978 when a levy abatement scheme was
introduced.
Finally, the broad objectives of the Board can be seen to have moved through a
number of phases. Early concerns were about increasing the quantity and
quality of training, concentrating attention on increasing the number of
training staff employed in its industries and establishing sound programmes of
training - in particular at the operative level. This was followed by a focus
upon introducing a systematic approach to training that emphasised the
business needs of the firm. By 1979 the overall strategy of the Board had 3
strands: {26)
To take all action within the Board's power to ensure that adequate
numbers of people trained in appropriate skills are available to
meet the needs of its industries for as far ahead as can be farseen.
To stimulate the adoption within the Board's industries of
trainingtechniques and practices to standards considered by the
Board to be appropriate to the needs of its industries in the
interests of business effectiveness and efficiency.
Through knowledge of the manpower trends in the Board's industries
and all the factors affecting them, to contribute to national
economic prosperity and manpower effectiveness.
Within this overall strategy, priorities for action - in addition to the
raising of training standards - were identified as: management and supervisory
development; craft, technician and technologist training; relations in industry;
safety and health at work; youth training; manpower planning; promoting
development of workers to meet key skill requirements and supporting
associated fledgling and at risk courses in FE establishments; administrative
and clerical training; overseas trade; energy conservation.{27} But perhaps
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more tellingly, the Board noted elsewhere that deciding priorities presented
difficulties due to the "often conflicting company, industrial, regional and
national interests",{28) As we shall see, reconciling these conflicting
interests was never satisfactorily achieved, either by the Ceramics, or the
Chemical, ITBs. Although our concern in this chapter is wit.h the firm/Board
relationship, it is worth noting that both ITBs enjoyed a. good reputation
within the Department of Employment during the second half of the 1970s. Both
were seen as 'fairly dynamic' and 'well-led'.{29)
At this point we may make a number of preliminary observations about the
similarities and differences between the two ITBs. In relation to structural
characteristics being a multi-industry Board the CGMP/ITB was clearly
operating in a more complex environment than the CAP/ITB, But in one important
respect at least, as far as the pottery industry was concerned, its task was
considerably simplified in that the overwhelming majority of firms were
concentrated in a relatively small geographical location - though other
problems may have flowed from this source. For this reason, although the
Board's headquarters were in North London, moves were made after the first few
years to appoint field training staff who lived and where possible had worked
in the area. As we have seen, while the chemical industry - and to a
significant extent the Board - was dominated by a relatively small number of
very large firms (the largest 6% employing over 65% of. the labour force),
despite the emergence of dominant groups, the pottery industry was still
characterised by a large number of medium-sized firms.
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The number of firms and employees within scope arid coming into the leviable
categories of the Boards also reflects their different industrial structures, In
1979/80, for the chemical industry there were 571 leviable firms with 360,000
employees out of a total in scope of 1,394, while in the ceramics, glass and.
allied industries there were approximately 900 leviable firms with 289,558
employees out of a total of about 1,800 firms in scope - with the respective
figures for the pottery industry being 136, 55,442 and 250. Although from the
beginning both Boards had adopted a similar attitude towards setting
relatively low levies, the extent to which firms achieved exemption varied
markedly between the two. While in the chemical industry over 90 per cent of
leviable firms were exempt, in the pottery industry the figure was less than
half that (although it is perhaps worth noting that only the glass industry,
at 476 per cent, achieved a higher than average exemption level, while the
lowest of CGMP/ITB's industries was extractive with only 9.7 per cent of firms
exempt). In fairly simple terms there would seem to be only four possible
explanations for such a wide variation: it was an accurate reflection of the
standards of training achieved within the industries; it reflected the
application of different standards by the Boards; it reflected the application
of similar standards by the Boards but differences in monitoring and
evaluative arrangements; fewer firms in the pottery industry registered with
the board actually bothered to apply for exemption. This last point may not be
an insignificant factor. The Ceramics Board provided no figures on the
percentage of firms applying for exemption, but although it was the policy of
the board to maintain contact with registered firms through sending out
literature, It was regarded as the responsibility of each finn to contact the
board if it wished to be considered for exemption.{30) To what extent any or
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all of the other explanations may be discerned as significant we shall be
addressing at various points in the following sections.
The overall thrust in direction of both sets of Board policies was, however,
similar. Both to some extent - no doubt partly as a response to early
criticisms of the board system in general - anticipated the changes that were
introduced under the 1973 Employment and Training Act, The emphasis shifted
from concerns to raise the quantity and quality of training on an industry
basis to those where the boards sought to increase their relevance to the
individual firm through focussing upon the business needs of the firm and
developing their advisory roles. However, following developments at the
national level, in particular the attempts of the Training Services Division to
influence the direction of Boards' activities in line with national labour
market objectives, the operations of both Boards broadened considerably to
incorporate these national - and in particular manpower - objectives. The
extent to which this created tensions between the objectives and between the
Boards and their industries is discussed below.
It should, however, finally be noted that in addition to external influences in
the determination of boards' priorities, it was the permanent staff of ITBs
that exerted the major internal influence. Both the board officials and the
four board members that were interviewed by the author (2 employer
representatives each from the chemical and pottery industries) supported this
view. Employer representatives in general tended to view their role as first
and foremost protecting the interests of their particular firm, and secondly of
the industry. And although the development of 'sound training' was regarded as
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an important function, it was still ranked below the other two. Indeed, one
board member in the pottery industry went so far as to state that his primary
role was to prevent the acceptance of some of the 'dafter ideas' put forward
by the trade union representatives. While all four board members felt that ITBe
bad managed to raise the overall level and standard of training within the
industry, it was claimed to be a very modest increase. However, none of the
members could provide quantitative evidence of this.
TRAIlING INTERVENTION AID THE BEHAVIOUR OF FIRXS
The General Outicok
The study revealed at all levels of management that regardless of which
industry or size of firm, there was a manifest, positive orientation towards
training as an activity. Training was an imperative of the firm: "it is
something we always will do and always have to do" could well have been the
motto of every firm visited. Training was the opposite of sin	 everyone was
for it. To the extent that there existed a unanimity of opinion that training
per se was beneficial then we can argue that in broad terms the existence of
structures whose object was to enhance training effectiveness was not
inherently incongruous with the needs of firms. In seeking a greater degree of
specificity about the reasons why training was regarded as beneficial the
predominant - and not necessarily unexpected - reason was related to its
function of promoting the economic interest of the firm. At a basic level,
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allowing for nuances and some qualifications, it was consistently held that
this meant contributing to the maintenance of or increase in the firm's
competitiveness. Once we move away from the level of the aphoristic, however,
such unanimity becomes harder to identify.
In effect, the above is asserting little more than a truism: that for each firm
there existed some minimum amount of training that was necessary to the firm's
continued viability. It Is when we move to consider such questions as what
should constitute the extent and substance of this minimum, whether the
minimum should also be regarded as the maximum, how far, if at all, it was
desirable to progress beyond the minimum, what factors should be taken into
account as important in determining the amount and type of training
undertaken, who is to be the best judge of these issues, that the picture is
more diverse. As we shall see different attitudes could be identified within
firms, between firms and across the two Industries on these issues.
Nonetheless, when asked to specify what factors were influential in affecting
training decisions the following were referred to. They are given in order of
the overall frequency with which they were mentioned and should not therefore
be assumed to be the typical response of any one firm:
1. the 'health' of the firm in terms of orders and profitability;
(100%)
2. the general economic climate; <approximately 90%)
3. labour turnover; (approximately 557)
4. the state of the local labour market; (approximately 0%)
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5. legislative provisions, especially health and safety and
employment; (approxiamtely 50%)
6. technological change (past, present, future); (approximately 45%)
'7. meeting the requirements of the ITE; (approximately 25%)
8. the views of (in particular training) personnel within the firm;
(approximately 25%)
9. industrial relations, (approximately 20%)
There was a considerable similarity in the response of the two industries. The
main differences that could be discerned were that in the chemical industry,
points 4 and five were mentioned more frequently than in the pottery industry.
One point of note that occurs from the above is that meeting ITB requirements
were perceived as being relatively low in the list of factors influencing
training decisions. Indeed, many of those interviewed categorically claimed
that their, or more generally the firm's, attitude to training was either not at
all or only marginally affected by the activities of the training board. At1
this point we may simply note that in many instances such statements were
antilogous to other statements or evidence.
Firiirs' .Liiage of the Training Boards
Even by the late l97Os in general the ITBs still had a relatively 'poor press'
despite their attempts to demonstrate their concern with the needs of their
industries. In all probability they had not completely managed to live down, or
shake off, their earlier reputations as bureaucratic and inspectorial. Where
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this view of ITBs persisted in individual firms it was associated with a more
antagonistic attitude. This tended to be reflected in the firm/board
relationship, although it does not necessarily mean that such firms were any
more or less likely than those with a less hostile attitude to be influenced by
the board. One clear caveat applies here: for those firms that did not apply
for exemption, opting instead to pay the levy, the ITE cannot be regarded as a
potent force in their decision making. One such firm appears in our sample
from the pottery industry. Attitudes had, however, apparently mellowed somewhat
over the years and the majority opinion seemed to be that boards had become
less 'buraucratically' inclined post-1973 and demonstrated a greater degree of
flexibility in taking account of particular problems encountered by the firm.
We can, however, identify a broad distinction between the two industries in the
range of perceptions that firms had of the two boards. In the chemical
industry firms were far more consistent in representing the board as an
organisation that had a kind of 'nuisance value' but lacked much relevance to
their own activities. Few people claimed that the board was overly
inspectorial. However, many did argue that, despite attempts to promote an
advisory or servicing image, the statutory obligations of the board in relation
to levy/exemption meant that they would never be fully accepted as advisory
bodies. In any case there was a great deal of scepticism of the capacity of
the board to provide the kind of training services that the firm might need,
and many managers and training staff stated their preference for using outside
'specialist' training organisations - which on a few occaisions included those
of the relevant trade association, the Chemical Industries Association (CIA)
In addition a number of personnel in the larger firms claimed that - with a
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few exceptions - the calibre of ITB staff was significantly lower than in
their own firms and that the ITB saw the large firm as a way of developing
its own expertise. "They should be paying us, nat us paying them" was the
opinion of one Training and Development Officer. Xore positively, it was
generally held that the ITB was striving to meet the training needs of the
firm and in that the board's objectives were not viewed as being inherently
incompatible with the firm's requirements. But concern was also more often
than not expressed that such objectives were becoming increasingly constrained
by the control being exerted by the central training system.
Thus whilst firms in the chemical industry tended to regard the board as
something of an irrelevance, the perceptions of pottery firms were much more
mixed. They could perhaps be represented on a continuum that ranged from the
overtly hostile to the almost deferential, At one end of the spectrum comments
were received such as "the ITB is forced upon us - why should it be?	 I saw
some literature from the ITB a few years ago and these were so confusing and
full of jargon I just pushed them into a drawer", And "if we did what the ITB
wanted us to do it would be a farce, we would be bankrupt." (31) At the other
extreme were comments that had a kind of missionary zeal about them; "s1ome
may regard the Board as government interference, but not here, Here they are
seen as a welcome intrusion, as someone who can come and give us a band It
supports and encourages companies to reach good productivity levels." Or "I
can't think of any disadvantages to the training board system. The Board's
aims are designed to ensure we meet our needs in the correct way. They are
specialists who can help us out, so I wouldn't hesitate to call them in."{32)
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These two attitudes represented about 25 per cent each of those intervied, the
other 50 per cent falling somewhere between the two extremes.
Neither of the above attitudes seemed particularly related to the size of firm,
There did, however, seem to be a link between the the hostile reaction and the
management ethos of the firm. The attitude of all the firms towards training
and the ITB, in both industries, was in fact strongly influenced by the stance
of senior management. But those firms in the pottery industry with the
greatest proclivity towards enmity had a more traditional, even paternalistic,
outlook. The managers in such firms tended to be of an older generation,
having spent all their lives in the industry - often in the same firm - and
had generally 'worked their way up'. The old established ways of doing things
were often regarded as the best and this applied just as much to training as
any other activity. Such people exhibited a strong independent attitude and
resentment of outside interference in the internal working of their
organisation. This manifested itself in a general anti-regulatory position.
Such attitudes are clearly not conducive to seeing any benefit in an
organisation which was regarded as posessing the power to 'fine' firms for
carrying out in a perfectly satisfactory manner what any self-respecting firm
would be doing anyway. There was thus in such firms a - to some extent-self
imposed - lack of identification with the board's objectives. This was often
accompanied by, complaints about the inability to comprehend board literature,
and the mystique that seemed to have developed about the training function.
Apart from a pre-disposition to see the board in a negative light, however,
such attitudes also seemed to reflect the poor beginning that the board was
perceived as having made, during the 1960s and early 1970s, in fostering good
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relations, In particular at the higher management level, which did much to sour
firm/board relations. This is evidenced by the fact that some firms at least,
whose initial reactions had been similar, by the late 1970s claimed to have
changed their attitude toward the board In a more positive direction. One point
that did emerge, however, was that in the pottery industry the ITB field
officers bad a much more favourable image than the rest of the board. ven
where the board was regarded as part of the 'governmental machine' it was
often acknowledged that the field staff had a good knowledge of the industry.
To sumnarise, in neither industry was there much support for the ITB but, by
the same token there were few cases of overt antagonism there seemed to have
developed some kind of mutual accommodation between firms and the training
boards although the image of the Ceramics ITB within the industry was a. great
deal more variable. Generally speaking, around 80 per cent of firms had come
to regard the ITB as at least seeking to meet the needs of individual firms,
However, in neither industry did firms regard the ITB as being part of the
industry. It was though regarded as closely allied to it with the qualification
that, in the chemical industry in particular, the board was seen as having
become more distanced from the Industry during the previous two-three years
and to have become Increasingly drawn under the auspices of the XSC and TSD.
Firms' Relationship with the Training Board
By the late 1970s then, despite the lack of a positive attitude of most firms
towards the ITEs most of the firms seem to have managed to establish
reasonably amicable working relationships with their board. There had, in other
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words been an improvement in the firm/board relationship. The specific reasons
for this resided in four factors: the removal from industry of boards'
financial costs; the greater flexibility of boards in their assessment of
firms' training methods; the focus of the boards upon company needs; a
lessening of the burden of paperwor. In other words the ITBs were now
perceived to have adjusted their priorities in the right direction. But as one
pottery Training Manager remarked "Cu1nder the new system the ITB is claiming
that training should be carried out to meet the rquirements of the company.
This has alw8ys been the reason why training is carried out - it seems to
have taken the ITB a long time to get the message". Inevitably the relationship
was subject to variation depending upon the firm's status regarding
levy/exemption. For example, firms preparing for exemption would have a
greater amount of paperwork than those that had already gone through that
particular 'hoop'. All the firms surveyed in the chemical industry were exempt
from levy though two had conditions attached. In the pottery industry one firm
had chosen not to apply - "we treat the levy demand just like the gas or
electricity bill",{33) - two firms were not exempt but levy abated, one of them
having been refused exemption the previous year but both confident of
exemption in the forthcoming year, two firms had been granted conditional
exemption, while the remainder had unconditional exemption. Notwithstanding
this improvement in the firin/ITB relationship, It was evident that by 1979/80
it was again coming under some stress. The main reason for this, as the
majority of personnel pointed out, was the increasing demands that boards were
making on firms to supply greater quantities of information concerning company
manpower plans. The 'spectre' of the return of 'bureaucratic' time-consuming
boards bad begun to raise its head again.
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As far as contact with board staff went 1 in the pottery industry most firms
were routinely visited every two to three months by the Training Advisor (TA)1
usually for an hour or two at a time, Firms' training staff apart, such visits
usually included contact with general managers. Of course, firms in the process
of applying for exemption or re-exemption would be in more frequent contact
depending on the stage that they were at and exemption visits typically lasted
for a full day when board staff from headquarters would also be present. On
the whole the frequency and nature of such contacts was considered to be
satisfactory. On the other hand, contact between firms and board staff
appeared to be far more irregular and uncertain In the chemical industry,
although no-one went so far as to actually complain that they saw insufficient
of the the TA. Nonetheless the inference that was drawn from this intermittent
contact was that TAs were inefficient in the performance of their job. One
Training 1'!anager claimed to see the TA usually only once a year or sometimes
longer, while another (interviewed on 2 Hay 1980) claimed not to have seen one
since the end of 1978.
One difficulty confronting the CAP/ITB which did not exist for the CGNP/ITB
was the geographical dispersion of firms in the chemical industry. The
consequence was an inevitable limit upon the frequency with which firms could
be visited. These limitations were one of the principal reasons why the Board
decided upon a structural reorganisation along regional lines, which took
effect in 1980. Unfortunately, from the Board's point of view, the Immediate
effect of reorganisation was to disrupt the schedule of visits, thus in the
short-term compounding the above difficulties. Morever, before the long-term
benefits could be reaped, CAP/ITB faced fresh problems in organising adequate
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visits to firms. These were: the imposition of cash limits which made it
increasingly diificult to recruit and replace staff; a review of the operation
of the training system which was begun by the ASC in 19'79 and which again
raised uncertainties about the future of ITBs and which diverted the Board's
energies. The last two points were also applicable to the Ceramics Board.
In summary, by the beginning of the 1980s, both the ITEs had progressed from
a period of poor relations with firms in their industries to one that
approached mutual tolerance and acceptance. It was also evident, however, that
the improvement was a tenuous one, set as it was against the previously noted
indifferent attitude of firms towards the ITBs, In particular the boards found
themselves in a position of some difficulty in improving their relationship
with firms because of the demands placed upon them to pursue national training
objectives, This resulted in boards placing increasing administrative demands
upon firms which in turn caused some resentment and acted as a continual
constraint upon improved relations.
Impact of the Training Boards: Training to Meet Firms' Own leeds
Training ,Standards
"Every so often we go through these bulishit exercises" was a Personnel and
Training Manager's view of the levy/exemption/review process. An imortant
element in trying to assess the degree to which the boards had been
responsible for raising the standard of training within firms would seem to be
the attitude adopted towards the recommendations and requirements laid down
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by the boards. Obviously, as a minimum firms would respond to such
recommendations where they were anxious to avoid paying levy. But beyond that,
the seriousness with which the recommendations were treated and how far they
were regarded as assisting firms' training activities would seem to have a
bearing upon the amount of influence that boards could bring to bear. In other
words if the board's recommendations did not, as a matter of principle, carry
substantial authority within the firm, and therefore were possibly viewed as
something to be circumnavigated with the least cost, then clearly they would
not, and possibly could not, have a significant impact. Therefore, it was not
simply the quality of board recommendations that mattered, but also the
general pre-disposition of firms towards such recommendations. One feature of
many - if not the majority - interviews with senior management and training
staff was a tendency to express, in general terms, deprecatory remarks about
the standard of training recommendations. Sometimes these would stem from
assertions that they were based on abstract principles that were not capable
of uniform application; sometimes they were based upon assertions that in
practice the training being carried out within the firm was superior to that
being recommended by the board. In either case therefore board recommendations
were not regarded as particularly helpful, or even relevant, with most people
insisting that it would make little difference to the way that training was
carried out within the firm if the training board were suddenly to disappear.
Alternatively the clear view being expressed was that boards impact upon the
standard of training was negligible. Despite such comments, however, there were
other indications that for various reasons, people were under-emphasising the
extent to which they thought the board was responsible for raising training
standards.
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When pressed to indicate the areas of activity where boards had been helpful
and/or affected the manner in which training was undertaken, there emerged a
consistent set of responses. Most of them, it should be noted tended to relate
to past rather than current activities, many of which pre-dated the 1973 Act.
Around 85 per cent of all firms agreed that training was much more formalised
than it would, in all probability, otherwise have been, and about half thought
that it was better organised. In the main this related to the keeping of
records. Further, all firms had, or were in the process of developing, training
plans which incorporated certain common features such as training programmes
and schedules for different categories - eg operatives, chargehands,
technicians, management, induction and health and safety training - and a
validation component of some sort. Firms in both industries consistently
mentioned an increased emphasis placed by boards on the development of
management training. In addition, some two-thirds of the personnel considered
that such detailed plans would not have existed but for meeting board
requirements and neither would attempts to incorporate within the plans
assessments of training needs based upon future manpower requirements.
Three other developments were attributed to board influence, The first was
considered to be one of the most important and direct consequences of training
policy. This was the increased quantity of training staff - including qualified
training instructors - employed by firms. For example, a Company Training
1(anager with the chemical firm Aibright and Wilson, who was responsible for
training within a number of divisions in the UK3 which employed 7,000 staff in
total, compared the pre-1965 position where the company employed only 2
Training Officers with the present (July 1980) where there were 13 full-time
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and 13 part-time Training Officers in addition to a central coordinating
training function which employed 3 staff. He was at this time responsible for
a head office training budget of £80,000. This, he claimed was directly
attributable to the 1964 Act. Many other training staff were of the opinion
that they owed their position to the introduction of training legislation.
Linked to this was the second consequence which was the increased attention
given to training by senior management due to the potential financial costs -
or by some firms in the early years benefits - of of the board system. More
resouces were now devoted to training, sometimes indirectly through pressure
exerted by training staff. But interestingly enough only about thirty-five per
cent of firms, and of those mainly though not exclusively the larger firms, had
a separate training budget. The third effect was seen as a more indirect and
less unambiguous result of ITB infuence. This was the greater
'professionalisation' of training, both in terms of the calibre of training
staff and the training practices employed. Thus most firms were explicitly or
implicitly acknowledging that they had been 'forced' to adopt a more
systematic approach towards training as a result of the requirements of the
training boards. Other than these there were a notable, if not excessive,
number, of specific examples cited where the boards had provided 'valuable'
advice or assistance. In the chemical industry the work that the Board had
done on the shortages of instrument artificers in the process industries <34)
was often mentioned, as indeed was the quality of much of the research carried
out or initiated by the board, However, in the pottery industry there appeared
to be a limited knowledge of board activities other than as they specifically
touched the firm and courses for fork lift truck drivers and in kinetic
handling were what was frequently referred to in this context.
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Just what the above adds up to, however, is something that we might consider
further. It was, for instance, the view of one Group Training Manager (Armitage
Shanks), who was • also an employer representative on the Ceramics Board that
rather than having created more effective training systems, firms were
participating in what bad become "enforced custom" or "role playing to satisfy
the Board". Boards, he claimed seemed to operate in the belief that if
everything gets written down, then the problem is solved. The inference to be
drawn from such comments is that firms were simply paying 'lip service' to
boards. There is also an element of 'self-satisfaction' in such statements,
whether or not such perceptions were accurate. Clearly there are two issues
involved here concerning the effectiveness of board influence. One is how far
boards could manipulate firms to comply with their recommendations. The other,
and perhaps more crucial element, is how effectively boards could validate
what was happening within firms. Unless firms were willing to comply of their
own volition, and as we have seen such an outcome was unlikely, then the
levy/exemption/review process might indeed be regarded as not much more than
a paper exercise if the capacity of boards to monitor and validate training
within firms was weak. There is evidence from both industries to suggest that
such was the case.
Firms' training plans that were seen by the author and which had been
approved by board staff certainly varied from the complex and , sophisticated to
the simple - if not apparently simplistic - which was generally related to
size of firm. Apart from what went into such documents, there was little
consistency in terms of format, coverage and detail, and thus little basis for
providing any comparative evaluation. A divisional Training Manager in one
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chemical firm (Aibright and Wilson) reported, for example, that in the previous
Levy Exemption Review (LER) as a result of being 'honest' with the board in
the information provided, they had only been granted a one year exemption
whilst another site of the same company carrying out exactly the same training
had managed to obtain a two-year exemption because they had 'played the game'
and 'fooled' the board through its paperwork. Part of the explanation of such
variation resides in the emphasis that boards were now placing upon
encouraging training to meet the individual needs of firms, One interpretation
of this is that the determination of what was in the interest of the firm was
internally rather than externally decided: that is, the emphasis had tilted
from the board to the firm In determining training needs. This is not to argue
that this represented some absolute shift and that external board influence
was therefore unimportant, Rather it is argued that, in relative terms, firms
appeared to have gained greater control In this area. However, a further
interpretation that might be placed upon such a development is that boards
had, in effect, accepted the 'reality' of the situation, which was that firms
would resist what might be perceived as efforts to make them train in excess
of what they judged to be their own needs, The impression given in the
overwhelming majority of interviews was that this would certainly be the case:
"our training plans are a true reflection of our training needs and we would
take Issue if the Board wanted something different"; and "filling in the forms
was a game. If the ITB bad insisted on doing things a certain way we would
not have done them" were two -typical responses.{35)
In setting greater store by their advisory rather than regulatory roles and in
their desire to demonstrate flexibility of approach, it seems possible that
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 373
Chapter Eight	 Irnpleiiientation and the Finn
both boards faced a dilemma: for the majority of firms in the chemical
industry and to a lesser but significant extent in the pottery industry also,
the Boards' authority resided in their power to penalise firms, not in the
quality of their recommendations. If, therefore, firms were seen as
insufficiently complying with board recommendations, resort to the levy 'stick'
would be inconsistent with such an approach. If firms thus perceived the
boards as unwilling to fully exercise their statutory powers then the
credibility of boards would further decline. What was suggested by many
personnel, and this applied particularly to training staff, was that in the
main board staff were too willing to be accommodating and were not
sufficiently forceful in their dealings with firms. Indeed, we might go further,
and suggest that when we are discussing the ability to influence behaviour, we
are not concerned with a one-way process. In other words we are not simply
arguing that there was some critial point beyond which boards could not
influence the behaviour of firms, but that firms were also capable of exerting
influence upon the boards such that the behaviour of boards was changed. A
significant example of this .tcurred in the chemical industry in 1976 when the
board attempted to change its Training Development Review procedures. This
caused a considerable amount of resentment within one of the largest chemical
companies (ICI) because of its "highly bureacratic nature, its 'checklists', its
'Missions' and its secret questionnaires" and ultimately led to a breakdown in
relations between the company and the board. Thereafter divisional
representatives of the company formed a working party to devise a coordinated
response and then held discussions with the ITB with the objective of
"repairing relationships in a way that would be of greater use to the
company.{36) The result was the adoption of Training Agreements entered into
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by the Board and each company division. (All the agreements were broadly
similar.{3'7} These agreements aptly illustrate the point that certainly as far
as the larger companies were concerned, sufficient resources could be mobilised
not only to make the board retreat but to accept the company's demands. Kot
only that, but the training staff within the company also recognised an
opportunity to use the disagreement to enhance and consolidate their own
position through the establishment of a Training Xanagers' Group.
Interestingly, news of this particular development had obviously spread on the
training 'grapevine' as It was referred to by members of other firms that were
visited and had followed ICI's lead and entered into similar agreements with
the board. The same kind of development was not unknown in the pottery
Industry. A Training Adviser for the Ceramics Board for example, stated that
one of the major companies (Wedgewood - in which he himself, interestingly,
had been a Training Officer before joining the Board) would tell him whether
and in what form their paperwork would be completed and his opinion was that
there was little that could be done to alter the situation.
The ability of firms on occasion to 'dictate' to the staff of boards was also
evident when boards appeared to make mistakes. The difficulties that the
chemical board's staff had in making regular visits to firms did indeed result
in delays in issuing exemption certificates, Delays had been experienced by
about half the firms visited and was the cause of a degree of resentment,
which sometimes turned into more overt hostility. For example, the CAP/ITB had
granted an exemption certificate to Albright and Wilson but with conditions
that had to be met in order to gain the second year's exemption. The
certificate expired at the end of February 1980 and preparations were made by
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the firm for a Review visit in January/February of that year. The Board
cancelled the visit with the result that the firm was "operating without a
licence". The firm's Training Officers subsequently held a meeting with the
Baard's TA at which, it was claimed, the TA was informed that he would only be
allowed back into the firm when liwited.
The evidence of our case studies thus far presented seems to be pointing us
towards the conclusion that in the firm/board relationship it was finns that
were largely responsible for determining what standards of training were
consistent with their business needs, and that the boards seemed unwilling, or
unable, to take action to change the situation. Clearly boards had had some
impact on training standards (probably an earlier one in the chemical than the
pottery industry) but having achieved such an improvement, it might be said
that firms viewed themselves as having taken over the role of ensuring the
existence of adequate training arrangements. Thus boards were increasingly
seen by firms as having lost their role, and perhaps, their rationale, There is
no doubt that while firms may have expressed this in specific terms, the
position of the boards lxi the second half of the 1970s was one of their
finding it difficult to sustain a coherent role that had some impact on
training provision in firms. Clearly one problem facing the boards in their
overall attempt to raise training standards was that they sought to apply
universal criteria, the implementation of which proved problematic due to the
variability of conditions and needs amongst firms. It is important to note
that the boards had little choice but to go for some set of universal criteria
given the statutory basis of its role in administering levy exemption. As the
Chemical Board noted "Es]uch a requirement imposed on Boards a statutory duty
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which not only was virtually impossible to realise in a manner which was
satisfactory to meet all situations but also had affected the relationship
between firms and the staff of the Board, the latter having to act as both
"inspectors" and "advisers". In many instances such a dual role has detracted
froni and not supported the development of confidence and trust between the
Board and its clients in industry."{38) The problem that this created 'on the
ground' was nicely summed up in a comment by one of the field staff of the
Ceramics Board that: "The Board comes out with grand schemes and they don't
give a damn about how to apply them to smaller companies. People like myself
have to improvise - reduce the whole bag of tricks to a small number of
features....Headquarters don't appreciate to what extent we are improvising. The
Board only wants to hear what it wants to hear, and it does not want to hear
about the difficulties of setting flexible exemption and DAT standards,, ..Of
course, validation comes into the improvising and adapting category." As we
have seen, the boards bad attempted to develop advisory roles. However, as
evidenced by firms reactions to this, the boards had clearly found it difficult
to effectively perform this function.
What is significant here is that faced with being relatively ineffectual the
boards seemed to be increasingly adopting a defensive, rather than an
assertive, stance about these two roles. 1or did they attempt to find any
alternative roles. The question arises, therefore, as to whether the boards
themselves perceived their Impact as a diminishing one or they were operating
under such severe constraints that they could not take action to ameliorate
the situation. What is of further importance in this respect was that under
nationally determined priorities, especially the Training for Skills initiative,
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the boards were intended to assume a key 'manpower planning' role, What we
need therefore to address is bow the boards assessed their position at this
time, what constraints or limitations prevented them from adopting a more
assertive role. In addition, in the section dealing with the impact of boards
upon training to meet national objectives, we will look at the related issue of
how boards were viewed at the national level as this also had a bearing upon
their activities and future.
ot surprisingly, even given the difficulties that they wer.e facing, the boards
still saw themselves as having an important part to play in maintaining
training standards. This - again not surprisingly - was particularly true of
the officers of the boards, although it should be noted that for field officers
in the pottery industry the emphasis was still very much on raising, as well
as maintaining, standards, Apart from one somewhat disillusioned senior board
official who claimed that boards had had little impact and would not be missed
if they were abolished, the remaining opinions were that without boards the
standard of training would decline. Great importance was attached to the
element of continuity that boards provided in focussing attention on the
training function within the firm. Field staff in particular were convinced
that without the 'prodding' of the board and the stimulation provided by the
package of instruments at the boards' disposal - advice, grants and exemption
- there would be a gradual erosion of standards that had undoubtedly been
built up as the result of board actions. This would apply especially in the
medium and smaller firms. This, claimed a senior Training Adviser from the
Ceramics Board was dictated by an economic logic that "persists in regarding
training as a cost. While the board is there management is asking 'what is it
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costing us not to train?' Without the board they will be asking 'what is it
costing us to train?" Training would once again become overly subjected to
short-term economic fluctuations.
It is equally true, however, that most board staff recognised that there were
limitations to what they were capable of achieving. And in their opinion such
constraints largely emanated from the provisions of the 1973 Act and the
rather ad hoc manner in which this had developed. Some of these have been
referred to above particularly regarding the tensions created by the dual roles
of inspectors and advisers where boards could be neither 'fish nor fowl'. There
were, however, two other sets of constraints. The first of these related to
inadequate resourcing and the second concerned a continuing uncertainty about
the future of ITBs. Whilst on one level removing boards operating costs from
industry had Improved the firm/board relationship, on another It was seen to
have damaged that relationship. Boards were now responsible to two masters,
with two sets of objectives and as a result were seen by firms as becoming
increasingly distant from the needs of the firm and more as instruments or an
arm of government. Even although the boards were not particularly effective in
influencing firms, this new role undoubtedly led t them being regarded as
more of a nuisance by them. Boards were thus now subject to greater financial
scrutiny from the centre which restricted the control that boards had over
determining their own priorities. These constraints - and the frustrations to
which they gave rise - is illustrated by the comment of the Ceramics Board
that central scrutiny was "time consuming and uneconomical in resources when
balanced against the results achieved. For example, this Board was the subject
of three accountancy audits last year, ie for the Public Accounts Committee,
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the NSC Auditors and auditors engaged to audit our own accounts in accordance
with accepted practice."{39) The position was further exacerbated as Boards
budgets became subjected to public expenditure cut-backs, which became
particularly acute from 1 q79 onwards. Given that as boards' income also
declined as the rate of exemptions increased the financial position of boards
became increasingly strained. Thus in the view of the Ceramics Board: "the
introduction of the 1973 Act and the consequences which flowed from It,
particularly with regard to government funding and reduction in the levy
funds, was a misguided and retrograde step. It believes that its industries
would have been better served under the provisions of the 1964 Industrial
Training Act and that many of the problems which industriy and ITBs face
today, for example lack of financial strength and conflict of priorities and
role vis a vis the MSC, would not hav.e arisen to the same degree if the
earlier legislation had remained unchanged ." {40) Board staff clearly therefore
felt hampered in developing their role, were aware of some of the adverse
consequences of this and were of the opinion that it was for these reasons
that question marks were constantly placed over their continued existence. As
a result the morale of staff was claimed to be low. Given such a situation it
is not surprising that boards began to adopt defensive postures
But, our own evidence suggests that it was not simply a question of resources
that was responsible for boards' inability to develop an effective role.
Becoming training advisers rather than training regulators was dependent to a
far greater extent upon getting firms 'on your side'. In other words firms
needed to be convinced of the utility of the services that boards were
offering. However, one clear difficulty confronting the ITBs lay in their
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 380
Chapter Eight	 implementation and the Firm
ability to evaluate the extent to which they bad been responsible for
improving training standards. "You can't quantify quality" was the way in which
the problem was expressed by a senior Ceramics Board official. Boards were
effectively unable to prove their utility, they could only assert it,
There was, however, another set of people who were also keen to assert their
utility and who it can be argued had usurped the role of the boards in this
context, These were the training staff within the individual firms. It was
clear, from the generality of comments that the views of training staff about
the liBs was double-edged. }Iany of them acknowledged that they owed their
position and indeed status to the existence of the boards. And further, a
significant number expressed the private opinion that without the boards their
position might very well be less secure. They had - especially in the past -
therefore used the boards as a 'lever' to enhance their own positions.
	
But,
particularly as the expertise of such staff grew, their own value to the firm
needed to be demonstrated independently of the board. A kind of 'rivalry' or
competitive element could be discerned in the attitude of training staff
towards the board. The irony of the situation was that boards' initial success
in getting training going in many firms through increasing the number of
training staff, had created a new forum for training that was thereafter in
competition with the board. Therefore for neither those training staff whose
positions within the firm were relatively secure nor those for whom It was
less so was there much mileage to be gained from giving the boards a 'good
press'. The result was that in both circumstances it was in the Interests of
training staff to maintain within the firm, and particularly at senior
management level, the inspectorial and 'bureaucratic' image of the board, even
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though by and large training staff themselves no longer saw the board in this
light. As one Training Officer put it:{41) "I don't suppose I've ever really
seen the board in an inspectorial role, but t will certainly claim this to
others that don't know. Managers sometimes need some convincing about
training," Thus even though board staff had access to management, their ability
to persuade firms that they had something worthwhile to offer was additionally
constrained in view of the attitudes of firms' training staff. Having thus
examined the impact of the boards on the standard of training within firms, we
turn in the following sections to an assessment of the impact of the boards in
raising the quantity of training in industry and in particular their role in
the achievement of national policy objectives.
The Quantity of Training
Training boards were required under the 1973 Act to exempt all employers who
made adequate arrangements for the training of persons required to carry on
the activities which are, or are expected to be carried out on employers'
establishments. The quantity of people trained in this context therefore is
only important insofar as all those who need training actually receive it.
Boards had no powers to compel firms to train beyond their needs. Nevertheless
there is clearly scope for disagreement about what is the right quantity to
meet those needs. The fact that the boards claimed to have been responsible
for increasing the amount of training carried out within firms suggests that
in this area at least boards were having some impact. We shall therefore
attempt to assess the extent to which this was so. We do, however, need to
note that for both boards there was a significant absence of information
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available, with no data available in a quantified form by the Chemical Board,
The figures that are available for the pottery industry, however, show for
example that the number of employees recieving training had risen from just
under 10,000 in 1966 to just under 20,000 by 1977. For the whole range of
industries covered by the CGNP/ITB, the increases in the volume of training by
occupation between the twa years shows a more than doubling in the
craft/operative and management/supervisory categories with a smaller increase
in commercial and clerical and a slight drop in the technologist/technician
categories.{42) The first issue that arises is how far such figures can be
regarded as representing a real increase: the second is how far such increases
can be attributed to the influence of the boards.
The claim of most company spokespeople that the needs of the company had
always determined the level of training activity would seem to stand at odds
with the above figures. There is of course the possibility that firms had
consistently underestimated what those training needs were and that it took a
training board to tell them. Another possibility (although the twa are not
mutually excusive) that was suggested by a number of people during the course
of the interviews was that the increases do not represent some absolute rise
in the number of people undergoing training. But that new methods of counting
brought about by the formalisatlon introduced by the boards meant the
inclusion of categories of 'trainees' that would have otherwise have been
excluded.. That is, to some degree what is being counted as an increase in the
quantity of persons undergoing training is really an increase in the numbers
undergoing a formalised period of training, as distinct from the unstructured
'sitting by ellie' or 'Joe' type. Perhaps the difference Is one of perception:
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to the boards 'sitting by Nellie' did not count as training; to many employers
it did. Once such training was formalised it could be counted as an increase
in the numbers undergoing training. Conversly some firms did not always seem
to be aware that some of their activities actually counted as training. One
Personnel and Training Officer in the pottery industry commented: "For the
first couple of years we did'nt bother going for exemption as we didn't think
we would meet the Board's criteria... .Wben we did go for it the Training
Adviser was really quite helpful.,.he pointed out that what we did with new
employees was really induction training. We hadn't realised that, and if we
started to keep proper records this would be counted." What this suggests is a
form of double-counting whereby it becomes extremely difficult to disentangle
inreases in training standards from increases in the numbers undergoing
training. It would seem that board staff were in reality engaged in raising
training standards and the above figures are more a measure of this, but, there
was also a tendency to count such improvements as increases in quantity. At
the very least this would appear to cast some doubt over the amount of
increase in the quantity of training that boards were claiming to have secured.
We cannot, however, assume that there was no extension of training provision.
Boards had latterly been including in their exemption criteria for example the
development of management training and increases in the number of apprentices
to cover future requirements as derived from firms' manpower plans. And
indeed, most firms acknowledged that the area of management training had been
one of considerable growth in recent years. Yet in general, the argument was
put in both industries that the board had not been a major infuence in
determining the quantity of training undertaken by the firm. "The pattern is
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not due to the ITE" claimed one representative. Factors mentioned as affecting
the numbers undergoing training at any one time tended to have to do with the
economic health of the firm and industry and changes in the structure of the
industry. For example in the pottery industry the growth of operative and
other training had coincided with a significant amount of restructuring: "From
a long history of piivately owned craft-based firms and companies, the
Industry has developed by restructuring, particularly since about 1955, into an
entirely different and highly sophisticated structure of technologically based
Groups of companies mainly publically(sic) owned..."{43) Obviously new
machinery means more training, although this may be offset through the effects
of 'de-skilling' which the introduction of new machinery can bring about, and
the fact that fewer workers are needed. Similar comments were forthcoming
from the chemical industry about the effects of new processes and technology,
although a great deal of emphasis here was placed upon the increase of safety
training, Apart from the legislative requirements in this area it was commonly
held that the major rise had followed on the 1973 Flixborough disaster. As for
management training, both industries seemed to agree that that one significant
factor was the need for management to keep abreast of legislation in the areas
of employment and industrial relations. Also short term economic effects were
seen to alter the numbers undergoing training. An economic downturn may, for
example result in the shedding of labour which means firms are operating at
minimum staffing levels. In such a situation "we are in trouble if there are
absentees so we can't afford to have anyone training."{44) On the ther hand
economic upturns could produce the same result: "During the winter we had
elaborate plans for training in other departments.. .but demand shot up, so
training got left bebind."{45)
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We can see therefore that as far as meeting the training needs of the
individual firm was concerned there were a variety of factors affecting the
numbers undergoing training at any one time. Apart from a, probably fairly
significant, initial increase brought about by the influence of the boards, it
would appear that by the late 19?Os boards were having no tangible effect in
this direction. In any case it would seem that discussions of quantity become
indissolubly linked with quality. We might indeed paraphrase the board official
quoted above and say that "you can't quantify quantity". Even so, given the
emphasis upon training to meet the businees needs of the firm, board staff
were hardly in a position - unless they were 'brave' enough to attempt to tell
management what those needs were - to affect numbers to any significent
extent. Firms, not boards were the arbiters of quantity. However, quantity was
also important in another respect which was to do with meeting the needs of
the industry or wider national needs, rather than the needs of the firm. We
therefore go on in the following section to examine the role of the boards in
this area and the reaction of firms to meeting - or riot - these wider needs.
U(PAGT OF THE TRAUING BOARDS: IIDUSTRY AID NATIOLP1L OBJECTIVES
The words of one ](anaging Director that "I'm not in business to train my
competitors' employees" is a sentiment that was shared by the overwhelming
majority of staff in the two industries. But that, in essence was precisely
what training boards were requesting that firms should do. We therefore turn
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in this section to examine the implications of these two, apparently opposing,
positions for the implementation of wider manpower policy.
To some extent, meeting the training needs of industry refers to those
activities which have been the concern of the previous two sections. In other
words if boards were ensuring that individual firms were meeting their own
needs adequately then the aggregated effects would contribute towards meeting
the needs of industry as a whole. Clearly the evidence presented so far casts
some doubt upon how far boards were actually contributing to firms' training
needs. However, meeting the needs of industry was not a matter over which the
boards had total control. The most important reason being that a significant
proportion of firms in the industry were excluded by size from boards'
activities. Nevertheless, over and above the aggregated needs of firms it was
claimed were broader issues of common concern and both the CAP/ITB and
CGMP/ITB initiated specific programmes of work to deal with these. In the main
these largely consisted of attempts to identify key skill imbalances within
the industry and were the outcome of the Strategic Planning processes
introduced by boards following discussion with the TSA/TSD.
The CAP/ITB published its first five year plan in 1976, updated annually
thereafter,{46) Broadly, the plan widened and changed the Board's role from
concentrating on training effectiveness in firms to additionally one of
providing for the future requirements of skilled manpower in the industry and
helping firms develop and cope with changes in manpower policies - in
particular those arising from economic, social, legislative and technological
pressures. The pursuit and achievement of the plan was dependent not only upon
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the cooperation of individual finns, but the involvement ot et'ii11 	 ii
such as the Chemicals EDC and the TSA, The Plan identified nine ij
which two are particularly relevant here.'C4?) First, the development
manpower planning capability to enable assessments to be made about map'
and training issues common to the industry and not specific to the indiida1
firm; secondly to secure adequate training arrangements in Industry to train
additional persons to meet both industry and national requirements. As can be
seen therefore the development of such plans had a dual purpose: to overcome
skill shortages within the industry concerned and thereby to contribute to the
national stock of transferable skills. The second of these, however, was to be
crucially dependent upon the cordinating role of the TSA/TSD and was part of
the MSC's attempt to develop a national manpower policy as set out in the
document Towards a Comprehensive Naz2power Folic'y{48) and as later contained
in the Training for Skills programme. One of the recommendations in Towards a
Comprehensive Kanpower Policy was the establishment of Regional Xanpower
Intelligence Centres whose principal tasks would be to analyse national and
regional data and to cary out manpower studies in their regions and advise the
'!SC about developments.
In common with the chemical, and indeed the other 21 ITBs, the strategic plan
of the CGMP/ITB channelled the activities of the board in the direction of
manpower policies. There was evident, however, a hint of reservation about this
in the Board's position as it was stated that: "In drawing up its plans the
Board reaffirmed that its main priority would remain the stimulation of
individual companies to adopt appropriate standards and practices..."{49) The
performance of such a role was obviously contingent upon the gathering of
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relevant manpower data from firms. As a basis for this all boards used the
Statutory Manpower Returns which had been instituted in 1977 and which all
companies were required to complete. Additionally information was gathered
through sample surveys. In the chemical industry, for example, this involved
visits to the establishments of some 100 firms covering all sectors and sizes,
questionnaires to all firms and discussions with Trade Associations and Trade
Unions.{50} Thus both boards were now actively pursuing strategies to achieve
a set of objectives formulated at the national level. What was less clear was
whether the strategies were the right ones and how far the boards were
equipped to carry them through. The evidence In fact points to boards
operating under a number of constraints that severely limited their
effectiveness in this area. These related to the attitudes of firms in their
industries, the structural characteristics of the boards themselves, and the
increasing Influence of the XSC on boards' activities.
The manpower survey carried out by the CGHP/ITB identified technician and
craft engineering occupations and general and production management as the
main areas of need, However, no figures were provided for prospective
shortages specifically for the pottery industry. The Board's 1979 Manpower
publication did though foresee a 7 per cent increase in technical and
professional service occupations, as against a 2 per cent expected growth for
the industry as a whole. The demand for operatives was also set to rise by 2
per cent while the demand for craft skills was forecast to drop by 6 per
cent.{51) Clearly key skill shortges did not look set to pose a problem within
the pottery industry, and as far as national shortages were concerned these
were, by and large, an irrelevant consideration as most of the skilled and
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semi-skilled occupations were not transferable but industry specific.
Interestingly a survey commissioned by the NSC Regional Office in late 197 of
training needs in North Staffordshire contradicted the Board's findings in a
number of respects. For example it was claimed that recruitment difficulties in
the ceramics sector "were concentrated among industry-specific and semi-
skilled occupations" although no severe problems were anticipated. It was
further noted, however, that there were "considerable shortcomings in the
availability of detailed and mutually compatible occupational data... .The
usefulness for survey purposes of the occupational information provided by
ITBs and other training organisations varied considerably."{52) Of all the
firms visited In the pottery industry none claimed to be training in excess of
their own requirements although two stated that they had taken on an
additional apprentice as a result of the manpower analyses carried out for the
board. In fact when questioned on this most firms assumed that they were being
asked about work experience schemes for school leavers In which about half the
firms participated - for 'social' reasons. None of the firms expressed any
serious concern about skill shortages and national skill shortages was a
subject that did not seem to have penetrated the hearts or minds of those in
the industry. Personnel in only three of the firms were familiar with the
Training for Skills programme.
In the chemical industry the major shortage was for Instrument
mechanics/technicians (reported by 75% of firms) with recruitment difficulties
being experienced for engineers, draughtsmen, engineering craftsmen,
experienced process operators, computer personnel, and laboratory technicians.
Some shortages were regional (eg instrument mechanics - predominantly in the
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North East), others were national while some were confined to large ffrm
professional engineers). Almost all were in transferable skills. The attitude
firms in the chemical industry was, however, in general also unsymatbetic tc
the view that firms should be training to meet national skill shortages. VMLst
in principle there was support for national initiatives, there was also some
resentment that individual firms were being required to shoulder a burden that
was often claimed to be the responsibility of others. Some of the larger firms,
however, did claim to have traditionally taken on more apprentices than they
needed, largely because they were 'socially responsible'. Nonetheless all of
these firms were in the process of cutting back their apprentice intake for
the following year. The reasons were broadly similar economic. Thus "[tihere
has been a debate about how many apprentices to take on because we won't need
them all. We wanted to take extra ones but the company can't afford it and no-
one else will pay. Why take lads on only to make them redundant after a year
or two. Therefore there will probably be a skill shortage when the economy
turns up."{53} There was then on the one hand an acceptance that shortages
occur and which may affect the firm at some future date, but on the other hand
there was a denial that firms had any obligation to do more than 'their fair
share'. In any case, as we shall see in a moment, many were of the view that
more training was not necessarily the solution to skill shortages.
Even though the general atitude of firms in the chemical industry was opposed
to training in excess of own needs, of some import was the evidence produced
by the CAP/ITB that the majority of firms were not in fact training to meet
their own future needs for skilled craftsmen,{4) Such evidence is particularly
significant in that it suggests that until that time the Board's interpretation
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of its role in ensuring that firms trained to meet their own business needs
was oriented towards existing, not future needs. But now the Board was
apparently attempting to ensure future supplies, when it had clearly had some
dif'ficulty in maintaining existing skills levels, and when the overall
disposition of firms can be seen to represent a barrier to achieving national
objectives in relation to skill shortages.
It is therefore pertinent at this point to consider the strategies that the
boards adopted. The proposals of the CGMP/ITB were based on a fairly
straightforward system of grants - a 'premium' grant in selected areas to
encourage companies to maintain a balance in meeting their needs for key
skills, and a 'star' grant for training to offset losses to the labour market,
Levy abatement and exemption criteria were also to be more stringently related
to key skill training needs.(55) Given, as mentioned earlier, that there were no
identified shortages in the pottery industry, the grant system had more
relevance to the other industries coming within the board's ambit, CAP/ITB's
response was rather more complex. Having analysed the industry's labour market
and employment practices in relation to the shortages identified, its proposed
courses of action envisaged a considerably expanded role for the Board.
Training for- Skills had in fact provided the Board with an opportunity which
it enthusiatically pursued to develop a new role for itself within the
industry. How far it could consolidate such a role was, however, a different
matter, It was claimed to be derived from comments received during industry
consultation which had suggested to the Board that it "should be involved in
"actual instruction" as well as acting in a purely advisory role..."{56) Thus
the Board stated that in the most acute area of shortage - instrument
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 392
Chapter Eight	 implementation and the Firm
maintenance - it would be "prepared to take overall responsibility for the
National Programme, including coordination of other ITBs involvement" {57) and
would ensure that shortfalls in apprenticeship were made good either through
sponsoring extra training places In firms or by recruiting and training its
own apprentices. In addition the Board made proposals for adult retraining and
stated its intention to give priority to its Manpower Development Planning
Programme and "give urgent attention to what additional manpower data is
required from industry, and how this might best be obtained, and monitoring
implementation of programmes." {58)
This "zealous" activity - as MSC Chairman Richard O'Brien called it{59) -
culminated In the opening of the Board's Instrument Training Centre on Teeside
on 16 May 1979 with an intake of 43 apprentIces. ?{SC funds were made
available for this project. However, the fanfare surrounding the opening of the
Centre had hardly died down when the CAP/ITB was announcing that "because of
lack of current finance and the uncertainty of future funding, it was unable to
recruit any CAP/ITB sponsored apprentices in September 1980,"{60) The grants
by which CAP/ITB were attempting to encourage employers to take on additional
apprentices came largely from the I(SC. The grant scheme was constructed to
give priority to firms already training their 'industry share', to encourage
firms who bad not previously taken on apprentices to do so, and to those
demonstrating that they were losing a disproportionate number of skilled
people. Conspicuous by its absence, however, was any reference to the
'revolution' that training for skills was .suposed to effect In reforming the
apprenticeship system. The grants provided £2,000 for the first year of
apprentices' and process plant operators' training.{61) The total funds made
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available to the Board from the MSC were £1.7million for 1979/80. Such did not,
however, represent a net increase in Board funds but rather the contrary as a
switch in resources was involved. With the start of the Training for Skills
programnle j the funding through ITBs of the Special Measures Programme ceased
and for CAP/ITB the allowance under the former was less than under the latter,
The limited finance available undoubtedly contributed to the lack of impact of
the Training for Skills programme.
Apart from the issue of finance there were, however, other serious questions
hanging over Training for Skills. One Training Manager in ICI described it asa
"non-starter". We therefore turn to examine why this might have been so.
Firstly we should consider the reliability and credibility of the information
on which the Training for Skills programme was based. Apart from the surveys
and projects undertaken or sponsored by the MSC, the most important of which
was the National Training Survey of 1975/76,{62) most of the information on
skill shortages was obtained through the ITB network. The collection of this
data. had aroused considerable resentment In most of the firms that were
visited by the author, and there are at least two reasons to suspect that some
of the boards' manpower forecasts were unsound. The first relates to the
amount of time consumed by the exercises. One large chemical company for
example estimated this to be the equivalent of about 600 man hours, while a
fairly small pottery firm put it at about two weeks full-time work. The degree
of animosity that he exercise built up is well illustrated by the following
comment on the Training for Skills survey which involved{63)
"communication of what had to be done, consultation about data
collection procedures, data collection itself, data feedback,
consultation about the consultation process for the data fed back,
the consultation itself, discussion of the outcome of the
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consultation, and finally feedback of the conclusions from the data
as moderated by the consultation. No doubt consultation about the
implementation of the conclusions will follow."
A not infrequently referred to result was that firms were not overly
particular regarding the accuracy of information supplied to the boards. "The
ITB data base is completely useless. They come round to companies and ask
'What are the skill shortages?' So we find them some" was another type of
comment.
The second, and perhaps more significant reason, was that firms were unwilling
to divulge what they considered to be confidential and sensitive Information
to outside bodies. Future manpower forecasts were capable of interpretation by
both competitors and trade unions. It was, f or instance, pointed out that firms
would be extremely circumspect about giving any information that pointed
towards possible future contractions, Similar problems of confidentiality also
affected attempts at industrial planning in the l970s.{64) Such concern about
confidentiality indeed affected training issues considered by tbe Sector
Working Parties. As Grant - notes: "In some cases, management were simply
obstructive. The working party on electronic computers was concerned about
shortages of skilled labour. However, when it contacted individual companies
for more information, five multi national companies, including IBM, refused to
give manpower forecasts, as did twenty-four out of thirty-one software
houses."{65) In this context a letter from one of the larger chemical firms
<dated 28 February 1980) to the CAP/ITB contained the statement that: "We see
problems here over issues of confidentiality. All divisions of this company
would be extremely reluctant to discuss details of new technology, markets or
products with any external agency, let alone one that Is in contact with our
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competitors. This is not to denigrate the integrity of CAPITB staff - it is
merely a fact of business life." This may have been one of the reasons why the
manpower predictions of the CGMP/ITB for the pottery industry turned out to be
significantly over optimistic for the years 197a-83. Such nlay also account for
the fact that during the course of interviews in chemical firms, even in those
regions where the Board asserted the shortages were most acute, none of the
firms claimed to be suffering any particular shortage of key skills at that
time. The serious shortage of instrument artificers was referred to by most,
but as a temporary phenomena that now seemed to have resolved itself. The
shortage was largely seen to have been created by an outfiux of workers to the
Middle East, many of whom had since returned. So, in addition to a general
predisposition not to carry out training over and above their 'fair share'
there was a considerable amount of doubt expressed within firms about the
desirability of basing additional, long-term and expensive training upon what
was often regarded as questionable data. Of major consideration in all this
was the cost element. Why, the rhetorical question was often posed, should
firms be expected to assume the additional cost of such training. Grants of
£2,000 were considered to be "derisory" when set against the total cost of
apprenticeship training - which was variously placed between £15,000 and
£25,000.
A mixture of reluctance and scepticism at the firm level was therefore acting
as a considerable constraint upon boards' ability to have any real impact on
training to meet wider national objectives. Such scepticiism was to do with the
nature and extent of skill shortages: were they real or illusory? And even if
real was a training solution the most appropriate response? The evidence of a
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detailed study of skill shortages in West Central Scotland, for instance, had
placed training related reasons in seventh and eighth positions out of fourteen
in factors contributing to skills shortages. Factors seen as more important
were: workers being attracted away by other local employers; a general rise in
the demand for shortage labour; poor quality labour; anti-social hours of work;
and difficult journeys to work.{66) The importance of training as a solution
was also an issue about which the CBI exhibited a degree of caution:{67}
The situation is full of paradoxes. Shortages are persistently
reported in areas of high unemployment among skilled people.
Rationally, skilled unemployment has been rising slightly and
vacancies falling. Overall there is 1 vacancy for every 3,3 skilled
unemployed but not all such vacancies are notified to ESA. The ESA
reports that investigations of individual cases quite often show
that shortages are over-stated, even illusory, or have obvious
causes such as particularly unattractive pay and conditions."
The paper went on to conclude that "there certainly are shortages" but that
"Eflnadequate recruitment and training is one cause but by no means the sole
cause' of such shortages. Among the possible causes the following were set out
(In no order of importance):{68)
-	 over-long apprenticeships
-	 poor educational standards of young applicants for training
-	 poor quality of adult applicants for jobs
-	 diminished pay differentials and rewards far skill
-	 relative lack of job security
-	 insufficient scope for the use of skills learnt
-	 restrictive parctices in employment
-	 Insufficient labour mobility
-	 lack of manpower planning
Some important modifications had occurred in the area of craft/skill training
during the past decade - mainly due to the work of the Engineering Industry
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Training Board - such as a reduction in the length of apprenticeship to four
years, off-the-job first year training, and the introduction of the module
systeni.(69) Nevertheless the system itself had remained essentially the sanie
carrying with it the same structural constraints that we have discussed in
earlier chapters. Indeed, it became quite clear during the course of the
interviews that restrictive labour practices were at the very least perceived
to be the single most important barrier to increasing the supply of skills
Such was not only the opinion of management and training staff, but was also
admitted by many of the trade union representatives seen. None of the firms in
the chemical industry took TOPS trainees that had completed courses in craft
trades: some had attempted to and had experienced the kind of problem reported
by one firm that had engaged three mechanics only to have to send them off
the site five days later when their 'status' was discovered by the unions.
Similar problems were reported with attempts to retrain workers when this
included upgrading or relaxing skill boundaries, Most firms reported some
improvements in obtaining agreements to introduce greater flexibility of
deployment, but this was generally between skilled trades - except that
between mechanical and electrical engineering - with little progress having
been made between the craft and semi-skilled divide.
There is an obvious conflict here with certain parts of the evidence
considered earlier and which concluded that as a cause of skill shortages
restrictive practices were not of major significance. We need to briefly
examine why this might be so. One possible reason may be that the demarcation
problem became more acute during the 1970s as structural and technological
changes in industry gained pace giving greater significance to the need for
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better utilisation of existing manpower resources. Further, successive attempts
by governments to control pay and. prices had, by the late 1970s, led many
unions to claim that pay differentials had been seriously eroded, thus
reinforcing unions' attachment to craft boundaries. And in a situation of
increasing unemployment it is difficult to see unions assenting to flexibility
agreements which in effect reduces the marketability or transferability of
skills. In other words it is in the interest of the craft unions to maintain
transferability at as high a level as possible: flexibility of deployment
reduces transferability by adapting skills more closely to the needs of the
individual employer. As a joint NEDO/I(SC study of engineering 'shortages'
pointed out, such a situation is likely to be more pronounced where there is a
lack of security of exnployment.{70) It is possible therefore that in the past,
causes other than restrictive practices had been referred to more often by
employers because the existing system tended to be treated as a 'structural
given' by both management and unions. This may be one reason why firms relied
heavily upon the local labour market rather than upon the internal labour
market of the firm to fill a particular vacancy. A similar point has been made
about the car industry in Britain by I'arsden et al who claim this to be a
much more frequent occurance in Britain than in most other industrialised
nations, in particular because the costs of negotiating greater flexibility
were seen by management as too high. They also point out that the greater
success of foreign competitors in utilising the internal labour market of the
firm to overcome skill shortages is linked to an increased willingness by
management to enter into agreements which enhance job security.{71) However,
despite the costs involved, some of the larger firms in the chemical industry
were engaged in attempts to tackle the demarcation issue, and many believed
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that the problem of skill shortage would not be overcome until this had been
achieved. If this is correct then it clearly casts further doubt upon the
capacity of the Training for Skills programme to tackle skill shortages as it
was an approach that predicated shortages of skills against existing manning
practices, rather than future requirements. In other words it failed to give
sufficient weight to industrial relations issues, or even to future skill
requirements resulting from technological changes.
On top of all this, there is one final, but important point that needs to be
addressed. We have noted above the importance of the local labour market in
recruitment practices. One of the problems when discussing key or transferable
skills shortages is that they are not predominantly shortages at the national
or even industry level. Shortages occur in different mixes of intensity in
different parts of the country and unless there exists a highly coordinated
and sophisticated manpower intelligence capacity, training boards that are
industry based are strucurally inadequate for the task, By definition,
transferable skills flow across industries. Because a board's information is
derived only from its own industry it may, therefore, actually encourage excess
training where there might, in fact exist regional surplusses due to the amount
of training being carried out in other Industries (or vice versa). It Is clear
that the MSC had become aware of the difficulties that this posed and was
increasingly concentrating its efforts on building up information about local
labour markets through Its own regional/district offices,
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CONGL1JSIOIS
The analysis presented in this chapter would indicate that there were four
major factors operating to make the position of the boards increasingly
tenuous in having an important role to perform in the implementation of
industrial training policy. These four factors are interrelated. In making an
overall assessment of the boards' impact on training we have to take account
of the characteristics and dynamics of the policy context within which they
operated. This is not simply necessary because the performance of implementing
agencies needs to be set against some notion of policy, but is important in
establishing the deeper constraints impinging on the boards' work rather than
just focussing upon ostensible behavioural explanations, eg low competence,
lack of resolve, recalcitrance. Further, it should clarify what the most
effective solutions - either at the strategic policy or implementation levels -
were open to reconcile the needs of national policy with the needs of
individual firms given the conclusions we have reached on the limited impact
of the boards as the intermediary bodies.
These four factors then may be set out as follows:
1. That following the 1973 Act the role of the boards had become
increasingly ambiguous.
2, That the problem that boards were addressing was not necessarily
the 'correct' one.
3. That boards were inadequately structured to achieve the
objectives of policy as it had developed.
4. That boards did not seem to have managed to generate any broad
or stable coalition of supporters - either from within their
industries or above.
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Thus in relation to the first of these factors, the boards may be represented
as attempting to achieve some kind of equilibrium between three types of
pressure. Two were external in the form of the demands of their constituents
and the demands of the centre, the other was internal in the form of boards'
own preferred courses of action. On the one hand existing to serve the
business needs of firms, on the other increasingly being used as instruments
for the achievement of national policy objectives, boards' ability to affect
either was hampered by their statutory and financial bases, of which the
latter bad been gradually eroded and subjected to increasing control from the
centre, This limited boards' freedom to respond and adapt to the different
needs of firms while at the same time in the eyes of many excused them from
having to justify their interventions against any criteria of business
efficiency. Such a situation generated considerable tensions between the
advisory roles that the boards wished to pursue with the need to maintain
some statutory powers. This was perhaps more acute in the chemical industry
where there is evidence that the standard of training was higher than that of
the pottery industry and the where the CAP/ITB more clearly wished to pursue a
consultancy/advisory role. Although regarded as an essential part of the
CGMP/ITBs operations, the advisory functions were more of a 'back-up'
reflecting the standard of training in the industry. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of training intervention was also contingent upon the accuracy of
the information available to boards. But such information had to come largely
from firms who, as we have seen, were none too keen to supply the boards, and
what information was supplied seems in many cases to have been suspect. In
short, the constraints that these conflicting pressures imposed served not
only to limit the impact that boards could have in affecting training
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decisions, but limited boards' ability to maneouvre the situation so as to
improve their effectiveness. There was, in other words little, if any,
passiblilty of policy development through [TBs. If anything, we might argue
that, as far as national policy objectives in particular were concerned, boards
had been responsible for some displacement of policy, but that this was a kind
of 'enforced' displacement resulting from the exigencies of the situation and
boards' limited capacity to respond.
The second factor that we have identified relates to the problem that boards
were addressing. One reason that might be put forward, however, to explain the
limited impact that ITBs were having is that they were too weak as
instruments of intervention, and had become even weaker post-1973. If this
were so then an obvious solution might be to provide the boards with greater
powers and resources, Whilst this may have overcame some of the difficulties,
it would not have fundamentally altered the situation. The reason being that
the problem of inadequate training extended much wider than training issues,
most notably into the 'knotty' realm of industrial relations and was subject to
the same kind. of econoic pressures - the state of the order book,
technological changes - that affected other kinds of investment decision. Such
factors were clearly beyond the reach of the boards. The remit of the boards
limited their activities and, thereby their impact, to training matters.
Therefore, simply enhancing the power of boards would certainly not have led
to any 'critical breakthrough' in the achievement of policy objectives.
Furthermore, as we have seen, firms did not react positively to even mild or
weak forms of intervention and were concerned to retain their autonomy in the
training field, This was especially true of firms that had developed their own
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internal personnel and training arrangements. Thus, giving boards greater
powers of enforcement, inspection and so on, may only have served to generate
a level of conflict that would make it more, riot less, difficult for boards to
achieve a greater impact, and would have done little to address the wider
issues involved.
The third factor refers to the structural inadequacies of the boards. So long
as they remained structured on an industry basis the difficulties created by
local and regional labour market imbalances would remain - unless the ISA
greatly expanded and developed its role in this direction. Attempting to match
the supply and demand for labour will be relatively ineffective where the
prime effort is expended in increasing the total supply without much regard to
the variability of factors affecting demand. A national approach to skill
shortages directed largely through industry based boards is significantly
misplaced if, for instance, shortages are a regional or local problem.
Our final conclusion is that training boards had failed to generate a stable
basis of support for their activities. Apart from the above, the reasons for
this are to be found in the contradictions inherent in the policy itself and
the implicit, but 'unrealistic' expectations this placed upon the boards.
Overall, there is little doubt that in both of the industries studied the ITBs
had been responsible for stimulating improvements in training performance and
efficiency (despite the obvious difficulties of measurement) and in the view of
boards thereby contributing to wealth creation. But having reached such a
position, the KSC/TSD was effectively saying that boards should not simply
promote training to meet the individual needs of firms, but that training
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should also be promoted to meet wider national needs. This brings us back to
the internal logic of the policy itself and the question of how far what was
rational behaviour at the national level was compatible with what was rational
behaviour at the level of the individual firm. The economic needs of the state
required that the total level of skills supply should be increased. But being
premissed on the view that it was industry's responsibility to provide
training meant that industry bad to voluntarily supply the increase. However,
as we have seen, the costs arid benefits of training were treated In much the
same way as any other form of investment decision by the firm and employers
did not regard it as being In their individual interests to train above their
own needs. Industrial training policy had never fully addressed the
contradictions inherent in this situation. It had neither made it sufficiently
in the Interests of firms to 'comply' with national priorities - through
financial incentives or by giving attention to other structural constraints -
nor had it been prepared to use more coercive means. To some extent it had
adopted a bit of each approach and therefore riot had much impact with either.
Structured as they were ITBs had, in overall terms, probably achieved as much
as they were capable of: that skill shortages persisted had more to do with
the logic of the policy and its narrowness of conception than with
Implementation 'failure'. This meant therefore that a lack of support from
below was being matched by a growing awareness from above that ITBs were
inappropriate instruments for the achievement of national policy objectives.
The existence of the ITB system did not lead to the creation of the 'virtuous
training circle' that the policy was obviously intended to secure. Furthermore,
due to the conflicting constraints and pressures under which boards were
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operating there was little scope for them to engage in any form of policy
development, This and the preceding chapter demonstrate that where policy
development was taking place it was at the central, not the sectoral, level.
Perhaps not surprisingly, it was the Manpower Services Commission and the
Training Services Division that were actively pursuing the development of
industrial training policy, and in this process ITBs had come to occupy a
place much more on the periphery.
We have obviously been drawing general conclusions about the operation of
industrial training policy from an analysis of two industries. Whilst the
performance of the other ITBs was variable - the most 'successful' being the
Engineering ITB which in some ways could be regarded as something of a 'trail-
blazer' - we would argue that the evidence suggests that in the majority of
cases such conclusions are sound. And in fact, the issues which we have
examined in this chapter were to assume a much greater degree of prominence
during the subsequent twa years as in 1979 the MSC began a major review of
the operation of the 1973 Employment and Training Act. It is the process of
this review that we therefore turn to examine in the following chapter.
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THH r1aCES. QI' CHANGE: TH.E RJE V LEW OF
THE 1973 RIVIPI,Q YMEN T AND TRA IN ING ACT
This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the processes that led to the
formal changes in industrial training policy between early 1978 and late 1981:
the most important of these changes being the abolition of seventeen
Industrial Training Boards and the promulgation of the New Training Initiative
- ostensibly a 'new' set of policy proposals. This chapter is concerned with
the former of these changes while the New Training Initiative will be
considered in chapter 10. The reasons why changes were deemed necessary had
mainly to do with dissatisfaction with existing arrangements of the kind
discussed in the previous chapter. However, an explanation about the form that
the changes took requires us to go beyond elaborating the 'shortcomings' of
the training system, to an examination of the decision-making process itself,
for the process was at least as important as the failings of the existing
system in influencing the type of changes involved. That is the changes were
Just as much the outcome of a political as well as a 'technical/rational'
process. To illustrate the point, whilst we might claim that by 1979 ITBs had
few supporters within industry and although there were complaints about
boards' operations, there was little evidence of great hostility such that the
continued existence of boards in some form was seriously questioned. By mid-
Analysing Policy Change: industrial Training in Britain	 Page 413
Chapter line	 Review of the 1?3 Employment and Training Act
1980, however, many industries were actively involved in promoting schemes
that would lead to the winding up of their ITB. In other words, what occurred
during this period was significant in shaping the direction of poiiçy change in
this area.
The main focus of the chapter is the Review of the Emp'oyment and Training Act
(RETA) 1973 and the series of events to which this gave rise. The analysis
draws largely upon information and material obtained during this period from
those involved in the 'process of change'. Thus the author was given access to
CBI files as well as much of the time of permanent staff. A considerable
number of interviews were conducted with the MSC/TSD officials who made up
the Review Team and who were responsible for servicing the Review Body. The
views of all ITBs were canvassed as were those of a number of employer
organisations and trade associations. In addition the progress of training
arrangements in the chemical industry was followed through by interviews and
material obtained from a number of companies, most notably ICI.
TEE GENESIS OF CHANGE
The Earl of Gowrie who, following the Conservative Party's election victory in
May 1979, had become Minister of State at the DE with responsibility f or
training, stated in December of that year that "since taking office again we
have indicated our concern that arrangements in this [industrial training]
field need to be related closely to the present and prospective skill needs of
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industry, and to be cast-effective. Ta this end we have set in motion a
review..,"{l) Such a review - Review of the Employment and Training Act 1973
(RETA) - was indeed in •
 progress, but the credit did not belong to the new
Conservative administration although the existence of a new government was to
have an important bearing upon the outcome. The review was in fact part of the
XSC's ongoing review process and had Its origins in the 1977 Review and Plan
which stated that: "there should In two years' time be a review of the progress
made under the 1973 Act as it relates to training by industry. The review
would cover the ITB and non-ITB sectors and would consider such questions as
whether under the existing arrangements not only firms' training needs but the
wider needs of industry as a whole are being met."{2} Initially it appears the
review was to be an internal exercise, carried out by TSD officials. However,
as the relationship between the TSD and ITBs became increasingly strained
during the intervening two years many ITB staff were apprehensive that such a
review would lack balance because firstly they would have no influence over It,
and secondly It did not open up to scrutiny the performances of the
NSC/TSD.{3) The logic of such arguments was difficult to refute and pressure
from the boards (sometimes with the support of individual companies) was
succesful in widening the scope of the review anâ. opening it up to 'mir
interests.
Thus the eventual terms of reference were fairly broad and although they did
not specifically mention either the 1(SC or TSD - or even indeed the ITBs - a
consideration of their roles would clearly be encompassed in the review. The
terms of reference were:{4)
To review the working of the Employment and Training Act 1973 so
far as it relates to arrangements for the promotion of training for
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employment, together with the provision of further education closely
associated with industrial training, and the links between them, and
to recommend how these arrangements should be altered or developed
for the future, having particular regard to:-
(1) The future needs of the economy for trained manpower of all
kinds.
(ii) The needs of workers, including young people entering
employment.
(iii)The efficient working of the labour market nationally and
locally.
(iv) The need to ensure the economical and effective use of public
funds.
Formal responsibility for the review was vested in a Review Body, chaired by
the Chairman of the SC and which was scheduled to report by July 1980. Its
composition was; {5}
EXBERS OF THE REVIEW BODY
Mr R O'Brien	 Manpower Services Commission 1
 Chairman
Mr A B Berry	 Director, Coventry and District Engineering Employers
Assoc iat ion
Mr GA Brinsdon Director of Education, Metropolitan Borough of Sandwell
Mr F Chapple	 General Secretary, Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and
Plumbing Union
Mr N Clarke
Mr K R Cooper
Mr M Downing
Mr 0 B Edwards
Mr K Gill
Mr P Naxby
Mr I F Honess
Mr J Monks
Mr J Phillips
Mr E Tindall
Director of Personnel Services, British Steel Corporation
Chief Executive, Training Services Division, MSC
Secretary, CBI, Manpower Services Advisory Board
Principal, Rotherham College o	 log
General Secretary, Technical, Administrative and Supervisory
Section, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
Deputy Chief Executive, ISO, MSC
Chairman, Rubber and Plastics Processing Industry Training Board
Head of Organisation and Industrial Relations Department, TUC
Chairman, Distributive Industry Training Board
Director General, Road Transport Industry Training Board
Even though formal responsibility had been given to representatives from a
range of interests there was still some dissatisfaction with the Review Body's
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composition. In particular education and private industry complained of being
under-represented,6) while others still saw the review as an internal MSC
exercise which thus lacked legitimacy and credibility. Lord Mottistone, himself
a former member of the Distributtve Industry Training Board, for example
argued that "...with the best possible will in the world I do not think it quite
appropriate for a body to conduct its own inquiry into itself".{7)
THE CONTEXT OF TEE REVIEW
The beginning of the Review Body's deliberations - its first meeting was on 7
June 1979 - coincided with the coming to office of a new government whose
specific views about training were uncertain other than a manifesto
commitment to review the relationship between schools, further education arid
training. {8)The Government was, however, committed to reducing public
expenditure as well as the number of Quangos and the amount of regulations
'imposed' on industry. On all three counts the MSC and ITBs were clearly in the
'firing line'. An early indication of this was the expenditure cut of £110
million (16%) and a 3 per cent cut in staffing imposed on the LSC in 3une
1979 for the year already begun,{9} Seine of these were passed on to ITBs who
complained bitterly about having their budgets cut so far into the financial
year. The boards' total operating costs for 1979 were reduced by
£9.8miilion,{10) leaving them at £42.3mlllion.{11) Thus the Ceramics ITB reported
a 20 per cent cut in expenditure and a 12 per cent cut in staffing levels,
while the Chemical Board was subject to an expenditure cut of 19 per cent.{12)
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The situation worsened in December 1979 and January and March 1980 when
further cuts were annonced which required the Commission to find savings of
£169 million in 1980-81 and staff savings of 3,400 by 1984. Further cuts
amounting to £80 million and 1,710 posts were incorporated Into its Plan for
1981-85.(13) The cutbacks forced the Commission to re-examine its priorities -
although some argued that this was not before time as in the past a number of
programmes had been subject to underspending,{14) Thus to meet a situation of
what was termed increasing need but diminishing resources the Commission
adopted three main priorities which were:{15)
to safeguard the provision of skilled manpower for Industry's needs.
Support for training in skilled and technical occupations will be
stepped up, but numbers trained under the Training Opportunities
Scheme will fall from over 70,000 to about 60,000 a year;
to increase opportunities for training and work experience for young
people. The Youth Opportunities Programme will be expanded to help
250-260,000 young people next year;
to provide a completely modern employment service able to help
people quickly into jobs. The jobcentre network will be completed,
but staffing reductions mean that some specialist services will be
merged into the general employment service.
Following criticism by the Employment Select Committee,<16) however, a fourth
objective was incorporated into the Commission's Plan for 1981-85 which
was: <17)
to do all that is practicable to place in permanent employment, in
training or in temporary employment those unemployed jobseekers who
most need help In returning to work.
Thus the areas most affected by the cuts were certain of the MSC's training
services, in particular the Training Opportunities Scheme. Interestingly, TOPS
had itself been subject to a review only the year before RETA began, a fact
which generated the observation that RETA was therefore only a partial review
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as TOPS was specifically excluded from the deliberations. The TOPS review had
revealed a mismatch between the 'social' and economic objectives of the scheme
and it was therefore planned to bring the courses more in line with employer
and labour market needs, particularly where there were continuing skill
shortages. Although the target of 100,000 completions per year had by 1976
been virtually achieved, long-term numerical targets were to be abandoned and
replaced by annual reviews of the needs of the various labour markets and the
wider national training system - in the light of current economic conditions.
Even so, projections to 1982/3 suggested a completion rate of 107,700.{18) The
effect of the expenditure cuts two years later was a virtual halving of the
number of completions for 1980. The one area that was not subject to
expenditure constraints - but which on the contrary continued to grow rapidly
was that of special programmes. In fact by 1980 there had been a considerable
shift in the balance of the Commission's resources whereby expenditure on
special employment measures (Job Creation Programme, Work Experience
Programme, Community Industry, Special Temporary Employment Measures and the
Youth Opportunities Programme) had risen from around 7,5% in 1976/77 as a
proportion of the total budget of .578.8million, (at 1980 survey prices) to
28.5% of the 725.1million budget for 1979/80. Moreover this was planned to
rise to 48% of the 1983/84 budget of £840million.<19) The Commission - and its
chairman in particular - was not slow to point to the effects of these
expenditure constraints particularly at a time when the unemployment situation
was rapidly deteriorating. Such reductions, it was argued, could not be "offset
by increased efficiency. Some reductions in services are inescapableN. A bleak
picture of the future was presented:{20)
Mprom the time it was set up, the Commission has sought to advance
a comprehensive manpower policy... .Employment and unemployment
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prospects are critical to its planning. The prospects over the next
18 months and beyond are now daunting - unemployment will rise
sharply and remain historically high throughout the Commission's 4-
year planning period. Major redundancies are in prospect in steel,
shipbuilding and other industries and will alive a sharp impact in
particular towns and districts. Meanwhile the size of the labour
force is growing. Unemployment is likely to rise disproportionately
for young people....Shortages of skilled workers may ease while
unemployment is rising, but intakes of young trainees could be
seriously affected."
There was occurring, therefore, a considerable shift in emphasis and resources
away from measures designed to have an impact on correcting structural
deficiencies in the labour market. Instead, it was to the politically more
salient group of young school leavers that resources were increasingly being
devoted, with the Commission giving priority to fulfilling Its 'Easter
undertaking' - first introduced at YOP's inception on 1 April 1978 - of the
offer of a place to all summer school leavers by the following Easter, But, as
the Commision pointed out in Its Draft Corporate plan for 1981-8, this was to
the detriment of other programmes:{21}
DrawIng up this year's Corporate Plan has faced the Commission
with hard and painful decisions which we believe are not In the
interests of the development of manpower policy in Britain. Last
year we expressed the view that our response to the needs of the
labour market was inadequate. This year we have again had to reduce
sharply the resources devoted to the employment and training
services. The growth of the Commissions special programmes should
not obscure the downward course of expenditure and staff on these
services to the labour market,"
It was against this background that the Review Body carried oub its work, One
question that we shall be considering therefore is the extent to which the
Government's priorities had a bearing upon the cogitations of the Review Body
and therefore influenced the final report. The nature of the review had been
characterised by Richard O'Brien (MSC Chairman, 1976-1982) as "one of the most
important exercises which the MSC has undertaken during my period as
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chairman.. .CIt] provides the first opportunity to take a comprehensive and
fundamental look at the operation of the various institutions and to judge
whether they continue to be fully relevant in rapidly changing circumstances
to meet the future training needs of industry and the nation. We are concerned
both with fundamental aims and with the means and the cost of attaining
them."C221 However the Government's actions were seen as posing a threat to
such a purpose, particularly by the trade union members of the Review Body.
The minutes of the second meeting disclose that the first matter raised for
discussion was the impact that the change of government was likely to have
upon the review. It was felt by John Monks of the TUC that the "known
attitudes of Government could be held to pre-empt the work of the Review in a
major and fundamental way. It seemed as if the whole context had now changed
from one in which the objective had been to face up honestly to deficiencies
in the present institutional arrangements with a view to reforming them to
improve performance, to one in which it would now be necessary to defend the
ITBs against threats of their possible disbandment." And further Mr Gill and
Mr Chapple stressed that the TUG could not be party to a process in which
their criticisms of the ITBs could be used as evidence to destroy them."<23)
This was the first but not the last instance where such views surfaced and
where TUG representatives needed to be prevented from walking out.{24) For
instance, such fears were further fuelled by the publication of the Pliatzky
Report on non-departmental public bodies {25) early the following year and
Richard O'Brien was again constrained to try and. convince the trade union
representatives that the Government would take no decisions affecting ITBs in
advance of the Review Body's report.{26) flow far Richard O'Brien was persoriaUy
convinced of this must remain a matter for some speculation.
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EARLY DEL IBERAT ICINS
Two months prior to the first meeting of the Review Body on 7 June 1979, a
new section was created within the TSD to deal with the review. Initially this
contained only two officials, but a further four were added later. Collectively
they made up the Review Team, The first task of the Review Team was to
prepare proposals for a working programme and programme of research to
present to the Review Body for its endorsement. The point was made at this
first meeting that "the Review Team must be given clear directions as to the
broad thrust of the enquiry but thereafter, given the exigencies of the
timetable must be free to take initiatives within a clearly understood
framework."C27} What clearly emerges from this and from subsequent minutes and
papers is that the Review Team had a significant influence upon the
structuring of the Review - both in terms of the approach to be adopted and in
setting the agenda: in other words the so called framework within which the
Review Team was to be working was in actuality largely detrmined by the
Review Team itself. To be sure the Review Body carried responsibility for the
final report, but it is somewhat unrealistic to expect that a group of people
who met on only ten occasions during the course of a year could have given the
kind of detailed consideration n.ecessary to the identification and formulation
of future policy options - except perhaps for the NSC chairman and the two
senior TSD officials who were members of the Review Body. Thus the Review
Team was not only in the position of collecting, collating, analysing and
presenting information, but was well placed to 'guide' the scope and direction
of the review. It should not at this stage, however, be assumed that this
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automatically implies that the Review Team was therefore responsible for the
outcome of the review.
The programme that the Review Team put before the Review Body was broadly
divided into two phases: the 'analytic', concerned with the past performance of
the system and the 'judgemental', concerned with the most appropriate
orgarilsational arrangements for the future. Included in the former category was
a series of 'research' programmes, most of them 'in-house', which would attempt
to assess the effectiveness of the component parts of the training system and
the system as a whole as they had developed since the 1973 Act in both the
board and non-board sectors. This was to be set within an analysis of the
relevant environmental factors - economic, demographic, institutional - which
retrospectively and prospectively might be held to influence the approach,
performance and results in training output. External research was also
commisloned, for which the MSC had provided a budget of £200,000. These
projects examined: the factors influencing firms' training decisions; a
comparative study of vocational training arrangements In France, Sweden, West
Germany and the United States; and the working of the levy exemption
arrangements.
In Its paper the Review Team considered that one crucial input would be the
judgements of "customers" of the training system. A major consultative exercise
was therefore initiated in July whereby: "In addition to CBI members we wrote
out to the main educational organisations, to all ITBs to their equivalents in
the non-ITB sector, to a limited number of interested organisations such as
1PM, BIN, via the TUC to all affiliated unions, and through a press notice to
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the world at large."<28) The questionnaire that was despatched to what were
referred to as ukey organisations"C29} asked for comments around the following
points: main streogths and weaknesses of the training system; quality of
training; responsiveness of the training system to change; industry's ability
to Influence national training objectives and priorities; the small firm
dimension; regional and local training needs; role of 1'!anpower Services
Training Services Division; extent of organisation 's direct involvement in
industrial training. When the problems had been Identified and analysed it was
proposed that ITBs and other participants would be consulted "after Christmas",
about the possible options, before coming to a final conclusion. As we shall
see later, the second stage of the consultation process never materialised.
Clearly, at least in ters of coverage, such a programme would appear
consistent with a thorough, fundamental review. If, however, we go beyond the
scope of the proposals and examine where the emphasis was placed, it becomes
apparent that the main focus of attention was to be directed towards the
future relevance of the ITB system. For instance, as an 'illustration' of the
possibilities should the Review Body wish to consider change in the existing
organisational arrangements the following were put forward: "revert to the pre-
1964 arrangements, abolish the ITBs and rely entirely on firms' own unaided
efforts to provide for their perceived training needs OR replace the individual
industry oriented ITB system by a national Training Agency which would
concentrate exclusively or predominantly upon training for cross-sector skill
shortages."{30) There are obviously a whole range of possibilities in between,
but none of them are mentioned and neither is the role of the MSC/TSD except
somewhat obliquely in relation to the second possibility (it is not clear
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whether or not the first includes the continuation of the HSC in some form, as
again no reference to it is made - but one might assume that it would).
Further, a five page 'annex' of suggested additional questions that was placed
bethre the Review Body related almost exclusively to ITBs. It included
questions such as "How are the Boards' objectives determined and by whom? How
much government influence is there on them? How often have the government's
views on objectives and therefore priorities been ignored? To what extent is
industry consulted or involved in making decisions about operational
objectives?" Other questions were listed under a variety of headings including:
planning, consultation, manpower information, organisation and administration,
criteria for assessing performance, and the extent to which nationally
perceived training needs are being met. The annex also contained a note that a
list of questions was in preparation for use in assessing the role of the
NSC/TSD. It was, however, not until the fourth meeting of the Review Body on 5
February 1980, that a paper was prepared by the Review Team on the role of
TSD's Industry Directorate and its relationship with the boards.
What, in other words, is being suggested is that from the beginning the role
of the ITBs assumed a relatively significant place in the review and that one
reason for this was that the Review Team were strategically placed to guide
the Review Body's remit. Another reason though is that two key areas were
specifically excluded from consideration. One we have mentioned above, which
was the TOPS scheme, the other was the Tr'ainizig for Skills programme, both of
which were primarily the province of the MSC. Indeed the background note which
accompanied the consultative letter sent to those organisations invited to
comment on the working of the Act contained the revealing passage that:{31)
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TMAlthough the retraining activities of the Training Opportunities
Scheme (TOPS) are clearly part of the national training system, the
review body has concluded that it would not be right to duplicate
the recent review of those activities by the MSC. Nor Is It the
intention of the Review Body to review the workings of the recently
instituted Training for Skills Programme for Action (TOSPA) in
which the ITBs are closely involved. Respondents should not
therefore conclude that Just because TOSPA is outside the scope of
the Review, the Review Body has decided already that the ITB system
should continue unchanged. The issue remains open... .The Review will
need to examine most carefully, against the background of their part
performance and achievements in the light of the differing
circumstances of the industries in which they serve, the future
relevance of the ITBs to the satisfaction of the future training
needs of the nation, of industry and of individuals."
There was no similar reference to the possible future relevance of the }ISC or
TSD.
On the basis of Interviews conducted, the orientation of other participants in
the review seems to have been to achieve as much agreement as possible. Or as
it was put by a member of the Review Team, there was a strong tendency
towards consensus". This is not to deny the differences of view that as we
shall see became more marked in some areas as the review progressed: desiring
agreement is one thing, achieving it is another, It does, however, perhaps
reveal a substantial degree of commitment - though the extent of this varied
between the different interests - to existing arrangements In which all had
some stake. It might also be taken as an indication that few were willing to
consider the possibility of significant or radical change. The conservative
nature of the final Report could be used in support of such a proposition. This
was certainly the view put forward by a member of the Review Team during the
course of an interview and who claimed that although the Review Body took the
view that the review was about whether or not there should be radical change,
they were unanimously agreed that there should not be. This may have been for
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one of - or some combination of - three reasons. Firstly it is likely that
radical alternatives would have destabilised the 'negotiated order'{32) that bad
been established in training policy. Recommending the abolition of the ITB
system ctould, for example, certainly not have been acceptable to the TUC.
Vhilst the CBI was perhaps less convinced of the benefit of the board system
there was at the time value placed upon the fostering of cooperative links
between the two organisations in the training area and to which It was
believed the existing structures had contributed. Thus Insofar as it was
possible, the CBI wished to secure some common ground and sought not to
jeopardise this unnecessarily.{33) Secondly, it is conceivable that in any case
the participants believed that radical change was not necessary and that
shortcomings in the existing arrangements could be made through modifications
or adjustments. Thirdly, the view was expressed by a number of participants
that any major new arrangements would be likely to mean extra cast and
possibly the creation of additional structures which would almost certainly
not have enainoured them to the Government. Even had radical alternatives been
seriously contemplated therefore, if they were likely to be rejected by the
l(inister then there would be little point in putting them farward.
THE CBI AID EXPLOYER ATTITUDES
There is, however, one important qualification that needs to be made to the
contention that radical alternatives were nat up for consideration, which also
casts doubt on the claim for unanimity and was to have an important bearing
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upon the policy changes that finally emerged. That is that whilst the CR1 was
not pressing for radical changes it was strongly of the view that the possible
options - radical or otherwise - should have been subject to wider
consultation before the Review Body submitted its report. Initially it had
indeed been the plan to hold consultations sometime after Christmas with ITBs,
non-board organisations, employers through the CBI, employees through the TUC,
training and further education consultative groups, and local authority
associations. Because of the work schedule and associated time constraints,
however, this was put back to after Easter.{34) But when, at the beginning of
April 1980, the Review Body came to consider the draft discussion docuinent{35)
prepared by the Review Team "the Chairman said that there was not sufficient
basis of agreement about the purpose and form of the Discussion Document to
permit it to be redrafted by the Review Team for circulation to interested
parties within the tight time constraints facing the Review.,.,The Review Body
then considered ETA(RB)80/19 as an internal document, not irrelevant to the
Review Team's work on drafting the final Report."36) Thus considerations of
what was to be included in the Review Body's report became increasingly
contentious as the CBI came to feel that the weight of opinion was likely to
result in recommendations that would, in some important respects, be
unacceptable to its membership and as such could not be supported.
There may, therefore, be a fourth reason why radical change was not
forthcoming: that those who wished at least to consider the possibility failed
to have it placed on the agenda. Such seems to have been fate of the CBI. The
CBI in fact seems to have got itself into a difficult position at this time.
Its representatives on the Review Body tended to adopt a reactive attitude
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towards possible alternatives, The point was made by the Review Team at the
first meeting that the Review Body should not commit itself to any particular
option until all the evidence had been analysed. Until then any views about
future arrangements should, it was suggested, be regarded as general
'aspirations' rather than as some 'blueprint'. This had been accepted by
members of the Review Body. But its practical implication was that the
initiative could be taken by those who did have some clear position and came
forwards with specific proposals, in which case they would be in a position to
guide the deliberations rather than react to them. If such proposals were
unacceptable to other interests, then unless counter-proposals could be brought
forward, the initiative would remain elsewhere. It was in this way that the
CBI, in fact, lost the initiative to the TUC. Whilst the CBI representatives
were prepared to consider a number of options, Including radical ones, they
were not prepared to commit themselves to any. The main reason being that
they had no clear stance about the 'best possible' future arrangements because
of the ambiguity surrounding the views of the CBI's membership. The CBI's
position at this time would support the observations made by Grant and Marsh
that the diversity of the organisation's membership confronts the CBI with a
recurrent problem. That is, in balancing the requirements of accurately voicing
the opinions of all of its members, and aggregating those opinions into a
well-informed, representative policy. The difficulties inherent in this have
often resulted in the CE1 'sitting on the fence' in relation to a variety of
issues.{37) The trade union representatives on the other hand were in a
position to commit their membership to particular proposals, whilst the
educational representatives could be more independent as they were not
constrained by considerations of constituents' reactions.
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Part of the explanation for the CBI's attitude is to be found in the results of
their own review of the work of ITBs which they had conducted during 1978/79
in anticipation of the forthcoming MSC Review and which it was hoped could be
used as a contribution to the review process. It is absolutely clear from the
list of topics on which the CBI was seeking the views of its membership, that
there was no suggestion or contemplation of the disbandment of the ITB system.
Thus in Septernber 1978 members were asked to comment on the following, which
in the main were those aspects that had given rise to dissatisfaction prior to
the 1973 Act:{38)
(i) existing criteria for exemption from levy or levy abatement
systems and their equity;
(ii appropriateness of exclusion levels for smaller firms;
(iii) the requirements of the training boards for employee
involvement in training plans;
(iv) the uses to which ITBs put funds raised by levies;
(v) methods used by ITBs to forecast manpower requirements in
different categories and their effectiveness;
(vi) whether there is any case for rationalisation amongst ITBs,
f or more standardisation of administrative procedures, or
for the sharing of resources and facilities;
(vii) whether the fact that industrial catering staff are within
the scope of the Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board
is still a cause for concern to employers who deal mainly
with other training boards;
(viii) the quality of boards' services and training staff;
(ix) incidence of paperwork and statistics;
(x) any other comments on the effects of the new legislation on
the work of ITBs.
An examination of the submissions recjved by the GEl disclosed varying
degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction and accorded with the CBI's own
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comment that Na number of divergent views have been expressed..." {39) This was
true both within and across industrial boundaries. There were, however,
relatively few 'anti-board' responses insofar as abolitions were called for. In
part this may have reflected the structure of the CBI's request. But more
likely It reflected a view that the abolition of ITBs was not regarded a
serious issue for consideration. For example, the submission of the Chemical
Industries Association contrasted markedly with its position some twelve
months later. In September 1978 whilst expressing criticism of certain of the
CAP/ITB's activities - for instance in relation to manpower planning and levy
exemption criteria - it expressed itself generally satisfied with the boards
priorities and advisers. A year later it was claiming that the board had
generally achieved its objectives and had outlived its usefulness. Thus at the
beginning of the RETA exercise, in relation to the work of the ITBs, the CBI's
conception of its members' views was:{40)
Nthat there has been a noticeable decrease in criticism of the work
of training boards. This varies from industry to industry. Where
there is greater acceptance, this is to a large extent due to the
improvement of communications and contacts between ITBs., their
staff, and companies' understanding of what ITBs are trying to do
and In ITBs' better appreciation of the real training needs of
individual companies. To some extent it is also, of course, due to
lower rates of levy and the facilities which now exist for
attainment of total exemption from levy."
The main criticisms or areas of concern centred around the perception that
boards were being used to achieve 'political' and social objectives; that
greater flexibility could be achieved in the levy exemption process which
should incorporate basic essential criteria; that levy exemption should not be
used as a sanction to enforce formal employee involvement in training plans;
and that boards should be less ambitious about manpower forecasting. The CBI's
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own review of the way that training policy was operating then, did not seem to
suggest any major or fundamental difficulties
Once the Review was under way, however, there is some evidence - as for
example was revealed in our case studies in the previous chapter - that in
some quarters industrial opinion began to harden against the ITBs. There is
little doubt that this was influenced by the new Conservative Government's
attitude towards industrial regulation and public expenditure. In such
circumstances some - although at this stage certainly a minority of -
employers came to regard the review as an opportunity to put abolition on the
agenda with the possibility of ridding themselves of a number of regulator
agencies. As one senior Training Nanager of one chemical company{41} put it:
"The XSC is probably safe given the existing and potential unemployment levels
- any government would have to tread delicately. ITBs are a different matter,
fair game." Industrial opinion began to divide between what industrialists
themselves referred to as 'hawks' and 'doves' on the training issue, Such
divisions were not confined to industries, nor indeed to firms within
industries, but existed in many of the larger companies visited at this time.
This diversity was not only picked up on, but was given considerable emphasis
by the Review Team In the its analysis of submissions from CBI members
received in response to the Review Teams's consultative letter of July 1979.
The CEI members of the Review Body took strong exception to the representation
of employers' views presented in the analysis, and in particular one key
paragraph which stated:{42)
"It is not yet clear whether general agreement will emerge on a
wider range of questions, because we may still receive a significant
number of additional responses. So far however there Is a complete
divergence of opinions on most Issues - in particular on whether
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 432
Chapter line	 Review of the 1973 Employment and Training Act
the 1973 Act has been more or less effective than the 1964 Act, and.
on the most appropriate training arrangements for the future. These
differences of opinion generally occur both within and between
Industries, among individual firms and in relation to geographical
area. In the following paragraphs generalisations are included when
justifiable, but it should be borne in mind that there are sometimes
internal contradictions in the evidence submitted, and only seldom
do the responses cover all relevant topics; consequently it is often
not clear what their views are on particular points."
Opinion within the CBI was that this was a gross misrepresentation of the
evidence and. if allowed to go unchallenged would have meant that any stance
adopted by the CBI on its members' behalf would have lacked credibility. It
was privately expressed that such might even conceivably have been the purpose
possibly in order to deflect some of the not inconsiderable criticism levelled
at the MSC/TSD, The CBI had In essence made a tactical error in allowing the
Review Team to solicit the views of its members on an individual basis (it had
even provided them with pre-printed addressed envelopes) rather than
insisting, as the TUC had done, that a paper be presented. representing the
collective views of the membership. The effect of the Review Team's analysis
was the penning of a strongly worded letter from the CBI's Director of
Education and Training to Richard O'Brien, which contained the following
statements: {43 }
"I took the opportunity yesterday to let the CBI Education and
Training Committee express their views on the paper entitled
'Analysis of Responses from CBI Nembers'. It came in for very heavy
criticism, Rightly in my view. There are two main reasons for this:
First, the title is misleading.. .the responses not only include those
of non-members (such as GTAs or Chambers of Commerce) but exclude
the substantial member interests in the non-ITB sector, particularly
those of the nationalised industries. Secondly the paper gives an
impression of confusion and differences of view which, in the light
of the actual submissions, appears to us to be either exaggerated or
insensitive to genuine differences in sectoral experience or
interests.., .In our view, this paper is far below the standard which
we have come to expect from NSC and we do riot wish to have GEt's
name associated with it. We will prepare and submit to the Review
Body our own commentary on the responses in due course but I have
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to tell you that the paper has added significantly to the unease
expresses to us by members about the exercise as a whole."
Thus the CBI prepared its own analysis which provided a much more coherent
picture of the views of its membership. Whilst still acknowledging the
diversity of views, these were presented as reflecting the different
characteristics, needs and experiences of Industries, and the practices of ITEs
within them: such differences were "material not eccentric".{44) Sectoral
differences were clearly demonstrated for instance as the Chemical industry
felt that CAP/ITB had raised training standards to a point where it had
outlived its usefulness, while the Construction industry supported a continuing
and vigorous role for the CITB. The main points of the paper referred to the
unanimity of views that the 1964 Act had contributed to improving the quality
of training; that the 1973 Act contained operational weaknesses such that
there was "widespread frustration" in relation to the bureaucratic and rigid
nature of the exemption system and the adverse effect on the industry/board
relationship caused by the board/MSC/TSD links. 9'!any respondents expressed
bewilderment as to the role of the TSD vis a vis liBs. The overwhelming view
was that the TSD had been a hindrance to the optimum relationship between
ITBs and Government or ITBs and XSC."{45)
Other germane comments referred to the Inability of the training system to
overcome skill shortages and pointed to the significance of non-training
factors; the absence of coordination at local labour market level which
contrasted with the Irrelevancy of national surveys and studies. Overall
respondents favoured the development of a more cooperative, advisory ITB
structure, perhaps on a fee paying consultancy basis, but only a "minority
favoured the abolition of ITBs or their own ITB"{46) And significantly, in view
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of the fact that the operating costs of the ITBs was to become the central
issue and the cause of the subsequent schism in the ranks of the Review Body,
the document commented that: "The majority who accepted the need for a
Training Board System of some kind, felt that industry has insufficient
control of ITBs. In some cases the related issue of operating costs was faced
and in some cases the principle of industry funding accepted. It must be noted
that this question was not. directly posed in the questionnaire. A strong
consensus either way could only emerge if that question was asked."{47} It is
interesting to compare the comment made on this point by the Review Team in
its paper which was that the question of the general balance between state
and industry funding of training was frequently side-stepped. Those who did
comment usually favoured the present arrangements, but a few thought
Government should pay less. The general message, however, could be summarised
as less Government intervention, but similar amounts of money for industry to
spend in the ways it saw fit."{48) In sum there were three main 'problem' areas
- • the inadequacies relating to local labour markets, rigidities in the
operation of labour markets, and the excessive bureaucracy associated with
existing training institutions,
ITB, TUG and EDUCATION: StJBJISSI0S TO RETA
Having examined the way in which, in response to what it considered a
potential threat to its members' interests, the views of the CBI about the
operation of the training system began to change, we now move an to consider
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the positions of the other participants in the review process: the ITBs, the
TUG, and education. The submissions of the ITBs to RETA were effectively in
two parts, The first part was a response to the invitations sent out in July,
but unlike the requests sent to other organisatlons, the Review Team suggested
that ITBs structure their responses around the monitoring and evaluation
guidelines issued by TSD to all ITBs in 1978 (see chapter 7). The second was a
response to a more detailed set of questions, issued by the Review Team in
December 1979, on the operation of the levy exemption system. These questions
concerned, for example, the considerations lying behind the board's choice of
exemption criteria; methods used to assess a firm's training standards against
exemption criteria; how the operation of levy examption was monitored and
evaluated; the success of levy exemption in stimulating firms to meet their
own training needs; and the advantages/disadvantages of the system. There was
considerable variation in both the quality and quantity of board responses
(From the Engineering Industry Training Board's 60-plus page submission to the
4 pages from the Carpet Industry Training Board). But that marked the extent
of the variation There was an extremely high coincidence of opinion about the
shortcomings of the existing arrangements which mostly centred around funding
and questions of boards' loss of autonomy. A key concern was that boards were
required by TSD to plan ahead on a five-year basis, but financial commitments
were only given on an annual basis - and even here might be subject to cuts.
The majority of boards appeared to regard the solution as lying In the
provision of block grants, although occaisionally the view was expressed that
industry might be expected to contribute more (eg Rubber and Plastics
Processing ITB), and greater freedom in deciding priorities. Not surprisingly
there was unanimous support for the continuation of the existing board system,
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although very few submissions were based upon consultations with firms in
scope, most ITBe preferring to rely instead upon board representatives - and
presumably senior staff - to formulate their views.
The occasional note of hostility creeps into some board submissions (eg
Ceramics) concerning the detailed financial tutelage exercised by the l'!SC at
the expense of 'meaningful' dialogues. Most others were more reasoned, but no
less firm. The Paper and Paper Products ITB for example expressed its views on
the framework provided by the 1973 Act in the following terms{49)
"...its successful implementation requires NSC to find a most delicate
balance between its recognition of national priorities and its
determination to meet them on the one hand and its encouragement
and support to Boards to meet their own industries on the other, On
the whole, the Board feels that this balance has not yet been
achieved and is of the opinion that the needs of industry, and the
different methods required by Boards to meet them, have not received
sufficient recognition at MSC level. It suspects that this imbalance
is caused. ..by the nature of the overall structure, and in particular
the financial side of it, which has significantly reduced the real
freedom of Boards to control their own strategies within the
national framework ."
While board/I'tSC/TSD coordination was seen to be in need of an overhaul, most
ITBs regarded as satisfactory the arrangements that existed for inter-board
cooperation. The Chairpersons and Chief Officers of individual boards had
always met on a formal annual basis (although these were described to the
author by one board member as the annual 'jamborees'), Additionally, apart from
the usual written communications, boards were in contact through a number of
liaison groups formed for specific needs - eg in the textiles industries - or
purposes - eg research, commercial and clerical training, and young people.
Various informal contacts were also maintained both at board level and between
senior staff.
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On the subject of inter-board communication a paper had been prepared by the
Review Team for the fourth meeting of the Review Body based on comments
received from ITBs.{50) Reference was made to the informal contacts which
existed between boards which suggests that the TSD was not entirely happy
about such meetings as on the one hand it was not in a position to discover
what went on in them and on the other therefore might be seen to place it in a
weak position vis a vis the boards. It was noted that "The Directorate of
Training and Dialogue Teams believe that there has always been a considerable
amount of contact between Boards at various levels (Secretary, Training
Advisor etc) on an informal or ad hoc basis. There is, of course, no obligation
on Boards to inform TSD, and there is no hard evidence as to the extent of
these contacts or the nature of the topics discussed. In their evidence,
several Boards stated that they felt the present "ad hoc" arrangements were
satisfactory and that nothing more formal was required."{51) Once again the
board/TSD relationship came In for criticism and as the paper acknowledged
"CC]oordination of activity to avoid duplication and achieve more effective
results was recoiiseci as a rol bj the. CTC Ceutrai !ratntn Councill
and the same problem still persists."{52) The MSC bad not provided the
coordinating mechanism that the boards had been led to expect.
These criticisms made by the ITBs did not, however, appear to be up for
discussion. The Review Team invited the Review Body simply to note the above
paper. Criticism was therefore deflected as the Review Body's comments were
Invited on a subsequent paper that essentially was the TSD's response to board
criticisms.{53) It was the TSD's case, not that of the Boards that was in
practice being considered by the Review Body. The TSD's response in the paper
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noted that from an initial twa year period when the dialogue system had seemed
to work well, the TSD/ITB relatIonship had deteriorated such that a number of
baz-ds were "debasing the basis and substance of the strategic dialogues arid
some teams have found it difficult to stand out against this trend,.."
Increasingly stringent financial constraints were seem to be the prime cause
but boards themselves had to bear a significant share of the responsibility.
Boards bad faIled:{54)
"to accept the reality of a comprehensive manpower policy; that they
do not exist in an isolated Industry or internal labour market but
are part of a national training system with many inter-industry,
inter-organisatianal, inter- ITB/TSD and inter-occupational interfaces
and mast of the concerns of the IkSC/TSD join these interfaces: that
many of the aims and activities of the NSC Plan and Programmes are
complementary and supplementary to the present and potential
interest of ITBs and their future operation. It is also a reluctance
to accept that the }ISC's own competence to take a national overview
of employment and training has grown but that some ITBs may not
have moved very far in their original conception of their role arid.
activities and how they should be changing to identify and service
different needs of their industries and its occupational needs."
The above passage clearly indicates the frustration experienced by TSD in
their inability to get boards to respond to national or central objectives,
however, the problem seems to be defined more in terms of boards' stubborness
or short-sightedness, rather than in relation to possible incompatibility of
objectives or the validity of the underlying premises of the policy.
In general the views of the ITBs had the support of the TUG although the TUG
was not particularly impressed at boards' contention that the pursuit of some
national and social objectives were inappropriate activities. In its submission,
the TUC argued not only for the efficacy of the board system as it presently
stood, but for its expansion into some of the other sectors not covered by
boards, which accounted for approximately 45 per cent of the workforce.{55)
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There was broad support for existing arrangements which, it was argued, needed
to be improved and developed, not radically altered: "no system was going to
be free of problems, but it would be preferable to build on the existing
pattern, restoring the better features of the 1964 arrangements."{56) It was
felt by the TUC that certain of the provisions of the 1973 Act had weakened
the training effort. This was particularly so In respect of the levy exempton
system and the 1 percent levy limit. There was a suggestion, however, that
part of the problem lay with boards which had insufficiently amended their
exemption criteria - that is had failed to progressively tighten them. Citing
the case of the CAP/ITB there was therefore "a danger that as the proportion
of firms within a board's scope increased, it would appear that there was less
need for boards." Here the employers' association "point to the exemption
figures to support their case. Yet in Training for Skills, (para 4.5) reference
was made to the fact that in the chemical Industry, employers, trade unions
and the ITB staff expected far reaching changes In the types of skills
required by technologically advanced companies over the next five years,. ..In
other words there is a clear need for the board to continue but this Is masked
at least in part by a failure to develop its exemption crlteria,"{57) The
vagaries of governments' policies on public expenditure was also seen to have
had a deleterious effect on boards' operations
Other Issues that were considered included those of local labour market
problems, skill shortages and retraining. As for the former It was considered
that an industry based structure was still preferable to one that was local or
or occupationally based. In the latter case, having alluded to the non-training
causes of skill shortages, the document went on to recognise the "clash of
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interests between groups of workers as groups party to established training
arrangements seek to uphold these arrangements in the face of changes which
may open up the occupations to other groups and so, perhaps, reduce the
ability of the established group to influence entry to the Job, or the relevant
terms and conditons of employinent,"{8} The overall thrust of the TUC's
submission then was to provide an analysis of the weaknesses of the present
system, but to claim that, in effect, nothing better than existing arrangements
could be designed to overcome them.
Unlike the CBI, however, the TUG took the initiative and put forward its own
recommendations for The Way Ahead. It had no need for further consultations
with its members as it knew what changes it wished to see implemented. These
were that:{59)
The MSC should have powers to direct all training authorities
(including those not covered by ITBs) to draw up proposals that
provide for;
- Initial vocational preparation for all young people in the
Industry;
- the review of the apprenticeship systems to ensure a modular
structure that allows progression into skill training from basic
vocational preparation schemes;
- to give advice on how the elements in ap?rnticeship tratatn
should be related to the staged upgrading of adults through
short periods of intensive training.
Industrial training boards should be given back their powers to levy
all employers within their scope with no upper statutory limit being
imposed.
Funding for initial vocational preparation should be shared between
industry and the state - ultimately through a collective fund.
Especially in its treatment of adult training the TUG's document represented a
clear acknowledgement of the difficulties surrounding adult training in areas
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traditionally controlled by craft unions and a firm committment to overcoming
them. As such it was endorsed by the other participants in the review. But
more crucially, it would seem that the TIJC document virtually set the seal on
the fate of the review. We may judge which way the wind was to blow from the
reaction of the other participants. The minutes of the meeting note that:{60)
From the GBI point of view, there was much to applaud in the TUC's
progressive, encouraging forward-looking document, especially in its
treatment of adult retraining. It should be noted, however, that
there was no consensus among the CBI membership for a return to
financial arrangements comparable to those which had been
introduced by the l94 Industrial Training Act;
From the ITB point of view, the TUC paper was welcomed as a
constructive basis for discussion - virtually a blueprint for the
future;
From the point of view of the educational interests it was suggested
that the attention devoted to the training needs of semi and
unskilled people was important and walcoine; on the other hand, it
was disappointing that the paper did not suggest any effective
solution to the problems of dealing with local skill shortages,
which it had identified so clearly,
It is clear that the initiative largely remained with the TUC for the rest of
the Review Body's deliberations. This was principally because the proposals had
the the positive backing of the ITB representatives and, on balance, the
support of the educational interests. It was clear, from comments of
educational members of the Review Body, and from the submissions of
educational organisations, that whilst there were a number of common areas of
concern there was no unified picture emerging about future arrangements. This
was reflected in the statement in the Review Team's analysis of educational
responses that: "There is a fair measure of agreement on some issues
particularly on the need for better coordination of the various participants in
training, and of the question of vocational training in schools. Other issues
produce opinions at variance with one another, and in the following paragraphs
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many of the comments are made only the once in the replles..."{61) The emphasis
on diversity of views, did not, however, produce the same kind of dissent from
educational representatives on the Review Body as had greeted the Team's
analysis of the responses from CBI members.
In general the educational interests were supportive of the ITB structure but
believed educational representatives were the 'poor relations' on Boards as
presently constituted, largely due to their having no voting rights in relation
to questions of levy. They were also of the opinion that there was a lack of
coordination between the various components of the training system and a lack
of clarity surrounding the division of responsibilities resulting in "interia
and confusion", and many commented upon the arbitrary distinction between
education and training. Although the education/training divide was touched upon
many times in the course of the review no one seemed prepared to pick up the
ball and run with it. One reason may have been to do with the questions that
this might raise regarding departmental division of responsibilities. A more
significant reason might be that to further involve educational interests in
training issues would almost certainly lessen the considerable influence
posessed by industrial interests. There was nevertheless, sufficient in the TUG
document on the issue of vocational preparation for the educationalists to give
it their approval, while the recommendations concerning ITBs and I'[SC/TSD could
at least be regarded as a framework for removing much of the ambiguity and
confusion.
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TUG MD CBI: CONFLICT OF IITERESTS
By the beginning of April 1980, having considered a large volume of documents
presented by the Review Team, the Review Body was ready to move towards
approving recommendations to be included in a draft discussion document, As we
have seen, the CBI was not offering any specific proposals of its own. On the
other hand the TUG bad put forward in February a detailed document of
'problems' and 'remedies' for the training system which had received a
favourable response from the majority of Review Body members, Although the CBI
expressed reservations about the possibility of returning the operating costs
of ITBs to industry, as suggested in the TUG document, it did not appear
unduly worried as the proposals were presumed to be only one of a possible
range of options, yet to be decided, And in any case, so the CBI believed, any
recommendations were to be subject to wider consultation before final
decisions were taken. When it became clear, however, that consultation was not
going to take place, the GBI, lacking any clear counter-proposals, became
concerned with fighting a rear-guard action to prevent the usurpation of the
principle of consultation prior to the making of a decision,
The Review Team had prepared and placed before the Review Body, at its meeting
of 1 April 1980, a draft discusèion document,{62) It contained three possible
future options of which it was evident that only one would be acceptable to
the TUC, the ITBs and - although somewhat less clear-cut - to the
educationalists. As such there was considerable apposition to its issuing forth
into the wider world.
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The three alternatives put forward for tmproving existing arrangements
were: (63)
1. Continuation of statutory industry bcxlies. Under this proposal
ITBs would continue (with possible extensions and/or modifications
in scope) in being but would be self-financing through their powers
to raise levies )
 with a relaxation of formal levy limits. I'SC would
retain powers to financially support key national objectives and
responsibility for coordinating cross sector programmes through
ITBS and other bodies, possibly with the provision of some form of
local/sub-regional joint ITB/]. SC machinery. Although ITBs' strategic
and. operational plans'ould still require ASC approval the main area
of accountability would be in relation to national training
objectives.
Of a list of nine advantages claimed for this first option, the following are
worthy of note:
(a) a large element of continuity with present arrangements;
(b) the principal beneficiaries of improved training would
themselves fund Board operating costs, thus removing the need for
Government control on staff terms and conditions and reducing the
number of MSC staff needed to monitor Boards' finances;
<c) public expenditure on Boards' operating costs would cease;
(d) the accountability of ITBs would be clarified, and at the same
time they would have a better chance of influencing directly central
policy objectives.
2, Lix'al labour .izarket arientation. Such an approach would combine
firm central guidelines with a large measure of devolution to
representative local advisory boards. Boards would be responsible
for identifying local training needs and priorities and submitting
to the HSC proposals for meeting such needs. The MSC would be
responsible for servicing boards and providing funding. National
training standards would be established through industry or
occupational bodies, or through special committees set up by MSC,
Grants to firms would be conditional on their training to acceptable
standards. Industrial training boards would be abolished.
The pertinent advantages claimed for the second option were:
(a) attention focussed on local labour market problems;
(b) compatibility with central responsibility for setting training
standards;
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(C) ability to focus on cross-sector problems in the local context;
(d) ability to focus on the training needs of small firms;
(e) greater possibilities for monitoring the cost effectiveness of
training and training expenditure.
3. Industrial self-regulation tb.rough collective agreements. This
approach was based on the premise that public intervention need not
call for statutory bodies with financial sanctions. There might
instead exist joint industry bodies, set up by employers and trade
unions but with educational representation, some of which could
develop from existing ITBs. The 1'(SC would channel funds for
achieving key training objectives through such organisations where
it judged them to be competent to administer such funds. And MSC
regional and district organisation would need to be enhanced to
provide good local labour market information. Finally, the Secretary
of State might have reserve powers in exceptional cases to establish
statutory bodies in industries where there ws a consensus in favour
among employers and unions.
As for the advantages, the third option would:
(a) place responsibility for industrial training more clearly upon
employers and trade unions;
(b) reduce public expenditure and bureaucracy by a more selective
use of public funds;
(c) provide greater flexibility by enabling different sectors the
freedom to tackle their problems and needs in different ways with
less emphasis on central direction by MSC.
The discussion document generated considerable antipathy and disagreement
amongst the participants. Its consideration occupied the whole day of the April
meeting of the Review Body (despite two other 'weighty' papers, one on the
non-training causes of skill shortages, being up for consideration and which
were, in the event simply 'noted'). It was claimed by the TUC that the document
was an inadequate reflection of earlier discussions and analyses and
incorporated "virtually nothing" of the TUCs submission even though it had
been "warmly welcomed" in February, This was echoed by the ITB interests who
additionally claimed that two of the options "had certainly not emerged from
the Review Body's earlier deliberations". Unsurprisingly, these were the two
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options that envisaged no future role for the ITBs: the local labour market and
the voluntarist solutions. They also claimed that: 'If there was a common
thread. linking the three options displayed in the draft, it seemed to be a
desire to reduce public expenditure on industrial training." The reaction of the
educationalists was more circumspect In that it was prepared to consider the
local solution, but claimed that operating on the assumption that the options
should reflect the Review Body's previous discussions there could be no
justification for advancing the voluntary option. The CBI on the other hand
felt that the document could provide a basis for consultation if It were "made
clear that the options were presented without endorsement.(64)
In response, the Review Team, clearly concerned to pacify the TUG
representatives, stated that "There had been no intention to modify the TUG's
earlier proposals. If the TSD summary failed to do justice to the TUC's ideas,
it should be amended." Such a statement evidently indicates that the first
option - as far as TSD officials were concerned - was indeed based upon the
proposals put forward by the TUC. The strength of the TtJC reaction probably
had more to do with the form and existence of the other two proposals than
any neglect of its own. As for the voluntary system, it "was true that the
Review Body had not previously discussed the latter as such - although it
could be viewed as an extension of the much discussed non-Board sector - but
there had been evidence from various respondents - including industrialists -
that cast doubt on the effectiveness of any institutionalised approach. It
therefore seemed right to provide respondents with an opportunity to consider,
and comment on such a system,"{65)
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There was obviously some move to put out a document containing only one
option, or at least giving the greatest weight to continuity of arrangements
and which would "advance proposals under which better responses to existing
problems would evolve from the present arrangements". It was, however, pointed
out - in all probability by the CBI representatives - that: "A consultation
exercise which displayed only one option would probably be misunderstood and
could well give rise to adverse criticism of the Review Body and its approach
to its task. On the other hand, if there were no consultation process at all,
the credibility of the Review Body's final Report would be likely to suffer,
especially with industrialists and the education services", {66}
The CBI, having failed to obtain the consent of the other participants to a
consultation exercise based on the above three options was not going to be
maneouvred into endorsing a recommendation based solely around the TUC option.
If the Review Body was not prepared to consult affected interests, the CBI was.
It therefore set in motion a round of consultations with its membership which,
at that stage, it was considered might farm the basis of a minority report,
although strangely this did not appear to be picked up on by the rest of the
Review Body.C67) Thus at the beginning of May, the CBI circulated a 'strictly
private and confidential' draft statement designed to test members' opinion on
two key issues: funding the operating costs of ITBs and how each sector of
Industry might constructively respond to meeting its own particular training
needs. The possibility of a local labour market structure was also put forward
even though it was concluded that it would either prove too costly, or would
offer little advantage over existing District Manpower Committees. Whilst not
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explicitly stating the likely recommendations of the Review Body, the covering
letter informed members that:{68)
..the draft discussion document produced for the Review Body to
approve on 1 April 1980, although acceptable to the CBI
representatives, was not accepted by the majority. An urgent meeting
of the CBI Nanpower Services Advisory Panel was called to consider
the implications of this decision. A number of other factors were
taken into account. First, since July 1979 it has become
increasingly unlikely that Government will continue funding the
operating costs of ITBs to the tune of 42m per annum. Secondly, the
nature of many of the criticisms levelled at ITBs suggested that, in
failing to issue a discussion document, the Review Body had also
failed to test out possible radical alternatives, which was a task
that could and should have been attempted. Thirdly, that while a
consensus existed on certain major features of the present system the
evidence from employers reflected significant variations between
different sectors in their experience of ITBs."
It was not difficult to read between the lines. Employers views were being
canvassed on the three options because the likely recommendations of the
Review Body would in all probability prove unacceptable to them. Having
pointed out the unlikelihood of continued Government funding, the ball was
clearly in the employers' court, The CBI document was careful to at least
appear to adopt a neutral position, pointing out that it had "no wish to appear
to promote a wholesale cutback of ITBs" but on the other hand "the future of
any Board which has failed over a period of, say, fifteen years to win the
confidence and support of the majority of members in its scope ought to be in
question." Although clearly not making reference to the TUC, the document
firmly opposed - indeed considered "reprehensible" - the proposals to regularly
increase boards' exemption standards. That one of the key issues that training
policy had been aimed at tackling - the gap between the individual needs of
employers and the wider national economic needs - remained to be resolved is
clear from the statement that:{69)
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"It is frequently argued that there is a conflict between the
training needs of companies, industries and. the nation as a whole.
We would stress that the economic strength of the nation derives
largely from the aggregate profitability of individual firms. While
some balance of training effort within an industry is desirable,
crude attempts to coerce companies into training beyond their needs
could well be counterproductive from a national standpoint. The
apparent discrepancy between the combined training effort of
industry and the hypothetical national need derives from a
combination of training and non-training factors."
Thus the tenor of the document suggested dissatisfaction with the review
process and without prejudging the outcome, contained a clear message to
employers to consider the possibility of moving from a statutory to a
voluntary basis. In any event, whatever the outcome of the review, the CBI's
position was that no recommendations should be implemented especially where
this concerned the issue of funding - until sectoral employer interests had
been consulted. It had, however, become clear that the CBI would not have
sufficient time to complete its consultation exercise with its members for the
results to be included in the Review Body's final report, which was due to be
with NSC Commissoners by the end of June. The alternative plan adopted
therefore was to have a revised version of the draft statement ready f or the
meeting of GEl Council on 16 July as a basis for discussion with the XSC and,
later, the Secretary of State for Employment. The CBI may have lost the battle
but it did not intend to lose the war.
OIJTCOXE OF RETA: 'OUTLOOK ON TRAIlING'
So, not having carried out the consultations as origina1y Intended, the Review
Body's recommendations were published on 31 July 1980. Predictably enough, the
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Report of the review Outlook on Training,{70) contained no major
recommendations for changing the institutional framework of training
provision. The first seven of the ten chapters of the report were devoted to
analyses of past experience and future requirements, while an extremely short
chapter eight dealt with possible alternative approaches. In fact the emphasis
was not so much upon possible alternatives as the reasons why such approaches
would be ill-advised. Local or voluntary solutions were dealt with in a single
paragraph, their disadvantages took three, while the rest of the chapter was
concerned with setting out the strengths of the existing statutory framework
which, it was claimed "have not been fully exploited in the particular
arrangements set out in the 1973 Act".{71} Thus it was concluded that:{72}
"Radical changes in the existing structure would involve massive
disruption. Any new bodies would take time to win credibility and
influence. There would inevitably be teething problems and mistakes
due to inexperience. klternative strucures wou'ld have to have clear
advantages indeed to Justify risking a major hiatus in training
effort iii a decade in which training will be of great importance. We
have not been convinced of the reality of those advantages: nor, is
it clear, have the great major1ty of those who submitted evidence to
us.,'
Within this context the report made twenty seven recommendations, the majority
of which were little more than re-affirmations of the prevailing arrangements
- for example that boards should continue to be reconstituted every three
years - or, in view of the depth of analysis that was supposed to have
preceded the review, statements of the obvious - for example that there should
be a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities between the MSC and
training organisations. The three key recommendations were:{73)
1. The funding of ITB operating costs should be returned to
industry.
2. There should be no statutory limit on the size of levy which
boards may impose.
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3, The MSC should undertake an examination of the scope of existing
ITBs, and the boundary between Industries in scope and those not
in scope to boards. This should be done in full consultation with
both sides of industry.
On the first two the CBI representatives reserved their position, while the
third was includd at their behest and was probably responsible for avoiding a
more open rift. Thus far, the views of the TUC and ITB interests seemed to
have prevailed. The TUG had never been content with the changes to ITB
financing introduced under the 1973 Act and it seems felt vindicated in their
views by the the criticisms levelled at the system from both sides of industry
and from ITBs themselves. They obviously saw the review as a means of
redressing the situation and unless the HSC/TSD were prepared to relinquish
their control over ITBe - which they were not - and which was regarded as the
main cause of the difficulties, then the obvious solution was to return the
funding, and thereby the accountability of boards, to their industries. That
this would result in greater accountability was strongly contested by the CBI
in its response to Outlook an Tz-5inlng. It was stated that: "We believe that, in
fact, the ,statutory powers of ITBs will continue to make genuine accountability
illusory. The levy raising powers of boards necessitate civil service scrutiny
and influence and, frankly, few employers feel that the proposed funding
changes would confer significantly more influence to an industry in respect of
the affairs of its ITB, as at present constituted."{74) It is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the TUG, and the ITBs were rather blinkered in
their appreciation of the likely outcome of the above recommendations. All the
signs were that the majority of industrial opinion would strongly resist a
return to the pre-1973 financial arrangements. As one member of the Review
Team commented shortly after publication of the report: "The recommendation of
returning the costs to industry will probably go through which will almost
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certainly lead to a reduction in the number of boards". The inherent
contradictions contained in the report were: that funding should be returned to
Industry; but industry would be unwilling to pay; therefore why make such a
recommendation in the first place? It may have been that the TUG took a
calculated gamble in pressing for such changes. Believing - quite correctly as
it turned out - that the Government would no longer be prepared to finance
ITB's operations then if someone else could be made to pay, the boards would
be relatively safe. The element of risk in such a strategy was the extent to
which employers would accept the changes: the TUG seems to have underestimated
employers' opposition. It also possibly miscalculated the nature of the
Government's thinking in this area.
The Government's Views
We discussed earlier the context within which the debate on the future of
industrial training was taking place and the fact that the Government's desire
to reduce public expenditure and reduce the regulatory 'burden' on industry
placed a question mark over the fate of ITBs Irrespective of the findings of
RETA. Such a perspective is given some credence by the interchange that took
place between the Secretary of State, James Prior, and the Chairman of the MSC,
on 20 December 1979 when the review was only halfway through its
deliberations.{7S) The meeting was to discuss the implications of the
reductions in the MSC's budget. The review came up in the course of discussion
and it was made clear to the MSC Chairman that public expenditure
considerations would be uppermost in the Government's reaction to the Review
Body's findings, a fact that was not explicitly made known to other members of
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the Review Body. Indeed the Secretary of State went so far as to press Richard
O'Brien for the Report to be in by the following April. Such a request was
clearly inconsistent with the aim of producing a thorough, objective review and
on this point the view of Richard O'Brien prevailed and the Secretary of State
allowed it to run on until July.
The Government was not, however, content to sit back and await the outcome of
RETA. It was - or more particularly DE lUnisters and officials were -
formulating their own views on the drawbacks and possibilities of the training
system. Significantly, the Government had, shortly after taking office,
commissioned the Central Policy Review Staff to produce a report on the
responsiveness of education and training to the needs of industry particularly
as it related to technological change, and this was published early in
1980.{76) The report was firmly set within the prevailing assumptions of the
Government that improvements to existing arrangements should 1) involve no
expansion of the state's activities and, 2) involve no increase in
resources.{77) The main concerns of the report centred on the impact of
restrictive labour practices on initial training and retraining and the need to
widen training opportunities and provision. It advocated the introduction of
training to standards based on a modular system which would give far greater
flexibility by allowing individuals to add to their skills at any point in
their working lives. The view that the existing apprenticeship system was
outmoded and inflexible was echoed by James Prior shortly before the
publication of Outlook on Training.{78) Further, the proceedings of the Review
Body had been witnessed by observers from the DE and who had, no doubt, been
formulating their own views about the desirable shape of future industrial
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training policy. The disarray of the Review Body, reflected in Outlook on
Tralnln& might also have presented itself to DE officials as an opportunity to
step in and take the initiative,
The Secretary of State did not in fact endorse Outlook on Training. James
Prior, in answer to a Parliamentary Question commented, "I welcome the report
as a basis for public discussion of the whole future of industrial training
policy for the next decade. The Government will study the report's
recommendations in the light of comment by interested parties and the
considered views which the Xanpower Services Commission have undertaken to
submit to me by the end of October. The Government will place its proposals
before Parliament as soon as possible thereafter'.79} So, Outlook on Training
did not represent some end point in the process, but rather the beginning of a
whole new round of consultations in which the agenda was to broaden out to
include the possibility of more radical change in the form of voluntary
arrangements. The reasons for this lay firstly, in the fact that the report was
weak. It concentrated on such relatively minor issues as funding at the
expense of a thorough analysis of future skill requirements and the best means
to develop them. Secondly,. agreement could not be reached even on these
relatively minor matters. In fact, the door had been left wide open for
Ministerial initiatives given that when Outlook on Training was considered by
the HSC at its meeting on 30 July 1980, it did not therafter in "view of a
wide divergence of opinion. ..feel able to convey any view to Government on
these recommendations".80} It was also rumoured at the time that there was a
White Paper already drafted within the DE which was simply waiting - for
appearances sake - for the Review Body to complete its report. Given the
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disagreement over the recommendations, however, its publication was delayed
still further
Responses to Out1ack on Training
During the course of the next three months the Kanpower Services Commission
received the views of some 400 interested parties (employers organisations,
individual firms, ITBs, the TUG, educational bodies, training organisations and
a variety of individuals) to the recommendations contained in Outlook on
Training. The comments were broadly as might have been expected from our
examination of the review process. The TUG, ITBs and education in the main
supportive, while the majority of employers were opposed. With one or two
exceptions - in particular engineering and construction - the threat of
increased financial costs was accompanied by a rising tide of hostility from
employers towards the continued existence of statutory ITBs. The CBI found
that there was "an overwhelming consensus against transferring the extra
burden of operating costs to industry" and that a "number of employers'
organisations covering a wide range of industries would favour developing
future arrangements with ITBs on a voluntary basis, at least partly related to
fees for services received."{81) Following the consultations, the KSC, at its
October meeting, endorsed recommendatIon 16 of Outlook on Training - that
there should be a sector by sector review of existing arrangements. In
consequence the Secretary of State thereafter requested the Commission to
undertake such a review as a matter of urgency and to report by early June
1981. So, yet more consultation was in the offing. This time, however, there
was a clearer direction for the move toward voluntarism had gained pace. In
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his letter to the HSC James Prior indicated the criteria which would determine
his final decisions on future training arrangements. These were:{82)
a, the likelihood of shortages of trained manpower in the economic
upturn;
b. the emerging demand for trained manpower in new technologies;
c. the need for adequate quality of training (including agreed
standards);
d. opportunities for vocational training for young people at all
levels;
e, wide opportunities for craft apprentices;
f. wide opportunities for adult training.
But he also "indicated the Government's preference for voluntary arrangements
where he could be satisfied about the willingness and ability of a sector to
meet these training needs without recourse to statutory boards".{83) And in the
debate in the Commons on 26 November 1980, Prior announced that exchequer
funding would cease by 1983. These views were restated in no uncertain terms
the following day by Lord Gowrie, Employment I'Unlster of State, at a BACIE
conference on the outcome of the Review of the 1973 Act.{84) Gowrie pointed to
the need for reviewing the institutional framework on the grounds that it was
no use hanging on to institutions that had outlived their usefulness and
observed that voluntary arrangements might be a better solution. Only where it
was clear that an ITB was necessary, he claimed, would a board remain. He then
reiterated the very thing that was sure to spell the end for some boards: that
exchequer funding of operating costs would be reduced for the forthcoming
financial year (1981/82) and would cease in 1982/83. That the future of ITBs
- and indeed training - was in jeopardy by such a move was an opinion shared
by the majority of ITB chairmen (the only exception being the Construction
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ITB). Such was expressed in a joint letter in January 1981, to the Secretary of
State, signed by 23 ITB chairmen who stated that returning the costs to
industry would "be a retrograde step and place their industries in the
unfortunate positions they were prior to the 1964 Act."{85)
Although both Prior and Gowrie had contended that the views of employers
would be an important factor in shaping future arrangements, many employers
felt that this consideration of their views did not extend to the Issue of who
bore the cost, an opinion that was stated by a number of those at the BACIE
conference. Perhaps on the other hand It was the Government's view that the
test of a board's utility should reside in the willingness of firms to pay for
it. The Government clearly did not wish to be accused simply of wanting to
scrap boards: it needed to be able to claim that something equally or mare
satisfactory was being put in their place. Employers therefore needed to be
galvanised into action to do it for themselves. This became even more pressing
when some people started to claim that some firms had actually started to
sack their training personnel In anticipation of boards being wound up.C86) In
effect the Government was putting the financial squeeze on employers and it
was beginning to work. Thus while the Government had gone in the direction of
increased voluntarism, recognising the previous Inauspicious history of this
approach it had introduced a financial element into Industry's calculations: If
voluntary arrangements did not come up to scratch, then industry would have to
foot the bill for maintaining a stautory industrial training board.
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lifE GOVERKKEJT TAKES THE IJITIATIVE
All the indications are that by late 1980 (if not earlier) the Government had
formulated Its views about the future shape of Ind.ustrial training - both in
terms of objectives and institutions. A commitment to reducing public
expenditure, 'unecessary' regulation of industry, and the number of quangos set
the climate within which the future of training institutions was to be judged.
Apart from perhaps key industrial sectors the Government seems to have
concluded that ITBe were largely redundant. If firms were actually training to
meet their own needs, then let them get on with it; If they were not then
obviously ITBs were achieving little and by definition were not providing value
for money - for whoever was paying. There was, however, one 'fly in the
ointment' as far as the Government was concerned, and that was that the
Secretary of State could only establish, abolish, or change the scope of an ITE
on the recommendation of the 1(5G. Given that ITBs could command a majority
of support within the Commission, it was clear that a recommendation for a
board's abolition was unlikely to be forthcoming from that quarter - no matter
what recommendations the sectoral review night make. Thus the Secretary of
State signalled his intention not to be so bound by producing, In January 1981,
an Employment and Training Bill which:
"empowers the Secretary of State to establish, abolish, or change
the scope of an Industr 1 training board without a recommendation
from the Commission but subject to consultation with the Commission
and. others. It also amends the requirements for consultation by the
Commission before the making of an order for such a purpose, so as
to permit their consultation to be on a more general basis."{87)
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The Bill also provided for tbe funding of ITB operating costs to be
transferred back to industry and other changes consequent upon that. It was,
as the Secretary of State described it, an enabling Bill. During the Second
Reading debate in the Commons, the Secretary of State claimed that: "The
Commission's views will continue to carry great authority, but it is important
that I should not be restricted in the range of options open in determining
the future structure of the training system. As I shall seek to show, diverse
views may be put to the Manpower Services Commission which will make it
Impossible for it to make recommendations. It would be unsatisfactory if I
could not act, if I had to wait until the [sector by sector] review was over
before putting any proposals before Parliament."{88) The Secretary of State was
effectively taking steps to be in a position to 'short-circuit' the MSC as, and
when, necessary. As we shall see shortly the Commisson's views carried
virtual1J no weight when it came to the matter of which boards should be
abolished or when. The Minister was preparing the ground for the abolition -
no-one was expecting creations - of training boards, However, even though the
training system, and in particular ITBs were coming under strong attack from
the right wing of the Tory Party{89) as we shall see, James Prior was a
considerable distance away from following such views.
During the second reading debate on the Bill, it became clear that the three
areas which the Government saw as constituting priorities for action were, the
apprenticeship system, adult training and retraining and vocational
preparation. Prior's statements were closely In line with the findings
contained in the CPRS report referred to above. The key objective, said Prior
was to change industrial training so that it better met "the needs of industry,
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first by providing a solid foundation training for all, and, secondly, by
reducing restrict1	 on the provision and use of trained workers, both young
people and adults."{90) If we link this to the underlying principle of the
Government's approach, which was to be based on "how effective the spending
has been...Cand] getting a much better return on the money spent",{91) then the
Inappropriateness of an industry-based structure becomes more evident. That is,
where far less weighting is attached to government interventions to secure
Improved training within industry and greater weighting Is given to increasing
the supply of cross-sector skills the need for ITBs diminishes, This is
particularly so where there Is perceived to be a greater need for flexibility
due to the pace of technological change, which additionaUy requires an
increasingly greater proportion of transferable skills within the labour force.
Thus the emphasis was now more than ever upon letting industry get on with
the job of training to meet its own needs and for the state to adopt a more
selective approach by concentrating resources on the key priority areas.
While the sector review was progressing therefore, the DE was advancing its
own proposals, in conjunction with the MSC, for what the Secretary of State
referred to as a 'new training initiative', based on the three priority areas
referred to above. This resulted In the publication by the MSC, in Nay 1981 of
a consultative document entitled A Hew Training Initiative.{92) The document
was premised on the need for a more coherent, flexible approach to training
from the bottom up - that is in the development of a system of vocational
preparation and training for young people which would serve as a basis for the
later acquisition of skills. To underline the necessity for a coordinated
approach the I oreward to the document was signed by the Secretaries of State
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for Employment, Education, Scotland and Wales. Developing a scheme of
vocational training for young people was,however, more than a response to
meeting the training needs of industry. It was also response to the increasing
criticisms of the YOP scheme, which by now was having to cope with a vast
increase in numbers: from one in eight school leavers in 1978/79 to one in two
In 1981/82.{93) Youth training schemes certainly had their origins in the
rising levels of unemployment.{94) But as numbers continued to rise the
success rate for placing trainees on YOP in permanent employment began to
markedly decline. This led to justifiable claims that the training content was
minimal or non-existent and some commentators concluded therefore that such
schemes were no more than measures to reduce the numbers - of a politically
salient group - on the unemployment register.{95) However, as we shall be
arguing in the following chapter, the scheme that emerged from the New
Training Initiative was more than a response to the increased levels of youth
unemployment.
The sector by sector review: 'A Framework for the Future'?
Shortly after publication of the discussion document, and the day before the
Employment and Training Bill became law, the sector review was completed. {96)
In the ITB sectors, as a result of the statutory requirement, the TSD had to
consult some 1,600 organisations that had either been consulted when an ITB
was created, or had come into existence since, An additional 400 questionnaires
were sent to organisations requesting the opportunity to express their views.
Views were sought inter alia on the relative importance of the issues
identified by the Secretary of State (see above) and the most appropriate
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institutional arrangements for dealing with them; and the value of the ITB&
past contribution and whether it should continue in being. The response rate
was under 30 per cent although for what were identified as 'key' organisations
- those having a close association with an ITB - it was considerably higher:
68 per cent for employers, O per cent for trade unions. Organisations were
also consulted in the non-ITB sector, although their number was not stated and
the response rate was described as 'poor'.
The recommendations contained in the sector by sector report caused a severe
internal disagreement at the the July 1981 meeting of the '!anpower Services
Commission, where relations had become more strained following reactions to
the report of the review of the 1973 Act. However, a split, which looked very
likley at one point,{97} was averted and it was decided that the
recommendations from the TSD should stand with the Commission avoiding a
sector by sector vote. The main reason for this was that the recommendations
were largely indeterminate. Seven of the 23 ITBs it was recommended should be
retained but no recommendations could, as yet, be made for the other sectors.
The fate of the other sectors was to be dependent upon the ability of
employers' organisations to come forward ,
 with proposals for voluntary
arrangements which met the criteria laid down by the Commission, and 	 the
three key objectives in the New Training initiative. The report commented that
"our caution about recommending changes stems partly from doubt about
assuming that voluntary arrangements will be sufficiently robust to carry the
pressures entailed in delivering the New Training Initiative and partly from
the fact that in very few sectors has a proposed voluntary alternative been
worked up to a point at which it can be considered satisfactory".{98) These
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reservations are apparent if we examine the recommendations in the two sectors
with which we have been earlier concerned - ceramics and chemicals - in both
of which employers' organisatlons were keen to seize the opportunity of taking
on a significant new role, while the trade unions were just as opposed to the
introduction of voluntary arrangements.
Although the British Ceramic Manufacturers' Federation's (BCMF) previous main
interest in training had been as critic of the CGHPITB, it had put forward
proposals whereby the Federation would itself act as the focal point for
voluntary training arrangements without the need for the creation of a
separate training organisation.{99} Apparently 'briinfull' of confideice, the
Federation envisaged no difficulty in meeting the six criteria for future
training arrangements and felt that as far as the Hew Training Initiative was
concerned there were no obstacles within the industry to be overcome, Such
arguments clearly, as they stood, did not appear convincing from an
organisation that "has not previously undertaken training functions for the
industry".{100) In order to make credible its proposals, the report argued that
the BCMF would need to show that:Cl0l}
a. the arrangements proposed would have adequate coverage -
approximately 30% of ceramic workers in scope to the board were in
non-member companies;
b. there would be an adequate organisational structure;
c. the Ceramics and Allied Trade Union and appropriate
educationalists could be actively involved in the arrangements;
d. the proposed organisation would have the capacity to assess the
technical and professional skills needed to meet the demands of new
technology and to develop schemes of vocational preparation for
young operatives in the industry;
e. the arrangements proposed would be adequately resourced to
achieve their objectives. We doubt whether the recruitment of one
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additional executive, however experienced, will be sufficient, or
whether an effective organisation could be run on BCXF's existing
subscription income.
There were no fewer reservations expressed for the chemical sector.C102} It
was noted that the Chemical Industries Association had submitted outline
proposals with the claim that "good progress is being made to achieving a
consensus". And so apparently had ICI had submitted draft proposals which it
was canvassing within the industry.<103) But none had as yet produced anything
that "could form the basis of viable voluntary arangements". Before any
decision could be reached therefore it was necessary that:{104)
a. the Chemical Industries Association and other employers'
organisations should be invited to develop for consideration their
proposals for an appropriate forum for promoting training on a
voluntary basis;
b. the proposals put forward would need to meet all the criteria
set out in para 6.7 and should be the subject of consultation
involving employer, trade union and educational interests as well as
the ITB concerned. Decisions can then be reached in the context of
arrangements for implementing the New Training Initiative,
Despite the Government's known preference for voluntary arrangements then, the
'I'SD seemed determined to ensure that if increased voluntarism was to be the
order of the day, then the arrangements should be as watertight as possible:
it was after all still to have responsibility for achieving and coordinating
national training objectives through such bodies. Nonetheless, the Government
was also warning employers that arrangements needed to be satisfactory. In a
speech in Plymouth the new Minister of State Peter Morrison - considered to be
much more of a Tory 'dry' than the Earl of Gowrie whom he had replaced -
stated that: "The Government aims to move over voluntary training arrangements
wherever possible and that means employers who want to be free of statutory
compulsion must think now and hard about how they can deliver these
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arrangements", He went on: "We believe that voluntary cooperation is better
than statutory compulsion. But we are not going to let companies off the hook
of statutory boards to slip back into inefficient training, skill shortages and
poaching. ...Employers must look, not for the softest, cheapest option, but for
the one which will deliver the goads effectively".{105) In view of the
scepticism being exhibited by the TSD/MSC and the opposition of the trade
unions and many ITBs to voluntary arrangements, the Government had to be seen
to be pushing employers to come up with credible alternatives. It may have
been determined to override the preferences of these interests but it needed to
be able to claim that It was replacing existing arrangements with something
better. It may also have been the case that the Department was somewhat
suspicious that some employers' organisations were taking a rather cavalier
attitude towards voluntary arrangements and did indeed think that they could
get away with the 'soft option'.
This was certainly the view of training personnel interviewed by the author in
one or two of the larger chemical companies who claimed that the CIA had to
be convinced that the Minister would not simply abolish the ITB If he were not
satisfied that there was something credible to put in its place. The period
from the publication of the Employment and Training Bill to October/Novernber
1981 was one of considerable activity for employers. Many of the larger firms,
trade and employers' organisations, and the CBI (which had established an d
hoc working group - eventually to become permanent) were lobbying Ministers
and civil servants at the Department of Industry as well as Employment. They
were lobbying the TSD/MSC as well/MPs, MP'S groups (eg the all party group on
the chemical industry), and peers. However, as many employers felt that their
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views during RETA process had been misrepresented due to the way in which the
evidence had been submitted and analysed, a deliberately 'political' decision
was taken to, as far as possible, play down any disagreements and play up
accord.
The main focus of employers' attention became directed towards attempting to
obtain amendments to the Employment and Training Bill and to ensure
acceptance of voluntary arrangements. In this they had mixed success. They
were, for instance, unsuccessful in, getting the Government to meet the winding
up costs of ITBs; confining am employer's responsibility for training to its
own employees only instead of to "persons employed or to be employed in the
industry"; and in defining the criteria of acceptance of voluntary alternatives
to ITBe. Amendments were, however, successfully achieved in,. limiting the
liability of employers to pay the operating costs of ITEs to 0.2% of their
total taxable emoluments; and in giving employer representatives on the
remaining ITBs the overriding power to decide the size of a levy.
Representations were also made to delay the implementation of the decision to
transfer to industry boards' operating costs which again did not meet with a
favourable response. One of the difficulties that had, in fact, confronted
employers was the lack of clarity surrounding precisely what the criteria of a
satisfactory voluntary organisatian were. Until the publication of the sector
review many employers felt that they were working in the dark. And even after
its publication it was not clear whether the factors listed {106) were criteria
or something else. Certainly many ITBs took them as criteria, and in their
struggle for survival attempted to discredit trade associations' proposals on
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the grounds that they did not meet the criteria laid down in the sector
reviewilO'7)
This difficulty was not resolved until December when the CBI were informed by
TSD officials that the items listed were to be regarded as "prime general
factors" - not criteria - to be taken into account when reviewing proposals
for voluntary arrangements. The reason given for not considering them to be
criteria was because of their 'judgemental overtones' and they would therefore
be applied flexibly. This reflected a more general softening of the approach to
proposals coming forward by employers. Information from a number of
participants suggests that the main reason was that the DE became more
prominent In the negotiations from July/August onwards, TSD officials had, it
would seem, been giving at least some employers organisations a rough ride.
For example, at one meeting between employer representatives and the TSD, the
officials were described as having adopted a 'high-handed' and unfriendly
approach and had gone so far as to refuse to identify themselves which had
considerably affronted the employers. The DE were seen by a CBI source as more
"helpful, pragmatic and understanding" than the TSD who were "twitchy" and
"oversensitive" about trade union attitudes, There appeared to be no difficulty
at all in employers gaining access to the Department at this time. In essence
it would seem that the DE took over from HSC officials - who were probably in
a difficult position given the lack of agreement within the the Commission -
the process of steering the changes through. It was only following the
Government's decision on the fate of the ITBs announced on 16 November by the
new Secretary of State for Employment, Norman Tebbit, that the DE once again
started to take a back seat as it handed over to the HSC responsibility for
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seeing that the new arrangements were set up in those sectors where boards
were to be abolished.
The decision of the Government was that statutory training boards were to be
retained in only six of the seven cases recommended by the l'tSC, These were;
Clothing and Allied Products; Construction; Engineering; Hotel and Catering;
Road Transport; Rubber and Plastics Processing. The Petroleum ITB was to be
redesignated the Offshore Oil ITB, making a total of seven statutory ITBs that
were to remain in existence. All other boards were to be wound up. It was
clear that the proposals from many sector organisations had not been
satisfactorily worked out by this time,{108) It was also clear that voluntary
arrangements were totally opposed by many 'sector' trade unions (including the
ceramics and chemicals) and the TUC. Len urray, for example described the
changes as a "monstrous rejection by the Government of its responsibility for
training" and as "wantonly throwing away a decade of work by the boards".{109)
Nevertheless, it was clear, that having long ago decided its course of action,
the Government was prepared to wait no longer, and work was begun on
arrangements for winding up seventeen industrial training boards.
COHCLUS 101
Our analysis of events during this period reveals that the lack of agreement
within the Review Body, and later the MSC, about the future direction and shape
of the training system enabled the Secretary of State and the DE to take the
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initiative that they wanted to take on industrial training policy. To an
extent, of course, the DE was also filling the vacuum created by the conflict
between employer and employee interests as there was no reason to assume that
any agreement between the two would eventually be produced. Thus, as it became
more evident that the Government was becoming conimitted to a particular
course of action, it found it easier, indeed in some ways was obliged, to step
in and control events, Although the Government had become anxious to press
ahead with reform, the conflict between the two sides of Industry was
therefore not without its advantages, especially as the disagreement arose over
the issue of ITB funding.
Although prior to the Review, employers had not expressed any particularly
strong views over the future of the ITB system, faced with the prospect of
having to 'dip their hands in their pockets' they caine down fairly firmly in
favour of abolition. Thus while the CBI had been unable to formulate a clear
position during the early stages of the review, by the end of that process its
stance was clear, even if it was expressed in negative terms. The views of
employers then may be said to have largely prevailed. However, the evidence
suggests that this probably had more to do with the fact that the shift in
industrial opinion that occurred was a shift towards the Government's position.
In any case, possibly to the surprise of sonie employers, the Government was
not inclined to let industry call the tune - only join in the chorus. The
Government did not back down, for example, over making industry pay the
winding-up costs of boards. Further, the indications were that the Government
was taking the training issue - or the supply of labour - seriously. Its
decision to abolish seventeen ITBs need not be taken as a sign to the
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contrary, as it would seem many industrialists took it to have been. Rather,
the decision reflected the view that, in the form in which they existed, the
majority of ITBs were not effective mechanisms for the achievement of national
training objectives.
Clearly it is more difficult to gauge what the Government's reaction would have
been if the Review process had, resulted in some form of agreement between the
two sides of industry. But given that the process was constrained in
attempting to find solutions by what was perceived would, or would not, be
acceptable to the Government (particularly in terms of expenditure) then
disagreement was almost certainly bound to arise. In one sense, given the TUC's
suspicions of the Government's anti-regulatory stance, its strongly argued
recommendation for returning the costs of training to industry is difficult to
understand as it could not be unaware that such a proposal would be objected
to by many employers. It is, however, possible that the strength of such
opposition was underestimated by the TUG, or more particularly in the light of
previous cooperation at the national level, the TUG might have expected the CBI
to act as a more moderating influence upon its membership than, in the event,
was the case. But most important of all. there was perhaps an element of a
gamble that did not pay off in the TUGs position. Given the Government's
commitment to reducing the level of public expenditure, it might be persuaded
to retain the ITB system if the boards no longer had to be paid for out of
exchequer funding. The Government, however, had. its own views, not only about
who should pay for training, but what the future shape of the training system
should be. We therefore turn in the following chapter to examine the
development of the Government's 'new training initiative'.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE NEW TRA IN ING IN IT IA T IVE AND THE
ROLE Q1 GO VERNMENT
Our analysis of events in the previous chapter brought us to the point at
which by the end of 1981 the Government had decided that future training
arrangements would be markedly different to those previously operating. These
decisions added to the level of disagreement between the main participants in
the training system that had emerged during the review of the 1973 Act. Thus,
virtually for the first time since 1964, there was serious disagreement among
the major interests. Up until this time it had been accepted - by governments
as well as private interests - that both sides of industry had a key role to
play in the formulation of industrial training policy. There had also been a
broad basis of agreement about the features of the form of Intervention that
should exist and what intervention could, and should, seek to realise. This
broad agreement, as we have already seen, was that decisions about training
should largely rest within the remit of firms' decision making and their
negotiations with trade unions. Though this was the case it was also accepted
that the state had a legitimate role in supporting Industrial training and also
representing the needs of the national economy in the area of training.
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Whilst tensions existed in this position - which were clearly visible at
various points in the decision making process - these tensions bad always
remained manageable because none of the participants had been either willing
or able to push their case. There was thus a sustained accommodation of
Interests. What helped sustain this, was a belief that effective change was
more likely to be achieved in circumstances of cooperation rather than
conflict amongst the parties. Important in its own right, therefore, was the
aim held by participants that policy decisions should contribute towards the
maintenance of cooperation. Such an aim was, however, circumscribed to the
extent that certain primary interests were not challenged. The exact
identification of where the threshold would lie for each of the participants to
actually cease aiming for such cooperation is obviously difficult to judge
under the complex circumstances. What we can say, nonetheless, is that it was
not until the Review of the 1973 Act produced an Impasse over funding that the
threshold was breached.{1)
What is suggested therefore is that either conditions had changed so that
cooperation was no longer possible in the same manner, or that less value was
now being placed upon proceeding by means of cooperation - or possibly both.
Any discussion of these issues has to start from the arrival, at a critical
point, of a new Conservative Government with different views about the nature
of economic problems, the role of the state in the economy, and the authority
of government in the policy process.{2) Whilst it is possible to view the
abolition of seventeen industrial training boards as a reflection of the
Thatcher Government's anti-regulatory, anti-public spending and market oriented
approach which marked a significant break with the past, this would provide
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only a partial - and therefore misleading - explanation of the changes which
took place. It does not, for example, take into account the changing wider
context within which training was a political issue. That is, the higher levels
of unemployment coupled with the economic recession. Further, such a view
largely ignores the possibility that the translation of the Government's norms
into policy did not necessarily mean no, or cons:tderably less, intervention,
but intervention of a different sort. Thus for the Government the issues
centred not so much around the adequacies of the existing training
institutions and how they might be improved, but around how to overcome what
was diagnosed as the main training problem - the poor utilisation of labour as
a result of restrictive labour practices. The problem was also seen to be
compounded by other market imperfections and limitations of the state
education system. Such a view was not new - indeed in some repects resurrected
many of the arguments put forward some 13 years earlier by the Donovan
Commission. What was different was the change in emphasis that it represented
since the passage of the 1973 Act, In the changing climate, such views were
also increasingly being canvassed by employers themselves as in, for example,
a report by the British Institute of Management published in 1981(3) and in
the CBI's publication Will to Vin.{4)
LAYING TR FOIJJDATIONS FOR THE BEY TRAINING INITIATIVE
The abolition of the ITBs may thus be regarded as in part a development from
the weaknesses In the training system that we have already identified in
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preceding chapters and which would indicate that the Government was similarly
convinced of these weaknesses, Far, despite the anti-quango rhetoric, it was
clear that there was more to the decision than a Conservative Government
coming along and identifying a convenient means of getting rid of a
significant number of regulatory agencies In one fell swoop - although
presumably such a course of action was not without its appeal. But it was,
however, undeniable that by the end of 1981 the Government had become
impatient to push through changes in this area. Such haste was, more
importantly, a result of the Gavernment& desire to press ahead with its own
initiative and priorities which lay in other directions. That is, although the
Government was largely abandoning the ITB system. this was not an indication
that it was not taking training seriously. Rather than It being the end, it
represented more the beginning of the story as we shall shortly see in our
examination of the New Training Initiative. But before the Government could
satisfactorily proceed with its initiatives into new areas it had to remove
what it perceived to be certain barriers and reassert Its authority in the
training area. There can be little doubt that in some Important respects the
Government viewed the !anpower Services Commission as comprising an obstacle
to its objectives. One reason for this was the independent attitude that was
adopted by the Commission and particularly its chairman, Richard O'Brien. The
1(SC chairman had not only asserted that a return to voluntarism would lead to
a "deficiency in the quality and quantity of training"{5) but had also been
critical of the effects of expenditure cutbacks on the Commission's operations,
particularly at a time of high and increasing unemployment. And further,
statements such as that made in 1981, that if one included in the numbers
unemployed those not registered and those covered by special measures, then
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training ia Britain	 Page 481
Chapter Ten	 The Jew Training Initiative
the unemployment figures would be about 3 million rather than the 2.32 million
included in the official statistics, did not particularly endear him to
governnient.{6) Significantly, Richard O'Brien was not reappointed as J!SC
chairman (7) in April 1982, the post going instead to the much more sympathetic
David Young - previously adviser to Sir Keith Joseph at the Department of
Industry and later to become Lord Young and Secretary of State for Employment.
It was the generally accepted view that Richard D'Brien had in effect been
'sacked' due to his outspokenness.
Nore fundamentally however it is quite evident that the Government was unhappy
with the XSC as a decision making structure. In part this was due to the way
in which decisions were reached. The bringing together of representative
interests in circumstances where value was placed upon achieving cooperation
was likley to result in 'compromise' decisions which did not sit easily with
'conviction politics'. On the other hand, if cooperation broke down, or became
unstable, then decision making was likely to be Ineffective. In addition, the
XSC was seen as having assumed, or been given, decision making authority that
properly belonged to government. In attempting to remove these obstacles the
abolition of the XSC was not an option that was up fox' consideration for both
practical - training functions still had to be managed - and political reasons.
The MSG could, however, be managed in a different way. In other words, the
Government was not so much seeking to change the structure of the Commission
which would have been costly, but was attempting to change the nature of the
relationship between the XSC and government. In effect, the Government may be
viewed as wishing to be in position where it could exercise greater authority
and take more of the initiative. Such a change would lessen the influence of
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private actors, as it had for example with the abolition of the ITBs which in
particular had undercut the influence of trade unions,{8) while other measures,
such as returning the authority for creating/abolishing/changing the scope of
ITBs increased that of the Government. Similar motives lay behind bringing in
as MSC chairman a 'government' man who would be expected to have a different
relationship to the DE than the previous chairman. Such moves were therefore
designed to place the Government much more firmly in the driving seat as far
as industrial training policy was concerned,
These kind of developments support Bulpitt's argument that the application of
ideology and the pursuit of particular policies were not the sole concern of
the Thatcher administration, but that it also sought to govern with political
effectiveness rather than be impeded by obstacles from outside interests.{9) As
Andrew Gamble has put it "government that thinks strategically is rare in
British politics".{lO) In other words the Government engaged in various
attempts to ensure that its authority prevailed and was sustained. This meant
not only that the procedures adopted for formulating policies now differed
from what they had been under previous governments, it also, somewhat
ironically as Bulpitt points out,{11} limited the choice of policies that the
Government was willing to adopt because of their intention to avoid policies
that could only work with outside support. Thus the Government's rejection of
formal incomes policy can be seen not only as an expression of a market
orientated ideology but also a conscious effort not to get embroiled in the
weakening of governmental authority that 'afflicted' all previous governments
that had adopted them. Related to this was the Government's prediliction to
adopt policies where responsibility for a successful outcome was seen to
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largely rest with others. In this context can be placed the renewed emphasis
upon the responsibility of industry for the provision of training: the obvious
corollary being that if industry does not provide sufficient training then the
failure cannot be attributed to government policy.
A New Training Initiative: The Strategic Framewark
It was against this background that the Government produced, in December 1981,
a White Paper entitled A New Training Initiative: A Programme for Action,{12)
which marked the first comprehensive statement by the Government of their
intentions in the training area. (The term 'new training initiative' had, as we
saw in the last chapter, been employed in the title of the consultative
document issued by the NSC in Nay of 1981, although the term was first mooted
by James Prior the previous February.) The XSC's consultative document had set
out three major national objectives for future industrial training policy
relating to: the reform of the prrenticeship system; developing a system of
vocational education and training for those under the age of eighteen; and
improvements to the provision of adult training and retraining. Alongside the
Government's December White Paper,	 the NSC published a further document
entitled A New Training Initiative: An Agenda for Action.{13) The ]'tSC document
set out the nature of the responses - of which there had been nearly 1,000 -
to the earlier consultative paper and noted that there had been "overwhelming
support" for the three obiectives,{14} a statement that was reiterated in the
White Paper.{15) Whilst such might have been the case, the statements did not
reflect the apparent disagreements that emerged between the TUG and the CBI
over questions to do with resources and delivery during the period prior to
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December 1981, These disagreements were claimed by a CBI source to have only
been overcome by the hard work of Geoffrey Holland, MSC Director of special
Programmes and later Director of the MSC who was said to have "run between"
the TUG and CBI sorting out problems and the wording of the document to make
it acceptable to both sides, The results according to the sane source, however,
was that the document that finally emerged was "significant in that it is a
real negotiated document - not just pious words but has the agreement of all
parties." Thus the rift between the CBI and the TUG that had occurred during
the RETA exercise was to some degree healed during the preparation of the New
Training Initiative (NTI). This enabled the TTJC and CBI to more effectively
challenge at a later stage certain of the proposals contained in the white
paper Therefore, consulting and obtaining the agreement of affected interests
were still being seen as important to the forwarding of policy initiatives, but
the essential difference was that the balance in the taking of the initiative
had markedly tilted in the Government's direction, which might be said to
ref lect "major shifts in strategic policy thinking within central
government". {16)
The MSC document did though comment that there was "no predominant view
emerging on how to make progress. We may all be agreeing on the same
objectives now - and that in itself is a milestone - but major issues
remain."{lY) Significantly, and as if in reply, one of the opening statements in
the White Paper was that: "The time has now come for the Government to give a
lead." and its atitude toward the HSC can be discerned from the later comment
that the N)!anpower Services Commission.. .is (and will remain) the main agency
through which the Government initiates action and monitors progress over the
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whole field of industrial training."{18) The 'Programme for Action' that was set
out in the white 1aper was based on 10 points:{19)
(1)	 a new £1 billion a year Youth Training Scheme, guaranteeing
from September 1983 a full year's foundation training for all
those leaving school at the minimum age without jobs;
(ii) increased incentives for employers to provide better training
for young people in jobs;
(iii) development of an "Open Tech" programme to make technical
training more accessible to those who have the necessary
ability;
(iv) a working group to report by April 1982 on ways of
developing the Youth Training Scheme to cover employed as
well as unemployed young people, within available resources;
(v) setting a target date of 1985 for recognised standards for
all the main craft, technician and professional skills to
replace time-serving and age-restricted apprenticeships;
(vi) better preparation for working life in initial full-time
education;
(vii) more opportunities for vocationally relevant courses for
those staying an in full-time education;
(viii)closer co-ordination of training and vocational education
provision nationally and at local level;
(ix) a £16 million fund for development schemes in particular
localities or sectors;
(x) examination of longer term possibilities for more efective,
rational and equitable sharing of the costs of training
between trainees themselves, employers of trained people and
the general taxpayer.
Thus the White Paper represents an attempt to set out a comprehensive approach
to present and future policy for vocational education and training. Most
importantly, in terms of future developments, as the demand for labour was
held to increasingly require flexibility and a broad base of general or
transferable skills, the main emphasis, both in terms of state resources and
action, was placed upon reform of the training system from the 'bottom up' -
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that is at the level of young people entering employment or training. Such
action alone could, however, only bring about the desired results in the longer
term and at the same time therefore, greater flexibility needed to be
introduced in the area of adult training and retraining. The White Paper
therefore represented the first coherent statement of the Government's
"decisions on immediate action and proposals for the longer term".{20) It is
clear from the strategic nature of the proposals that the policy was regarded
as developmental in character. That is, it represented a framework for action,
some of which was to be left to later stages to be worked out and followed
through.
The Government's general outlook was repeated and elaborated, in line with its
evolving strategy, in a number of subsequent white papers. The first -
Training for Jobs{21) - produced in January 1984 reviewed the progress on the
achievement of the NTI objectives and put forward proposals for their further
development, most notably, the establishment of a system of certification
common to YTS, vocational education and other training standards and
qualifications, and the launching of a 'national awareness campaign' for adult
training. In the following Warch the Government published Employment Policy:
The Challenge to the Nation{22) which was notable for its reaffirmation of the
importance of the 'supply side' and competitive market forces as the basis for
tackling employment problems generally, including those of training. Shortly
after in April yet another white paper appeared. Education and Training for
Young People{23) was jointly presented by the Secretaries of State for
Education and Science and for Employment and the Ninister without Portfolio
(Lord Young as 'Employment Supremo' before being brought in as Employment
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Secretary), as well as being supported by the Scottish, Welsh and Trade and
Industry Secretaries, reflecting its central place in the Government's policy
initiatives. The paper set out proposals for a two year Youth Training Scheme
(YTS), beginning in April 1986 )
 that would lead to recognised qualifications
and for the establishment of a working group to advise on the development of
a coherent and comprehensive structure of vocational qualifications. The final
document, Working Together - Education and Trai.ning,{24} produced in July 1986,
stressed the way in which education and training policies were being developed
in a complementary and coherent way. It went on to announce an eztension of
the Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) (25) which had been
operating as pilot projects - beginning with 14 in 1983 and enlarged to 74 by
1986. The purpose of the TVEI projects was to test curriculum schemes for
preparing young people of differing abilities for adult and working life. From
autumn 1987 these are to be developed into a national scheme. The other
proposal was the establishment of a new framework of National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQ), to be developed and supervised by a new National Council
for Vocational Qualifications <NCVQ).
The Conservative Government's Policy Standards for Training
From the NTI and the other documents referred to it is possible to identify a
number of policy standards which It is important to consider at this point as
there can be identified a significant shift from certain of the standards that
had previously prevailed. What is further significant Is, that from the NTI to
the present, the standards espoused have displayed a high degree of
consistency. Thus while different standards can be identified in relation to
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the different matters to which the various documents have addressed
themselves, what is clear is that over this period the Government has held and
elaborated the same fundamental outlook on training policy. The most important
standards that can be identified from these various sources are discussed
below before going on to look at how these standards were applied in the
policy initiatives adopted and implemented to date.
There is no doubt from these documents that the Government's stance is one
which attaches considerable importance to the training function, for
notwithstanding the fate of the ITBs, these initiatives represent a major
intervention by the state, involving the spending of not inconsiderable sums
of money. At first sight this might appear to indicate a significant departure
from the standards held concerning the limited role of the state tn tne
economy. Deaton, for instance, argues that "the Government's stated policy in)
the area of training stands in marked contrast to other aspects of its
economic and industrial policy."{26} But an examination of the relevant white
papers and policy statements reveal a familiar market orientated outlook with
the consistent expounding of the view that the supply of labour and training
is most efficiently allocated through the market.C27} This being so the
question obviously arises as to why the Government regards it as necessary to
make a major intervention in the area of training. The apparent contradictions
between these two positions can in fact be reconciled if we take account of
the fact that the Government recognises that the market in this area is not
operating so as to achieve optimum allocations and further, that it cannot be
're-established' in the short run but needs to involve a longer process of
changing the attitudes of participants in the market. In short, the Government
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also holds other views concerning the operation of the market and the place of
training within it.{28}
These have to do with what are regarded as obstacles to the flexible operation
of the labour market. As argued in the 1985 Employment White Paper, "the
supply side Is crucial, and that needs an efficient labour market. Government
can help provide the conditions for this...to ensure that the supply of labour
meets demand in quality, quantity, cost and flexibility." {29) Since 19'?
theref ore, there has been a series of Interventions designed to remove these
obstacles, f or example liinitiations on the operation of the closed shop and
trade union immunities, a curtailement of statutory employment protection
rights, and a reduction in the protection afforded to those In low paid
industries through the Wages Council and the Pair Wages Resolution. Further,
even though these education and training initiatives do represent a major
Intervention, they are, by the Government at least, regarded as Interim
measures: the ultimate objective being the withdrawal of a large amount of
state involvement - extending even, for example, Into the area of the training
of all young peaple.{30) In the meantime the Government has assumed it is
necessary for the state to play a leading role - particularly in the area of
finance - in certain areas of training provision.
Withdrawal from other areas such as the ITBs should not, however, be taken to
indicate that it was the Government's belief that an adequate amount and
standard of training was being provided in these areas. Rather, the opposite
view was held.{31) Importantly, the reason for inadequate provision Is assumed
in part to be due to the attitude of employers, who in a large number of cases,
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it is claimed, regard training as a cast and not as an investment.{32)
Following on from this is the standard, which has been firmly stated, that
"the major responsibility for training must fall to employers as customers and
users."{33} This reflects the view, as stated in the 1984 White Paper Training
for Jobs: "the decisions as to who is trained, when and in what skills are
best taken by the employers (and indeed the individuals concerned) who have to
satisfy the needs of the market, rather than central direction."C34)
The view that employers tend to regard training as a cost rather than an
investment means that this is regarded as a causal factor in any explanation
of labour shortages and inadequacies, and makes transferring further
responsibility to them in the market not a straightforward issue as is evident
by the inability of previous arrangements to have a satisfactory impact in
this respect. Such a problem, however, most particularly affects training that
is not job specific: that is general or transferable skills training. (It is
this kind of training for which YTS is, in the long-run, designed.) Echoing
arguments from as far back as the 195 Os, the Government has claimed that
because of the costs involved, employers are deterred from training Individuals
who may then take up employment with employers who are willing to offer
higher wages freed from the costs of training - that is 'poached'. The problem
is seen, therefore, as one where "the individual firm has absolutely no
guarantee of a return on [its] investment since the trainee Is under no legal
obligation to stay once his training is complete."{35) The fact that employers
may act as 'free riders' in respect of the available pool of trained labour Is
in effect leading to a distortion in the operation of the market which has
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implications for the output of the national economy whatever the benefits or
disbenefits for individual employers.
On this basis there is, therefore, on liberal market premises a case for
intervention to correct the inefficiencies created by such distortions, and one
possibility suggested by the Government is a remissable tax on training.{36)
This is despite evidence - some of which has been produced latterly{37) -
which would suggest that poaching does not constitute a significant problem
in affecting the total volume of training undertaken by firms. As we shall see,
however, although such views are similar to those which were around in the
early 1960s, the response has been different, Part of the rationale of the 1964
Industrial Training Act was to share the costs of training more fairly between
employers, but past experience of trying to implement such an objective clearly
convinced the Conservative Government of its inappropriateness, As It stated
in the TI White Paper: "Attempts to even out costs between employers in
particular industries through the Industrial Training Board's levy/grant system
foundered under the weight of bureaucracy involved and its inability to deal
with the problem in respect of cross-sector skills where much of the
difficul±y lies." {38)
On top of that of employers there is also need to consider the position of
trainees. Being given renewed emphasis is the argument discussed in earlier
chapters that as skilled labour is able to sell Its skills in the market, this
means that trained workers are often able to gain a higher income from an
Investment to which their contribution may often have been marginal. In short,
training enhances the Individual's market position, and given this benefit an
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individual could be expected to make a contribution towards the cost of
training, that is share some of the burden of the investment in themselves.
This is certainly a standard that can be identified with the government's
approach to youth employment and training where it is possible to argue that
the financial burden, especially in the area of skill training, bad increasingly
been borne by employers in the first instance and latterly by the state. The
perceived source of this increasing cost is indicated by Borman Tebbit's
statement that: "[O]riginally the individual and his family paid for training
at craft level.. .The period of apprenticeship has been reduced., although it is
still longer than that actually required for the training. The pay of
apprentices has Improved both in relation to that of trained adults and to
that of young people in employment where no training is given. Contracts of
the old nature have become virtually unenforceable in a Court of Law, As a
result skill training has become more expensive to firms with less promise of
a return.TM {39) The suggested solutions therefore rest in efforts to keep
training costs down and the need for "the acceptance by trainees of levels of
income which reflect the value to them of the training given."{40) This is one
means of reducing the cost to employers of training, thereby making training
more attractive financially. Another means would be to reduce the overall cost
of training. The view of the Government is that training could be significantly
more cost effective. This applies in particular to the apprenticeship system
where trade unions are regarded as exercising undue influence to the detriment
of costs. In the Government's opinion: "Our apprenticeship system may have been
admirably suited to the first half of the twentieth century, but it is
certainly not suited to the last quarter."{41) The reason being that: "In recent
years.. .apprenticeships have failed to provide an adequate response to our
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emerging skill needs. In many instances rigidities have discouraged entry and.
linked skilled status to time-serving rather than competence. Partly as a
result of this...the number of apprentices recruited has dropped sharply so
that only some 40,000 were recruited last year."{42)
Thus the standards that we can identify within the New Training Initiative and
related developments may be summarised as follows;
That the market provides the most effecient mechanism for the
allocation of labour, and should remain so;
That the state should, however, intervene to remove obstacles which
distort the operation of the market in respect of the supply of
labour: such distrortions occurring through poaching and restrictive
practices;
State intervention should be selectively applied in line with
national manpower objectives;
Intervention should be directed towards making training more
financially attractive to employers;
The state has, therefore, a responsibility to provide a significant
financial contribution towards securing improvements to the training
system, but that this should be in the sort, rather than the long-
term;
That wherever possible, decisions about training should be taken
within a voluntary frameiork but that the main be the
responsibility for such decisions should reside with employers, not
employees;
But that individuals who benefit from training should be expected to
make a greater contribution towards its costs
The most significant means through which the Government has sought to apply
and realise these standards embodied in the New Training Initiative has been
the Youth Training Scheme. The schem&s outstanding significance can be
attributed to three prihcipal factors. First, the scheme is the largest ever
mounted, initially set to provide some 400,000 training places. Second, it is
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similarly the largest in terms of resources employed. Although subject to
underspend, as we shall see, planned initial expenditure on YTS was set at £1.1
billion. Third, there is no doubt that it was, and has increasingly been seen
as, the linchpin in the reform of the training system. Ye need, therefore, to
consider in some detail the provisions and implementation of the Youth
Training Scheme within the context of the New Training Initiative. This will be
the concern of the following chapter. Firstly, however, we need to look at the
other developments under the New Training Initiative and also at what has
happend to the voluntary arrangements In those industries where the ITBs were
abolished. The abolition of the ITBe and their replacement by a range of Non-
Statutory Training Organisations (NSTOs) marked the Conservative's first
initiative to reform the training system and consideration of the extent to
which increased voluntarism has produced improvements or not is of importance
given that extending voluntarism is a longer term aim of the New Training
Initiative.
THE 1EV TRA II JIG IJITIATIVE PROGRAXJES
Although YTS is regarded as the central component in the long term reform of
the training system we will be concerned in this section to review the
progress of other policy initiatives especially those relating to the three NTI
objectives: the reform of occupational training, including apprenticeship, to
achieve greater flexibility and competence judged on the basis of standards;
the provision of full-time education or training or planned work experience
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for all young people under the age of 18; an increase in the opportunities
available to adults to acquire, increase or update their skills. As the second
of these relates primarily to YTS, it is the first and third objectives that
mostly concern us here.
Policy towards the training of young people differs in one important respect
from that towards adult retraining or the reform of occupational training in
that there exists a much more clearly defined - programme through which the
objectives are pursued. Securing the other objectives are less straightforward
as they trespass on areas affecting collective agreements that are regarded as
for negotiation between management and unions. Thus whilst the Government has
given the lead In terms of setting out the standards that it wishes to see
pertain and the overriding policy objectives to be achieved, the working out of
the programmes and their implementation has been left more - though by no
means exclusively - in the hands of the NSC than has been the case for YTS.
The reason being that progress towards these objectives is seen to require a
more gradual, or step by step, approach because of the greater need to obtain
the agreement of the different interests than was necessary for the
establishment of YTS: in this respect the ]iSC is viewed as an appropriate
forum to secure such agreement. We therefore move an to a consideration of the
extent to which the standards are being applied and objectives moved towards
in these other areas. One of the difficulties that confronts us in this respect
is that unlike policy towards the vocational education and training of young
people, there exist a wider range of smaller scale programmes in relation to
the two other NTI objectives. We are not, however, concerned so much to provide
a detailed examination of these programmes, as to draw out the overall pattern
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that is now emerging in. these areas, together with the role of the centre, and
in particular the MSC.
The Government's approach towards education and training and wider labour
market issues has been expressed In economic rather than social terms, and is
consistent with its market oriented outlook. This approach was perhaps most
clearly expressed in the January 1984 White Paper, Training for fobs. Such an
emphasis upon economic objectives can also be discerned in the pattern of
programme developments emanating from the NSC post-1983, and which it can be
claimed reflect the Government's market orientated stance on education and
training. The direction which the HSC has been taking has tended to follow the
Government's views that the state cannot create jobs, but it can provide the
conditions In. which they might be created. There can be little doubt that such
views have been fostered by the appointment to the MSC of chairmen
sympathetic to the Government's approach. Thus when David Young was 'elevated'
to the Cabinet via the House of Lords in October 1984, his successor was Bryan
Nicholson, chairman of Rank Xerox and a known supporter of the Government on
employment matters. Thus the Government can be seen to be exercising greater
Influence on the Commission's decision making through its use of appointments
to the chairmanship. But also, the programmes that have been developed have
significantly increased the the status and functions of the MSC as an
organisatlon, which we may assume has the support of MSC permanent officials.
Therefore, the ability of the Commission (ie the Commissioners collectively) to
act as an Independent decision making body appears to have been markedly
downgraded as it has been squeezed between pressure emanating both from above
and. below. Indeed the extent to which the Government is 'sidestepping' the
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Commission may be gauged from the manner in which Lord Young announced the
Government's most recent package of employment measures. These were announced
at the Conservative Party Conference in October 1986 without prior reference
to the Commission. It was commented at the time that "several I(SC members
expressed concern.. .and that it was another example of the Department of
Employment taking a unilateral decision". {43)
So we can see a shift, from 1982 onwards, in the direction of MSC programmes
to one which bears. a closer resemblance to the Government's market oriented
approach. Vhilst the problems resulting from unemployment - particularly for
the young and long term unemployed - are seen to require continued attention,
(although the issue of youth unemployment can be expected to decline in line
with the considerable drop in the school-leaving population already beginning,
and which will result in one third fewer 16 year olds in the labour market in
the early 1990s than there were in the early 1980s) the greatest emphasis has
been placed upon helping industry to become more efficient, This was most
clearly marked in its 1984 Corporate Plan where the KSC's major task was
identified as providing programmes "designed to meet the challenge of the
labour market in those years ahead, both in reinforcing recovery through
helping to remove obstacles to the efficient utilisation of skills, and in
helping to ensure that all those in work or seeking employment have every
opportunity to make the most of their skills or to acquire new ones."{44)
A more market oriented approach does not, however, given the current obstacles
mean a greater degree of de-centralisation. On the contrary, one result of the
1(SC's attempt to push through the NTI objectives has been an increase in
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centralisation, in particular as a consequence of efforts to develop a
comprehensive and coordinated system of vocational education and training with
a common basis of qualifications. Such developments have led to the NSC
playing a far more prominent role in the field of secondary and further
education at the expense of the DES, LEAs and FE colleges. One clear example of
this is in the area of work-related Non-Advanced Further Education <NAFE)
whereby the Commission was requested by the Government to ensure that NAPE
courses related more closely to labour market needs.{45) To ensure such an
outcome the MSC's budget has been increased by the transfer of funds totalling
£65 million in 1985/86 and £110 million in 1986/87 from the Rate Support
Grant.{46) The result, according to Dutton, has been that "(I]n schools and FE,
we appear to be robbing the pupil in general education in order -that a few
following vocationaly orientated courses,..can benefit."{47) This move raised
the hackles of both educational and local authority interests not only because
of the loss of revenue and functions to the NSC, but because of the secretive
manner in which the decision was taken: "Na one in local government or
education knew it was coming; even the ASC Commissioners were kept in the
dark."{48) Such an extension of the MSC's operations in this and related areas
such as TVEI,{49) in particular at the expense of the DES,lend a good deal of
credibility to Moos's contention that "when the government wanted to change
the direction of education and training quickly, the MSC proved an essential
mechanism, uncircumvertted by the normal - and often lengthy - process of
consultation and lobbying associated with local authority decisions. The
implication of this for the LEAs was profound - as, Indeed, was probably
intended." {50) But from a somewhat different perspective, Aitken argues that
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the DES has simultaneously and successfully achieved an enhanced degree of
central power. (51)
We can see therefore that in those areas where the NSC acts as purchaser (eg
FE courses) or supplier (eg of finance) it has moved towards a position of
increasing control over the provision and providers of education and training
arid/or training related activities, which has resulted in a far greater degree
of centralisation than existed previously. In other areas, however, its
influence is far less direct and depends to a much greater extent upon
exhorting and persuading those with more direct responsibility for determining
the amount and quality of training provided. As set out by the MSC,
achievement of NTI objective 1 means ugoing beyond modernising initial
training arrangements such as apprenticeship. We must improve access to
training and vocational education and to jobs; improve the relevance and cost
effectiveness of training; and provide a sounder basis for assessing and
testing competence and ensure that arrangements for validating, recording and
certifying training competence attained are effective and flexible. Such aims
however "call for quite radical changes in policy and practice in industry and
in our education and training institutions. Much of the work and almost all the
agreements required are the responsibility of employers, trade unions and
professional bodies, the joint industry organisations, including ITBs and the
further education standard setting and validating bodies. In many areas the
Commission can only use its influence and help others make progz-ess."(52) So
the MSC's strategy has been one that has attempted to change attitudes to
training, not though regulatory and inspectorial means, but by adopting much
more aggressive marketing and promotional - not to say propagandist - tactics,
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encouraging employers and individuals to take advantage of the benefits of
training. {53)
A similar approach has been adopted in pursuit of the objective of opening up
training opportunities for adults. This has been furthered not only by
developing new training methods but through the Open Tech programme which, by
April 1986, had produced some 3,000 training modules providing 18,000 hours of
learning which had been used by some 32,000 people at a cost of £16.2
millian.{54) But most significantly, November 1984 witnessed the launch of an
Adult Training Campaign. The purpose of the Campaign being to "inform
employers, individuals and training providers of the importance and value of
training and retraining for adults and their relevance to economic growth and
competitiveness....The Commission believes that a sustained campaign over
several years involving all those with an interest in adult training will be
necessary to bring about the desired changes in training arrangements".{55) As
a first step, during 198 "a wide range of materials was made available in
support of the Campaign, including a Campaign Guide, a speaker's kit, leaflets
and. the bi-monthly newsletter, Focus on Adult Training." (56) In addition
regional conferences have been held and Local Action Groups formed to tackle
local training issues. The focus upon improving the labour market through
better access to information is also being pursued by exploring the
"possibilities of using new technology developments to make such information
more widely available to individuals and employers through a computer based
network of Training Access Points (TAPs) linking local and national databases,
and to support that Information through local advisory agents".{57)
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As far as the 1(SC's responsibility for the direct provision of training is
concerned again we can witness a clear move towards a market based approach
in line with the Government's statement that the "resourcing of the Training
Opportunities Programme.. .should increasingly be directed to encouraging the
necessary provision in industry".{58} The Training Opportunities Scheme was
replaced in 1985 by a series of schemes coming under the collective title of
the Job Training Programme. The largest of these, which is the direct
descendent of TOPS is the Sob Training Scheme (JTS) providing "intensive
occupational training to upgrade, update, extend or convert skills of
unemployed people aged 18 or over".{59) Other schemes include the National
Priority Skills Scheme, providing grants through Industry Training
Organisations for training in key skills; Training for Enterprise; Access to
Information Technology; and Local Consultancy and Local Training Grants. All
such schemes are delivered through the Skills Training Agency which was
established as a separate agency within the Commission on 1 April 1983. The
function of the agency is stated as being to provide "an efficient, up-to-date
range of training services responsive to changing training needs through the
Commission's network of sklllcentres and its Mobile Training Service".{ôO) The
emphasis is obviously on cost effectiveness for the agency operates on a full
trading account basis and is required to achieve the complete recovery of its
costs in providing training services to the Commission's Training Division
(formerly Training Services Division) and employers. Such financial
accountability is presumably based upon the assumption that it makes for
responsiveness and flexibility in meeting 'customer' demands. These moves have
been carried further in the most recent (1986) reorganisation designed to
enable the MSC to respond to its "rapidly developing role and "meet the
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changes of the future" {61) Thus the XSC is now divided into five major
organisational units: The Vocational Education and Training Group (which
clearly illustrates the emphasis that is being placed upon the coordination of
education and training); The Employment and Enterprise Group; The Skills
Training Agency; Planning and Resources Division; and Personnel and Central
Services Division.
Whilst we are mainly considering initiatives in relation to the three
objectives (national standards of competence; education and training of young
people; adult training) separately, it is at this point worth re-emphasising
their Interconnectedness. Par example, the establishment at a sound foundation
training for young people (objective 2) that is linked to nationally or
industry recognised qualifications from which trainees may progress to further
qualifications would itself make a significant contribution to the first
objective Dne important reason being that it would have created a mechanism
for the recruitment of young people into skilled occupations that circumvents
the traditional means for recruiting apprentices. That first year
apprenticeships have been funded through YTS is proof of this. Further, where
agreements have been reached upon training standards - as they have been in
the chemical, printing, engineering, shipbuilding and catering industr1es62) -
and where this is based upon a modular structure this opens the door to adult
training and retraining. It is as yet, however 0 unclear precisely what such
progress as has been made in these areas adds up to. it was abundantly clear
that the aim of achieving the first objective by 1985 as intended had fallen
by the wayside. Nonetheless, agreements are being reached in some sectors it
would seem, and the vocational education and training of young people is being
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re-shaped so as to meet the perceived needs of the labour market. One
indication that the programmes are bearing fruit is the declining attention
given to reforms required to the apprenticeship system. Indeed this also
suggests that apprenticeships are in any event coming to be seen as
increasingly irrelevant and, replacement rather than reform of the system is
what is required. Thus, the MSC reported that "[Diuring the year (1984/85] the
training offered by skillcentres continued to move away from traditional
trades and centralised syllabuses and towards training in skills relevant to
today's demands, including the application of new technologies and more local,
flexible, modular tralning".C63)
Some of the vehicles for a number of these reforms and for implementing the
market based strategy have been the Industry Training Organisations. This is
the now collective noun for the Non-Statutory [voluntary] Training
Organisations plus the remaining Industry Training Boards, many of which
operate at the local level unlike arrangements under the former ITB system. So
having looked at the emerging pattern of industrial training policy from the
central level, it remains in this chapter to give some consideration to the
organisation of industrial training through the NSTO system. In the main this
is done by returning to review what has been happening in the two industry
sectors from our earlier case study: pottery and chemicals.
ION-STATUTORY TRAINIIG ORGAN ISATIOJS
The speed with which the Government acted in 1981/82 to wind up seventeen
ITBs and replace them with voluntary arrangements was was seen by many as the
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Government not taking such arrangements too seriously, despite statements to
the contrary.(64} Such an interpretation was certainly held by some of those
Involved in the process, perhaps the most outspoken comment coming from the
Director of the outgoing Food, Drink and Tobacco ITB, David Mitchell, who
claimed in April 1B2 that the voluntary proposals coming forward from
organisations in that sector were grossly inadequate and furthermore that the
Government had effectively dropped any pretence of creating a viable voluntary
alternative. Mr Mitchell was quoted as saying that the Minister of State, Peter
Morrison, had told industrialists that he must have "at least a piece of paper"
demonstrating their capacity to deliver, "otherwise I will get egg on my
face".{65) Even the CBI was concerned, as It reportedly believed that only
about one-third of the non-statutory training bodies would be effective and
there was no focal point provided for the new arrangements.{66) The CBI was,
however, treading warily at this stage as it had 'upset' one or two important
employers' associatIon because of the active role that It had assumed during
the preceding months.{6?} It remains to be seen therefore how seriously
employers actually took these new arrangements. To date, however, there is
little by way of information regarding the performance and achievements of
ISTOs and the conclusions presented here are largely based upon information
obtained from the ceramics and chemicals sectors.
Following the negotiations in 1982 between the DE, MSC and employers
organisaticrns approval was given to approximately 160 organisations to
establish themselves as NSTOs.{68) Since that time, due to a number having
failed to get off the ground or amalgamations between NSTOs the figure seems
to have settled down at around 100,(69} Given that NSTOs are a clear
âxzaJysing Pvlicy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 505
Chapter Ten	 The 7ev Training Initiative
expression of the standard that responsibility for training rests with
industry - or perhaps more precisely with employers - NSTOs are in the main
left to develop their own philosophies, priorities and arrangements for
encouraging training within their industries. Their links with the MSC centre
largely around their contribution to the objectives of the New Training
Initiative, and contact between the two sets of organisatious appears to be
loose and lrregular,{70) being most often concerned with training grants which
are disbursed by the NSTOs. In any industrial sector the number of NSTOs tends
to reflect the degree of heterogeneity: The greater this is the larger the
number of NSTOs. Thus in the food and drink industry, for example, there are
14 NSTOs,{71) whilst there is only one for the ceramics industry - the
Ceramics Industry Training Organisation (CITO) - and one main one (there are a
number of much smaller ones) for chemicals which is part of the Chemical
Industries Association (CIA), the employers' association. However in the latter
case a joint organisatlon (see below) has been set up with the NSTO for the
pharmeceuticals industry which is attached to the employers' association - the
Association of the ritish Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI),
Clearly the establishment of the NSTOs represented a new role for many
employers' organisations. It is quite apparent that the NSTOs do not envisage
their role to be a voluntary form of an ITB. Quite apart from anything else
they are not resourced to anywhere approaching the previous level of ITB
funding. They have therefore had to establish their priorities according to
modest budgets, and the employiuent of relatively few staff, Thus, the CIA
Training Department was allocated a budget of £70,000 in its first year and
consists of four staff - two training (Training Nanager and Training Officer)
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and two support (information and ad.ministration). This compares with the
1979/80 expenditure (mostly of 1'ISC grant income) of the Chemical and Allied
Products ITB of £2.781 million, and a staffing complement of 140.{72} Because
the NSTO is part of the CIA, membership is automatic for CIA members with no
provision for 'opting out'. In this way the budget of the NSTO is protected.
The pottery NSTO, CITO, on the other hand is in a much less secure position as
it has been constituted separately from the relevant employers' association,
the British Ceramic. Hanufacturers' Federation (BCNF), and Is funded on the
basis of a voluntary subscription from member companies. The rate of
subscription is calculated on the number of persons employed and is set at 2
per head per annum but with no membership fee (thus the smallest firm on
CITO's books pays an annual subscription of t8: and members are entitled to
one vote at General Meetings for each £1 subscription paid). This results In a
budget of just under 80,000. CITO employs a staff of five and a half (a Chief
Executive and three training 'Team Leaders' plus a full-time secretary and
part-time typist) and a YTS trainee who is destined to become a permanent
member of staff. It was the view of those interviewed in September 1986(73)
that it has only been during the past year that the future of CITO has begun
to look secure.
One early reservation about NSTOs was that where they were attached to
employers' associations many employees would be excluded from their scope.
Such would appear to be the case In the chemical industry where membership of
the CIA covers around 60 per cent of employees formerly covered by the ITB.
However, the NSTO operates a decentralised system of regional self help groups
(of which there are eleven) and non-member firms are encouraged to join these
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groups, although it remains unclear what additional proportion of employees
this covers. CITO on the other hand claims a membership covering over 90 per
cent of employees whereas those firms in membership of the BCT(F only cover
about 60 per cent of the workforce. The employee coverage claimed by CITO is
probably accurate but some reservations do need to be made because since the
abolition of the ITB there are no labour force statistics collected, The
industry has undergone considerable contraction during the past six years, but
again, no precise figures exist about this.
The Ceramics ladustry Training Organisation
The reasons why CITO was cons-tittti separately from the BCMF were probably
twofold. First, the lack of the Federation's training experience. This resulted
in their original proposals being given 'short shrift' by XSC officials (see
chapter 9). The inference being that, in the early stages at least, training
was not being considered a serious issue by employers in the industry. Second
was the need to cover a wider range of membership than that of the Federation.
The real impetus came in fact from the chairman of one of the largest pottery
groups in the industry (Royal Doulton) who, although working closely with the
Federation, initiated a series of working parties from September 1981 onwards
until the Board of CITO was formally constituted in May 1982. Whilst the
overwhelming majority of employers in the industry had been in favour of the
abolition of the ITB, it did not follow that they viewed the establishment of a
voluntary organisation in positive terms. As a CITO official put it: "most
firms saw their membership of CITO as the price that bad to be paid for
keeping out the Board". {74) o doubt bearing such attitudes in mind one of the
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first decisions was that initial membership would be for a minimum period of
three years, thus giving the NSTO time to establish itself within the industry.
It is therefore only during the past year that memberships have come up for
renewal and according to CITO officials membership has been maintained at
around 70 firms (a few having left and a few new ones having joined), which at
least suggests that there exists at present a sufficient basis of - at least
passive - support for the organ.isation,
Formal decision making authority rests with an elected Board of Management
which meets four or five times a year. The constitution {75)) provides that the
Board consists of not more than twelve nor less than six directors or senior
executives of employer members. It also makes provision for an officer or
employee of a union member. However, to date . there has been no union
representative on the Board. Part of the reason relates to the initial
opposition and stance of the trade union movement towards NSTOs and which
also affected union membership of the chemicals NSTO. Originally it was TUC
policy that unions should not participate in the establishment of NSTOs.
However, following invitations to join, and the feeling that was evident among
some unions that members' interests might best be served by their involvement,
the TUC held a special conference in August 1982 w.hich resulted in the issuing
of guidelines for participation. The most significant of these were that the
organisatlan should cover the majority of employees in the industry; that there
should exist parity of representation between employers and unions; and that
the organisation should be adequately financed. It would seem, however, that
few NSTOs have been willing to grant membership to unions in accordance with
such guidelines and it appears that individual unions have made judgements
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about their participation on rather more pragmatic criteria.{76) The Ceramic
and Allied Trade Union (CATU) was invited to nominate a member but the
conditions that CITO laid down suggest that it was an offer that CATU could
only refuse. There would for instance be no parity of membership, but more
importantly the CATU Board member would only be entitled to vote where
membership was on the same basis as that for other members - a subscription
rate of £2 per head for all those represented.
Nost decision making activity is delegated to CITO staff, Board meetings
apparently tending to focus upon organisational issues such as staffing levels1
the use of cars and other expenses. It was interestingly claimed though that
from the outset the Board had adopted a somewhat 'hawkish' attitude to the
NSC, apparently the image of an over-extended, ineffiecient bureaucracy remains
strong in many employers' minds. There is said to exist a policy of "no
compromise" with the '1SC in cases where a clash of interests might exist. This
attitude has apparently spilled over to CuD staff who, although claiming that
on the whole relations with MSC officials were cordial, frequently referred to
the fact that they would brook no interference from the MSC in their internal
affairs. CITO staff see their role very much as providing a service to their
industry based upon its needs. Early priorities obviously focussed upon
survival: establishing a credible image and what was termed 'building bridges'.
The latter was seen to be necessary, indeed unavoidable, it was claimed, due
to the exteme unpopularity of the former training board. This was apparently
the reason why none of CITO's staff were drawn from the Ceramics ITB
(although one training officer was recruited from a former textile training
board) nor. indeed, and perhaps more interestingly from within the pottery
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industry itself. The rationale given was that the organisation wished to
demonstate its independent status; something of an irony given that one of the
major criticisms of the ITB had been that their staff lacked expertise of the
industry.
CITO staff in fact do not regard themselves as being concerned with 'training'
which is regarded as too narrow a concept, but rather with the more in vague
term the 'management of human resources'. Thus having apparently achieved
their early objectives, current priorities were stated as being the development
of management training which is viewed as a crucial starting paint for
encouraging sound attitudes towards training. Other priority areas mentioned
were financial and marketing training, plus YTS. Lgain somewhat ironically,
opinions about the state of training within the industry are reminiscent of
those expressed by previous staff of ITBs: that with the general exception of
the larger firms (although by no means all), training was highly traditional,
and was viewed essentially as a cost to be minimised. Hanagement attitudes are
regarded as the main priority due to what was seen as the low level of
competence: 9'!anagement in the pottery industry is light years behind that of
many other industries."{77) In order to bring about the desired changes
therefore, the decision was taken that the organisation should not exist simply
as a resource and information centre for members, but should actively be
involved in course development, using their awn staff and where necessary,
outside consultants. Although early days, the response from members was said
to be encouraging. Because of resource constraints, however, communication with
members seems to be somewhat haphazard. To regular newsletters or similar
publications are distributed (possible accusations of wasting money may also
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serve as a deterrent). Instead the organisation seems to rely largely on
members approaching them if the need arises and lack of time limits the extent
to which other forms of contact can be maintained. To overcome this constraint
and in order to stimulate a greater interest in training a Trainers' Working
Party was established in January 1986, composed of training managers and
officers from individual firms.
CITO also administers )!SC grants which are available inter alia for sandwich
students, apprentice training and training in new technology. The low level of
take-up of such grants was, however, instanced as an indication of the lack of
interest in training within the industry, although the need for such training
within the pottery industry was claimed to be less than for other industries.
During the current year (1986) firms have only taken up 5 grants for industry
based sandwich courses amounting to around £10,000. It is only in the case of
the Youth Training Scheme that all of the available funds are distributed, CITO
is the largest Managing Agent (see chapter 11) for YTS in the pottery
industry, currently administering 280 places. The claim is that after having
got off to a poor start with YTS, largely due to the Jaundiced view that
employers had from their experience of the Youth Opportunities Programme, the
attitude of employers had changed. Rather than seeing the YTS as a
'social/political' instrument, employers were now participating for the "right
reasons: an opportunity to provide adequate, formal training". {78)
CITO officials claim the credit for this change in attitude. In 1983 it was
stated, the majority of industry was refusing to participate in the scheme:
that it eventually did so was due to CITO's persuading employers that it would
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be inapproprite to absent themselves from it. The change is such that it was
claimed that there is now more demand for trainees than there are trainees.
This overprovision of places was said to have arisen largely because
employers now recognise the benefits to be derived (although it was also
acknowledged that the falling school rolls and some increase in jobs also
contributed). There was, however, some ambiguity surrounding precisely what
these benefits were. CITO staff did not feel that YTS trainees were displacing
those who might otherwise have been taken on into permanent employment. The
main reason given was that CITO only approve places where trainees are not
taken into permanent employment at "a very early stage - before the off-the-
job element is undertaken". The inference to be drawn is, in fact, that some
employers at least regard YTS as a form of cheap labour and that this issue
has caused a degree of tension between CITO and some firms. On this point, it
is significant that there was no 'top-up' of trainee allowances in the pottery
industry, as there have been in many other industries, although the trade union
has negotiated additional payment for the second year of the two-year YTS.
Employers' 'enthusiasm' for YTS did not, however, extend to the two-year scheme
launched in April 1986, They were supported in their opposition by CITO who
wrote to the XSC objecting to the second year being mandatory rather than
optional. Because of the way in which the pottery industry is structured, it
was claimed, and the narrow band of craft skills required, two years is viewed
as unwarranted and 'gilding the lily'. CITO's solution therefore was to advise
firms that "if, after 12 months it is appropriate to terminate the training,
then do so. But that training cannot be terminated if the trainee is not going
into permanent employment." {79)
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There is little doubt that one of the major achievements of the Ceramics NSTO
is to have survived the past three and a half years and to have established
Itself within an industry that Is not, on the whole, renowned for its
progressive approach to training. We turn next to look at how the NSTO that
has been established within the chemical industry has fared.
The CheiQicals 1(570
Established in January 1983, the NSTO for the chemicals industry is firmly
placed within the organisational structure of the Chemical Industries
Association, being simply known as the CIA Training Department. It Is linked
to both the Training Policy Committee and the Industrial Relations Board
(employers forming the majority membership of both) but under the overall
responsibility of the Industrial Relations Directorate, In addition to the
Training Department, however, a further body has been established, the Chemical
and Allied Industries Training Training Review Council (CAITREC) which was
initially composed of eight employer representative members from the CIA and
the Association of British Pharmecutical Industries (ABPI), plus one from
education. Until early 1986 -the were no trade union representatives on CAITREC,
although invitations to join had been extended. Trade unions in the chemical
industry had been extremely hostile towards the establishment of the TSTO <80)
and refused to participate. During the course of the past three years, however,
opposition became more muted, possibly even symbolic, particularly as the
Training Department managed to work with and secure the agreement of the
trade unions to significant changes in the structure and content of craft
apprenticeships (see below). There is little doubt that this experience
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convinced the unions of the utility of participatin in the work of the NSTO in
a formal basis. CAITREC, however, is a non-executive body and does not employ
staff. Its purpose is to "keep under review the training needs and activities
of those parts of the chemical and allied industries represented on the
Council, and to provide a forum for the several interested parties to discuss
these factors at national level."{81) Thus the NSTOs have served as vehicles
for closer cooperation between the two main employers associations within the
industry. (82)
As training within the chemical industry is regarded as being of a generally
high standard the STO is much more sanguine than the Ceramics NSTO about the
extent to which it needs to encourage training. It does not, for example,
directly involve itself in the provision of courses - other than those that the
CIA has traditionally provided in the areas of industrial relations and health
and safety. In broad terms its role is seen to be that of facilitator and
coordinator. More specifically its objectives were set out in the first of its
annual Training Bulletins {83) as being to:
a) establish local self-help groups of chemical industry training
personnel
b) provide a training advisory sevice
C) provide a training information and reference service
d) facilitate the provision of training courses to meet specific
identified needs, eg supervisors, safety representatives
e) provide a direct link to MSC and Government training policy
decision makers
f) niaximise the provision of MSC Training Grants to qualifying
member companies.
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Thus the NSTO sees itself generally as having a consultancy and advisory role.
For example, one of the first documents it issued was 'Guidelines to Good
Training' {84) The regional Chemical Industry Training Organisations (somewhat
confusingly, given the Ceramics NTSO acronym, labelled CITOs) are regarded as
an extremely important element in keeping members in touch on training
matters and stimulating interest. Their purpose is stated to be to: "ensure
that there are sufficient local resources in terms of people with the requisite
skills and knowledge to meet the present and future needs of a profitable
Chemical Industry ." {85) In addition to representation from firms from other
industries CITOs are encouraged to invite representatives from education, the
NSC and "where appropriate" local trade union officials. So far, however, only
one OtTO contains a trade union representative. All of the CITOs are serviced
by the CIA Training Department, and every meeting of every CITO is attended by
one of the two field officers from the Department. Interstingly though, the
CITO network is additionally viewed by the CIA Training Manager, as
particularly important in the achievement of national training objectives, For
lnstnce: "The CITO network.. .also provides me with information about common
priority needs which accumulate into a national need and thence to a national
solution."{86)
In October 1985, the CIA announced a 'first' in industrial training which was
"set to revolutionise craft apprenticeships".{87) This was a scheme for craft
training in chemical plant maintenance based on a national standard and
testing procedure. Work on the project was carried out by the CIA's Training
Manager in conjunction with the City and Guilds of London Institute and was
claimed to have "the full backing of the Manpower Services Commission and the
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trade unions". Companies were invited t register their new and the majority of
their existing craft apprentices from October 1985. Clearly such a development
was regarded as something of a feather in the cap of the CIA, having achieved
what the ITB bad failed to do in its fourteen years existence. And it can also
claim to have met the first objective - reform of the apprenticeship system -
of the flew Training initiative with a few months to spare. To date (September
1986) the scheme is being used by around one-third of the new craft entrants
to the industry and by some sites for certification of existing craftsmen, The
bulk of the remaining two-thirds are employed by ICI who are, however,
committed to progressively join the scheme through 1987-88 It is estimated
that by 1988 over 90 per cent of trainee craftsmen in the industry will be
registered.{88) One of the stated future priorities of the Training Department
was to make training to standards the only system within the chemical
industry. The Training Department's conunittment to the validation of training
through the application of standards has been evident in the contributions
that it has made to the work on the Review of Vocational Qualifications,{89)
Being keen not only to introduce common standards, but to influence the
direction of change, the CIA Training Manager is a member of the Planning
Group which will advise the new National Council for Vocatonal Qualifications
(NCVQ) .He has also promoted the formation of an 'expert' group within the GEl
to "provide original thought" from that source to the NCVQ.
The CIA appears to have established good working relations with MSC officials
which is viewed as necessary given that a major aim of the NSTO is to ensure
that its industry is able to make maximum use of the public funds available.
This approach stands in marked contrast to the ceramics NSTO especially when
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we look at the total size of grants distributed. In contrast to CITO's £20,000
for 1985/86, the CIA's £453,100 was the largest award of grants for any
industry, a record that has been carried through for 1986/87 with awards of
£512,000.{90} Although the CIA does not act as a YTS managing agent,
consultations with the NSC are currently taking place about developing two-
year YTS model schemes for engineering and laboratory technicians in order
that future selected YTS trainees could be integrated into apprentice training
arrangements. This again can be regarded as a not insignificant contribution
to the NTI objectives, combining the first and second.
Clearly, the CIA Training Department has achieved much in its short existence
given the resource limits within which it operates. The resourcing of the
Department does, in fact, look set to become an issue within the CIA in the
near future. The Training 1'!anager, for example, stated that although adequately
resourced until recently the situation had now changed and he expressed the
fear that the "work load will destroy my team (and possibly myself) if help
does not arrive soon",{91) The 'help' needed being one mare field officer
immediately and another by 1989. Whether CIA Council will be prepared to
provide the additional funds is, at the moment, uncertain.
*	 *	 *	 *
It is obviously difficult to estimate how far the NSTOs have contributed - or
otherwise - to improved training arrangements within their industries. One
reason is that since ITBs were abolished there is no systematic collection of
information about training in individual firms, and neither organisation sees
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 518
Chapter Ten
	
The Jew Training initiative
itself as having a monitoring funtion, indeed they are anxious to avoid such a
role given the ill feeling that this produced in the days of the ITBs. Another
reason is that it is still early days in which to make what must essentially
be qualitative judgements about the performance of the NSTOs and such a task
is in any case made more problematic as the standards of training as well as
the needs of industrial sectors varies considerably. Further, such information
could only be properly assessed through studies undertaken in individual firms.
lhat we can say, however, is that iii a comparison of the two NSTOs studied the
CIA certainly seems to have made greater strides in achieving significant
changes in training practice. In particular, there is a far greater emphasis
placed by the CIA on the achievement of national training objectives than
there is within CITO, To a significant extent this Is to be expected, given the
geographical concentration and the structure of the pottery industry which we
have discussed previously. But partly it is suggested, it is also a function of
the different organisational structures involved. The greater relative security
of the chemicals ffSTO means that it needs to devote less time selling itself
to its industry and hence has more time to devote to more strategic issues.
CITO on the other hand, operating within an industry that does not have a
tradition of sound training, has had to concentrate more upon the different
training needs of individual firms and has consequently had less time to
develop an overall strategy for the industry.
As far as resources are concerned, both organisations are operating on 'shoe-
string' budgets when compared to the resources available to the former lTBs.
In a sense, employers are getting their training services on the cheap. There
is, however, a feeling within both organisations that they are highly cost-
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effective and that this is regarded as a plus with many employers. While CIA
Training Department claims the positive support and. commitment of its
menbers, CITO cannot, as yet, make such a bold claim. It does, however, feel
that one positive achievement at least is that they have dispelled the overt
antagonism towards interference in training that existed within firms that had
been generated by the old ITB,
Interestingly members of both CITO and the CIA Training Department meet on a
fairly regular basis through their membership of the Process Industry Group.
One particular criticism of the concept of NSTOs when they were first
established was the likelihood of fragmentation and a lack of any clear focus
for coordination of their activities. In this regard the CBI has played a
significant part in establishing liaison groups through its NSTO Standing
Conference. The standing Conference acts as a consultative forum with the
purpose of sustaining the NSTO structure within the national training system.
Through the Conference the views of the NSTOs are conveyed to the MSC and CBI
staff service the the liason groups. This structure developed out of the CBI's
determination to adopt a 'dryer' and more assertive role ii training matters
in order to prevent the MSC from taking the lead as it was seen to have done
in the past.92} The Process Industry Group is one such liaison group, although
it had its origins in pre-NSTO days. It currently consists of 19 industry
sector representatives which includes man-made fibres, glass and wool textiles
in addition to ceramics and chemicals. The aim of the Group is to provide
mutual support and cross fertilisation of Ideas as well as a channel of
Influence in policy matters. Flow effective It performs this function is,
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however, questionable. It was described to the author as "a talking shop. Of
limited value to the larger NSTOs, but of some comfort to the small."{93)
Both the 1(SC and the DE seem to have been content to let the NSTOs operate
without much attempt to influence their activities, although CITO has
experienced some problems with the XSC over the tightening up of standards in
relation to YTS (see chapter 11). The only Indication of recent interest from
the DE was a letter circulated to all TSTOs in Xarch 1986 under the signature
of D Trippier, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. Essentially the letter
was concerned with "taking stock, to see what arrangements have actually been
made, and to look at what progress has been made In each sector."{94) There
was no Indication that the DE was concerned to do other than obtain some
fairly basic information.
So, having examined the above developments relating to the New Training
Initiative, it remains to complete our analysis by an examination of the main
plank of the TI, the Youth Training	 This.	 shefl d.o in the foU.owiu
chapter.
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In the previous chapter we examined the general approach the Conservative
Governments of Mrs Thatcher brought to industrial training policy embodied in
the New Training Initiative. In particular 1 we identified a new set of policy
standards, with a different weighting of emphasis, than had previously
prevailed. What was notable, if not surprising, was the prominence given to
market orientated solutions to training problems. Given the view of the
Government, however, that the labour market In general and the training market
In particular were subject to distortions the result of such an approach to
training did not necessarily result in an immediate withdrawal of state
intervention. Rather what we have witnessed is more a process of 'intervening
to withdraw' that seeks to enhance the capacity of the market to provide an
adequate supply of skilled labour by removing barriers to Its operation and
trying to change the prevailing attitudes of market participants. This was
clearly a visible feature of the various programmes launched under the New
Training Initiative. Withdrawal has occurred, nonetheless, in respect of the
replacement of i ITBs by a range of NSTOs. The resorting to a far more
voluntarist set of arrangements must in part be attributed to the declining
Importance afforded by the government to training organised along industrial
sectors, rather than to simply just a dogmatic aversion to intervention. So,
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the arrival of the Conservatives has not produced a sustained exercise in
withdrawal from the area of training. Instead, there has been more a
realignment of efforts and change in the pattern and form of intervention.
Significantly higher levels of unemployment have obviously provided much of
the impetus to this change in direction. At the centre of this switch in
training intervention, and reflecting increased unemployment, has been the
inauguration and development of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Ye now turn
to look at the scheme which cannot be seen as merely an attempt to 'mop up'
the young unemployed, but must be seen as a direct and ambitious attempt to
refashion industrial training and vocational preyation in Britain, We begin
with an examination of the policy standards pertaining specifically to the
scheme - in addition to those that relate to the ew Training Initiative (NTI)
in general - before going on to look at the policy that was developed and its
subsequent implementation.
YOUTH TRALING SCHEI(B: POLICY STAJDARDS
Perhaps the first and most obvious standard that can be identified in respect
of youth training relates to the view that high levels of unemployment amongst
young people, compared to other forms of unemployment, is politically,
economically and socially damaging. The relative priority accorded to the young
unemployed, while reflecting a general concern within society about the
particular plight of this group, nonetheless also reflects the Government's
view that the responsibility for this form of unemployment does not rest
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primarily with those affected. As Kr Prior stated at the time ITS was first
mooted, "We have a special duty to ensure that in these difficult times their
(young people's prospects are not permanently damaged" adding that schemes
like YTS are "-to provide help and assistance to those groups that are least
able to help themselves."{l) In the main the Government has 'laid the blame'
for high levels of unemployment on the stucture and operation of the labour
market - on the supply side rather than the demand side - particularly the
prevailing levels of wages. The Prime Minister herself has clearly indicated
that she believes unemployment has been significantly caused by workers
already in the labour market pricing themselves out of a job or destroying the
jobs of others.{2) The position, however, is somewhat different in the case of
the young unemployed who have not previously participated in the labour market
and cannot share in the collective responsibility for present adverse
conditions. Furthermore the state under the guise of previous governments, must
also assume some of the blame for failing to provide - through the education
system - an appropriate vocational preparation to enable school-leavers to
successfully compete in the labour market. (3) Thus as we shall presently see,
YTS has also become an important instrument not oniy in the reform of
vocational training but also in the reform of vocational education, through the
agency of the NBC. Previous governments are also considered to have
contributed to the uncompetitive position of young people in the labour market
by sustaining interventionist machinery such as Wages Councils which "have
done damage to the job opportunities of young people."{4)
Where perhaps some responsibility can be attributed to this group for their
employment problems is the 'unrealistic expectations' about wage levels they
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collectively hold. Thus closely allied to standards concerning the relative
priority of young people has been that to do with wage levels among this
group, as well as others, which are seen as having ben excessive and which
has had a detrimental effect on employment prospects. As Employment
Secretary Tebbit expressed it in 1981: "Pay is far from the sole cause of
inflation, but excessive labour costs feeding through into prices are a major
cause of job losses."{5) An important element in reducing wage costs is seen as
a lowering of expectations about wages, particularly among young people who
may forego employment because of the wage levels offered.{6) Part of the effort
to reduce expectations is evidently seen to lie, like much else in the NTI, in
reforming structures In the labour market like apprenticeships and Wage
Councils which raise prevailing wage norms and hence fuel expectations.
Therefore, whilst the Government has treated youth unemployment as a special
case, this has been most overtly stated in economic rather than political or
social terms, We may deduce that the Government is not unaware of the
political and social damage that may result from this and other forms of
unemployment{7) Indeed as Jim Prior has recently revealed, the riots of the
summer of 1981, together with an unemployment rate fast approaching three
million, was the most worrjing time for the 1979-83 administration.{8) The YTS
scheme, which the Employment Secretary had had to persuade Cabinet to accept,
provided Margaret Thatcher with "something more positive to say about the
Government's efforts on youth unemployment" despite the fact that "[S]he didn't
like the idea of spending more money".{9) By striving to keep the debate in
economic terms, however, the Government are hoping that responsibiltiy for the
causes and effective cures of this form of unemployment - and indeed possibly
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others - will remain outside the political, that is the government's, domain. In
sum, the assumption held is that because the young unemployed are not
significantly responsible for their own condition, then the state has some
responsibility to provide an alternative to unemployment. Given the view that
young people lack adequate vocational preparation the logical alternative to
unemployment is some form of training. This also mirrors the Government's view
that the state cannot create jobs but can provide opportunities. However,
closely aligned with such views is that the assistane is provided on the
grounds that young people cannot expect to be shielded from the 'realities' of
wage levels in the labour market. We can, therefore, identify four standards
relating specifically to the Youth Training Scheme in addition to those which
pertain more generally to the NTI. These are:
1. That relative to other forms of unemployment, unemployment
among young people is unacceptable.
2. Given that young people cannot be held directly responsible for
their own unemployment, the state should take responsibility
for providing an alternative to unemployment.
3. That the alternative should take the form of a coordinated
system of vocational preparation and training.
4. That the expectations of young people in relation to levels of
remuneration should be lowered.
TILE YOIJTE TRAIJIJG SCKEAE: THE POLICY
Having extrapolated the standards from an examination of those assumptions
that pertain to the area of youth employment and training we now move on to
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examine how the policy, as formulated, Is 'bounded' by these standards, as well
as those considered earlier about training policy in general. In doing so it is
Important that we bear In mind the 'developmental' character of the YTS
initiative. This was explicitly acknowledged In the New Training initiative
White Paper which stated: "We therefore set out in this White Paper our
decisions on immediate action and proposals for the longer term."{lO) Similarly
the MSC's simultaneously published document A New Training Initiative: An
Agenda for Action concluded that "[w]e regard the agenda as a stepping stone
along the way - a start."{ll} From the relevant government and KSC documents
it is possible to identify a significant number of closely Interrelated
objectives for YTS that are evidently bounded by the standards previously
discussed. Some of the objectives identified, not surprisingly overlap with, or
contribute to, those wider objectives contained in the TTI documents, For
exniple, the third objective listed can also be regarded as' a contribution to
the reform of the apprenticeship system where YTS training may be broadly
similar to the modular system which it has been suggested should replace an
apprenticeship system based on time-serving. These objectives{12) are set down
as follows:
1) To create circumstances where young people in the under 18 age
group are not subject to unemployment.
2) To provide for those school leavers not entering further or
higher education, or going on to other forms of training, a
programme of training, thereby improving their employment
prospects.
3) To have included in the programme training in general,
transferable skills, moving towards the Introduction of
recognised standards of competence.
4) To change the expectations of school leavers in respect of
their Immediate employment prospects and remuneration levels.
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5) To widen and make more flexible the skills base of the
workforce,
6) . To contribute to halting and reversing the decline in training
-particularly in manufacturing industry - in order to increase
international competitiveness.
7) To contribute to a longer term change in the nature of training
provision by allowing employers to exercise greater control
(and trade unions less control) over the content of training.
provision made available to those undergoing training and, by
so doing, to shift responsibility for training away from state
agencies.
8) To change attitudes on the part of employers towards training
provision whereby they see it as an investment rather than a
cost.
9) To move towards a position where financial responsibility for
training is largely borne by employers.U3)
10) To have the necessary state machinery to exercise certain
functions of control and coordination.
The above objectives, bounded by the standards which emphasise economic
concerns and and the ultimate efficacy of the market, demonstrate that YTS is
not - at least in intent - some straightforward job creation programme for
young people, but rather a major initiative for transforming training in line
with the broader NTI. Not only do the objectives encompass the aim of
eradicating the problem of unemployed young people, they also reflect a
coherent move to increase the provision of training, as well as change the
balance of responsibility for and the nature of training through extending the
role of employers in the training of this major new category of trainees. In
effect the intervention, initiated as a response to the large numbers of
unemployed, will increase the role of the market in the global allocation of
training and allow employers greater scope to determine training provision in
line with their needs, However, as can be noted from objective three above, the
policy expresses the general type of training that should be provided, namely
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that in general or transferable skills. There does appear to be a potential
conflict between the intention to increase the employers' role in determining
training provision and the Government's view that there is a need for
transferable skills training. This issue will be addressed presently.
Before going on to look at the implementation of the scheme it is necessary to
outline the programme elements and related operational objectives of the
policy. Despite the Government's involyJnient in training, it was keen, as
might be expected, that the organisation, delivery and financing of YTS should
be as straightforward as possible involving the minimum amount of bureaucracy.
Thus Exchequer funding basically comprises only two elements: the trainees'
allowance and a contribution towards the cost of training. Until April 1986
YTS was operated under three different modes - 'A', 'B(l)', and 'B(2)'. Mode 'A'
is probably the simplest, and certainly the cheapest, of the three which may
in part account for the fact that it constituted nearly 80% of the places. All
three modes were to provide a broadly based twelve month training programme,
with a minimum 13 weeks off-the-job training, to all 16 and 17 year old
unemployed school leavers, and some employed 16 year olds, Mode 'A' was where
employers acted as the managing agent (see below), while with Mode 'B' the NSC
acted as the managing agent because of the absence locally of enough employer
based places or to provide for the special needs of some trainees, Given that
Mode 'B' was for those not able to take up a Mode 'A' it developed a reputation
of being 'second class'. The schemes have principally been administered and
delivered through the following structures:
a) a national Youth Training Board (YTB) which includes
representatives of the CBI, TUC, Local Authorities and the MSC.
It is an advisory body attached, but without direct
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responsibility, to the Training Services Division of the MSC. Its
functions are to advise on strategy and planning and to oversee
the content of the scheme;
b) ivanaging agents - generally major' private sector employers including
non-statutory training organisations, as well as local authorities
and nationalised industries - contracted to the XSC in particular
localities to design and deliver programmes involving a number of
individual organisations and to exercise supervision over them.
Xanaging agents receive a fee of £100 per place contracted and
manage the sponsor's block grant and the trainees' allowances. Most
agents are also sponsors;
C) sponsors are those organisations offering places under the scheme;
d) Local Area Nanpower Boards (55), composed of representatives of
employers, trade unions, education, local authorities and
voluntary organisations, with an independent chairperson. Local
Boards are responsible for assessing the quality of and monitoring
and evaluating schemes in their areas in the light of local needs
and advising the;{14)
e) 55 NSC Training Division Area Offices which exercise general
oversight and control and have ultimate responsibility for
approving managing agents and sponsors. They also prepare plans of
places and entrants in their areas.
It is important to point out that in addition to being responsible for
establishing the policy's strategic objectives the Government also played a
major role in determining the content of the programme which it set out in the
New Trrurt9 Initiative White Paper. There were, however, a number of issues
of contention concerning the programme, as well as details in need of
finalisation, Reconciling these differences, which had certain implications for
realising the strategic objectives, and finalising the small print fell to the
Youth Task Group, the establishment of which had been recommended by the
MSC.{15} The Task Group was established through the HSC and reported its
findings and recommendations in April 1982. The Task Group Report{16) was
accepted by the Government and became the basis for the operation of the
scheme as set out above. Although it did not signify a major departure from
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the Government's original proposals it did secure certain alterations that the
Government would no doubt have preferred not to have conceded. Certainly, the
important point is that the scheme remained very much a government initiative
and was not, with the exception of some minor modifications, a negotiated
compromise between itself and outside interests.
The Government's assent to the changes proposed by the Task Group were
largely due to the unanimity that reigned within the Commission and the
serious possibility that any attempt by the Government to dilute the
recommendations of the Report would lead to the resignation of the TUC from
the Commission. {17) Despite the Government's desire to reduce the influence of
trade union support in training matters, it was perfectly clear that any
scheme for youth training would almost certainly fail in the face of trade
union opposition. Under pressure therefore from the NSC itself,{18} the scheme
was extended to employed 16 year olds in addition to the unemployed to give
greater substance to YTS as a training rather than a job creation programme.
This was, however, acceptable to the Government as it could be achieved within
the maximum budget laid down of 1 billion. This extension of the scheme by
160,000 places was achieved through the 'additionality principle' whereby an
employer is expected to take on three additional trainees for every two young
people normally recruited. The scheme was, therefore, supposedly financially
attractive to employers, who recieved a contribution towards training and the
trainees wages during the first year.{19) In practice the additionality
principle has not been strongly applied and is being phased out,{20) Other
changes brought about by the Task Group were less palatable and challenged the
Government's view that youth unemployment could be attenuated by reducing wage
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levels. The Report therefore provided for a trainee allowance of £25 - a
similar level to that received under the Youth Opportunities Programme -
rather than the £15 proposed by the Government, on the grounds that it should
reflect trainees learning role.{21) It was also argued in the Task Group Report
that unemployed young people who did. not participate in the scheme should
remain entitled to Supplementary Benefit. Whilst the Government grudgingly
accepted this recommendationC22} it did riot entirely relinquish its position as
it was provided that where young people 'unreasonably' refused the offer of a
YTS place their benefit would be reduced for six weeks. What these changes to
the programme amounted to was not an abrogation of the Government's strategic
objectives, but did place a check on moves to create the conditions where
school leavers' expectations about remuneration would be lowered. Quite simply
employers did not wish to -be saddled with devising programmes for a
disgruntled army of conscripts.
THE YOUTH TRAINING SCffE](E: D(PLEXEJTAT 101
Apart from these changes the policy as laid down for the launch of the
scheme was very much in line with the Government's standards identified above.
But when we turn to examine the implementation of the scheme the standards
begin to look increasingly less secure. As already indicated the evidence is
that the consultations with outside interests, particularly employers and trade
unions, did produce a genuinely agreed package. However, the agreement was in
principle among repreettatives of peak associations and not in practice from
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all those bodies who might be involved in delivering the programme. So, as is
almost unavoidable in training policy, the success of implementation depended
upon 'carrying' the vast number of participants involved in various capacities.
This was not to prove an easy task far the Government and I(SC, and a number
of tensions and obstacles soon began to emerge as the policy 'confronted'
prevailing	 attitudes.	 Apart	 from the technical and organisatal
difficulties{23} associated with the launch of a major new initiative, there
were more fundamental problems facing the operation of the scheme. So ) while
the very rapid establishment of a scheme intended to provide around 460,000
training places was no mean achievement by those involved 1 the longer term
success of YTS has far from proved so readily achievable as it initial
establishment.
ot surprisingly the drive to find the necessary quantity of places was at
some cost to the qualitative objectives that the training should emphasise
general, transferable skills and that labour market considerations should
determine trainee placements. It has, for instance, been claimed that the need
to find places quickly overruled labour market considerations and that this
need even led to schemes being approved in declining industries where there
was spare training capacity.{24} Likewise a study by Chapman and Tooze of YTS
in Scotland (which included a detailed analysis of mode 'A' schemes operated in
Dundee and Renfrew) found that 90% of trainees were concentrated in just four
of the 11 'occupational training families' (OTFs) identified, namely clerical
and administrative; manufacture and assembly; installation, maintenance and
repair; and personal service and sales. They concluded that this reflected the
personal preference of trainees.{25) U'are recent figures of the national
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picture would confirm this concentration, if not to such an extreme degree,
with §9% in these four families.{26)). Likewise, Challis et al have similarly
observed that in some areas the aspirations of. trainees were given priority in
where they were placed..{27) Thus there is evidence that we have trainee-led
rather than employer-led demand for training. That this state of affairs arose
is not completely surprising because the voluntary nature of the YTS means
that young people have to be attracted onto the scheme, which to some extent
mitigates against placements being determined solely by employer demand
Indeed, a more recent follow-up of the Dundee and Renfrew studies discloses a
further shift within the four OFTs, away from manufacture and assembly and
installation, maintenance and. repair, to clerical/administrative and personal
services/sales. The net result being to increase the proportion of trainees In
the latter two groups from 54.4% in 1984 to 70.7% in 1985.{28) There must
exist serious doubts about the capacity of the economy to absorb these types
of skil1. in this volume, particularly as evidence would indicate that any
increased demand for them is more than likely to be offset by increased
productivity. {29)
The difficulties occurring with the allocation and distribution of places have
not been the most serious ones encountered. For one thing, as YTS is concerned
to provide foundation training in general, transferable skills, the actual
source of the training probably cannot be regarded of the first importance
What is central is the quality of the training. Yet it is in this respect that
YTS has come in for some of its most damning criticism. Nor can the problems
encountered here simply be attributed to the priority given firstly of finding
places and then secondly of filling them. Rather, the troubles encountered
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first off are best seen as a foretaste of what appear to be longer term
problems that pose a deeper challenge to the ultimate success of the strategy
being pursued. Before going on to suggest what may happen in the future,
however, we must look at the record to date. From the evidence there is little
doubt that the requirements of quality of training provision have conflicted
with the need to have such a large number of places made available at any one
time. Ryan, for instance maintains that the eight quality criteria originally
laid down by the !'SC was in fact waived with the exception of the one
requiring three month off-the-job training. In doing so, the MSC was explicitly
recognising that it was dependent upon the goodwill of employers and could not
push them too far in terms of demands on training quality. In such a position
of dependency, therefore, when faced with low quality schemes the XSC's only
course of action was to close them down. Such an option was unlikely to prove
a valuable sanction in the light of its more general dependency on employers
to obtain and retain places. In any case, obviously to foster the necessary
goodwill, the NSC had given an assurance to employers that "inspection of
projects would be restricted to low levels."{30)
It is doubtful, nonetheless, whether in the early years of the scheme effective
monitoring was a practical proposition given that the competence of the MSC's
programme assessors assigned to keep a check on managing agents was not of
the first order. As one successful scheme manager said of the assessors "We
would not employ some of the people who come here to check us. They ask us
basic questions about YTS which they don't know. They go through a checklist
of questions, and ask us questions like: 'are there proper toilet facilities?'
nd go away quite content. We are left to our own devices."{Sl) And although
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claimimg to be on reasonbie personal relations with the MSC Assessors, the
Chief Executive of the Ceramics Industry Training Organisation (CITO) was
dismissive of them on grounds of competence - the first visit had, he claimed,
been made by a clerical assistant. Although never explicitly alluded to by the
HSC it is clear that this problem has been increasingly recognised Throughout
1983/84 the KSC's own monitoring system (32) was indicating that around one
third of scheme places were not meeting the minimum requirements laid down
(hence the need to waive the quality criteria). The XSC, therefore took some
steps to rectify this situation by organising courses in quality control
methods for 1 1500 staff.{33) Concern over this has persisted and evidence of
continuing attempts to Improve quality control suggest that difficulties
remain, although some of this effort reflects the increased demands placed on
quality control by the move to the two-year scheme which entails the
comprehensive awarding of qualifications and to which we shall be referring
shortly.
The problems surrounding the quality of training cannot, however, be solely
laid at the door of the 1!SC and its staff who were in any case pursuing
Initiatives to overcome them. Those actually involved in delivering the
training presented more deeply embedded obstacles to successful
implementation. From a pilot study conducted by the MSC "there was found a
marked lack of understanding by managing agents and sponsors of certain
aspects of the standard criteria; and a lack of integration between programme
elements, particularly when off-the-job training was carried out externally."
Further the MSC has noted "that large numbers of managing agents' staff had
little or no background in training" and that they were finding difficulties in
Azialysizig Policy Chwige: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 541
Chapter Eleven	 The Youth Training Sche.1]ze
encouraging agents to remedy this.{34) Therefore, we can see that while the
machinery for implementing YTS was established in rapid time, having the
appropriate personnel to effectively operate the scheme has not proved such a
straightforward matter. That this should be the case cannot be held to be
completely unexpected. The scheme marks a net extension to the scale of
industrial training In a relatively short period of time, but it has been
established within an industrial environment where training is accorded what is
widely recognised as a low priority. Such an enviroment has produced a
situation over many years where training, and equally Importantly trainers,
have endured low levels of provision and status. !oreover, it is claimed In an
independent report for the MSC that this situation has, in fact, worsened in
many sectors following the disbandment of the ITBs,{35) And on top of all this
the	 situation has been exacerbated by the recession during which training
has been viewed as an expendable 'cost' rather than a route to increased
competitiveness and profitability.{3) Thus, industry has not been geared up to
effectively train the increased number of trainees arriving through the scheme.
It is not, therefore, surprising to find, that a significant amount of the
training is being provided not by large companies, but through private
training consortia backed by public money who vary in their competence from
the very good. to the very bad,{37) Nonetheless, there is no getting away from
the fact that YTS, not to mention its recent extension, ultimately depends for
it success upon a significant development in the training 'infrastructure' of
Britih industry, and it is bringing about this development that lies at the
heart of the implementation of the policy. (Interestingly the NSC{38) and.
others {39} see as the path to be followed something akin to the system of
modular vocational education being developed In Scotland. The irony of this
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emulation is that the Scottish initiative has been built upon the existing
state education system.(40))
Whether YTS and the wider 1Iew TraIning Initiative of which it is a part is
able to bring about the development of the training infrastructure must remain
open to doubt while major questions hang over the quality of training provided
under YTS. This doubt is further compounded by suggestions that the scheme
does not represent the net addition to training provision it may at first
sight appear to be. For one thing there is the possibility that YTS may
actually have contributed to the continuing decline in permanent, employed
training places in manufacturing industry because employers are not obliged to
provide contracts of employment to YTS trainees even when recruited as part -
as is possible - of the normal training intake. They can thus replace all
trainees with a fresh intake each year. Some doubts have also been cast upon
how far the scheme has been genuinely creating additional training places, and
the MSC admits that YTS does not fully represent a net addition to global
training. Rather, in the case of Modes 'A' and 'B2' 24% of the places reflected
jobs (ie 'permanent' training places) for 16 and 17 year old.s brought within
the scheme and 7% represented job substitution of trainees for older
workers.{41) The first survey carried out on the destinations of YTS
trainees {42) revealed that 6% of those completing a YTS course went into
full-time employment and it may be deduced that approximately 30% became
unemployed. Figures for 1985/86 were broadly similar.{43) It is difficult to
estimate from the figures available the extent to which YTS trainees are
displacing other workers or would have got jobs anyway,{44) although Chapman
and Tooze put the displacement figures in Dundee and Renfrew at 4,7% in 1985.
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{45) Evidence obtained about the pottery industry suggests that many employers
are only willing to provide YTS places where they can be relatively sure of
offering a full-time job at the end of the training. {4Fj)
While of primary importance the inadequate training Infrastructure is not the
only obstacle to realising the objectives of the policy. The scheme has in
addition suffered from an 'underutilisaticri' by young people of such
infrastructure as currently exists. It is not possible to provide anything
approaching a definite view on how serious a problem this Is - either in terms
of the needs of the economy or the objectives of the policy - but it clearly
represents a significant shortfall between what policy makers wished to see
happen and what has actually occurred in practice. First, take-up has not been
as high as was originally estimated. In 1963/84 of the 560,000 eligible 16 and
17 year olds the Youth Task Group estimated some 460,000 entrants on to YTS
but the actual numbers reached only 370,000. The cost of supporting the
resulting unfilled places amounted to some 55 million in 1983-84, By 1884-85
the MSC had managed to get its estimate of take-up (404,600) more in line with
actual take-up (389,400), with the position being slightly reversed far 1985/86
where take-up (400,000) exceeded estimates (384,000).{47) This does not,
however,	 cover up for the fact that there is a major shortfall - of
approximately 40% - between numbers eligible for the scheme and. those entering
it. Such a shortfall is reflected in that spending in 1984-85 at £773.4 million
was well short of the Task Group's original estimate of £1.1 billion to run the
scheme in that year,{48} and was still well below, at £869.9 million, in
l985/86.49) (.93 millon of that spending came from the European Social Fund.)
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However, this failure to fully generate the intended extension to industrial
training is not the full picture. Having entered the scheme a significant
proportion of entrants have not remained on the scheme the full year. While
there are significant seasonal fluctuations in the number of early leavers
(those who leave before 48 weeks), over 1984-85 of all leavers 55% fell into
the 'early leaver' category,{5O) the average length of stay being 42 weeks.{51)
The current average length of stay on the scheme is put at 39 weeks.{52} Many
of the early leavers do so to take up full-time employment, but this still
raises questions over the extent to which YTS can be supplying an integrated
package of training if so many leave early and places some doubts over the
importance of the one year training, let alone a two year package, to labour
market demands, Flnally,the Government's intention that allownce9 should be at
a low level to reflect the individual benefits conferred by training and to
make expectations about earnings more realistic has itself been dented as a
number of trade unions have, under TIJC recommendations, been able to negotiate
a 'topping up' of allowances because trade union agreement is necessary before
a scheme may be approved by the MSC{53) This may, of course, lead to further
distortion btween the supply and demand of places. (There is in addition some
evidence to suggest that certain managing agents are doing their own form of
'topping up' by seeking additional payments from firms with whom they are
placing trainees.{54} It would be wrong, however, to imply that the trade
unions have had much influence over a scheme that in many respects, by seeking
through the 'back door' to reform the apprenticeship system, poses a direct
challenge to one of their power bases, Clearly, the unions have found it
difficult - though not impossible as evidenced by NUPE's boycott - to oppose a
scheme with social overtones.
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Youth Training Policy: Retrospect and Prospect
Having examined, youth employment policy and its implementation to date it is
possible to summarise some of the key issues and, also to look forward to the
prospects for the two-year scheme launched in April 1'?86, There is little
doubt that there have been problems surrounding the efficacy of the strategy
incorporated in the policy. The intention to open up market forces In the
allocation of training sat uncomfortably beside the expectations of markedly
increased provision by industry of training for 16 and 17 year olds in
general, transferable skills. In particular, there are evidently widespread
doubts within industry as to the value of general, transferable training. Such
training not being company specific poses the greatest question for companies
over returns, even ignoring dangers of 'free riding'. Indeed evidence from the
representative body for one major sector consulted over the New Training'
Initiative, talks of such training being the type that employers are most
likely to avoid and of the need for public funds and back up from the
education service to carry it out. The central plank in attempting to increase
the amount of this type of training, even If Its problematic nature tended to
get played down, is bringing about a notable shift in employer attitudes to
training, and to a lesser extent the attitudes of young people to employment.
This strategy of changing attitudes was in a sense the 'policy within the
policy'.	 Vhat we now need to address is whether those problems we have
identified with the implementation should be regarded as failed implementation,
policy change during implementation or something else.
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What in effect we are addressing here is what responses were evoked by
confronting such problems and to what extent did the responses stay within
the framework laid down by the policy as it was originally conceived. In other
words, are the responses reinforcing the strategy or are they displacing it?
The major problem that the implementation of the scheme has faced has been
the quality of the training provided, itself in large measure the outcome of an
inadequate training infrastructure, The response evoked by this has been
continuing efforts by the HSC to improve the level of training competence in
the private sector througb. various initiatives designed to establish a core
network of approved managing agents several of which will probably be
constituted by private training consortia rather than by large companies.
Therefore, developing the training infrastructure has been, and will remain,
an important part in the implementation of YTS. It is important to emphasise
that while this network of training agents will rec&ve public funds for their
services, they will be to some degree operating in a market environment in that
funds will, it appears, be increasingly tied to the quality of service
provided. {5) That extending and improving the training capacity of industry
should be necessary is hardly surprising given the generally low priority
afforded to training in Britain, but it does also suggest that the policy as
originally formulated and identified above did contain within it 'a policy
within a policy'; that is establishing YTS as originally concieved necessitated
various initiatives inside and outside the scheme to restructure the market.
The complexity of this approach, of course, was that YTS itself constituted an
effort to restructure the market, therby generating potential uncertainty in
distinguishing means from ends, The crucial question is thus whether the
market can readily be restructured in a training orientated direction,
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It might be thought, given that industry has responded well in at least
providing places, that doubts about the future for developing the training
capacity of industry need not be great given time. But such a viewpoint rests
on the assumption that places are supplied by industry for serious training
reasons. Evidence suggests, however, that many firms participate in YTS based
on other considerations. For as the Coopers & Lybrand Report noted: "Many of
our respondents claimed that they had participated in the scheme from a sense
of social responsibility, rather than because they saw it as a valuable
training programme or useful for their business; a few said it was to avoid
adverse public coniment."{6) Much of industry may be happy to participate, but
for reasons other than the policy's objectives; such latent conflict is likely
to become conspicuous as moves are taken to enhance the training element of
schemes and to shift more of the costs on to industry. It has only been by the
MSC 'soft-peddling' that such conflict has not been brought to the surface in
such a manner that would have seriously threatened the implementation of the
policy. Moves to tighten up on the monitoring of schemes and to transfer more
of the costs and responsibilities to employers may well bring matters to/head.
In addition to issues of training quality, the implementation of YTS has also
to some degree been adversely affected by difficulties encountered with the
value young people place on the scheme. To many of them it does not seem to be
the pre-requisite for success in the labour market, In consequence
participation in terms of take-up and length of stay have not been as high as
originally intended by the policy's designers. Instead, the large numbers of
'early leavers' from the scheme must cast a doubt over just how many young
people are gaining an adequate foundation training. Furthermore, to enhance the
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 548
Chapter Eleven	 The Youth Training Scheme
attractiveness of the scheme to young people the allocation of places has not
been employer-led, though whether employers really wish to play a fuller part
is another matter.
Nevertheless, this adds greater weight to the question as to how far YTS is
actually the training scheme envisaged at the outset. Looking into the future
the prospects for the neceesary change are not promising, The problems
emanating from the perceptions and attitudes of young people, like those of
employers, are more than those simply associated with teething problems.
Rather the outlook appears very much to based on the general aura(57)
surrounding YTS and the prevailing conditions in the labour market. For one
thing, there is little doubt that YTS has had difficulty in shaking off the
public image attached to YOP as being for those who failed to get a proper
job.{58) The very fact that YTS was introduced after a dramatic rise in the
proportion of young people who were unemployed adds much credence to such
views. On top of this, if the quality of training is often of a low standard
and employers are not exactly seen to be crying out for this kind, of training,
then it may not be so surprising that the scheme is not seen as the panacea
to problems of getting a job. While the Government may criticise those who do
not take up a place for being unwilling to participate in the labour market{)
and the XSC points an accusing finger at detractors of the scheme, it does
appear that many young people perhaps not unwisely have taken the view that a
permanent job in the hand is presently more valuable than completing a YTS. It
might even be said that young people have a more realistic picture of the
current labour market than either Lord Young or the MSC. It, therefore, can be
argued that the difficulties encountered from the start in ensuring that YTS
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was universally recognised to be an effective and needed addition to industrial
training is likely to continue to hinder its recruitment and holding capacity
arid that this may, in turn, detract from any potential it has to become a fully
effective training scheme - the scheme is in danger of being caught in a
vicious cycle of a continuing credibility gap.
From the foregoing it is clear that there have been a considerable number of
difficulties surrounding the implementation of YTS, It is also, however, equally
clear that the responses, both from the Government and. the !SC, do not suggest
any move away from the standards that have been identified as pertaining in
this area, but on the contrary may be seen to represent a re-affirmation of
them, The direction of change has not been towards a decline of policy in the
area of youth training but towards its development and enhancement.
Development has taken place in the face of difficulties encountered with
implementing the programme. This developmental perspective has been one
adopted by the Government and the MSG themselves in recognition of the point
that YTS represents a lead from Government that employers in the market will
Increasingly be expected to assume responsibility for; it is not .just about
establishing a training scheme but entails a gradual restructuring of the
market. The implementation of YTS represents a clear example of policy
development, and one that has been led from the top.
There remains, however, one outstanding issue concerning the evidence of policy
development: The absence of a precise timescale	 thereby rendering the
implementation process so elastic as to never allow for it to be deemed a
failure, Though readily acknowledging that there have been serious difficulties
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in putting the programme into practice as a means to realising the objectives,
this does not mean that to date YTS can be regarded as an example of
implementation failure. It is unrealistic to assume that an initiative of this
sort can from the outset produce a programme that is so perfectly constructed
as to be aiñe to overcome any and all circumstances mitigating against its
.succesful operation. Revision and time are pre-req.uisites for success in
realising policy objectives. In other words, implementation failure is not some
absolute category. Instead, it is proposed that it is more appropriate to see
implementation failure, at least in the case of YTS, relatively in terms both
of time and development. Thus the longer the programme is being put into
effect and not fully realising the objectives the more appropriate it is to
talk of implementation failure. This would need to be qualified in
circumstances where the shortfall between outcomes and policy objectives was
continuing to diminish. By the same token, it would be more valid to regard
YTS as an example of implementation failure if the number and/or scale of
initiatives to develop the programme declined or stopped altogether, ie the
programme was being left much more to stand - or fall - by Its own devices,
Theref ore, implementation failure can be seen to start to occur once the
prospects for successful development of the programme begin to recede, Of
course, this does not prevent Judgements being made about the likely
effectiveness of any development initiatives - as has been done above but it
is Important to distinguish between predictions of failure and its actual
occurance.
1t only have the responses had to do with developing the policy in order to
overcome implementation difficulties, there has also been an important response
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to enhance the policy in its own right. Such an enhancement of the policy may
be viewed as on the one hand a move to sustain more secur&y those standards
that already hold, and. on the other to realise more rapidly those that remain
to be attained. In other words, the Government has taken strategic decisions to
up-grade the scheme so as to more closely realise the policy's objectives, This
has involved a clarification and a re-ordering of the priority afforded to the
objectives of the policy. Most obviously this is apparent in the decision to
move from a one-year to a two-year YTS despite the difficulties encountered in
implementing the original scheme: "Introducing the programme has not been
without difficulty for some providers and the Government recognises, in
particular, the problems of transition. But success lies within our reach. The
Government remains committed to achieving that success."{60) Indeed, one reason
why the implementation of YTS is not likely to be allowed to simply run into
the sands is the very strong promotional drive by the XSC for increased
training in industry and the much greater prominence given to the issue of
training as a cause and cure for Britain's economic problems.{61)
In his budget statement of 19 March 1985, the Chancellor announced that the
Government was willing to make available an additional £125 million in 1986/67
and £300 million in 1987/66 for the development of YTS so that from April
1986 it would offer a two-year training place to 16 year old school leavers
and a one year place to 17 year old school leavers The proposal was to be
more than a doubling of the length of the scheme, it being intended that "all
trainees should have the opportunity to seek recognised vocational
qualifications." Additionally, it was indicated that the new YTS would become a
permanent feature of vocational education and training provision, but it was
Analysing Policy Change: Industrial Training in Britain 	 Page 552
Chapter Eleven	 The Youth Training Scheme
added that employers would he expected to make a "substantial contribution
towards the costs."(62) For its part the MSC entered into negotiations with
representatives from industry, the trade unions and the education service.
These negotiations were not without difficulties with the CBI indicating that
many of its members in sectors like retailing did not know how to occupy
trainees for the longer period and certainly by the proposed starting date. (63)
Information from the pottery industry confirms that this applies in that
sector, where the majority of employers are of the opinion that the range of
skills required by a trainee cannot be extended to two years. This seems to
have been got around by an 'informal agreement' between firms and the managing
agent whereby young people may be taken into permanent employment at the end
of twelve months - although if there is no job their training cannot be
terminated. In effect it would seem that many employers in the pottery
industry will be continuing to operate a one year scheme. One consequence of
this situation is that there will be no d.oubling of the off-the-job training
component, despite the trade unions and education interests supporting 26
weeks. Instead, in line with what employers were arguing a minimum of only 20
weeks off-the--job training was laid down, although the MSC has stuctured the
grant regime to encourage provision above the minimum.{64)
The new scheme is based on a more precisely defined model encompassing inputs
(induction and	 initial assessment; participative learning; continuous
assessment; and guidance and review) and outcomes (competence in a Job and/or
a range of occupational skills; competence in a range of core skills; ability
to transfer skills and knowledge to situations; and personal effectiveness).
The 1'ISC in the run-up to the launch has been supplying general guidance on the
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requirements of the two-year scheme and providing umodel schemes" covering a
range of occupational areas, especially where experience of such training is
limited. Included in the latter are requirements that trainees should be
provided with the opportunity to pursue relevant vocational qualifications.
Nonetheless, it is recognised that only a few qualifications are entirely
appropr\te to the work-based training provided by YTS. Therefore a standard
YTS certificate is being introduced which amounts to a record of the main
elements of the training programme, the trainees performance against the four
outcomes of the scheme and the trainees achievements in particular 'competence
objectives'. In effect, the 1SC seems to have became a national awarding body.
The certificate will also list any other qualifications achieved,{65) What we
are witnessing with the move towards the two-year scheme is a far grr
involvement by the MSC to lay dawn the framework for the content and
assessment of the scheme, backed by tighter monitoring and quality control.
(66) As MSC chairman, Bryan Nicholson stated: "Two-year YTS gives us the
chance to bring in even higher quality standards and stricter controls and to
make sure they are observed."C67) Although it remains the NSC's responsibility
to oversee and monitor the scheme, the securing of recognition of
qualifications obtained through YTS for progression within and from the
scheineis the responsibility of the YTS Certification Board. The Board was
established following the interim report of the Review Group on Vocational
Qualifications in England and Wales {ôS) and includes representatives from the
City and Guilds of London Institute, the Business and Technician Education
Council, the Royal Society of Arts and the Scottish Vocational Education
Council
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ft would he wrong to imply that there is consequently a high degree of
centralisation as far as training provision is concerned, but such moves to
lay down a national framework are increasingly bringing to the surface
conflict between the Government and MSC's economic/training objectives for the
scheme and the social ethos of many employers providing places. Thus, even
before the well orchestrated fanfare that launched the new scheme in January
1986 had died down, there were rumours that several companies which supply
places, including Unilever, Rank Xerox, IB( and Dixons, were threatening to
boycott the new scheme. There was additionally talk of a number of these
companies establishing their own independent schemes, while the CBI had to
organise workshops to inform MSC staff of the problems companies were facing
in meeting the standards laid down and dealing with the auditing procedures.
(69) With such views among several of the CBI's members it is not surprising
that CI chairman Sir Terence Beckett was engaged in a rallying call that
"[wje must make the Government's new two-year YTS succeed if we are to catch
up with our competitors." (70) There is no doubt that many employers are
committed to YTS, but that such a commitment persists in 	 being for social
reasons. As a GEl source put it: "We have always tended to emphasise the
economic objective and it Is perhaps a little disappointing that more
companies have not realised the potential of the scheme to raise the level of
ki1ls overall,"{71) Such an outlook from companies would obviously generate
serious tensions if the government decides to follow through on its proposal
to shift the full cost of the scheme onto employers. Conflict can also be
expected to arise as the 1(SO moves further to tighten its control. The area
where this seems most probable is in the establishment of Approved Training
Organisations (ATOs). It is intended that:C72)
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"from 1 April 1988 no organisation will be able to continue to
provide training for YTS unless it has secured the status of an
Approved Training Organisation by satisfying a number of conditions,
whose purpose is to ensure high calibre and competent training
throughout	 the	 programme,	 including	 previous	 satisfactory
experience, adequate resources, systematic arrangements for
assessment, the means of keeping its training programme under
review and positive commitments to equal opportunities and health
and safety."
For this reason many of the larger companies, as well as the GEl, established
dialogues early in 1986 with the chairman of the NSC, Bryan Nicholson,to
discuss inter alia the issue of ATOs. Nonetheless old habits, or old
perceptions, die hard, For example, a recent meeting between the Ceramics
Industry Training Organisation and }[SC District Office officials ended in
disagreement because of what was seen by the Chief Executive of CITO to be
unacceptable demands for the provision of information on the operation and
financing of the organisation. This apparently resulted in a 'deadlock' with
the SC threatening to withold ATO status. The number of NSTOs - of which
there are approximately 100 - is relatively insignificant in the overall total
of around 4,000 YTS managing agents. However, although such threats may carry
greater weight with managing agents specifically and solely established to
administer YTS, they may carry less credibility with the larger companies who
also act as managing agents. The actual outcome of such attempts to lay down
standards for training organisations remains to be seen. 1eanwhile, the 193ô
budget brought forth a further development to assist in the achievement of
policy objectives, namely the New Workers Scheme which provides a one year
subsidy of l5 a week to employers who recruit those aged 18 or 19 at wages
below 55 a week (or 20 at 65). "The scheme is designed to boost the
employment prospecfts of those who have just left YTS..."{73) It appears YTS is
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not enough on it own, although one would not guess that from the 1tSC's
television commercials for the new scheme.
ilith the conclusion of our examination of YTS we have brought our study up to
date, In the final chapter we will make an assessment of the process of policy
change in the area of industrial training, trying to identify the key factors
affecting change, before assessing the future prospects for the New Training
Initiative.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CQNCl U& IONS
Having examined the area of industrial training policy in Britain over the
past 25 years or so, it is now necessary to take stock of what the evidence
Implies for the process of policy change in 'this area and what it might
Indicate about policy change more generally. What we need to ascertain Is not
only what patterns emerged, but importantly what factors or forces shaped
them, Further, in the light of what was said in the previous two chapters
about the establishment and early years of the New Training Initiative as
representing something of a departure In the form of policy compared with the
previous two decades we shall also consider the likely development of training
policy over the next few years.
Our analysis of Industrial training policy throughout the period studied has
revealed a mixed pattern in the terms of the process(es) of policy change.
Without doubt changes to policy have occurred after changes of government, but
to see the only factor affecting change as adversarial politics would be a
very partial view, if not actually misleading. For one thing, the major formal
changes to policy have all been Introduced by a Conservative administration;
In 1964 and 1974 incoming Labour governments were generally happy to work
with and administer the framework laid down by their predecessors. This is a
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reflection of the fact that, until recent years, industrial training policy has
been marked by a high level of agreement at the national level - not only
between the political parties but industrial interests also - together with a
low political salience, Even some of the more radical reforms initiated by the
Conservativ.e Governments of 1979 and 1983 cannot be ascribed to adversarial
politics. Nevertheless, certain aspects of these reforms, for example, the
abolition of the majority of industrial training boards and the curtailment of
the influence of trade unions in industrial training decision making, have
breached some of the principles upon which the former consensus was based, We
shall consider below how far this may have introduced an adversarial element
into this policy area.
It is clear that the changes that have occurred in industrial training policy
have not represented clear stopping and starting points. Rather they can be
regarded much more as a process of evolution where past experience has been
an important element in influencing the changes incorporated into policy. In
other words, one aspect that our study has demonstrated is the links between
implementation and policy change, and hence the importance of setting any
analysis of change within this wider context. Our understanding of the changes
that took place in 1973, for instance, would have been incomplete, if not
inaccurate, if we had studied such changes solely from the perspective of, for
example, the power of private actors to influence the decisions of government.
This evolutionary characteristic may be seen in the three main instances when
formal changes to policy have occurred. The provisions of the 1973 Employment
and Training Act were largely a response to the - mainly unanticipated -
consequences of the establishment of the industrial training boards following
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the 1964 Industrial Training Act. The criticisms that caine to be levelled
against boards, in the main as a result of their use of the levy/grant
mechanism - Inefficiency, profligacy, duplication, bureaucracy, and their
differentialy harsh impact on small firms - were more difficult to defend
given the problems inherent in measuring what boards had actually managed to
achieve. Assessments of boards' impact tended to be subjectively based, but
measurement was additionally made more difficult by the fact that little
common criteria existed (subjective or objective) against which achievements
could be set, This reflected the fact that the legislation had provided for the
exercise of a considerable amount of discretion by ITBs in relation to training
decisions within their particular industries, and for very little central
direction or coordination.
Despite such criticisms, however, the utility of intervention was never
seriously questioned and the 1973 Act can be seen an attempt to overcome the
problems encountered during the previous eight years. This was done through
modifying the levy/grant system, it being regarded as having given rise to
most of the criticisms, and adding to the training machinery by the creation
of a new coordinating organisation - the Hanpower Services Commission - at
the national level. The 1(SC would render ITBs more accountable to the centre
arid, thereby, bring about a greater degree of consonance between the activities
of ITBs and the pursuit of national manpower objectives. Whilst the new
levy/grant/exemption system did manage to quell - though not completely -
employers' criticisms of the ITBs, the arrangements introduced under the 1973
Act produced a fresh set of difficulties in the form of tensions between ITBs
and the NSC's Training Services Agency (later Division). Boards' first priority
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as perceived by the boards themselves was towards improving the overall level
of training within their industries, Anxious to attain arid retain the support
of their clients <le firms), the boards resisted attempts from the centre to
pursue national objectives where these were seen to conflict with the pursuit
of sectoral objectives.
At the national level, one of the prime objectives of training policy has been
to overcome the problem of shortages in 'vital' skills. What was becoming
increasingly evident as the 1970s progressed was that the activities of ITBs
were not leading to a resolution of this particular problem. The number of
apprentices employed in manufacturing industry, for example, declined quite
dramatically during this period. Whereas in 1968 there were 236,200
apprentices represen.ting 5.6 per cent of workers in manufacturing industry, by
1974 the number had dropped to an unprecedented low of 139,600, or 4.2 per
cent. Despite considerable increases in the MSC grants available to ITBs to
promote 'key' skill training, the 1980 figures showed only a marginal
improvement: 149,500 apprentices representing 3.6 per cent of manufacturing
worlcers.{1) It took a severe economic recession to dispose of the immediate
problem of skill shortages, which also resulted in companies cutting back on
training and shedding skilled labour.{2) Avoiding future shortages to which
this would give rise when the economy again began to pick up was not seen as
something that ITBs could remedy. Thus the majority of ITEs were becoming
increasingly viewed as inappropriate instruments for securing wider national
objectives. Additionally however, it became clear that in one important respect
the 1 q73 Act had actually made it less, not more, likely that adequate volumes
of training in transferable skills would be forthcoming. The provision in the
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Act for the exemption from levy of firms that were training to meet their own
needs resulted in a reduction of boards' income and thus further diminished
the ability of boards to encourage training in 'vital' skills. It was for this
reason that the ill-fated proposals to change the basis of funding through the
establishment of a collective fund were put forward in Training for Vital
Skills. <3)
Following the inconclusive 1979/80 review of the 1973 Employment and Training
Act, the Government decided to abolish the majority of the ITBs, retaining only
seven in what were regarded as 'key' sectors. The majority of employers, who
had been faced with the prospect of either retaining and paying for the ITBs,
or establishing their own voluntary, and very much cheaper, arrangements, opted
for the latter and supported the Government. Thereafter, the Government set out
its 'New Training Initiative' which is an attempt to structure training
arrangements so as to provide a labour force that is more responsive to the
changing requirements of industry. Because demand for skills in the future is
likely to be increasingly in new areas of growth and away from a skill
structure that is based upon unskilled, semi-skilled and traditional craft-
skilled jobs, the attention of policy makers has focussed upon: developing a
comprehensive and coordinated system of vocational education and training for
young people; and encouraging the modernisatiori of training within industry in
order to provide for the more effective utilisation of existing labour. The
chief means by which these were to be achieved were through the establishment
of the Youth Training Scheme and the MSC's promotion of the other 1TI
objectives in relation to: the reform of the apprenticeship system based upon
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the acquisition of agreed standards and flexibility of age of entry; and
opening up training and retraining opportunities for adults.
Industrial training policy has thus undergone a series of formal changes
during the period under study. What therefore we need to address is bow these
changes are to be represented. It was argued above that our evidence shows
that it would be misleading to represent such changes as the outcome of
adversarial politics. That indeed, until recently the policy, and changes to
policy, have been based upon a broad consensus between the major interests.
That there has existed this high incidence of agreement, not only about the
shape and direction of policy but also about the means by which decisions
should be taken, has meant that formal changes to policy have always been
about securing improvements to existing policy. That Is, there has never been a
'root and branch' (or 'belt and braces') reassessment because it was assumed
that the form and direction of the prevailing policy was the generally
appropriate response. The major interests were, in effect, basically happy with
existing arrangements: radical change was not being looked for. As and when
change was perceived to be necessary, therefore, it was as a result of
difficulties encountered in implementing the policy, not as a result of any
major or fundamental flaw in the policy itself. So, reducing the procedural 'red
tape' surrounding the operation of levy/grant would reduce employers' hostility
and enhance their willingness to comply with ITB recommendations. Excluding
small firms from future levy arrangements was an admission of the view that
the objective of equalising the costs of training between firms was unworkable.
ITEs, it was clearly felt, would be more likely to work towards nationally
perceived objectives if there existed some central machinery to identify and
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clarify national priorities and coordinate and control boards' activities.
Therefore, until the early 1980s at least, changes to policy were about making
adjustments to what was, not about raising fundamental questions to do with
the nature of the problem or the efficacy of intervention.
Furthermore, the representation of the process of policy change provided by
the group process approach which we discussed in chapter one, appears in the
case of industrial training to be at least rather simplistic and at points
inaccurate. It is simplistic because other factors can be seen to have an
influence upon the process of policy change. We have seen that changes to
policy have occurred In this area as a result of firstly, the changing nature
of the training problem. One obvious example of this is the way in which the
rise in unemployment, which began in the mid-1970s and accelerated from the
beginning of the 1980s, has become bound up with the issue of industrial
training. It is highly probable that had there not been the dramatic rise in
the number of unemployed school leavers, the Youth Training Scheme would not
have been established. Second, there is what might be termed changing
technical considerations. Industrial training policy exists to ensure that
economic growth is not constrained by shortages of workers in key skills. What
these skills are - or will be - is not necessarily static. Policy has,
therefore, to take into account the shifts in the type of skills required by
industry if it is not to encourage training for yesterday's, as opposed to
tomorrow's, needs. And third, as we have noted above, change has been a
response to difficulties encountered during the implementation of policy, often
perceived as unforseen consequences of the operation of the policy that have
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led, for example, to policy displacement, rather than being due to the
opposition, or the exercise of a 'veto', by one group or other.
The group process approach is Inaccurate in that we have identified at least
two significant occasions where governments have taken the lead arid initiated
change that has not been the result of pressure from affected interests. One
such was the original decision to i.ntervene in the area of training. As we saw
in chapters two and three, neither side of industry was challenging the basic
premise that the responsibility for training should reside with industry, nor
that the state should do more than provide some retraining facilities for
social, as opposed to economic, reasons. The challenge to this prevailing view
came from within the governrnental machine itself. The second such occasion
relates to the series of decisions taken in respect of the New Training
Initiative. Not only did this involve the Government going ahead with decisions
that were opposed by the .
 unions (and Iii some of the details by employers), but
was the beginning of a process whereby the decision making capacity of the
Department of Employment was enhanced at the expense of that of the Manpower
Services Commission. Thus, in effect, government has reduced the influence of
representative interests	 In particular the trade unions - upon the
formulation of industrial training policy. So w have seen that governments
have been both able and prepared to initiate change in this area. Moreover,
rather than change being secured as a result of agreement and compromise
between government and groups, it has been secured when there has been
disagreement between the main affected interests (as in 1980) or when .no clear
position was held by them (as in the early 1960s). Government was not,
however, prepared to push ahead with changes in 1972/73 when a) there was a
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unified opposition to the proposed changes from industrial interests and b)
the Government was anxious to secure the cooperation of the two sides of
industry in other policy areas which, at the time, were accorded greater
priority than industrial training,
What therefore is evident is that implementation has been important in setting
the agenda for subsequent changes to policy. This provides a further reason
why changes to policy should not be seen simply as the result of a different
government arriving on the scene with a fresh set of policy proposals ready
and waiting to be put into effect. Although formal changes have taker place
after changes of government, what was incorporated in them had, to a
significant extent, already been determined by prevailing views that had
developed during previous periods of implementation. What is also clear,
however, is that there is not much evidence of policy development having taken
place. Indeed we would conclude that there was little opportunity for those
concerned with the implementation of policy to attempt to improve the strategy
being pursued in order to achieve a greater realisatlon of the policy
standards. This was certainly the case with the ITBs and, though perhaps to a
more limited extent, with the MSC. The principal reason for this resides in the
nature of the policy itself. As we have seen, industrial training policy was
primarily about establishing machinery through which changes in attitude and
behaviour, it was hoped, would be induced in those responsible for the
provision of training. Thus the policy set up machinery which did not have the
capacity to follow through where behaviour fell short of what was desired by
policy makers and implementers. This was due to certain contradictions between
the objectives of training policy, the practical realities of the training
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system, and the form of intervention chosen. These contradictions were never
realjy addressed during the (re)formulation of policy and were thus
incorporated into the policy programmes that were to be implemented. Such
contradictions	 were incapable of being resolved, however, at the
implementation level, what, therefore, we are seeing when we talk of the lack
of impact of industrial training policy in, for example, removing skill
shortages or reforming the apprenticeship system, is not so much an
implementation failure as a failure of the policy itself.
These contradictions become evident when we move on to consider the nature of
the responses involved in the changes to industrial training policy, where a
much more consistent pattern emerges. This relates to the persistence of
certain 'key' standards that have bounded not only the policy choices made, but
those that have been considered. The standards that all governments have
accepted and applied in this area have reflected certain prevailing values and
as such have led to the formulation/reformulation of policies that did not
breach particular principles, even where change to policy has been concerned
to overcome problems disclosed during implementation. First and foremost
amongst these has been that to do with the autonomy of private capital.
Document after official document, from the 1962 white paper{4) to the 1986
education and training white paper (5) have stressed that industrial training
should primarily be the responsibility of industry - or more specifically
employers. Although the state has been regarded by all the main interests as
having a legitimate interest in seeking to set out national manpower
objectives, the pursuit of such objectives through policy action has
Analysing Policy CMnge: Industrial Training in Britain	 Page 72
Chapter Twelve	 Conclusions
consistently been bounded by the standard that employers take decisions about
levels of training, just as they take any other investment decision.
Thus the role of the state has been regarded as one which supplements (not
supplants) the market in the allocation of labour. The means through which
this is done is firstly by establishing machinery, the purpose of which is
threefold: to provide a forum whereby the main (in particular industrial)
interests can participate in decision making; to coordinate training activity;
and to provide a system of financial penalties and Incentives to encourage
behaviour in line with policy objectives. Secondly, as the type of training
that the state is primarily concerned to increase is assumed to be that which
Is generally (though not exclusively or necessarily) over and above the
immediate needs of individual employers, then it has been accepted that the
state has some responsibility to finance additional training. And thirdly, that
the state should have a residual role in directly providing retraining
opportunities for unemployed individuals, but only so long as this does not
trespass upon the view that employers are the final arbiters. The
contradictions inherent In this position are clear. On the one hand,
'intervention' in training is necessary because It Is widely acknowled that
employers under-Invest in training which, in turn, results in under-training
and persistent skills shortages. Yet on the other hand It is argued that the
decisions about the type and amount of training required should be left in the
hands of employers. It is asserted that the aggregate decisions of employers
do not add up to national economic requirements, but that somehow these
national requirements can only be met by leaving training decisions in the
hands of individual employers whose Investment In training tends to move up
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and down with the business cycle. Industrial training policy therefore, has
been concerned with encouraging, exhorting and inducing, through the variety of
organisational forms established, producers to change their behaviour. But it
has stopped considerably short of providing any more direct means of
influencing behaviour, It has, almost totally, left crucial training decisions
In the hands of private actors. And even where representatives of producer
groups have participated in policy making at both national and sectoral level,
as we have seen, they lack the capacity to ensure the necessary follow-through
on decisions taken.
Not only has the dominance of the standard concerning the autonomy of private
actors limited the strategy pursued, but prior to that it has also led to a
rather narrow definition of the training problem itself in terms of what is
viewed as the problem(s) requiring governments' attention. Thus, despite a
recognition that skills shortages may be caused by a number of factors, what
has repeatedly appeared as the most consistently stated cause has been that of
'poaching'. That there is in fact very little evidence to support the contention
that poaching leads to skill shortages (indeed one recent survey claimed that
small firms - often assumed to be the 'villains of the piece' as far as
poaching is concerned actual]y spent proportionately more on training than
other firins{6)) tends to suggest that it appears to represent something of an
excuse for not directly tackling other known, but probably more sensitive,
causes, Certainly, what has happened, is that faced with an observable problem,
the actual definition of the causes of the problem has been narrowly cast, and
this seems to owe more to preconceptions about wlat is feasible or acceptable
In terms of intervention, rather than inadequate information about or unsound
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analysis of the problem. Improvements in information gathering and analytical
techniques developed throughout the 1970s have not led to any fundamental re-
casting of the training problem. A prime example of other known causes which
have not provided a basis for action would be the rigidities built Into the
pattern of recruitment and utilisation of skilled labour. This was recognised as
a cause of skill shortages in the late 1950s, detailed in, for example, the
Donovan Commission's report of 1968,C7) and the Central Policy Review Staff's
Report of 1980{8) and often re-iterated in official publications. Broad
agreement exists, however, that such niatters should be resolved through
collective bargaining and as such are outside the scope of state action.
As far as information gathering is concerned, it is clearly important that
relevant and reliable Information is available not only to implementers, but
also to policy makers. Apart from some of the Inherent difficulties which we
have previously discussed in forecasting future manpower requirements, one
other consequence stems from what we earlier termed 'forward loading', or
leaving many of the crucial decisions to private actors. This is that the
information upon which policy choices are made is voluntarily supplied by
employers. Because such Information Is bound up with future investment plans
many employers are reluctant to supply such information which means that what
is available is often of dubious quality. The implications of this for
accurately assessing problems and targetting the policy programmes are
obvious.
So we may conclude that changes to industrial training policy have been set
within a framework of standards that ultimately have proved inconsistent, This
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is because the end-point or policy objectives - eradicating skill shortages -
which have been derived from the standards have been over-ambitious in
relation to the weak means chosen to attain them. Training policy has in
effect been a continuous attempt to 'square' this circle. Our evidence has
shown that the reasons for the the predominance of these standards has been
on the one hand the desire of both sides of Industry to retain control over
training arrangements, and on the other the unwillingness of governments to
challenge the basis of this control. .How far such unwillingness springs from
governments anticipating that to intervene more directly would engender such
hostility from producer groups that any policy would therefore. prove
unworkable and/or might have unpalatable consequences in other policy areas,
or how much from a genuine belief in the 'rightness' of leaving training
decisions to industry is obviously difficult to say. In attempting to separate
issues of what 'should' be done from what 'can' be done we are delving Into
rather murky waters. Nevertheless the evidence presented leads us to conclude
that on balance, whilst issues of political feasibility have not been
unimportant, most governments have felt that it would not be right to take
away industry's responsibility for determining its own training needs. Even
Labour governments which might have been expected to have taken a rather more
interventionist line have argued that "an effective system for correcting skill
imbalances and improving training opportunities for employees....is at present
more likely to be brought about through agreement than by new legislation."{9)
It remains finally to say something about the New Training Initiative in the
context of the above comments and to attempt some assessment about whether
the NTI is any more likely than past policies to 'square' the training circle.
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Such a question is all the more pertinent given that the standards concerning
market allocation and industry's responsibility for training decisions have, if
anything, been given greater weighting than at any time during the past 20
years. Nevertheless, the NTI can in certain respects be seen to mark a break
with previous policies in that, whilst bounded by these same standards, it
represents an attempt to reform the training system and overcome skill
shortages by different means, chief amongst which is the Youth Training
Scheme. It is essentially an attempt to establish a new pattern of training
intervention taking into account that previous programmes have failed "to
produce the number of skilled people required by a modern competitive
econoiuy"ClO) Establishing this new pattern has involved a clear shift away
from the previous standard that the state should provide the machinery through
which to influence private actors and to coordinate training decisions in line
with national objectives, Instead there has been a more determined attempt to
directly influence the key variables that are perceived to affect training
decisions, of which the most important is costs. Whereas previously there was
a lack of follow through on the issue of employers not investing sufficiently
in training, the NTI is concerned to ultimately increase the contribution that
employers make in the training area, What the Government is seeking to achieve
is an increase in the amount invested in industrial training per se without
too great an emphasis being placed upon whether this accords with national
needs or shares the costs on some equitable basis. So, the problem is seen as
under-investment In training and the effort is being directed towards either
some upward shift in the level of investment or some 'virtuous cycle' of
increasing investment that is justified in terms of individual companies'
competitiveness and profitability and not the collective, aggregate needs of
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the economy. In part this may reflect that the Government regards attempts by
the state to lay down training guidelines to private companies (ie an anti-
planning view) as anathema, but It may more importantly reflect the different
training needs that are now perceived to exist. That is because "(n3o one can
predict the precise composition of the skilled labour force which will be
needed over the coming years.. ,such [u)ncertainty puts a premium on flexibility
and mobility within the workforce."{ll) This clearly indicates that in such
circumstances the role for a central directing agency will be exceedingly
problematic in terms of what skills to invest in. Nonetheless the Government
can contribute to this increased flexibility by giving support to a much wider
range of recognised standards of achievement based on pioven ability rather
than an time-serving. Less directly the Government can contribute to increased
flexibility by on the one hand increasing opportunities of access for adults
(eg the Open Tech, the Adult Training Strategy and the Adult Training Scheme)
and on the other removing obstacles to flexibility (especially trade union
influence in collective bargaining).
The central part of the NTI has been the establishment and extension of the
Youth Training Scheme. In the first place 1 through the use of government
finance, it has sought to increase the global level of training. Vhat it has
also sought to develop is training schemes that provide training in
transferable skills with nationally recognised standards of competence and
qualifications.{12) But already identified with the progress of YTS to date is
a fundamental question hanging over the approach of the NTI. This is whether
significant numbers of companies are actually changing their attitudes towards
training and recognising the economic benefits that the government claims will
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accrue to them. Companies in large measure have participated in YTS for social
not economic reasons and, unsurprisingly in present circumstances, are not at
all keen to foot the total bill for the training of young people. This social
ethos has meant in addition that much of the training provided on the schemes
has not been in areas of foremost importance to the competitive position of
British industry. Nany of the schemes have been in either declining industries
or in administrative, clerical and distributive occupations. How far this
situation will persist is somewhat uncertain and the YTS indubitably still has
some distance to go in achieving what is clearly the long term aim of
developing a scheme of similar quality and status to the Dual system that
operates in West Germany, for example. The early need, to get YTS off the
ground quickly, determined the pattern that emerged, which has meant that the
NSC and others are having to 'work overtime' in tightening up on quality - of
both schemes and managing agents - and changing the image of YTS, In the view
of the Deputy Director of Education and Training at the CBI, the main effort
from here "must now be to ensure the development of a scheme that is balanced
in terms of occupations, that remains firmly entrenched in business, that is
increasingly a quality scheme and one that Is attractive to young people. Also
that the scheme is increasingly integrated with other forms of long duration
training." But despite many past and current difficulties it is his view that
"we have a great opportunity now in the UK to develop a form of Youth Training
that is much more flexible than in some competitor countries and better able
to respond to changing economic and social needs,"{13)
It has also been claimed that the YTS is "a scheme which has been evolved in
partnership (most of the time!) between the interests involved"{14) Whether
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this 'partnership' extends to other areas of the training system is, however,
more doubtful. The trade unions and the Labour Party were totally opposed to
the abolition of training boards and the introduction of voluntary
arrangements. It would seem likely therefore that if the next general election
were to witness the return of a Labour Government, that changes in this area
would be forthcoming. But whilst the trade unions might press for a return of
the ITBs in some form, it is doubtful whether a Labour Government would adopt
such a course of action, not least because they are aware of the limitations
inherent in the ITB system. The indications are that the Labour Party would
not be prepared . to resurrect the old machinery, but rather are planning to
introduce some form of training tax on all employers.{15}
We may conclude therefore from the experience of the past twenty or so years
that despite the centrality of industrial training to national economic needs,
no government has been prepared to intervene in the supply of manpower other
than through indirect and weak instuments. The belief that problems of supply
would be overcome by such means has owed as much to pious hopes that
attitudes would change as it has to the actual policies and programmes
themselves, But so long as firms do not perceive it to be in their self
interest to alter their behaviour, then traditional and entrenched attitudes
towards industrial training are likley to persist unless some future
government is prepared to intervene much more directly in the provision of
industrial training.
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List of questions put to individuals who participated in the case study
that fornis the basis of Chapter 8.
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INDUSTRIAL TRAINING STUDY	 QUESTIONNAIRE
N.B.	 Not all questions are applicable to all interviewees: variations
will occur according to rank or position, size and scope of firm.
1. What different types of training activities are undertaken (a) at
divisional level and (b) at central level? What is the average length
of time spent in training for each occupation or skill, for which
training is provided by the firm, toreach the required standard of
competence?
2. What is the proportion of on/off the job training for different categories
of occupation? Have these proportions changed during past 15 years?
3. Which areas have seen the most growth in training activity since 1964
(and conversely have there been any areas which have declined)? To what
reasons do you attribute the growth/decline? How can growth in the
quality of training as opposed to quantity be measured?
4. Are there any occupations/skills which the firm uses but for which no
training provision is made by the firm?
5. Have the firm's/division's training activities/needs changed over time?
If so in what direction? How much is due to the influence of the ITE,
how much to other factors (and can these be identified)?
6. How are training programmes arrived at (i.e. what are the processes
involved): who prepares them, with what objectives in view; what
influences their content (e.g. availability of physical, economic
resources; meeting criteria of ITB, trade union influences, outside
organisations; etc.); how far ahead are they planned; are they reviewed
and if so against what criteria, how and when?
7. How is relevance and effectiveness of training for a particular job measured
8. How did the system of Training Agreements come to be adopted and why?
(Relevant firms only.)
9. Does the system of Training Agreements work well/moderately well/poorly,
from the firm's point of view: could it be improved on and if so how?
(Relevant firms only.)
10. From the firm's point of view how would you rank the following in terms of
providing the most useful basis from which effective training could be
promoted: (as appropriate)
Levy/Grant system
Training Development Review (TDR)
Levy Exemption Regulations (LER)
Training Agreements
Dynamic Approach to Training (DAT)
Please give reasons for your answer.
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11. Does the division and/or firm as a whole suffer from any particular
skill shortages? Are these the same or have they changed (and if
so in what way) since, say, 1960? What do you regard to be the
most significant factors affecting skill shortages (e.g. insufficient
training carried out by industry; lack of mobility; in€ufficient
financial rewards; trade union inflexibility regarding conditions of
apprenticeships; etc.)? Have skill shortages been eased in any way by
the activities of ITBs - or are the causes such that ITBs could have little
impact anyway?
12. What proportion of man hours is specific to training (providers as
opposed to receivers) for the firm as a whole?
13. What do you regard to be the major advantages/disadvantages of the
training board system: can these be measured effectively?
14. From your experience of ITBs what do you consider the objectives and
priorities of ITBs to be (from the ITB point of view)?
15. What do you consider to be (or should be) the primary objectives in
training - from the point of view of the firm? Are these objectives
compatible with question 14 above? What are the major constraints
on achieving these objectives? How can success in achieving the
objectives be measured?
16. What is the frequency of contact (formal/informal) and at what level
between ITB staff and training staff? (At various levels as
appropriate, e.g. divisional, central.)
17. Does the ITB exert different amounts of influence in different areas of
training activity: if so which, how and why?
18. Do you feel that the ITB acts as a constraining influence on any of the
firm's activities? If so how and in what areas? How could this be overcome?
19. In general, do you view the Training Board as flexible and supportive
of (a) the division/firm and/or (b) of the industry as a whole; or
more in an inspectorial, policeman role applying prescriptive rules?
What reasons for either?
20. Are the activities of the Board (a) too broad (b) about right (c) too
narrow? Which of the Board's activities/services do you feel have been
of most benefit to the firm in the past and in what ways can they be of
most value in the future? Are there any activities which you believe
could be reduced or dispensed with and for what reasons?
21. How relevant do you think the Training Board system is today from the
point of view (a) of your firm (b) the chemical/pottery industry in
general (c) nationally? Please give reasons.
22. Are the financial costs of dealing with ITB positive/negative in so
far as this can be ascertained? Are there hidden costs (possibly
unquantifiable) involved and what might these be?
23. How has the Training for Skills programme affected the firm's training
activities? Can the proposals in Training for Skills be considered
radical in any way? Will they have any significant impact on skill shortages
in the (a) Division (b) Firm (c) nation: If so how, why and when?
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24. In your opinion, why was the Training for Vital Skills programme
abandoned? What are your views on the proposal for collective
funding?
25. What amount of trade union involvement takes place within the firm
in the preparation of training plans and what is the structural
procedure for processing this? Is there any difference in the amount
of interest and involvement between craft unions, general workers unions
and white collar unions in training matters?
26. What are your views of the 1964 and 1973 Training Acts? What do you
consider to have been the primary objectives of these Acts and to what
extent do you think they have been achieved? What effects do you think
the Acts have had at the level of (a) the division/firm (b) industry
Cc) the nation?
27. Do you believe that a national manpower/training body such as the Manpower
Services Commission is necessary and for what reasons?
28. What do you believe the objectives of theMSC (or more particularly the
TSD) have been and are likely to be in the future - do you believe they
are the right objectives? How effective do you feel the MSC has been in
achieving its objectives and solving the problems associated with
training? What is your opinion of the competence of the TSD and how
relevant do you consider their activities to be (a) to the nation as a
whole (b) to industry generally (c) to the company/division?
29. In .what ways do the MSC activities impinge at the level of the firm/division
30. What criticisms would you make of the MSC and how would you like to see
it develop in the future?
31. What do you consider to be the primary objective of the present Review
of the 1973 Act being undertaken by the MSC?
32. What do you think will be the most likely outcome of the Review and why?
33. How much influence do you think the Department of Employment has in
directing training policy?
34. How far, and in what senses is training policy a political issue: is
it subject to a considerable/moderate/small amount of political influence,
in which areas and under what circumstances?
35. Would you expect to be consulted about any government or MSC proposals
for introducing new measures: if so by whom and at what stage?
36. What role do representatives (employer, employee, others) perform on the
ITBs? What role should they perform?
37. What are your sources of information on training matters (e.g. books,
periodicals, ITS, training staff in other companies, etc.) and which
are the most important? How many journals/periodicals do you (or the
firm) take and which do you make a point of reading?
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38. Basically, what actual impact do you think governmental training policy
has at company/division level: are there any activities which you would
introduce, modify or not carry out at all if' there was no governmental
interference in training? Do you believe that in training matters the
company's objectives are compatible with national (Department of Employment
and MSC) objectives and which do you view was being the most important?
What are the significant areas of' incompatibility and would you consider
them to be typical of' industry as a whole?
39. In general, how would you sum up the changes that have taken place in
the world of' training since 1964. Do you see them as changes for the
better or worse?
40. Future training policy. Do you think the training 'system' is performing
satisfactorily at present or do you consider that changes are required?
If the latter state the changes you would like to see and the reasons.
